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Violence and victimisation in Iraq is a long story and, in recent times, specifically in the 
aftermath of the 2003 controversial occupation of the country by the United States and its 
allies, and the atrocities committed by so-called ISIS, the situation has escalated to a 
horrific extent. Ethno-sectarian violence, bombings, armed conflict and enforced 
disappearances have demonstrated the complete absence of any effective reaction by the 
state, and this has undermined efforts at consolidation by the Iraqi state and its legal 
system following the downfall of the previous oppressive regime in 2003. Hundreds of 
thousands of Iraqi citizens have become victims of violence by non-state actors, largely 
due to the failure of the 2003-transition process and the flawed constitution and divisive 
ethno-sectarian system. This fuelled political conflict, widespread corruption, insurgency, 
terrorism, and extremism, paralysing the Iraqi state and its criminal justice system. This 
thesis claims that the Iraqi state has failed to provide redress for non-state violence. It 
further argues, based on international human rights’ instruments, that the state owes 
positive duties to citizens to protect them from such violence.  
The thesis will be argue that one method – but not in isolation - of gradually addressing 
the failings of the Iraqi state would be for Iraqi citizens themselves to take ‘substantive 
steps’ to ‘establish a healthy civil society reflecting social contract principles.’ Such steps 
can and should be taken with the support of governmental bodies and other authorities, 
as part of a genuine and inclusive transitional justice programme in which accountability, 
truth recovery, reparations, legislative and institutional reform, and reconciliation will be 
vital, if any future stability and peaceful coexistence is to be established, especially after 
the ISIS conflict. Despite being a very lengthy task, at present the security situation is 
gradually improving following the defeat of ISIS. The foregoing steps are arguably also 




respect for and protection of the human rights of citizens is the primary objective. This 
will be imperative in restoring citizens’ trust, confidence, and hope that the Iraqi state and 
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
1.1 The Context of the Thesis 
Insecurity and physical violence have long been endemic in Iraq. However, it is becoming 
increasingly difficult to ignore the extent of physical violence by non-state actors, 
especially in the aftermath of the controversial occupation of the country in 2003 by the 
United States and its allies.1 As well as contributing to the death or injury of hundreds of 
thousands of Iraqis, 2  the situation has also threatened the very existence of Iraq, 
particularly when part of it was controlled by the so-called Islamic State of Iraq and Al-
sham (ISIS).3  
Iraq lays claim to one of the oldest known codes of law, Hammurabi’s Code, dating back 
to at least 1,700 B.C. The Code embodies important principles for the protection of the 
lower classes, for the state’s authority to enforce the law, and for providing punishment 
which fits a crime. 4  By contrast, neither the oppressive pre-2003 regime nor the 
subsequent regime has had a legal system capable of instilling a sense of security and 
justice. A partial explanation of this leads back to 1920, when Iraq became a state after 
the British unified the three provinces of Basra, Baghdad and Mosul.5 In accordance with 
the mandate of the League of Nations, Britain sought to build a single, modern, self-
determining and democratic state.6 However, there is a disturbing parallel between the 
                                                
1 It is clear that the invasion of Iraq in 2003 by the US and UK was illegal according to international law, including the United Nations 
Charter, regarding the use of force. See Karima Bennoune, ‘Toward a Human Rights Approach to Armed Conflict: Iraq 2003’ (2004) 
11 University of California, Davis 171, 172; Dominisca Svarc, ‘Using Force In International Affairs: The Role of International Law 
in Contemporary International Politics’ in Mathew Happold, International Law in Multipolar World (Routledge 2012) 82; also, it has 
been suggested that this invasion was morally wrong and that those responsible for this atrocity deserve to be brought to justice and 
should make substantial reparations for the damages done to Iraq and its people. See J. Angelo Corlett, ‘US Responsibility for War 
Crimes in Iraq’ (2010) 16 Res Publica 227, 227-244; a clear, strong criticism of the UK’s part in the toppling of the Saddam regime 
and subsequent occupation of Iraq has recently been made in the conclusions of the Chilcot Inquiry (The Iraq Inquiry). See ‘Sir John 
Chilcot Public Statement’ (The Iraq Inquiry, 6 July 2016) <http://www.iraqinquiry.org.uk/the-inquiry/sir-john-chilcots-public-
statement/ > accessed 12 September 2016. For further details, see ‘The Report of the Iraq Inquiry Executive Summary: Report of a 
Committee of Privy Counsellors’ (2016).  
2 According to the Iraq Body Count (IBC), there have been approximately 158,347 to 176,949 civilian deaths from violence between 
20 March 2003 and June 2016, Iraq Body Count (IBC) ‘Documented Civilian Deaths from Violence’ 
<https://www.iraqbodycount.org/database/> accessed 23 May 2016; it has been assumed that the invasion of Iraq worsened public 
security during the period of invasion, contrary to the requirements of international law that the occupying power has the responsibility 
to maintain political order and ensure public security. See John C. Williamson, ‘Establishing Rule of Law in Post-War Iraq: Rebuilding 
the Justice System’ (2004) 23 Georgia Journal of International and Comparative Law 229, 230.  
3 Some of the largest cities in Iraq, including Mosul and Anbar, fell under the control of ISIS in 2014 and 2015. See the discussion in 
Chapter 5, pages 179-181. 
4 Luther D. “Dan” Thomas, ‘Establishing Justice in Iraq: A Journey into the Cradle of Civilization’ (2008) International Journal for 
Court Administration 1, 1.  
5  For further details, see Zaid Al-ali, The Struggle for Iraq’s Future: How Corruption, Incompetence and Sectarianism have 
Undermined Democracy (Yale University press 2014) 18-22.        
6 See Toby Dodge, ‘Iraq: the Contradictions of Exogenous State-Building in Historical Perspective’ (2006) 27 Third World Quarterly 
187, 188. Iraq was administered by Britain on a mandate of the League of Nations from 1922 to 1932. After the latter date, Iraq 
became an independent state and was admitted to the League of Nations. M. Cherif Bassiouni, ‘Post-Conflict Justice in Iraq: An 




involvement of Britain in the formation of the state of Iraq and the role of the United 
States following the 2003 invasion.7  
The external occupying powers (in the 1920s and 2003) intended, ‘in coalition with a 
section of the indigenous population it has selected as its ally’, to build a viable Iraqi 
state.8 However, in itself ‘external state-building is bound to be “top down,” driven by 
dynamics, personnel and ideologies… outside the society they are operating in’.9 In an 
ideal state-building project, the capacity of the new state’s institutions to monopolise the 
use of legitimate violence to enforce decisions throughout its territory is the state’s first 
fundamental test, especially in the aftermath of previous oppression by military force.10 
It has been suggested that when state institutions demonstrate their positive relevance to 
citizens, they are thus accepted and this contributes to the growth of state legitimacy and 
even hegemony.11 In other words, the survival of the state rests not on its creation by 
indigenous or extraneous forces, but on its ability to follow the afore-mentioned steps.12  
Many commentators have claimed that the project of state building in Iraq by both the 
British in 1920 and the US military in 2003 has failed because expensive necessary 
resources13 led to the occupying powers imposing quick fixes to meet their short-term 
interests rather than those of Iraq as a whole in the longer term.14 Meeting these short-
terms interests may have weakened the early formation of Iraq, resulting in prolonged 
instability. Accordingly, Iraq is a fragile state which, through frequent changes of regime 
and policy, has undergone continual unrest and violence.15 It has been asserted by Markus 
E. Bouillon that: 
If state fragility is the problem, […] then the answer must be state-building […] in terms of 
erecting a sustainable Iraqi state from the bottom up… [as] a long-term undertaking […] by Iraqis 
themselves. In consequence, outside actors can only support this endeavour, encouraging and 
enabling the negotiation of a domestic social contract in an Iraqi-led and Iraqi-owned process.16 
                                                
7 Rodney Wilson, ‘Review Article: Determinants and Consequences of Iraq’s Troubled History: A Review of Eight Contemporary 
Books on Iraq’ (2005) 32 British Journal of Middle Eastern Studies 241, 242. 
8 Ivo H. Daalder, Nicole Gnesotto and Philip H. Gordon, Crescent of Crisis: U.S.-European Strategy for the Greater Middle East 
(Brookings Institution Press, 2006) 127. 
9 Ibid; Jeremy Sarkin and Heather Sensibaugh, ‘How Historical Events and Relationships Shape Current Attempts at Reconciliation 
in Iraq’ (2009) 26 Wisconsin International Law Journal 1033, 1038. 
10 For further details, see Daalder, Gnesotto and Gordon (n 8) 128. 
11 Dodge (n 6) 189, 191. 
12 Toby Dodge, ‘Can Iraq be Saved’ (2014) 56 The International Institute for Strategic Studies 7, 10.  
13 Sarkin and Sensibaugh (n 9) 1039; see Stephen Blackwell, ‘Between Tradition and Transition: State Building, Society and Security 
in the Old and New Iraq’ (2005) 41 Middle Eastern Studies 445, 446.  
14  Markus E. Bouillon, ‘Iraq’s State-Building Enterprise: State Fragility, State Failure and a New Social Contract’ (2012) 6 
International Journal of Contemporary Iraqi Studies 281, 282. 
15 Ibid. 




On this basis of social contract principles, it is essential that the presumed fragility of Iraq 
is seriously addressed for successful rebuilding to occur. Such a process indicates, in part, 
that the responsibility for state-rebuilding or consolidation lies mainly with Iraqi 
authorities and citizens, and also that any reasonable outcome of external intervention in 
Iraqi affairs re state building is likely to be limited. However, this suggested process is in 
complete contrast to what the occupying powers did in 2003. In spite of justifying their 
intervention in the name of state-building in Iraq, they have, by making serious mistakes, 
failed to ‘deliver on the promise of creating stable, sustainable and democratic governing 
institutions’.17 The Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) which temporarily governed 
Iraq post-2003 dissolved the Iraqi military and security forces, and banned the ideological 
Baath Party, which had brutally ruled Iraq, committed atrocities against the human rights 
(HR) of Iraqi citizens, in particular the right to life, and made the state a ‘republic of fear’ 
for approximately 35 years.18  Thus, the state system of those years was apparently 
eliminated and the external powers assumed administration of the country. This resulted 
in a vacuum due to the fall of the previous oppressive state and, consequently, it was 
unsurprising that violence and instability ensued, because:  
The weakness of seemingly strong yet inherently fragile states [such as Iraq] is compounded by 
the fact that since they are held together entirely by repression and not by performance, an end to 
or an easing of repression could create destabilizing battles for succession resulting anarchy, and 
the rapid rise of non-state actors. In nation-states made secure by punishment and secret 
intelligence networks, legitimacy is likely to vanish whenever the curtain of control lifts.19   
As the ‘curtain of control’ was lifted in Iraq, various sub-national identities have asserted 
themselves and moved in to fill this vacuum; thereby, they have attempted to occupy the 
political space in ‘anticipation of the re-creation of a state that could be shaped according 
to their preferences’.20 In this atmosphere, indiscriminate violence, in particular sectarian 
violence,21 broke out ‘on one level exploiting the vacuum [… and] on the other seeking 
to capture and shape the new entity that would fill this space’.22 It is therefore better to 
understand the dominance of indiscriminate violence against Iraqi citizens (whether by 
the state or non-state actors, in particular sectarian and inter-militia violence since 2003), 
                                                
17 Dodge (n 6) 187; Al-ali (n 5) 62.  
18 For further details, see Ali A. Allawi, The Occupation of Iraq: Winning the War, Losing the Peace (Yale University Press, 2008) 
133-150; Bassiouni (n 6) 330-331. 
19 Bouillon (n 14) 286-287. 
20 Ibid. 287. 
21 It has been suggested that the violence between the Sunni and Shi’ite groups in Iraq ‘has a history: a history not based on religion 
but on access to resources, power, and the social contract’. For further details about the historical background of sectarianism in Iraq, 
see Sarkin and Sensibaugh (n 9) 1036-1038; according to the Chilcot Inquiry, ‘deep sectarian divisions threatened both stability and 
unity. Those divisions were not created by the coalition, but they were exacerbated by its decisions on de-Ba’athifcation and on 
demobilisation of the Iraqi Army and were not addressed by an effective programme of reconciliation’. See ‘The Report of the Iraq 
Inquiry Executive Summary: Report of a Committee of Privy Counsellors’ (n 1), para. 792. 




and the increasing prominence of sectarian politics, as both ‘a replay’ of its post-
independence period and ‘the direct result of the collapse of an already fragile state’.23  In 
other words, the violence and sectarian politics are the result of state collapse, rather than 
the agents of this collapse.   
However, such sectarian politics may have been deliberately used to undermine any 
possibility for Iraqi citizens to learn from past violence and, thus, to consolidate their state 
and provide effective security and justice, which in turn would curb the illegitimate 
ambitions of different social groups to shape the state for their own sub-identities and 
interests. Instead of helping and enabling the Iraqi population to do this, the occupying 
powers deliberately or negligently undermined any real prospect of doing this. Indeed, 
the CPA has been criticised because it mainly focused on lustration and prosecutions 
rather than drawing upon the pantheon of transitional justice mechanisms available, such 
as truth commissions and reparations.24  
The above mentioned circumstances will be further explored in Chapter 5,25 but it can be 
concluded here that the intervention of the occupying powers, as suggested by Cordesman 
and Khazai, ended in the ‘failure to create a viable political system and effective 
governance’ following the invasion of Iraq.26 This failure facilitated violence by criminal 
groups, including terrorists and insurgents, leading to fear and uncertainty about the future 
of the state, and the failure of Iraqi leadership in its governance.27 As a result, the fabric 
of Iraqi society, with its diverse ethnic, religious and sectarian background, is likely to be 
torn apart.28 In addition, the rule of law, if it can ever be said to have existed at all, will 
be weakened and even more violations of the right to life are likely to occur. Therefore, 
the obligations of the Iraqi authorities to promote social cohesion, the rule of law, the 
tackling of such violent activities, the provision of protection to their citizens, and justice 
and reparation for victims may be said to be seriously lacking.  
This thesis will argue that the Iraqi state has failed to provide redress to the victims of 
violence by non-state actors. It will further argue, based on international HR instruments, 
that the state owes positive duties to citizens to protect them from such violence. In 
                                                
23 Ibid. 
24 Sarkin and Sensibaugh (n 9) 1073-1074.  
25 See pages 134-142. 
26 Anthony H. Cordesman and Sam Khazai, ‘Iraq in Crisis’ (2014) Centre for Strategic& International Studies iii; See also ‘Sir John 
Chilcot Public Statement’ (n 1).  
27 See Sam Khazai and Anthony H. Cordesman, ‘Iraq and the Challenge of Continuing Violence’ (2012) Centre for Strategic & 
International Studies 7. 




addition, this thesis will claim, in the context of a very difficult and volatile security 
situation, that the Iraqi government has not fully investigated criminal activity, and shown 
some incompetence in investigating crimes, in terms of the mechanisms and processes 
that are in place to protect citizens from non-state actor violence. This is explored 
particularly in Chapter 5 in Section 5.3. It will be argued that the ethno-sectarian system 
of government tends to undermine the efficacy of the governing mechanism and taints 
the interaction between the architecture of the Iraqi governance order and its legitimacy, 
partly due to religious and sectarian divisions. Clearly, given that these factors are 
undermining public faith in the Iraqi legal order, it is possible that the application of 
positive obligations will merely introduce another raft of unfulfilled norms into the legal 
order. This thesis acknowledges that such a possibility cannot be excluded. However, 
Chapter 6 will develop the notions that the Iraqi government may gradually accept the 
positive obligations in question, at least to an extent, while awareness of them may 
gradually have an impact on citizens’ expectations of government. Thus, a degree of 
implementation of such obligations may gradually have an impact on trust building and 
improved relations between citizens and government. 
1.2 The Parameters of the Thesis 
The thesis will mainly focus on the physical violence committed by non-state actors 
against human rights, especially the right to life. In the specific case of Iraq, it will neither 
address violent crimes committed by the occupying powers or private foreign security 
agencies, nor their arguable failure to provide adequate security and fulfil their positive 
obligation to protect the right to life of Iraqi citizens in accordance with international law 
and, specifically international and regional human rights law, during or following the 
2003 occupation. 
1.3 The Objectives of the Thesis  
This study examines the status of the rights of Iraqi victims in the climate of widespread 
indiscriminate acts of violence against the right to life by non-state actors since 2003, and 
the lack of redress and protection. To do this, further important issues need to be 
examined, such as: how the duties of the state to protect the right to life and provide 
justice and reparation have been addressed, in accordance with philosophical/ethical 




legal obligations concerning the rights of citizens to security; the investigation, 
prosecution and punishment of violent crime, and reparation for victims, especially under 
the doctrine of ‘positive obligation’ established by the jurisprudence of international and 
regional human rights law. It will also consider whether the Iraqi legal system 
acknowledges that Iraq is bound by these obligations and, if so, whether it has failed to 
observe them. Should it have failed, the factors affecting the ability of the Iraqi state to 
comply, and how the political, legal and judicial systems of Iraq may be reformed to 
ensure a better level of compliance will be addressed.  
1.4 An Original and Significant Contribution to Knowledge 
Indiscriminate violence by non-state actors has been widespread in Iraq, especially post-
2003. While the general principles as to the failure of the Iraqi state to control non-state 
violence have been covered in some detail in the literature, the key claim and argument 
developed in this thesis is that the Iraqi state has failed to provide redress to victims of 
non-state actor violence. It further argues, based on international HR instruments, that the 
state owes positive duties to citizens to protect them from such violence. Therefore, the 
application of these principles to Iraq is the real gap in the literature that the thesis will 
purport to address. The thesis will then explore possible future reforms in the post-ISIS 
conflict period of serious HR violations, to honour these principles gradually and restore 
trust in the Iraqi state and its criminal justice system. Such reforms, it will be argued, 
should include genuine coordinated efforts by both the government and all sections of 
society to produce their own new transitional justice system and measures of 
reconciliation. In so doing, people of various religions, and ethnic and sectarian identities 
may be able to live peacefully in a viable state based on legitimate social contract 
principles, and one where the redress of harms done to victims by non-state violence and 
the state’s positive duties to protect citizens against such violence are taken seriously. 
1.5 Structure of the Thesis  
This first chapter provides the background to the main problems responsible for the 
instability of the Iraqi state and the reasons which may be adduced for the violence to 
citizens committed by non-state actors. The objectives of the research, the contribution to 




Chapter 2 explores the nature of the obligation of the state to protect the right to life in 
accordance with philosophical/ethical principles, particularly social contract theory. 
Criticisms of social contract theory are also discussed in this chapter, before examining 
the protection of this right as required by international and regional HR law. In addition, 
various examples of the case law established by HR courts concerning this right to 
protection will be analysed, including the recent generation of cases regarding positive 
obligations, especially in the domestic violence context under the ECtHR. States’ positive 
obligations under HR law are also extended in this chapter to cover a wide range of 
violence and sexual offences against a person and are not confined to threats to life.  
Chapter 3 deals with the procedural obligations of the state to investigate the violation 
of their right to life by non-state actor violence, and to prosecute and punish violators, as 
demanded by the philosophical/ethical, international, and regional standards of law. It 
will also investigate the extent to which victims deprived of their right to life have a right 
to be provided by the state with justice, and the procedural obligations involved, in 
accordance with the jurisprudence of various HR courts. The HR cases relevant to 
investigatory duties which cover many of the major developments in the last five years 
are analysed. In addition, it will discuses the relationship between the theories of social 
contract and transitional justice and its impact on the gradual implementation of the 
state’s positive obligations toward victims. The theory of the transitional justice is also 
introduced in this chapter as a counterpoint to the international standards for criminal 
investigations through exploring the potential of Amnesties/ Truth and Reconciliation 
Commissions (TRC) processes to offset these standards in a post-conflict or transitional 
scenario, in order to clarify which investigations Iraq should follow in the transition 
period.  
Chapter 4 explores the right to reparation and the obligation of the state to make 
reparation to victims of violent crime by non-state actors. To understand the nature of this 
obligation, it discusses: the notion of state responsibility for reparation for the violation 
of the right to life; the philosophical/ethical justification for imposing this obligation; the 
nature of adequate reparation for the violation of the right to life; and, the extent of the 
state’s obligation to provide this reparation, as required by international and regional HR 
law. In addition, the chapter also highlights the anchoring of reparations programmes 
within a holistic transitional justice framework to enable victims and society to reconcile 




Chapter 5 considers how far these obligations are acknowledged by the Iraqi state and 
provided for in its legal system, both in theory and practice. The background to the 
deficiencies of the transitional justice process post-2003 and their adverse effect on the 
ability of the Iraqi state and its criminal justice system to honour these obligations is 
presented. The first section examines the positive obligation of the Iraqi state to provide 
security and protection of the right to life of its citizens, particularly against non-state 
actor violence. It provides a wide portion of examples, literature, and analysis to support 
the arguments that the Iraqi state owes positive duties to citizens to protect them from 
such violence. The second section considers existing Iraqi criminal law with regard to its 
procedural obligations and explores the claim that, in the context of a very difficult and 
volatile security situation, the Iraqi government has not fully investigated criminal 
activity. It also discusses the potential of the 2016 Amnesty Law to become part of the 
transitional justice and reconciliation process post-ISIS. The third section examines 
whether a victim’s right to adequate redress is fully provided for in Iraqi law. It explores 
the adequacy of the tort liability system under Iraqi Civil Law and Law No. 20 of 2009, 
and its practice to provide redress for non-state violence. This chapter, alongside Chapter 
6, provides a more nuanced approach to the transitional justice issues facing Iraq post-
ISIS conflict.  
Chapter 6 synthesises the preceding chapters by relying on the findings, identifying what 
has gone amiss in Iraq, and who should be blamed for the failure of the Iraqi state and its 
legislative, executive, and judicial authorities to provide redress for non-state violence 
and fulfil the positive duty to protect. It examines future prospects and the difficulties in 
establishing an inclusive transitional justice process. Reconciliation initiatives and the 
role of TRC/Amnesties supported by government and all affected communities have also 
been considered in this chapter as potential ways of addressing past violence and allowing 
a healthy civil society to emerge post-ISIS. This chapter provides some indications, in the 
light of recent positive developments following the defeat of ISIS and the good leadership 
of the current Prime Minister, that the Iraqi government may gradually accept these 
positive obligations, at least to some extent, and that awareness of this may gradually 




Chapter 2: The Right to Security:  An International Overview 
2.1 Introduction 
The concept of security plays a significant role in modern discussions about the role of 
HR in contemporary societies. The prevalence of indiscriminate violence indicates that 
we are living in a risk society, where fear about public security and social well-being may 
be well-founded.1 According to Beck, a risk society requires ‘a systematic way of dealing 
with hazards and insecurities induced and introduced by modernization itself’.2 In this 
sense, modernisation has resulted in the lives of individuals being surrounded by 
uncontrollable risks, including the risk of violence from third parties.    
The general public has the expectation that the state must ensure security and take 
preventive measures to protect people from crime,3 including violence by non-state actors. 
For its part, the state is required to protect its citizens and is responsible for preventing 
criminal acts and punishing the perpetrators of crime. Doak states that this expectation is 
an essential element of a modern democratic society and it is also strongly linked to the 
rise of a HR culture and the requirement of fair treatment for citizens.4 
The concept of the right to protection or security may be said to exist in two different 
contexts: the collective and the personal. In the former sense, society has a right to be 
protected by the state (for example, in times of civil unrest);5 in the latter, it should 
guarantee the protection of the individual’s right to liberty and security.6 This right 
appears in major HR instruments alongside the right to liberty and used to emphasise 
simply the negative duty which obligates the state to refrain from infringing it without 
justification.7 In addition to these HR instruments, the concept of a right to security can 
                                                
1 Ulrich Beck, ‘The Terrorist Threat World Risk Society Revisited’ (2002) 19 (4) SAGE Theory, Culture and Society 39, 45-46.  
2 Ulrich Beck, Risk Society: Towards a New Modernity (SAGE Publication Ltd 1992) 21.   
3 Jonathan Doak, Victim’s Rights, Human rights and Criminal Justice: Preconceiving the Role of Third Parties (Hart Publishing 2008) 
37.   
4 Ibid.  
5 Van Kempen notes four different concepts of security: ‘international security; negative individual security against the state; security 
as justification to limit human rights; and positive state obligation to offer security to individuals against other individuals’, Piet Hein 
Van Kempen, ‘Four concepts of security – a human rights perspective’ (2013) 13 Human Rights Review 1.  
6 Doak (n 3) 38; Van Kempen defines security as ‘freedom from such phenomena as threat, danger, vulnerability, menace and attack’. 
Van Kempen (n 5) 2.  
7 See Sandra Fredman, ‘The Positive Right to Security’ in BJ Goold and Liora Lazarus, Security and Human Rights (Hart Publishing, 
2007) 314; Liora Lazarus, ‘Mapping the Right to Security’ in BJ Goold and Liora Lazarus, Security and Human Rights (Hart 




be traced back to the theory of the social contract proposed by Hobbes, Locke and 
Rousseau, inter alia.8  
This chapter examines the positive obligation of the state to provide security and 
protection of the HR to life of its citizens, particularly against non-state actors of violence 
as dictated by moral philosophy (particularly social contract principles) and by 
international and regional HR law. It will argue that the state has no moral or legal basis 
on which to reject this responsibility. In particular, based on international HR instruments, 
it argues that the state owes positive duties to protect its citizens from non-state violence. 
While this obligation may involve some challenges in its implementation, it will be 
emphasised that the rules of international and regional HR law and domestic criminal 
justice law should be used concomitantly to strengthen state law concerning the HR to 
life.  
2.2 The State’s Positive Obligation to Protect the Right to Life 
The concept of duty to protect the human right to life is well established in international 
HR law. The duty places a state under a positive obligation, in certain circumstances, to 
prevent private individuals from breaching the rights of other individuals.9 This right 
applies equally to all individuals and any attack on it, it will be argued, whatever the 
degree of damage done, could amount to a violation of the human right to life and many 
well-established international norms.10 
Before exploring the nature and extent of the state’s legal obligations in this matter, it is 
worth pausing to consider the moral and ethical backdrop which underpins the 
international HR framework.  
2.2.1 The Moral/ Ethical Philosophical Justifications for Imposing Such an 
Obligation on the State 
The concept of a right to protection appears to have evolved with Hobbes, Locke, 
Rousseau and Blackstone. The ideas of these philosophers were highly influential in 
promoting recognition of the right of individuals to security and protection from harm. 
                                                
8 Jennifer Fahnestock, ‘Renegotiating the Social Contract: Healthcare as a Natural Right’ (2011) 72 University of Pittsburgh Law 
Review 549, 562-564.   
9 Sheri P. Rosenberg, ‘Responsibility to Protect: A Framework for Prevention’ (2009) 1 Global Responsibility to protect 442, 448.  
10 Ibrahim Mohammed Sheriff, ‘Physical Damage and Compensation in Tort, A Comparative Study’ (PhD thesis, University of 




Their ideas and how they have affected contemporary ideas about the right to security 
will now be considered.  
2.2.1.1 Hobbes’ Conception of Security 
Security, since Hobbes’ Leviathan, has been acknowledged as the main benefit of forming 
a political community. This is the good for which individuals exchange their natural 
liberty.11 According to Hobbes, the clear reason for the creation of the state and the basis 
of its legitimacy rests on its ability to afford security to its citizens.12 For Hobbes, the 
social contract is the means by which humans overcome the circumstances in which 
‘every man is enemy to every man’ and ‘men live without other security’.13 In this 
environment of fear in living without security and the horrific consequences of ‘war’, 
Hobbes was persuaded that there was no benefit to mankind, no possibility of civilisation 
or self-achievement and ‘worst of all, continual fear, and danger of violent death’.14 
Therefore, it is the promise of security which lies behind the transition of mankind from 
being in a state of nature to being a member of a political community,15 and which 
contributes to the creation of the conditions in which the lives of individuals can 
flourish.16 
Hobbes considered that the provider of peace and security possesses absolute power and 
that individuals cannot challenge this power,17  and it is the consent of those in the 
commonwealth which confers this sovereign power. 18  His social contract was an 
agreement between individuals to surrender most of their freedoms to the extent necessary 
to avert war.19 Therefore, for Hobbes, security was both the reason for the creation of the 
state and the excuse for its absolute power over its followers. 20  Indeed, since the 
individuals agreed in their contract to reciprocally follow the rules of the sovereign in 
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12 Ibid. 
13 Ibid.  
14 Ibid; see Rhonda Powell, ‘Security and the Right to Security of Person’ (DPhil thesis, University of Oxford 2008) 3; April L. Cherry, 
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16 Liora Lazarus, ‘The Right to Security’ in Rowan Cruft, Matthew Liao and Massimo Renzo (eds), The Philosophical Foundations 
of Human Rights (OUP 2014) (forthcoming) 2. 
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18 Jan Narveson, ‘Social Contract: The Last Word in Moral Theories’ (2013) 4 Rationality, Markets and Morals Journal 88, 95. 
19 Hobbes (n 11) Ch XIV, 82. 




exchange for security, the individuals cannot take any action to hold the sovereign 
accountable for violation of that contract.21  
Hobbes’ ideas about maintaining peace and security reflect his deep concern about the 
horrific impact of the English Civil War (1642-1648) on the country’s population.22 
However, Hobbes’ idea that the benefit of security is too valuable to be endangered by 
dispute, and that, therefore, the sovereign needs to hold absolute power, is much less 
persuasive.23 This is because absolute power can be abused; it would allow the sovereign 
either to fail to protect HR or even infringe these rights with impunity.24  
2.2.1.2 Locke, Rousseau and Montesquieu’s Conception of Security 
Locke made a significant contribution to the development of knowledge about HR, 
especially in his ‘Second Treatise of Government’.25 Locke contended that, before any 
societies or communities had been formed, human beings were free and equal to all others 
in the enjoyment of natural rights to life, liberty, and property.26 The moral conduct of 
one human being towards themselves and others was governed only by their innate human 
nature, namely natural law, knowledge of which could be attained solely by reason.27 In 
these circumstances, should an individual’s life, freedom and property be attacked, they 
had a duty defend it and punish the violator. The problem with such a view was that 
individuals, by themselves, often lacked the strength or knowledge to do so. To overcome 
this conundrum, Locke agreed with Hobbes that ‘safety and security’ were the main 
reason for individuals to form societies,28 and asserted that individuals surrender their 
power to others on the ‘express or tacit trust, that it shall be employed for their good’.29 
Unlike Hobbes’ idea that ‘subjects’ give up their liberty to an almost absolute authority, 
Locke’s social contract centred around the notion that individuals entered freely into 
                                                
21 Hobbes (n 11) Ch XVIII, 107-108; Glanville (n 17) 238.   
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25 John Locke, Two Treatise of Government (Thomas Hollis ed., London: A. Millar et al, 1764). 
26 Donald L. Doernberg, ‘We the People: John Locke, Collective Constitutional Rights, and Standing to Challenge Government Action’ 
(1985) 73 California Law Review 52, 59; Joshua Foa Dienstag, ‘Between History and Nature: Social Contract Theory in Locke and 
the Founders’ (1996) 58 Journal of Politics 985.  
27 Douglas G. Smith, ‘A Lockean Analysis of Section one of the Fourteenth Amendment’ (2002) 25 Harvard Journal of Law & Public 
Policy 1095, 1148. 
28 Locke (n 25) § 222; see Powell (n 14) 3; Liliya Abramchayev, ‘A social Contract Argument for the State’s Duty to Protect from 
Private Violence’ (2004) 18 ST John’s Journal of Legal Commentary 849, 851.  




agreement to form a political community for the protection of their natural basic HR with 
mutual obligations between the individual and governing body, but without giving 
absolute, unaccountable power to that government, because ‘no rational creature can be 
supposed to change his condition with an intention to be worse’.30 Therefore, the essential 
purpose of the government is to ensure the protection of the individual members of 
society.31  
Locke considered that the possession of absolute power by the government over its 
citizens would be a great threat to the security of individuals.32 Consequently, he stated 
that ‘to be free from such force is the only security of my Preservation’.33 He thus 
maintained that the authority of the state was limited by its obligations towards its citizens 
to ‘preserve the Members of that Society in their Lives, Liberties, and Possessions’.34  
Locke, nevertheless, in his theory about the state prerogative, stated that it was in the 
interest of public good for the state to exercise this power without recourse to law, because 
a situation may arise which is not covered by existing law and which needs a speedy 
solution.35 According to one commentator, it is better to interpret Locke’s position in this 
matter to mean that ‘the prerogative of the executive to act outside of the law might be 
located within the constitution’.36 This gives rise to a dilemma as it seems to enable a 
state to exercise legal power outside the limitations of the law, ‘in violation of the 
prescribed legal limitations on the use of that very power’, making it unlimited or 
constrained in legal terms.37  
Preservation of the lives, liberties and possessions of society members demands that the 
rules of society be just and legitimate, particularly since the individual members of the 
society participate in the rule-making process.38 Therefore, when a government violates 
this agreement by enacting a rule that goes against the protection of life, liberty and 
property, the citizens can ‘resume their original liberty’, dissolve that government and 
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34 Ibid Ch XV, §171. 
35 Ibid Ch XIV, § 160. 
36 For further discussion, see David Dyzenhaus, ‘Schmitt v Dicey: Are States of Emergency Inside or Outside the Legal Order? (2006) 
27 Cardozo Law Review 2005, 2005-2039. 
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constitute a new one capable of properly protecting them.39 As Locke stated, security 
must be achieved ‘within the limits of law’.40 
Like Locke, Rousseau asserted that the social contract was a reciprocal commitment, 
stating that the necessary balance between safety and liberty is, in fact, guaranteed by the 
social contract, which by definition is a mutual agreement between the members of a 
society to place themselves and the majority of their rights under the authority of the 
general will, where every member of the society is an integral part of the whole.41 This 
implies that to be valid the social contract must be marked by free consent, reciprocity, 
and moral obligation, and should one of these provisions be absent the contract is 
constitutionally invalid and any government created by it is therefore illegitimate.42 The 
philosopher Montesquieu similarly held that when individuals freely give some of their 
rights to a government, the protection of these rights becomes its responsibility.43  
2.2.1.3 Blackstone and Contemporary Ideas about the Right to Security  
Blackstone published his ‘Commentaries on the Law of England’ in the 18th century,44 
and certain statements contained in them are relevant to this study. Blackstone agreed 
with Hobbes and Locke that security was the prize for which individuals entered into 
social and political community.45 He asserted that the ‘right to personal security’ stems 
from the three absolute, natural principal rights of man,46 of personal security, personal 
liberty, and private property.47 The primary and absolute rights which Blackstone referred 
to were those which belong ‘to persons merely in a state of nature, and which every man 
is entitled to enjoy, whether out of society or in it’.48  
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Blackstone stated that the right to personal security includes the right of individuals to 
the protection of their life and that laws must be passed to combat murder and achieve 
this goal.49  However, it should be borne in mind that these man-made laws do not 
themselves make these acts unlawful. They merely encapsulate the primary law of nature, 
which forbids violations of the natural rights of individuals.50 Moreover, he observed that 
without adopting a method to enforce these rights, laws that recognise them would be a 
‘dead letter’.51 His idea in describing security as a natural and legal right was the first 
attempt to substantially recognise the individual’s right to security.52 
During the 20th century, a debate about the essence of the right to security began to emerge 
in contemporary theories. Shue regards as basic HR ‘the line beneath which no one is to 
be allowed to sink’.53 From his perspective, rights are ‘basic’ if and when ‘enjoyment of 
them is essential to the enjoyment of all other rights’.54 He also holds that ‘whether a right 
is basic is independent of whether its enjoyment is also valuable in itself’.55 
Similarly to Blackstone, he determines security as one of the three essential rights, 
together with ‘liberty’ and ‘subsistence’. 56  As opposed to Blackstone, his essential 
argument on the right to security is not based on the moral imperative that basic rights 
are intrinsic to human nature. Instead, he considers security to be a paramount ‘meta-right’ 
because it is a precondition without which it would be impossible to enjoy all other 
rights.57 He describes the right to security as the right ‘not to be subjected to murder, 
torture, mayhem, rape or assault’.58 He asserts that, at least, if any rights exist at all, then 
the basic right to physical security is one.59 For Shue, all rights are accompanied by both 
positive and negative duties,60 and he places the essential duties for the protection of the 
right to security into three categories: 
Duties not to eliminate a person’s security—duties to avoid depriving. 
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53 Henry Shue, Basic Rights: Subsistence, Affluence, and US Foreign Policy (2nd edn., Princeton University Press 1996) 40.  
54 Ibid. 19. 
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56 Lazarus (n 16) 8. 
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Duties to protect people against deprivation of security by other people—duties to protect from 
deprivation. 
 Duties to provide for the security of those unable to provide their own—duties to aid the 
deprived.61    
State intervention to fulfil these duties is an essential factor in ensuring the enjoyment of 
other rights and, accordingly, if the state does not implement them, this enjoyment 
becomes impossible. This point of view has been criticised by Lazarus as appearing to 
perceive the right to liberty to be less important than the right to security. In addition, she 
claims that Shue is unclear about the practical methods of fulfilling these duties.62 
However, it should be noted that Shue is obviously aware of the potential use of excessive 
coercive powers by the state in protecting its citizens, and the harm this could cause.63 He 
states that the best way to establish the good organisation of a society is to ensure self-
restraint rather than encourage the adoption by the state of excessive coercive powers 
over its citizens.64           
Like Shue, Fredman considers the right to security to be the primary precondition for 
liberty, meaning ‘autonomy and genuine freedom of choice, rather than freedom from 
interference’.65 Fredman and Powell have recourse to the theory of Sin and Nussbaum 
about human ‘capabilities’,66 which states that to allow individuals to achieve autonomy 
and freedom of choice, they must be provided with certain protected ‘capabilities’, such 
as ‘economic opportunities, political liberties, social powers, […] good health, basic 
education, and the encouragement and cultivation of initiatives’. They consider that such 
capabilities justify the need for both the positive and negative aspects of the right to 
security.67 Fredman shares Shue’s view about the positive and negative duty, asserting 
that the right to security cannot be diminished by the duty of restraint on the part of the 
state. At the very least, the positive duty must expand to encompass the protection of 
individuals against the threat of other individuals’ acts. This requires a state to take 
positive measures when necessary to avert illegal acts by others. She indicates that the 
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state obligation to protect individuals is attributable to the social contract theory, 
according to which protection is considered a fundamental duty.68  
The most recent formulation of the right to security was presented by Ramsay in his 
theory of ‘vulnerable autonomy’.69 He points out that the right to security should be 
provided in accordance with the need of individuals to be free from fear of crime, which 
is a prerequisite for exercising autonomy.70 He also states that preventive provisions in 
criminal law are required because of the vulnerability of a citizen’s autonomy and the 
duties of citizens to provide reciprocal reassurance.71 Any failure to reassure others makes 
it necessary for accountability to be imputed according to the preventive measures of 
criminal law, such as Anti-Social Behaviour Orders and other such provisions. This is 
because the ‘responsibility to protect the vulnerability of others is the reflex of those 
others’ right to be free from the fear of crime, which is to say their right to security’.72 
Ramsay deems that this right to security has affected not only the thinking of the political 
mainstream,73 but has also had a key influence on the European Convention of Human 
Rights (ECHR).74 Although this right appears indirectly in Article 5 of the Convention,75 
he notes that the demands of security establish a legitimate basis for limiting the rights of 
individuals, a limitation which is approved by Convention.76 Therefore, he asserts that 
‘an individual has no cause for complaint if his human rights are interfered with when 
such interference is necessary to uphold another’s right to security’.77 However, Lazarus 
finds Ramsay’s assertion to be debatable when he states that ‘the right to security is 
enforced by means of a liability for failure to reassure others, and this liability implies a 
positive obligation to be aware of what will cause others insecurity’.78 Thus, Ramsay 
advocates the widest possible interpretation of the right to security and offers a rational 
standard basis for the idea of prevention in the context of criminal law.79  
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For Lazarus, Shue, Fredman and Ramsay do not adequately consider the possibility of 
the state using the right to security as an excuse for excessive coercion.80 Lazarus rightly 
raises the possibility that the state may diminish individuals’ rights because some states 
may abuse their power with impunity, a position which is clearly closer to the idea of 
Locke, as she indicates in ‘The Right to Security’.81 She affirms that the political and 
moral obligation of the state ‘to secure individuals must always be clearly constrained’. 
Moreover, she adds that ‘If there is a right to security correlative upon the State’s broader 
duty of security, it must be balanced within a hierarchy of rights which places liberty, 
dignity and equality firmly at its apex’.82  
It may therefore be appropriate to inspect the right to security with regards to the specific 
duty of the state to protect the right to life of its citizens from non-state actors of violence. 
It is understood that because the state shoulders the duty to regulate private conduct in 
order to minimise the risk of the violation of the HR of others,83 infringement of these 
rights by private parties ‘can never legally remove or impair any of these rights or 
freedoms, either generally or individually’.84 Therefore, these rights, including the right 
to secure individuals’ lives, still have a mandatory effect and are legally enforceable. 
Indeed, the state bears the responsibility to address acts of violence by private parties.85  
2.2.1.4 Summary Remarks 
From the above, at the very least, the state undoubtedly has a moral obligation to secure 
the right to life of its citizens against acts of violence according to social contract 
principles. This is despite the different, even contradictory, concepts of how this 
obligation should be achieved, but the right to security is not about living without the 
threat of violence at the expense of the illegitimate curtailment of individuals’ liberty, 
such as excessive state coercion. It is about the recognition that every human deserves to 
live without violence. Excessive coercive measures by the state, claimed to be necessary 
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for the fulfilment of its duty to protect, cannot be deemed inherent to the right to security. 
Therefore, this right is so fundamental that any state or other man-made law must conform 
with it and not misuse it to detract from basic HR. As Lazarus states: 
If security constitutes such an essential element of all other rights, then let us secure those rights 
in the first instance, instead of deploying the language of security to arrive at their protection. The 
right to security needs to […] correlate to clear and meaningful obligations and duties […]. The 
right to security must be […] meaningful in law, [and] not be so easily deployed to legitimate the 
State’s coercive overreach.86 
This misuse includes negative attitudes of the state, such as moral negligence, 
unwillingness, and culpable inability to provide security and protection of the right to life. 
2.2.2 Criticisms of the Social Contract Theory 
One criticism of the social contract theory, as a moral theory, is that it considers morality87 
as merely relative because its principal aims are to promote whatever necessary measures 
are required for collective survival and well-being. In Kant’s words, it replaces 
categorical imperatives with hypothetical imperatives.88 However, social contract theory 
is not a complete and independent system of morality, but is subject to a superior 
fundamental, philosophical morality. This means that it cannot solely work for the 
common good whatever the circumstances.89 In any particular instance, should measures 
for the common good contradict philosophical morality, then such measures are null and 
void. As an example of this, an innocent individual could not be killed by the authorities, 
even if this would spare hundreds of others in that society. This is because philosophical 
morality forbids a fundamentally wrong act from being done to achieve something 
good.90       
Social contract theory has also been accused of employing two distinct, concomitant 
contradictory moral concepts: first, that morality is required to institute society in the first 
place, and, second, that morality is dependent on society.91 These two concepts, however, 
are complementary rather than contradictory. Because philosophical morality is 
necessary for the establishment of a society in the first place, it is not implied that society, 
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once formed, cannot institute further measures to support and strengthen morality. For 
example, the forbidding of crimes such as murder is a necessity for the very existence of 
civil society; for other kinds of wrongs, civil society can institute various measures to 
promote moral virtue among its members.92  
It is disputed whether a state of nature is a valid concept at all, as it has been much 
discredited by modern social science, as the rudiments of social organisation seem to have 
always existed.93 Accordingly, the state of nature is merely a convenient explanation of 
the formation of political society.94 However, social contract theory does not depend on 
whether a state of nature exists or not. For instance, Locke, in his deliberations about the 
social contract, considers that ‘the state of nature exists wherever rule of law is absent –
that is, in the absence of a third judicial party to arbitrate disputes impartially among 
individuals with the authority and power to enforce such decisions’.95 This means that 
whenever a government breaks down and anarchy prevails, a state of nature exists within 
that country, as the condition of its people is that they are outside the rule of any kind of 
civil law.96 Since people, in a state of nature, ‘tend to see their own affairs in a biased 
way and are often influenced by passions, such as desires for revenge, conflicts are likely 
[to result] in violence’.97 
The social contract theory has also been criticised as too exclusive, and critics have 
maintained that only rational beings are capable of entering into a contract (tacitly or 
otherwise) and honouring its terms.98 According to this theory, children and retarded 
adults cannot enter into a contract because they lack the necessary rationality, and so they 
would be less deserving of moral consideration than those who are rational. Any moral 
treatment they would be given would be supererogatory but not obligatory.99  
Finally, the classical social contract theory has been criticised over the assumption that 
individuals have explicitly, implicitly or otherwise agreed to be ruled by a government of 
their choice and abide by laws instituted by that government for the common good.100 
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Critics maintain that such consent cannot be obtained or defended. Hume’s arguments, 
for instance, are relevant here.101 In his famous essay, “Of the Original Contract”,102 he 
denies that such an agreement can exist, and attempts to answer two empirical questions: 
‘first, for what reasons state institutions have evolved in almost all human societies, and, 
second, why individuals typically feel obliged to obey the law’. 103  Hume discusses 
consent mainly as a possible element of an explicatory theory for the justification of 
political authority, but not as a normative criterion.104 To answer the first question, he 
considers the role of consent to be only in the early stages of the development of state 
institutions; for him, the main driving forces for such development in the interests of a 
state’s citizens are security and economic prosperity.105  
However, as states develop further, sovereigns are usually selected by the customary rule 
of succession.106 In addition, citizens of many states have been ruled by force; those born 
into such a state passively accept its rules, without doing so by contract. 107  Hume 
maintained that ‘Almost all the governments which exist at present, or […] in history, 
[are] founded […] on usurpation or conquest, or both, without any pretence of a fair 
consent or voluntary subjection of the people’.108 In answer to the second question, Hume 
stated that ‘neither governments nor citizens consider consent to be the foundation of 
political authority’,109 but rather that: 
Governments usually treat every citizen as a rebel who insists on his or her natural freedom and 
refuses to abide by the law. This holds even true for persons who could not have consented to their 
authority, such as young adults who were— according to Locke’s theory—previously incapable 
of making binding promises. The citizens, on the other hand, typically do not believe that they or 
their ancestors have agreed to the sovereign’s rule. They rather habitually acquiesce in his laws 
and tend to think that “they were born to such an obedience”. The citizens’ allegiance to their 
governments is strongly supported by their interests in preserving the social order and their fear 
of chaos and insecurity.110 
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To Hume, therefore, the answer to ‘why should the social-contract theorist think that the 
legitimacy of a form of government or of a system of moral rules depends upon the 
hypothetical agreement of those who are subject to them’, is that ‘nothing is more 
advantageous to society than such an invention [i.e. government]’.111 This means that the 
form of government or system of moral rules best serves the interests of the community 
members and, this sufficiently legitimatises it so that they comply with it. Therefore, it is 
entirely unnecessary to appeal to a hypothetical social contract to legitimatise a 
government or a system of moral rules.112 
However, according to Frank Dietrich, Hume’s arguments fail to dismiss ‘consent’ as a 
fundamental criterion of political legitimacy; at best, these arguments only demonstrate 
that any existing government does not meet, or only insufficiently meets, the requirement 
of consent.113 Hume stated that ‘my intention here is not to exclude the consent of the 
people from being one just foundation of government. Where it has place, it is surely the 
best and most sacred of any. I only contend that it has very seldom had place in any degree, 
and never almost in its full extent; and that, therefore, some other foundation of 
government must also be admitted’. 114  In Dietrich’s opinion, even though Locke’s 
criterion of tacit consent has disappointedly been little observed in practice, this ‘does not 
invalidate the normative reasons motivating him to introduce this requirement’ as both a 
justification for the exertion of political authority and for the legitimacy of states which 
effectively secure the lives and material possessions of their citizens.115 However, he 
pointed out that employing Hume’s interests ideas fails, 
to provide a sufficient foundation for the justification of governmental rights and civil duties. Only 
an individual’s factual consent to the authority of a state is capable of conferring legitimacy to the 
exertion of political power. It may be worth noting that theories which refer to a hypothetical 
consent do not meet the above explained requirement either. The idea of an imaginary contract 
may illustrate why it would—under certain circumstances—be in the individuals’ best interests to 
leave the state of nature. However, a hypothetical agreement has, unlike a factual one, no binding 
force and cannot entail any moral obligations.116 
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Some of the above criticisms of the social contract theory have a degree of merit, but the 
theory still has many compensatory strengths. One of these is that it ‘provides a firm 
criterion for deciding what we ought to do and for justifying that decision, which is that 
it must somehow help preserve or enhance our social life’. 117  It also provides a 
compelling rational incentive to obey certain moral rules which best promote social peace 
and prosperity.118 The greatest strength of the theory is that it establishes both a normative 
and moral base for arguing that the state must protect the right to life, and it also justifies 
acts of civil disobedience should the state fail in this. Therefore, when a government 
whose primary reason for existence is to provide protection for its citizens fails to do this, 
it has breached its contract, enabling its citizens, on the principle of reciprocity, to cease 
to have any obligation to obey the law.119  
It will be argued later that Iraq, until recently, specifically before the defeat of ISIS and, 
to some extent, consolidating the state institutions under the leadership of the current 
Prime Minister Haider Al-Abadi, can be viewed as having been in a state of nature, since 
it had failed to protect citizens against non-state violence. One method of moving from 
this state of nature necessitates the defining of a clear and strict relationship between the 
state and society based on the notion that the government must serve the people, in 
particular by providing protection against violence by non-state actors, by re-building 
legitimacy and addressing the fragility of the state. This, it will be argued, would be best 
served by the employment of legitimate social contract principles in a genuine Iraqi 
process of transitional justice from conflict and violence to peace.120  
2.2.3 The Evolution of the Right to Life in International Human Rights Law   
Social contract theory, as outlined above, has informed the development of the right to 
life under contemporary HR law. The horrific impact of the Second World War 
encouraged the international community to establish an effective international legal 
system capable of ensuring protection of the right to life, promotion of international peace, 
and prevention of repeated conflict. There is a broad agreement that the actual emergence 
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of modern international HR law began with the UN Charter of the United Nations in 
1945,121 Article 1(3) of which states that one UN objective is to attain international co-
operation in ‘promoting and encouraging respect for HR and for fundamental freedoms 
for all without distinction as to race, sex, language or religion’.122  
The right to life is considered to be the most essential of all HR, described by the UN 
Human Rights Committee (UNHRC) as ‘supreme’123 in a wide array of international and 
regional HR instruments. Although initially conceived as a mechanism to protect 
individuals from the abuse of power by the state, recent developments concerning the 
convergence of the vertical and horizontal aspects of HR law have meant that individuals 
are now able rely directly for the protection of HR on both aspects.124  
There are currently several situations where the state must enact a legislative framework 
and practical measures to protect individuals from serious criminal acts that threaten their 
life or physical safety.125 Such preventive obligations are broadly designed to protect 
society as a whole, but have particular relevance for vulnerable groups, such as women 
and children, which are subject to special protection within international mechanisms.126 
In addition, under international and regional HR law, in certain defined circumstances 
states can also have a positive obligation to take preventive operational measures to 
protect individuals from life-threatening injury posed by acts of terrorism.127 In this 
context, ‘states are required to establish effective mechanisms for identifying potential 
future threats of terrorist attack, to analyse the information with reasonable care, to reach 
an informed risk assessment and to take appropriate action’, which may include, where 
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appropriate, the duty to provide information to the public and not only to disrupt 
threatened attacks by law enforcement agencies. 128  However, as the countering of 
terrorism poses grave challenges to the protection and promotion of HR, states must 
ensure that all measures taken comply with their obligations under international law, 
especially international HR.129  
The states’ positive obligations under HR law, however, extend to a wide range of 
violence and sexual offences against a person and are not confined to threats to life. This 
chapter now proceeds to explore in detail the nature and extent of these obligations within 
international legal frameworks.  
2.2.3.1 The Universal Declaration of Human Rights 
The Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) was the first instrument under 
which individual HR became the subject of international legal concern.130 The UDHR, 
along with the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) and the 
International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR), 131 
constitutes the foundation of international HR law.132 
The UDHR established a universal language of HR, and those of individuals stem from 
being members of the international community, and the UN gives expression to these as 
global values. It is currently acknowledged that it is the obligation of a state to enhance 
and protect all HR and fundamental freedoms, regardless of its political, economic, and 
cultural systems.133 The UDHR is based on the ‘inherent dignity of all members of the 
human family’ and are the ‘foundation of freedom, justice and peace in the world’. It 
recognises that to ensure every person’s right to life, liberty and security, HR need to be 
observed.134  
However, it should be noted that the Declaration did not place any legal binding 
obligations on the state, even though it did anticipate future universal legislation 
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concerning the right of all individuals to life, liberty and security.135 In addition, many 
states have incorporated the principles of the UDHR in the fundamental rights or basic 
laws of their constitutions. Moreover, many of the provisions of the UDHR are considered 
to reflect customary international law, and therefore to be binding on states that have not 
signed some of the instruments subsequently adopted.136 In this sense, it has been claimed 
that, among supporters of the development of international law, terrorism should be 
considered as a universal violation of customary international law because such acts 
violate many well established international norms and because widespread systematic 
attacks on civilians are considered to be crimes against humanity.137 Therefore, even if 
the provisions of the Declaration specifically concerning the protection of the right to life 
were not legally binding on the states, it is important to note that violation of these 
provisions should be considered breaches of universal customary international law.138 
2.2.3.2 The International Convention on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) 
Unlike the UDHR, this treaty is legally binding on states that have ratified it. Article 6	(1) 
of the ICCPR states that:	
Every human being has the inherent right to life. This right shall be protected by law. No one shall 
be arbitrarily deprived of his life.    
Under Article 6 of the Convention, the obligations of the state go beyond the duty of 
refraining from the unlawful taking of life by its own public officials. It also embodies 
the state’s positive duty to take appropriate steps to safeguard the lives of individuals 
within its jurisdiction from attacks on their right to life.139 However, it should be noted 
that the right to life under Article 6 of the Convention cannot be interpreted as making 
states stand as absolute guarantors against every threat, as this would impose a 
disproportionate duty on the authorities. Nevertheless, in certain defined situations, state 
authorities do have a positive obligation to take operational measures to prevent violence 
by non-state actors.140 This positive obligation must be practical and effective not merely 
notional or indeterminate.141 
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As a result, the Convention has established the UN Human Rights Committee (HRC) to 
consider reports submitted by its members, expressing the measures they have adopted to 
give effect to the rights set forth in the Convention.142 The HRC can also receive appeals 
from victims whose rights have been violated, if the country in question has ratified the 
Optional Protocol which permits such petitions. Moreover, the victims must have 
exhausted all existing domestic remedies before a complaint can be made against the 
violation of their rights by the state.143 It is indicated in the General Comment on Article 
6 of the Covenant that state parties should take specific and effective measures to prevent 
the violation of the right to life by both criminal acts of individuals and state authorities.144 
The notion of the positive obligation to prevent violation by private parties has developed 
as a standard requiring due diligence; this concept is recognised in many domestic tort 
law systems.145 However, while due diligence requires that as many reasonable measures 
of prevention be put in place as could be expected from governments, if, in spite of such 
measures being taken, violations occur, then governments are not responsible for these 
breaches.146 The HRC has comprehensively articulated the due diligence standard in 
General Comment No. 31 in Article 2 of the Convention.147 Under Article 2(1) of the 
Convention, state parties are required to ‘ensure to all individuals within its territory and 
subject to its jurisdiction the rights recognized in the present Covenant, without 
distinction of any kind’. Article 2 (2-3 (c) also requires states to adopt legislation and 
remedies necessary to effect the rights recognised by the Covenant. 148  The same 
Comment also imposes legal obligations on states to protect individuals from both state 
action and the violation of individual rights by private parties. Therefore, under the 
Convention, if states fail to exercise due diligence in protecting these rights against such 
violation, then the states are guilty of negligence.149 
The jurisprudence of the HRC has contributed effectively to the promotion of the 
obligation of the state to take adequate measures to protect the right to life. For example, 
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in Krasovskaya v Belarus,150 concerning the disappearance of Anatoly Krasovsky, the 
Committee concluded that there was insufficient evidence linking the state authorities 
with this disappearance. However, the Committee also reminded the member states of 
their positive obligation to protect individuals against any violation of their Covenant 
rights, regardless of whether this violation is committed by its agents or by private 
individuals. Furthermore, the Committee recalled its General Comment, mentioned above, 
which requires member states to have an appropriate mechanism for both the judicial and 
administrative authorities to address allegations of the violation of HR.151  
Similarly, Djebbar and Chihoub v. Algeria,152 considered the allegation of the violation 
of the right to life of Djamel and Mourad Chihoub by the state authorities. The two boys 
were arrested by members of the army in 1996. The victims’ family had not seen or heard 
from them since and had therefore lost hope of finding them alive, as 15 years had passed. 
The family also believed that they had died while in detention. The HRC noted that the 
member state had not released any information concerning the allegation and the other 
concerns of the family, and therefore concluded that the state party had failed to comply 
with Article 6 of the Covenant, which imposes a positive obligation on the state to protect 
the right to life of its citizens.153   
The Human Rights Committee has also placed such an obligation on states, in cases other 
than life-threatening ones, including torture, ill treatment, and gender-based violence. In 
its General Comment on Article 7 of the Covenant, which concerns the prohibition of 
torture, the HRC extended the scope of protection to include acts of violence committed 
by individuals acting in their ‘private capacity’.154 It is also implicit in Article 7 that a 
state has to take positive measures to ensure that private persons or entities do not 
perpetrate torture or cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment on others 
within its jurisdiction.155 Therefore, ‘there are strong arguments for the claim that the 
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state’s obligations in relation to the prohibition of torture under the ICCPR now extends 
also to the private sphere’.156 The HRC, for instance, has followed this approach in its 
jurisprudence,157 concluding observations on state parties’ reports in cases involving 
gender-based violence, including sexual, domestic and honour-related violence. 158  It 
recognises that gender-based violence can breach Article 7,  and, thus, state parties must 
take appropriate measures in accordance with the principle of due diligence to prevent 
and combat such violence.159 However, Edwards notes that the standard of due diligence 
appears inadequate as a benchmark for the protection of women against violence since 
states are only required to take ‘reasonable’ steps to eradicate such violence, and it is 
unclear how to measure this failure.160 Moreover, which type of measure states should 
undertake in line with the due diligence principle are affected by the particular right and 
circumstances.161 For honour-related violence, states should be aware that violence which 
violates the prohibition of torture and other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or 
punishment is widespread in their society, and that they have an obligation under 
international HR law to take preventive measures on the societal level.162 This means that 
addressing such a problem by criminal legislation alone is insufficient and so ‘civil law 
measures are also often needed, such as amendments to the family law, as are policy 
measures, such as establishment of shelters and systems for relocating high-risk persons 
to other safe and long-term places of residence. A particularly important policy measure 
is the modification of stereo-typed gender roles and prejudices and practices based on the 
inferiority of women’.163  
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The practice of the HRC has been noted, however, to adopt a more restrictive view on the 
preventive obligations of the state regarding violence perpetrated by private individuals 
on the societal level, and that its jurisprudence has related to measures taken after harm 
has been caused, rather than prevention and, so ‘the HRC has yet to articulate prevention 
obligations in the context of non-State abuse’.164 Certain preventive measures, therefore, 
are sometimes required on an individual level to prevent private acts of violence. In 
Article 24(1), the HRC stated that ‘in cases where the parents and the family seriously 
fail in their duties, ill-treat or neglect the child, the State should intervene to restrict 
parental authority’ and, therefore effective early prevention strategies are needed.165 
2.2.3.3 The European Convention of Human Rights (ECHR) 
The European Convention of Human Rights (ECHR) pays significant attention to the 
protection of the HR to life in Article 2: 
Everyone’s right to life shall be protected by law. No one shall be deprived of his life intentionally 
save in the execution of a sentence of a court following his conviction of a crime for which this 
penalty is provided by law.  
The European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) noted in McCann and Others v United 
Kingdom 166  that this right is one of the most fundamental in the Convention and 
establishes a basic value common to all democratic societies.167 Under Article 2 of the 
ECHR states must not only refrain from taking life but must also protect it against threats 
from third parties. This will involve effective criminal law measures to prevent and deter 
criminal acts that threaten life.168 
The principle of positive obligations placed on the state stems from the decision in X and 
Y v Netherlands169 which stipulates that the signatory states of the European Convention 
of HR have a positive duty to establish preventive measures to ensure that non-state 
parties do not violate the HR of others.170 The Court in this case found that the state had 
failed to safeguard the rights of victims to privacy over the failure to protect a woman 
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with learning disabilities from sexual abuse. Although the decision is related to Article 8 
of the Convention, it is widely acknowledged that it also applies to all provisions, 
including the right to life.171  
The Osman case172 has contributed towards a radical rethinking of the right to protection 
under Article 2 of the Convention. Ali Osman had been killed and his son wounded 
following sustained threats against them by a schoolteacher. The appellants, i.e. the 
wounded son and the widow of Ali Osman, complained that the failure of the police to 
take adequate and reasonable measures to protect the son from being exposed to assault 
and his father from being killed by a person whom the authorities knew, or ought to have 
known, was a danger to them had violated their right to life according to Article 2 ECHR. 
The Court documented that if someone suffers a ‘real and immediate risk to life’ from 
identified third parties, the state authorities should protect them.173 However, it held that 
the appellants were unable to present evidence that the police knew, or ought to have 
known, that their lives were at risk and so the Court concluded that the obligation under 
Article 2 had not been violated by the state.174  
This obligation was confirmed in Mahmut Kaya v Turkey.175 The case related to the 
assassination of a doctor by the Contra fighters with the knowledge and support of the 
security forces, on the grounds that he had been suspected of helping the PKK. While the 
Court did not conclude that the state was involved in the assassination, it did conclude 
that the authorities failed to comply with a positive obligation to protect the deceased 
from the known risk to his life. As someone suspected of aiding and abetting the PKK, 
the deceased were at some risk of falling victim to an illegal attack. Since the state 
authorities were aware, or ought to have been aware, of this threat to the life of the victim, 
the authorities had failed to respond, and could therefore be indicted for failing to take 
reasonable and adequate measures to prevent the danger to the life of the victim.176  
Similarly, in Edwards v UK,177 concerning the killing of the appellant’s son by his prison 
cell-mate, the ECtHR ruled that the victim’s right to life under Article 2 had been 
breached. The Court held that although the authorities knew, or ought to have known, that 
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the cell-mate represented a ‘real and serious risk to the life of others’, they had failed to 
take adequate and reasonable measures, which led to the loss of life.178 Accordingly, the 
state was judged to have violated Article 2 of the Convention. Because criminal law 
demands that the state play an active role in the deterring of the commission of criminal 
acts by providing law enforcement mechanisms to prevent them and ensure punishment 
for the violation of the rules of non-aggression to the HR to life, the Court concluded 
there was a violation of Article 2 of the Convention.179  
Under the ECHR, Article 2 should be read in conjunction with the general obligation of 
states under Article 1 to ‘secure to everyone within their jurisdiction the rights and 
freedom defined’. The substance of Article 1 rests on the principle of effectiveness which 
is more than a mere theoretical concept of protection. Effectiveness is achieved only by 
providing positive practical measures. Thus, there is no doubt that member states cannot 
claim to fulfil their duties under Article 2 of the Convention by simply remaining 
passive.180  
In cases concerning domestic violence in which victims or potential victims alleged that 
their states parties have, inter alia, failed to protect them from domestic violence, or to 
establish sufficient measures to prevent domestic violence, the ECtHR has handed down 
important judgments, finding violations of their HR on the ground of the failure of states 
to fulfil their positive obligations.181 For instance, in the case of Kontrovà v. Slovakia182 
concerning the alleged failure of the authorities to protect the applicant’s children’s lives, 
since the authorities had sufficient knowledge of the husband’s abusive and threatening 
behaviour, including death threats, due to the applicant’s ongoing communication with 
the police, the Court held that there had been a violation of Article 2.183 Specifically, 
given the criminal complaint of November 2002 made by the applicant against her 
husband, accusing him of assaulting and beating her with an electric cable, alongside the 
emergency phone calls of December 2002, the Court observed that the situation in the 
applicant’s family had been known to the local police. However, as the domestic courts 
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established and the Slovakian government acknowledged, although ‘under the applicable 
law, the police had been obliged to: register the applicant’s criminal complaint; launch a 
criminal investigation and criminal proceedings against the applicant’s husband 
immediately; keep a proper record of the emergency calls and advise the next shift of the 
situation; and, take action concerning the allegation that the applicant’s husband had a 
shotgun and had threatened to use it’, the police has failed to do so and, instead, an officer 
had even assisted in changing her criminal complaint of November 2002 to minor offence 
calling for no further action.184 The direct consequence of these failures by the police was 
the death of the applicant’s children.185  
The decisions of the ECtHR in the two cases of Bevacqua and S. v. Bulgaria186 and Opuz 
v. Turkey 187  in 2008 and 2009 are considered a turning point for the Court and 
international law as they advanced the due diligence standard in the context of domestic 
violence by enumerating several identifiable minimums, including the existence of a 
judicial mechanism for obtaining protection measures, such as orders of protection, and 
the availability of prosecution in the public interest for all crimes of domestic violence; 
these gave practical substance to judging a state’s adherence to the principles of 
protection, investigation, and prosecution contained in the due diligence standard.188 In 
Bevacqua and S. v. Bulgaria, the first applicant claimed that she was regularly abused 
and assaulted by her husband, leading her to leave home with their son (the second 
applicant), and file for divorce.189 However, her husband continued to assault her. In a 
shelter for abused women, the applicant spent four days with her son but she was allegedly 
warned that she could face prosecution for abducting the boy, leading to a court order for 
shared custody, which, she stated, her husband did not respect. Further violence against 
her was triggered when she pressed charges against her husband for alleged assault. Her 
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demands for interim custody measures were not prioritised and only when her divorce 
was pronounced more than a year later did she finally obtain custody. She was again 
battered by her ex-husband in the following year, and on the grounds that it was a ‘private 
matter’ requiring a private prosecution, her requests for a criminal prosecution were 
rejected.190 The applicant argued before the ECtHR that her right under Article 8 of the 
ECHR to respect for private and family life was violated by state authorities since they 
failed to take the necessary measures to provide an adequate legal framework that would 
protect her and her young son from the violent behaviour of her former husband.191 She 
also claims that Bulgarian law was contrary to, inter alia, Article 3 and 8 of the ECHR 
because:  
the relevant law according to which the burden to prosecute for light bodily injury rested with the 
victim was incompatible with the State’s duty to provide protection against domestic violence and 
was discriminatory in that the law’s shortcomings impacted disproportionately on women.192 
The Court found a violation of Article 8 on the grounds that the cumulative effects of the 
domestic courts’ failure to adopt interim custody measures without delay in a situation of 
domestic violence amounted to a failure to assist the applicants, contrary to the state’s 
positive obligation to secure respect for their private and family life. 193  The Court 
concluded that: 
the possibility for the first applicant to bring private prosecution proceedings and seek damages 
was not sufficient […] and could not serve to prevent recurrence […]. In the Court’s view, the 
authorities’ failure to impose sanctions or otherwise enforce [the perpetrator’s] obligation to 
refrain from unlawful acts was critical […], as it amounted to a refusal to provide the immediate 
assistance the applicants needed. The authorities’ view that no such assistance was due as the 
dispute concerned a “private matter” was incompatible with their positive obligations to secure 
the enjoyment of the applicants’ Article 8 rights.194 
In the second case, Opuz v. Turkey,195 the applicant and her mother had suffered years of 
domestic violence and threats from the applicant’s husband. Despite numerous 
complaints to the police and prosecuting authorities, claiming that their lives were in 
danger, the authorities had done little to protect them, and, ultimately the applicant’s 
mother was killed by him.196 The prosecution argued that the mother’s right to life under 
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Article 2, and Opuz’s own right to be free from torture and ill treatment under Article 3, 
had been violated by ineffective Turkish authorities. It was also contended that the law 
enforcement’s inadequate response was a result of gender-based discrimination and, 
therefore, a violation of Article 14 of the ECHR.197 In deciding the case, the Court 
observed that it was critical, despite the withdrawal of complaints by the victims, ‘to 
consider whether the local authorities displayed due diligence to prevent violence against 
the applicant and her mother, in particular by pursuing criminal or other appropriate 
preventive measures’ against the applicant’s husband.198 The Court’s historic judgment 
found that because the state authorities failed to exercise due diligence in providing 
effective protection measures and prosecution, there had indeed been a violation of 
Article 2 concerning the murder of the applicant’s mother and a violation of Article 3 
concerning the state’s failure to protect the applicant.199 It found that the criminal law in 
place did not have the capability to provide an adequate deterrent effect and, thereby, 
ensure effective prevention of violence against the women. This was alongside the 
widespread passivity on the part of the police and prosecutors to respond to such 
complaints. The Court noted that ‘the overall unresponsiveness of the judicial system and 
impunity enjoyed by the aggressors…indicated that there was insufficient commitment 
to take appropriate action to address domestic violence’.200 This has also led the Court to 
conclude, for the first time in a case of domestic violence, in conjunction with Articles 2 
and 3, that there had been a violation of Article 14 (prohibition of discrimination) of the 
Convention. It observed that ‘domestic violence affected mainly women, while the 
general and discriminatory judicial passivity in Turkey created a climate that was 
conducive to it. The violence suffered by the applicant and her mother [was] therefore 
[…]gender-based’.201 
In cases where private violence, including domestic and all gender-based violence, have 
not resulted in death, the Court imposes positive obligations on member states.202 In 
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Eremia and Others v. the Republic of Moldova, 203  the first applicant and her two 
daughters complained that their rights under Articles 3 and 14 had been violated because 
of the failure of Moldovan authorities to provide protection from the violent and abusive 
behaviour of their husband and father, who was a police officer.204 For the first applicant, 
the Court held that, despite the knowledge of the state authorities of the abuse that the 
applicant endured, the authorities had failed to take effective measures to protect her, in 
violation of Article 3 of the Convention.205 The Court further for the daughters that, 
despite the detrimental psychological effects of them witnessing their father’s violence 
against their mother in the family home, little or no action had been taken to prevent the 
recurrence of such behaviour, in violation of Article 8. Lastly, the Court also found a 
violation of Article 14 in conjunction with Article 3 in respect of the first applicant on the 
grounds that ‘the authorities’ actions had not been a simple failure or delay in dealing 
with violence against her, but had amounted to repeatedly condoning such violence and 
reflected a discriminatory attitude towards the first applicant as a woman’.206 
2.2.3.4 The American Convention on Human Rights 
It is clear that instruments of international HR law which impose a positive obligation on 
member states should be interpreted along with the general obligation of states to respect 
and secure the rights of individuals, as provided for by the same law. Such an 
interpretation is shared by the Inter-American Court of Human Rights (IACtHR), as 
illustrated in the case of Velasquez Rodriguez v Honduras.207 The case concerned the 
unresolved disappearance of Velasquez-Rodriguez in Honduras in alleged violation of 
Article 4 ‘Right to Life’ and Article 7 ‘Right to Personal Liberty’ of the American 
Convention on Human Rights (ACHR). 208  The disappearance was believed to be 
committed by persons connected to, or acting in, pursuance of orders from the armed 
forces of Honduras, according to the findings of the Inter-American Commission. The 
Court interpreted Article 1(1) in conjunction with Article 7 to mean that the states 
members must take steps to prevent, investigate, and punish’ any breach of rights 
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acknowledged by the Convention, and provide adequate compensation for damages 
resulting from such.209 
The Court further stated that the state has a legal obligation to ensure that all reasonable 
measures are taken to prevent the violation of HR, and to conduct an effective 
investigation into the violation committed within its jurisdiction, determine and punish 
those responsible, and provide adequate reparation for the victims. It noted that the state 
duty to take preventive measures should also include the protection of individuals against 
violence by non-state agents. 210  Moreover, the Court applied the concept of ‘due 
diligence’ regarding state responsibility for violence by non-state agents in this case. The 
Court indicated that an unlawful act ‘which violates human rights and which is initially 
not directly imputable to a state … can lead to international responsibility of the State, 
not because of the act itself, but because of the lack of due diligence to prevent the 
violation or to respond to it as required by the (ACHR)’.211 
	This means that where rights are guaranteed, in this case by the ACHR, the state is 
compelled to implement ‘due diligence’ to ensure their fulfilment.212 The Court also 
stated that the existence of a legal system is not enough to claim that the rights of 
individuals are treated with respect; the government must also ‘conduct itself so as to 
effectively ensure’ the enjoyment of rights.213 While the Court has confirmed this position 
in later decisions,214 it must be proved that the state authorities knew, or ought to have 
known, of the existence of a ‘real and immediate risk to the life’ of a recognised individual 
or group of individuals within its jurisdiction.215 Only in these circumstances will states 
be held to have failed in their duty to take appropriate measures to prevent the criminal 
acts of a third party and also have failed to comply with their international obligations in 
this matter. 
The Jessica Gonzalez case, 216  heard by the Inter-American Commission on Human 
Rights, underlines the fact that the state has a duty to take all information about violations 
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of the right to life seriously and to effectively reveal the facts about them. Jessica Lenahan 
was a domestic violence survivor from Colorado whose three daughters had been 
murdered in 1999 by their father, who was also her ex-husband. The applicant’s lawyers 
attributed the death of her daughters to the failure of the Castle Police Department to 
adequately respond to the applicant’s frequent and urgent calls over several hours, 
reporting that her estranged husband was in violation of the restraining order against him 
and had taken her minor daughters away. It was argued that the United States had failed 
to comply with the American Declaration on the Rights and Duties of Man,217 which 
demanded the exercise of due diligence to protect the applicant and her daughters from 
domestic violence acts.218 
The Commission, after a comprehensive review of the evidence and arguments presented 
by the parties, considered that two questions needed to be answered to determine whether 
the United States had violated its duty to protect the applicant and her daughters from 
domestic violence. First, ‘whether the state authorities should have known that the victims 
were in a situation of imminent risk of domestic violence’; and secondly, ‘whether the 
authorities undertook reasonable measures to protect them from these acts’.219 It noted 
that the issuance of the restraining order, which required and authorised law enforcement 
officials to take every reasonable measure to prevent acts of violence by the applicant’s 
ex-husband, meant that the judicial authorities knew that the beneficiaries were exposed 
to harm and therefore state protection should have been provided.220  Moreover, the 
Commission noted that while the applicant had contacted the police department eight 
times when her daughters had disappeared, and in each call informed them about the 
restraining order, there was no indication that the police officers who responded to her 
calls and those who visited her house had taken any action to review the context of the 
restraining order or to find where her children were.221    
Consequently, the Commission concluded that the failure of the comprehensive system 
of the United States to provide an effective response to protect the applicant’s daughters 
from the deprivation of the right to life constituted a violation of their right to life under 
Article 1 of the American Declaration, and their right to be afforded special protection as 
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a vulnerable group under Article VII of the same Declaration. It underlined that although 
the state authorities were aware of the necessity to take immediate action,222  they had 
failed to fulfil this obligation.223 As ‘the State’s duty to apply due diligence […] to protect 
girl-children from right to life violations requires that the authorities […] have the 
capacity to understand the seriousness of the […] violence perpetrated […] and to act 
immediately’.224 It also concluded that the right to judicial protection of the applicant 
under Article XVIII of the Declaration had been breached by the United States at two 
levels: ‘fail[ing] to undertake a proper inquiry into systemic failures and the individual 
responsibilities for the non-enforcement of the protection order [and] not perform[ing] a 
prompt, thorough, exhaustive and impartial investigation into the deaths […] and fail[ing] 
to convey information to the family members related to the circumstances of their 
deaths’.225 
The above case, and the two earlier cases of Maria da Penha v. Brazil226 and Gonzalez et 
al. v. Mexico,227 are considered landmark cases in which the due diligence doctrine has 
decided the responsibility of the state on violence against women perpetrated by private 
actors.228 In Maria da Penha v. Brazil, Maria da Penha had been subjected throughout 
her married life to domestic violence by her husband, including two murder attempts, and 
as a result she became a paraplegic. The petitioners alleged that the violence she endured 
had been implicitly condoned by Brazilian authorities, because for more than 15 years 
they had failed to protect her or take effective measures to prosecute and punish her 
husband, despite her repeated complaints. 229  The Commission found violations of 
Articles 8 (fair trial) and 25 (judicial protection) of the ACHR, indicating that the violence 
she had suffered was ‘part of a gender pattern of negligence’ and ineffective action by the 
State on domestic violence, and that the general ‘judicial ineffectiveness’ had been 
‘conducive to domestic violence’, in society.230 
 
                                                
222 Ibid., para 164.  
223 Ibid., para 160. 
224 Ibid., para 165. 
225 Ibid., para 197. 
226 Maria da Penha v Brazil, Case 12 051 IACommHR Res No 54/01 (16 April 2001). 
227  González et al. (“Cotton Field”) v. Mexico, Preliminary Objections, Merits, Reparations, and Costs, Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. 
(ser. C) No. 205 (Nov. 16, 2009). The discussion of this case will be included in Chapters 3, pp. 67-68 and 4, pp. 127-128. 
228 For further details, see Karin Henriksson, State Responsibility for Acts of Violence Against Women by Private Actors: An Analysis 
of the Jurisprudence of the Inter-American System of Human Rights (MSc thesis, Uppsala University 2016) 36-67. 
229 Maria da Penha v Brazil (n 226), paras 1-20; See Houchins (n 188) 13-14.  




2.2.3.5 Summary Remarks 
Having analysed the jurisprudence of various different HR fora, it can be concluded that 
the state has a legal duty to positively protect its citizens against violent attacks by non-
state actors. If the state fails to take adequate measures, then it can be held in breach under 
international and regional HR law. In addition, the failure by the state and its criminal 
justice agency to pursue and investigate such criminal acts would constitute a violation 
of the above instruments, as would any bias, prejudice or absence of independent 
judgment.231    
2.3 The Nature and Scope of the State’s Positive Obligations  
The precise nature and scope of the protective obligations imposed on states remains 
uncertain.232 The above study of case law related to the ECHR revealed the recent trend 
towards imposing expanded obligations upon the state to prevent violation of HR, 
including the right to life. However, there has been little guidance from the Court about 
these obligations when private individuals, rather than the state, are the perpetrators of 
violence.233 It may seem obvious that there is a wide margin in the estimates of what the 
expanded obligations should be, and this grants member states a degree of freedom in 
determining how to protect the rights of individuals against the criminal acts of private 
individuals.234  Certainly, the standards contained in the Convention require member 
states to take reasonable and proportionate measures, and do not require extraordinary 
ones, as the state cannot anticipate every single violation committed by private 
individuals. 235  
The legitimacy of measures taken by the state to protect and secure the right to life of its 
citizens depends on whether these measures comply with the rule of law,236 and the 
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necessity of respecting HR.237 In the McCann case,238 the ECtHR had to judge whether 
the fatal shooting of three IRA members, suspected of carrying a bomb, by British special 
forces in Gibraltar in 1988 violated Article 2 of the ECHR.239 The Court recognised that 
the British authorities had faced a dilemma: ‘to have regard to their duty to protect the 
lives of the people in Gibraltar including their own military personnel and, on the other, 
to have minimum resort to the use of lethal force against those suspected of posing this 
threat in the light of the obligations flowing from both domestic and international law’.240 
The Court ruled that the use of force must be strictly proportionate to the entitlement of 
individuals to be protected against illegal acts of violence,241 and made it clear that 
recourse to lethal force to prevent such acts must be as limited as possible.242 Before using 
extreme force, authorities should consider the endangerment of innocent lives and those 
merely suspected of committing an offence. If the threat to the lives of individuals can be 
averted by alternative measures, then these should be employed. As the authorities in the 
McCann case could have prevented the suspects from travelling into Gibraltar, there was 
no excuse to have recourse to lethal force, and so the Court deemed the shooting to be 
unnecessary.243  
Similarly, a recent case brought before the Court reflects the deep concerns about the 
legitimacy of protective measures taken by state authorities to respond to the threat of 
terrorist acts and the possibility of trespassing the HR of innocent individuals. The case 
of the fatal shooting of a Brazilian citizen, Jean Charles de Menezes in 22 July 2005 
involved two Special Firearms Officers (SFOs) and various British security forces.244 
These forces were hunting would-be terrorist bombers following the discovery of 
explosive devices in rucksacks left on public transport on 21 July 2005, as ‘it was feared 
that the failed bombers would regroup’ and ‘attempt to detonate further explosions’.245 
This operation was launched two weeks after four suicide bombers detonated explosions 
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on London public transport on 7 July 2005, which left fifty-six people dead and many 
injured.246  
Intelligence information indicated that two terrorists were intent on exploding bombs on 
21 July. On the next day, security forces followed Mr. De Menezes as he went to work, 
believing that he had ‘a good possible likeness’ to one of the suspects.247 As he entered 
the underground station, an order was issued ‘to stop the subject getting on the tube’248 
and when Mr. de Menezes took his seat on a stationary train, he was killed by the two 
FSOs.249 It then became apparent that Mr. de Menezes had not been involved in the 
attempted terror attacks on 21 July, and so the British authorities expressed their profound 
regret at his death and an official representative of the MPS (Metropolitan Police Service) 
travelled to Brazil to apologise to his family and make an ex gratia payment to them.250 
Later, specifically in 2009, the MPS reached a monetary settlement with the family after 
they brought a civil claim for damages.251  Previously, Mr. de Menezes’ cousin had 
brought a complaint in January 2008 before the Court, following the decision of the 
Crown Prosecution Service (CPS) not to prosecute any individuals in respect of her 
cousin’s death.252 She argued that because the authorities responsible for the investigation 
were precluded from considering whether the use of force by the implicated officers was 
necessary and reasonable, they were unable to evaluate whether force was justified.253 It 
also submitted that where a fatal shooting by a police officer was concerned, securing 
public confidence by ensuring accountability is needed and that a perceived failure to 
prosecute public officials undermines such confidence.254 
The ECtHR ruled that the UK had not violated Article 2 of the Convention. It stated that: 
The frustration of Mr. de Menezes’ family at the absence of any individual prosecutions is 
understandable. However, it cannot be said that any question of the authorities’ responsibility for 
the death ... was left in abeyance.255  
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The Court further added: 
Sometimes lives are lost as a result of failures in the overall system rather than individual error 
entailing criminal or disciplinary liability. Indeed, […] in complex police operations failings could 
be institutional, individual or both. In the present case, both the institutional responsibility of the 
police and the individual responsibility of all the relevant officers were considered in depth by the 
IPCC [Independent Police Complaints Commission], the CPS, the criminal court, the coroner and 
the inquest jury […]. Neither was the decision not to prosecute any individual officer due to any 
failings in the investigation or the State’s tolerance of or collusion in unlawful acts; rather, it was 
due to the fact that […] a prosecutor […] concluded that there was insufficient evidence against 
any individual officer to meet the threshold evidential test […] of criminal offence.256 
Consequently, the Court concluded that: 
The domestic authorities have [not] failed to discharge the procedural obligation under Article 2 
of the Convention to conduct an effective investigation into the shooting of Mr. de Menezes which 
was capable of leading to the establishment of the facts, a determination of whether the force used 
was or was not justified in the circumstances and of identifying and – if appropriate – punishing 
those responsible.257 
Although the ECtHR in its previous jurisprudence concerning putative self-defence had 
endorsed a combination of a subjective standard (honest belief) with an objective one 
(good reasons for that belief) to decide whether the use of force was necessary, it seems 
that in the Armani da Silva case to they have strongly moved toward a subjective 
standard.258 The Court considered, firstly, that the ‘existence of “good reasons” should be 
determined subjectively’ and that it never regarded ‘reasonableness as a separate 
requirement but rather as a relevant factor in determining whether a belief was honestly 
and genuinely held’.259 Therefore, the test to assess killings in putative self-defence is 
now framed by the Court as follows: the person should have an ‘honest and genuine belief’ 
that force is necessary, which the Court consider in terms of it being subjectively 
reasonable based on the circumstances at the relevant time. If this belief is not so, the 
Court will not be likely to accept that it was ‘honestly and genuinely held’.260  
To determine the state’s responsibility for unlawful lethal force under HR law, this 
subjective standard was considered by most of the Grand Chamber as ‘inappropriate’, 
since it would allow states to absolve themselves of responsibility, even where their 
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agents used defensive force with negligence or gross negligence, without any good reason 
to believe that the attack was imminent or underway.261 In practice, victims would be 
placed at an unfair disadvantage in their attempts to hold states responsible for HR 
violations. 262  
In a joint opposite opinion to the decision of the Court, three judges pointed out that: 
There has been a violation of Article 2 under its procedural limb in the instant case…. [According 
to the international standards on the use of force by the police],263 if the police plan an operation 
which may require the use of firearms, they have the duty to act with the utmost care and in 
particular to meticulously check all the relevant information on which the operational plan is 
based. While planning their operations, the police also have the obligation to carefully assess the 
available alternatives and to choose the means which entail the least risk for human life and 
health.264  
They consider that the ‘[f]orce used in putative self-defence is never absolutely necessary’ 
on the grounds that Article 2 (2) requires the use of force not in defence of reasonably 
perceived violence, but rather ‘in defence of any person from unlawful violence’.265 They 
further stressed the serious danger that the police may use excessive lethal force where 
killings in putative self-defence based on unjustified error are not properly criminalised 
and punished under domestic law.266 According to one judge ‘it is surprising that such 
heavy institutional responsibility would not translate into at least some individual 
responsibility’.267 This view, however, has been said to be troubling since the Grand 
Chamber pointed out that Article 2 is concerned with the investigation itself rather than 
its outcomes or lack thereof. This is in line with the state’s ‘margin of appreciation,’ as 
the Court ‘could discern no uniform standards across the ECHR’s contracting states when 
it came to the appropriate evidential burden to be used in decisions as to whether or not 
to prosecute’.268 Nevertheless, the lack of a ‘positive’ outcome to an investigation will 
inevitably say something about its effectiveness in securing both the effective 
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implementation of domestic laws protecting the right to life and the accountability of state 
agents for deaths occurring at their hands.269  
2.3.1 Criticisms of the State’s Positive Obligation   
The horizontal aspect of the right to life is not, however, without its critics. Van Kempen, 
for example, argues that the horizontal application of HR through the auspices of criminal 
law undermines these rights for several reasons.270 Firstly, he states that to assert the need 
to empower individuals to achieve individual security, which is an essential precondition 
for freedom, does not necessitate that the state obligation to protect individuals against 
the misconduct of others should be based on HR. If it did, he argues, it would disregard 
the fact that not all duties of the state are or should be based on HR.271 Moreover, 
protection of citizens against serious threats was a state’s responsibility before the concept 
of HR existed. Rather, what is important is that HR ‘came into development in defence 
of the liberty of the individual against the power of state authorities and not to counter 
threats from private parties’.272 Furthermore, in his opinion, it would fail to acknowledge 
the difference in order and scope between HR and the value on which they are based.273  
Second, Van Kempen contends that the inappropriateness of employing criminal law 
against private individuals in fulfilment of the state’s positive obligation is that it leads 
the state authority to trespass their HR.274 Third, he maintains that relying on criminal law 
to fulfil the state’s positive obligation may unintentionally contribute to the entrenchment 
of the notion that this law is the solution to every security problem, and even possibly 
deter state authorities from implementing further additional security measures.275 Having 
criminal law fulfil such a function is contrary to the fundamental principle that criminal 
law should be used only to criminalise illegal acts and then only as a last resort.276 Finally, 
Van Kempen considers that it would be much more acceptable if this responsibility were 
not based on civil HR. As a more appropriate alternative, which avoids the problems of 
the concept of positive security within criminal law, he prefers the concept of state 
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sovereignty, where the essential function of the state is to provide security to its 
citizens.277 This concept, as defined by the International Commission on Intervention and 
State Sovereignty (ICISS), is threefold in its significance: 
First, it implies that the state authorities are responsible for the functions of protecting the safety 
and lives of citizens and promotion of their welfare. Secondly, it suggests that the national political 
authorities are responsible to the citizens internally and to the international community through 
the UN. And thirdly, it means that the agents of state are responsible for their actions [either of] 
commission [or] omission. The case for thinking of sovereignty in these terms is strengthened by 
the ever-increasing impact of international human rights norms, and the increasing impact in 
international discourse of the concept of human security.278		
While Van Kempen has a legitimate concern about the potential abuse of HR by the state, 
he has arguably paid insufficient attention to the context of the development of positive 
obligations and their rationale. In Dickson’s view, the characterisation of obligations in 
positive and negative terms (on which Van Kempen’s argument appears to rest) is 
essentially false.279 Dickson invokes Hohfeld’s idea that all rights have correlative duties 
and therefore it is not necessary to speak of obligations as negative and positive.280 This 
means that the positive nature of any obligation is already inherent without the need to 
explicitly declare it; the function of national and international HR courts is merely to 
ensure that rights which already exist are fully implemented. It can be argued that any 
extension in the role of HR to govern illegal acts committed by private individuals falls 
within the legitimate scope of HR law. This is because, even if HR were concerned only 
with ensuring that the state refrains from the violation of HR of its citizens, these rights 
would still require that passive attitudes by the state should not promote the idea that such 
violent conduct by private parties against HR will be tolerated or neglected. It must be 
admitted that the use of criminal law to pursue the positive obligation of protecting the 
right to life may involve the minimising or even violation of HR. However, every measure 
by the state, whether according to the concept of positive obligation or the principle of 
sovereignty, should be subject to the scrutiny of international and regional instruments 
and domestic law, and be condemned if illegitimate. In addition, allowing the state to 
choose its own appropriate measures to counter acts of violence would help to eliminate 
any excuse that the state could put forward to dismiss this responsibility.  
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It seems reasonable to claim that the state is morally and legally bound by its citizens’ 
expectations to protect them from violent acts of non-state actors. Although the nature 
and scope of the state’s positive obligations may differ from one situation to another 
according to the circumstances of each particular case,281 the law-making bodies and the 
criminal courts must take compelling concrete measures to ensure the protection of those 
at risk of losing their lives or being subjected to other forms of violence, including torture 
or gender-based violence, as a result of criminal acts by non-state actors. While the 
implementation of these preventive steps may involve practical difficulties in anticipating 
and detecting future criminal acts, the refusal to acknowledge that the existence of the 
social right to life requires adequate protection from criminal acts is, to say the least, 
highly contentious.282 This is in line with modern legal thinking about the social contract 
which in modern times has been the subject of more detailed in-depth exploration than 
ever before.283 However, it should be noted that no state can fully protect citizens from 
being murdered or injured by non-state actors. All states can do is establish mechanisms 
that reduce the risk, such as an efficient police force. Therefore, the state should not be 
held responsible for the consequences of acts of violence if it has fulfilled its positive 
obligations with due diligence. 
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Chapter 3: International Procedural Obligations of Investigation, 
Prosecution and Punishment 
3.1 Introduction 
The concept of a ‘right to remedy’ for victims of violent actions by non-state actors has 
led to the identification of various elements which need to be considered in the rectifying 
of wrongs.1 Shelton suggests that this right to remedy refers to ‘the range of measures 
that may be taken in response to an actual or threatened violation of human rights’.2 These 
measures can be divided into two. First, the procedural measures required to provide a 
remedy,3 namely the state’s duty to respond vigorously to criminal acts in order to fulfil 
its responsibility, not only to prevent such acts but also to put in place an effective 
criminal legal system capable of investigating, prosecuting and punishing perpetrators.4 
The second is the substantive duty of the state to make adequate reparation to victims of 
violent acts against the right to life.5  
From the victim’s perspective, the obligations of the state to effectively investigate deaths 
and injuries caused by criminal acts and prosecute and punish the perpetrators should be 
seen as a ‘right to justice’.6 This has been considered as giving victims the right to know 
and pursue the whole truth about their targeting,7 and to see the perpetrators prosecuted 
and punished.8  
This chapter examines how the victims’ right to justice and the procedural obligations of 
the state are recognised under moral/ethical, international and regional law and the 
jurisprudence of various HR courts. It can be argued that victims of violent acts have a 
moral and legal right to have the state investigate, prosecute and punish those responsible 
for the violation of their right to life. Should a state neglect to uphold this right, the moral 
and legal legitimacy of the state’s authority over its citizens would be questionable. In 
addition, while certain international standards for criminal investigation can be identified, 
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the argument accepts that at the present point in the post-conflict situation in Iraq, it 
cannot yet be expected that these standards will be fully adhered to, as will be discussed 
in Chapter 5, Section three. Moreover, these standards have themselves some limitations, 
which raises the question of whether amnesties/ Truth and Reconciliation Commissions 
(TRC) processes in a transitional scenario should be considered; these processes may to 
some extent be found to replace adherence to such standards during the transitional period 
in Iraq. 
3.2 The Moral/Ethical Justification for Imposing such an Obligation on the 
State  
Punishment needs to be morally justified if the rights of victims of violence to seek justice 
from the state against the perpetrators are considered to be legitimate. There has long 
been controversy regarding the nature of punishment and by what authority the state 
possesses the right to punish.9 In Leviathan, Hobbes enquires whether there is a right to 
punishment, asking, ‘by what door the right or authority of punishing, in any case, came 
in?’10 Hobbes answer to this question asserts that, while a sovereign has a right by nature 
to punish, it is also true that, as punishment is an evil,11 a subject cannot give his consent 
to accept it.12  
From these assertions,13 it seems that although a subject has the right to resist punishment, 
a legitimate state has no duty to respect a subject’s right to resist if they have offended 
against the rules of the social contract.14 This, according to one commentator, even if the 
members of a newly created state cannot give their consent to accept punishment for the 
violation of the social contract because no one has a pre-political right to punish, this does 
not prevent the possibility that a state can take upon itself the right to punish.15 A state 
acquires the right to punish on behalf of its members through the authorisation left, but 
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not given, to it by its members. The right to punish, for Hobbes, ‘is an artificial right 
submitted by an artificial person’.16    
In discussing the right to punishment, Rousseau viewed the rightness of justice to be a 
moral principle, but also considered what in practical politics a legitimate right to 
prosecute and punish should be and how far it should extend.17 This argument is based 
on the social contract. As outlined in Chapter 2, this basically states that when individuals 
freely form a body such as a state and freely agree to a constitution for the governing of 
that state, then, by general will, they freely give consent to legitimately enacted state 
laws.18 As Rousseau asserts, ‘in order then that the social compact may not be an empty 
formula, it tacitly includes the undertaking … that whoever refuses to obey the general 
will shall be compelled to do so by the whole body’.19 Rousseau affirms that all citizens 
must recognise that removal of the right to life is contrary to social contract principles 
and, therefore, must be punished.20 He holds that the general will of the members of a 
state is only valid if it not only binds individuals to the legitimate law and sanctions of 
the state for the protection of its citizens, but also prevents the state from unjustly 
depriving innocent individuals of their rights, with the intention of promoting the 
common or alleged common good.21  
Drawing on Rousseau, Brettschneider maintains that the rights of individuals in matters 
of criminal justice which arise from the social contract can be understood in two senses: 
first, that the notion of ‘hypothetical consent’ to punishment implies that citizens in the 
formation of a state freely give the right to punish to its governing body; second, that the 
authority given to the state to punish does not allow the fundamental rights of citizens, 
guaranteed by the social contract, to be infringed.22  Thus, the existence of a social 
contract provides a very good pragmatic basis for the promotion of morality. By 
enshrining a moral code within the state’s criminal justice system for the benefit of society, 
the right of justice for victims is much more achievable than was the case when mankind 
existed in a state of nature before society and social contracts were formed.23 This does 
not mean that a state without a social contract is not bound by principles of right and 
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wrong and that punishment for wrongdoing is unjustified. For instance, in an unjust state 
which has no legitimate social contract, the criminality of murder must be acknowledged 
as a serious wrong because it violates the natural rights of individuals which must be 
respected, even where a social contract is absent.24 Accordingly, it is necessary for the 
state to punish criminals because this is demanded by moral law,25 even when a social 
contract is absent. This is because all rights to justice may be said to stem from the moral 
law which not only transcends the social contract but also requires the social contract to 
conform to its norms.26 
3.2.1 Summary Remarks 
The right of victims to have perpetrators brought to justice should be seen as a 
fundamental requirement of both moral law and social contract principles and that all 
criminal justice systems must conform with this. It follows that victims have a moral right 
to compel states to bring their criminal justice systems up to standard and fully implement 
them in practice. Only if the state does this can it claim to have legitimate authority over 
its citizens in the sphere of HR. However, this requirement may bring about conflict with 
state law, as a state, in formulating its criminal justice system and putting it into practice, 
seeks not only to provide justice for its own sake but also for utilitarian reasons.27  
3.2.2 The Controversy Concerning the Rights of Victims to Justice 
This controversy will be addressed in terms of the following. 
3.2.2.1 Justice for Utilitarian Reasons  
Cesare Beccaria, inspired by Rousseau’s social contract, states, in his work On Crimes 
and Punishment, that the criminal justice system is justified as a necessary instrument to 
protect against individuals intending to breach the social contract.28 He states that one of 
the functions of these systems is to provide redress to private victims from perpetrators 
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of violence. However, since these systems originate from the terms of the social contract, 
they are more concerned with the well-being of the whole of society than with the rights 
of victims.29 As the only justification for punishment is to serve social utility it should 
not be inflicted to redress private damage.30 Furthermore, punishment for a crime must 
be proportionate to the degree of debt created by it to society.31 If it is too harsh, then it 
is unjust and if it is too lenient then it would not act as a sufficient deterrent.32 Similarly, 
Jeremy Bentham maintained that punishment should be utilitarian and proportionate 
because ‘the greater an offence is, the greater reason there is to hazard a severe 
punishment for the chance of preventing it’.33 As punishment harms the criminal, it can 
only be justified if the benefits it gives to society exceed the harm which has been done.34  
This view considers that violence against the individual as an offence against society, and 
punishment inflicted on criminals as a means of deterring future crime,35 to considerably 
limit the rights of individual victims, as the affected persons, to be granted justice. 
Individuals, before any human political society was formed, had a natural right to defend 
themselves against acts of violence by others.36 When individuals became victims of 
violence they or their relatives had the right to administer justice by themselves against 
the perpetrators.37 As societies were formed, individuals agreed by social contract to 
entrust this right to the state.38 In return for this entrustment, the state became morally 
obliged not only to prevent the violation of the human right to life of its citizens, but also, 
after violations have occurred, to ensure that victims’ rights are upheld by investigating, 
prosecuting and punishing perpetrators. This means that acts of violence should be 
regarded as harmful to individual victims and not only as an offence against the state,39 
and it is fair for the state to punish perpetrators because they are guilty of ‘non self-
restraint’ towards certain rights protected by criminal law which are obeyed by others. To 
tolerate criminals benefitting from their illegal actions cannot be justified.40  
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3.2.2.2 Justice for its Own Sake 
This view of punishment is supported by Immanuel Kant, who was an early proponent of 
the theory of punishment as a morally ‘just desert’. Kant criticised the use of punishment 
as a means to achieve other ends;41 for Kant, judicial punishment was only justified if 
exercised solely against the perpetrator for his illegal actions and not to achieve external 
goals.42 Moreover, forms of punishment need to be in proportion to the seriousness of the 
criminal acts committed. 43  Kant’s theory of punishment seems clearly to favour 
retributive justice.44 For Kant, without such justice there can be no talk of ‘any value in 
human beings living on the Earth’.45  
Kant clearly considers that retributive punishment must be imposed for the violation of 
moral law; he considered this to be a ‘categorical imperative’.46 On the other hand, he 
certainly recognised that juridical or positive law is primarily concerned with pragmatic 
matters and that the state must impose punishment on criminals not only to achieve justice, 
but also to deter future criminal actions.47 While Kant was persuaded that punishment by 
death is necessary for the crime of murder, there are circumstances in which he considers 
that it could be socially dangerous. 48  This dichotomy is rarely acknowledged by 
commentators on Kant’s theory of punishment. On the whole, they consider that Kant 
supported only retributive justice and rejected the idea of formulating positive law for 
utilitarian purposes.49 However, according to Brooks and Scheid, it can be argued that he 
supports both, even though he definitely gave much greater priority to retributive 
justice.50 Bradley, like Kant, also holds that murder is a violation of the moral law, and 
therefore requires retributive punishment, which must be imposed solely because it is 
deserved by the offender. To impose punishment for any other reason is grossly wrong 
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and immoral.51 However, there has been criticism of the exercise of justice for purely 
retributive reasons as this excludes punishment for the social benefit of society.52  
The prioritisation of retributive punishment, however, is not always achievable, nor is it 
the best solution to the many atrocities facing societies,53 especially where states, such as 
Iraq, have experienced violent conflict and/or grave and large-scale violations of HR. In 
this context, to achieve broad notions of justice while maintaining peace and stability, the 
field of transitional justice has been developed by practitioners, policy makers, and 
academics to guide government responses toward these objectives.54 It refers to a set of 
judicial and non-judicial approaches that societies may use to cope with the legacy of 
such violations, to bring those responsible to justice, establish the rule of law, and provide 
repair following such atrocities.55 By looking backward and forward, transitional justice 
affirms that ‘successive governments must build institutions that will bring justice to the 
past, while showing their commitment to good governance in the future’.56 In addition, 
by balancing the ideals of justice and the realities of politics, it might be able to create a 
radical transformation of the foundations of society, including its principles.57 Therefore, 
when this transformation is realised, it can become a starting point which permits a state 
to fully embrace the rule of law, restore stability and civic trust in a political system and 
its institutions, and construct a new social contract.58  
Transitional justice has been described by Pablo de Greiff as performing a social contract 
function. He believed it to have ‘two mediate goals, namely recognition and civic trust, 
and two final goals, reconciliation and democracy’.59 The processes of transitional justice 
are considered an enabling path to social contract re-negotiation (often in the form of 
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constitutional drafting) via the abuse of power condemnation, a justification for citizens’ 
expectations of justice and reparations for victims of HR abuse.60 In addition, social 
contract principles can produce a philosophical framework to facilitate movement away 
from past atrocities and vicious cycles of grievance and vengeance, because transitional 
justice helps ‘knit society together across different lines of social tension’, and renewing 
a social contract can provide this.61 This may arguably be the key to the restoration of 
trust and hope, for new respectful shared norms of reciprocal relationships of 
accountability, the re-establishment of stability, security, and a peaceful, stable and 
healthy civil society in Iraq. In turn, the implementation of the state’s positive obligations 
toward victims as discussed in this thesis might then be a more realistic prospect.62 
3.2.2.3 Summary Remarks           
The foregoing discussion indicates that to provide legitimate justification for judicial 
punishment of violations of the right to life, punishment must be imposed to restore 
victims’ sense of protection and justice in their criminal justice system. Nevertheless, 
because of the flaws of the strictly retributive-centred approach to addressing the needs 
of victims and society in the wake of mass HR atrocities, transitional justice has recently 
evolved towards a more holistic restorative justice.63 The latter pays less attention to 
perpetrators and focuses on finding the truth about the past, and helping victims and 
communities through the process of reconciliation and finding collective memory.64 It 
also assumes that victims, offenders and their respective communities participate in the 
process of justice.65 Until recent times, victims have been neglected by the retributive and 
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3.2.3 The Right of Victims to Participate in the Criminal Justice System 
Until the late 20th century,67 the diminishment of the participatory right of victims in 
criminal justice procedures is attributable to the two systems which have shaped the 
manner of public prosecution, namely the crime control and due process models.68 Packer 
sees these models as a means of collectively ensuring the promotion of the goals of the 
social contract.69 For Packer, the crime control model is based on the control of criminal 
conduct being the most significant function of the criminal process.70 It is primarily 
concerned with achieving efficiency in crime control and with the prosecution of 
offenders in order to serve the interests of society and not the victims.71 This model aligns 
itself with the utilitarian concept of criminal justice.72 The other model, the due process 
model, concentrates on preventing abuse by the state in the formation and execution of 
its criminal justice system. To do this, it seeks to impose limitation on the crime control 
model,73 and this process aims to provide safeguards for those accused of acts of violence 
to prevent miscarriages of justice.74 This model may be said to align itself with retributive 
rather than utilitarian justice theory.75  
These two Packer models of the criminal process have been criticised as not taking into 
account victims of crime and their right to participate in the criminal process.76 Christie, 
in his ‘Conflicts as Property’77 holds that victims have not only been left to live with their 
suffering, material loss or physical injuries, but have had the right to witness the cross-
examination of their aggressors in court removed, leaving them humiliated and 
aggrieved.78 Also, society itself has lost the opportunity to be clearly informed of the 
details of the violations, while offenders have lost the opportunity to communicate with 
victims, thus losing the important possibility of receiving forgiveness.79  
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3.2.3.1 Modern Developments  
Many studies indicate that, although victims of violent crime have been left with a feeling 
of powerlessness, isolation and fear,80 they have, in fact, been more affected by being 
allowed only limited involvement in the prosecution system than by the crime itself.81 
This has resulted in it now being acknowledged that a third model of criminal justice 
needs to be established, a new approach called the Victims Participation Model.82 Its 
essential elements are recognition of the primacy of victims of criminal acts and that they 
should be treated with dignity, respect, and fairness.83 
It has been stated that to secure both the effective participatory right of victims in criminal 
justice systems and expedite retributivist and utilitarian justice in public prosecution 
systems, the theory of ‘procedural justice’ should be adopted. 84  Procedural justice 
requires that individual victims be satisfied not only with the fairness of the final 
judgment in their cases, but also with the process by which this judgment has been 
reached.85 From a utilitarian perspective, a legal system which treats victims with respect 
and allows them to participate appropriately in the prosecution of perpetrators can be said 
to condone harm victims while also responding to the broader damage done to society.86 
By acknowledging harm to victims, social welfare is strengthened,87 and trust in the legal 
system is more likely to be maintained as fear of intimidation and victimisation are 
overcome.88 In addition, fair process strengthens the participants’ trust in decision makers 
and may subsequently lead them to be more honest and cooperative.89 Hence, even if 
outcomes are unfavourable, long-term compliance with the law by participants is more 
likely.90 Respect shown for the dignity of individuals provides the opportunity to be heard 
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and taken seriously, whilst also confirming their self-worth and standing in society, and 
increasing their trust in the morality and legitimacy of the state’s legal processes.91  
Procedural justice can be incorporated into both the utilitarian approach to criminal 
prosecution and retributive theory.92  When retributivists consider when and to what 
extent criminals deserve to be punished, as well as address the basic question of why 
punishment is deserved at all, the victim inevitably becomes part of the discussion.93 
However, although social contract principles give a state the authority to hold individuals 
accountable for violating and harming collective social norms, 94  a particular injury 
suffered by victims is also a specific, individual personal harm.95 Therefore, a criminal 
justice system cannot be said to be legitimate unless it considers the harm which victims 
as individuals have suffered.96 Fletcher suggests that a relationship of dominance has 
been created by the perpetrator over the victim,97 and so the reason for the state to arrest, 
try and punish perpetrators is to redress this dominance and the inequality between victim 
and offender.98 Should a state not prosecute and punish perpetrators of acts of violence, 
it would fail in this redress and be complicit, and thus the state would have the same 
dominant, harmful status as the victims.99 According to Hampton, when reacting to crime, 
there is a moral duty to lower the status of the perpetrator and raise that of the victim, to 
annul ‘the act of diminishment’.100  
3.2.3.2 Summary Remarks 
To conclude, social contract theory does not recognise victims’ rights to demand justice 
and or take a full part in criminal justice proceedings, because it considers the punishment 
for violations of the right to life only as a breach of the contract in terms of the general 
harm to society. Nevertheless, it can be argued that the right of victims to make these 
demands is based on the universally binding principles of moral law which outweigh 
social contract principles, and from which all forms of justice ultimately derive. 
Accordingly, victims have a moral right, even if their state’s criminal justice system fails 
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to recognise these rights.101 If not, citizens, particularly victims, would have no reason to 
believe that their criminal justice system is based on moral and legitimate foundations. 
Thus, any concept of criminal justice which considers that victims’ participation in the 
judicial process interferes with or is irrelevant to the state’s purpose to achieve justice and 
control crime should be considered invalid.  
3.3 The Current Provisions of International Law 
The international community has established a comprehensive set of legal instruments to 
ensure that victims of violent crimes are adequately provided with a remedy. However, 
the state’s duty to investigate the violation of HR and prosecute perpetrators under 
international law is not expressly referred to in general HR instruments, even though these 
instruments recognise the right to a remedy when a violation of HR has occurred.102 The 
first recognition of the right was documented in 1948 in the Universal Declaration of 
HR.103 Since then, the right to a remedy has been contained in several instruments.104   
The most important promotion of remedial action for victims of criminal acts is contained 
in the Basic Principles and Guidelines on the Right to a Remedy and Reparation for 
Victims of Gross Violations of International Human Rights Law and Serious Violations 
of International Humanitarian Law (the Basic Principles and Guidelines).105 According 
to Principle 3, the state’s duties to respect and guarantee respect for, and implementation 
of, international obligations includes:  
the duty to (a) take appropriate legislative and administrative and other appropriate measures to 
prevent violations; (b) investigate violations effectively, promptly, thoroughly and impartially 
and, where appropriate, take action against those allegedly responsible in accordance with 
domestic and international law; (c) provide […] victims of a HR or humanitarian law violation 
with equal and effective access to justice […] irrespective of who may […] bear[…] responsibility 
[…]; and (d) provide effective remedies to victims, including reparation.106  
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However, while the Basic Principles and Guidelines refer to the 1985 Basic Principles of 
Justice (The Victims’ Declaration),107 which considers that all victims have a right to 
remedy for acts of violence, it has, crucially, failed to extend these rights to victims of 
non-state crime.108 While the principles enshrined in the Victims’ Declaration are not 
legally binding on states, they provide guidance on how victims should be treated within 
their criminal justice systems.109 According to Principle 4 of the Victims’ Declaration, all 
victims should be treated with ‘compassion and respect for their dignity’ and require 
access to ‘justice and to prompt redress’. However, Doak notes that the Declaration does 
not explicitly provide for a duty to investigate, prosecute and punish criminal acts or 
reveal the truth about past violent acts, and this has permitted a variety of interpretations. 
Therefore, it is reasonable to claim that Principle 4 is not only inadequate to achieve a 
remedy for the victims of crime, but even positively adds to the problem of achieving 
reparation for these victims.110 Nevertheless, the Declaration importantly draws explicit 
attention to the rights of victims in criminal processes internationally.111  
3.3.1 The Duty to Investigate and bring Perpetrators to Justice under the 
Jurisprudence of HRC 
The comments and the jurisprudence of the HRC have substantially clarified the nature 
of the state’s duty of remedy under Article 2(3) of the Covenant to include the obligation 
to conduct an effective investigation and prosecution of violators of the right to life and 
the other HR.112 The Committee established this obligation by combining the general 
right to a remedy under Article 2 with Article 7 of the Covenant which concerns the 
prohibition of torture.113 The Committee concluded in its comment on Article 7 that 
complaints about ill-treatment require effective investigation by proficient authorities, 
and any persons found guilty must be held accountable. Victims must be able to access 
effective remedies, including the right to compensation.114  
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This right to remedy as demanded by the HRC was invoked in several cases concerning 
allegations of arbitrary arrest, death, torture, and disappearance in Uruguay during the 
late 1970s. The Committee found in the case of Bleier v Uruguay,115 which concerned 
the alleged forced disappearance of Eduardo Bleier in October 1975, that the state had a 
duty to uncover what had happened to Bleier, bring to justice those responsible, pay 
compensation, and ensure that similar violations did not recur.116  
The previous decisions of the HRC also reflect the fact that payment of compensation by 
itself is an insufficient remedy in cases concerning serious allegations of HR abuse. 
Bautista v Colombia,117 concerned the disappearance, torture and murder of Bautista by 
armed men posing as civilians. Although two military officials were found responsible 
for the disappearance by the National Procuraduria Delegado for HR, the victim’s family 
was only offered financial compensation. One of the two officials was dismissed from his 
post but neither were subjected to criminal punishment. The Committee declared these 
disciplinary and administrative decisions to be completely inadequate because they were 
ineffective within the meaning of Article 2, Paragraph 3 of the Covenant.118 Therefore, it 
is reasonable to state that administrative adjustments and payment of compensation are 
insufficient in serious cases of HR violation, such as disappearance and breaches of the 
right to life.119 
Although the Committee has frequently maintained that the Covenant does not afford 
individuals the right to oblige the state to prosecute another person with criminal charges, 
it does assert the need for a thorough investigation, criminal prosecution, and punishment 
of violations of HR.120 The Committee also found that amnesty laws which prevent the 
victims from obtaining the prosecution of the perpetrators are an adequate remedy and 
contrary to the state’s obligation to investigate and prevent grave HR abuses. 121 
According to Seibert-Foher, the concept of bringing perpetrators to justice is ambiguous 
and raises the question of whether the state must secure the prosecution and imprisonment 
of those held responsible for violating HR.122 It is true that the Committee has sometimes 
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given member states a degree of freedom to identify suitable measures to bring a 
perpetrator to justice.123 However, in other cases of the violation of HR, the Committee 
has explicitly demanded that the state impose criminal punishment for the breach of the 
right to life. This is clearly explained in the General Comment in Article 6 on the right to 
life of the ICCPR.124 Moreover, the Committee has also specified that a state is obliged 
to guarantee that criminal proceedings are begun against the persons responsible.125     
Ironically, while states are obliged to investigate allegations of HR abuse and prosecute 
and punish the perpetrators of these criminal acts, the concept of ‘right to remedy’ has 
usually been limited to abuse of victims’ HR by public officials, and does not extend to 
reflect the aims of international standards to deal either entirely or substantially with 
victims of non-state crime.126  The criminal behaviour of private persons may be as 
dangerous as that of official authorities, particularly if it is known they have such 
significant powers that they are even more dangerous to the lives of individuals than any 
criminal action by a state.127 Therefore, in the context of large numbers of victims of 
violent acts, in considering that HR standards are concerned only with the accountability 
of public authorities for the perpetration of HR violations by themselves, it may be 
doubted whether private individuals responsible for acts of violence qualify as violators 
of HR.128  
The HRC recognises in its General Comment No. 31 the need to investigate, prosecute 
and punish the violent acts of non-state actors.129 The Committee recalled its General 
Comment in the case of Krasovskaya v. Belarus,130 which concerned the disappearance 
or presumed death of Anatoly Krasovkaya. It noted that although the appellants had 
submitted many complaints to the authorities, this had not led to the arrest or prosecution 
of any offender.131 It further observed that the state authorities had failed both to conduct 
a proper investigation and clarify what stage their proceedings had reached ten years after 
the disappearance of Mr. Krasovsky.132 It concluded that in the absence of an explanation 
of the lack of progress in the investigation, the state party had undoubtedly violated its 
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duties under Article 2, paragraph 3 and Articles 6 and 7, by failing ‘to properly investigate 
and take appropriate remedial action regarding the disappearance’.133  
Clearly, the HRC acknowledges the state’s duty to punish horrific, large-scale 
deprivations of the right to life, whether by private individuals or public officials. Even 
when committed by non-state agents, these acts of violence still constitute a serious threat 
to life and security. The enforcement of these standards of the HRC clearly demonstrates 
that member states of the Covenant have an obligation to criminalise, prosecute and 
punish violent acts, including terrorism.134 As an example, the Committee employed 
these standards when it emphasised that those responsible for killings in Northern Ireland 
should be prosecuted.135 In its Comments on the report submitted by the UK, it expressed 
deep concerns that, although significant time had passed since the killings of individuals 
in Northern Ireland, no fully independent and comprehensive investigation had occurred 
into the many murders, and that the responsible offenders had not been prosecuted. It 
considered it particularly concerning because, after persistent allegations of involvement 
and collusion by members of the state party’s security forces, the situation remained 
unresolved. It thus emphasised that the British state should urgently take measures to 
ensure a thorough explanation of violations of the right to life in Northern Ireland.136 
The HRC has regularly insisted that punishment is necessary if HR are to be adequately 
protected. For example, the Committee urged the Colombian government to ensure full 
implementation of children’s rights by adopting punitive measures against acts of child 
murder.137 The state’s efforts to bring to justice those responsible for past HR violations 
were welcomed by the Committee as measures which comply with the demands of Article 
2, paragraph 2.138 Seibert-Fohr notes that even if prosecution is considered an inadequate 
method of prevention, it is certainly a strong option that the state can take to combat 
serious acts of violence, such as terrorism, and meet the requirements of HR 
conventions.139 She also claims that the state’s failure to act against these criminal acts 
may be interpreted as acquiescence and can even embolden perpetrators to commit further 
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acts.140 Nevertheless, not every failure to prosecute a crime is a violation of the victims’ 
right. The requirement is limited to particular situations and thereby suggests that it does 
not apply to every individual case.141 Clearly, the duty of the state to prosecute and punish 
private violations of the right to life under the due diligence principle is merely an 
obligation of conduct and not of result.142 Accordingly, member states of the Covenant 
should only be considered in violation of their obligation if they do nothing or respond 
inadequately.143  
Efforts have been made to persuade the Committee that, indeed, every victim of acts of 
violence has a right to justice. It has been argued in many cases brought before the 
Committee that victims are entitled under the Covenant to insist on the prosecution of the 
perpetrators and that various substantive rights provide a legal basis against immunity.144 
Nevertheless, the HRC did not acknowledge that these provisions entitled victims to the 
right to require punishment of the criminals on the grounds of violation of HR.145  
For instance, the complainants in Acuña Inostroza asserted that the Chilean amnesty law 
No. 2.191 of 1978 violated Article 14 (1) (the right to fair trial) because victims and their 
families were not given access to the court on equal terms, nor were they given the right 
to a fair and impartial hearing.146  Nevertheless, the HRC rejected this assertion but 
without explaining in any detail the actual meaning of Article 14. 147 This Article applies 
only to the ‘determination of any criminal charge’ and not to the determination of whether 
or not criminal charges should be brought. If no charges have been made then Article 
14(1) does not provide the victim with the right of review.148  
On the other hand, Article 15(2) (the exception to prevent the retroactivity of criminal 
law for crimes under customary international law) does not provide protection against 
immunity.149 The complainants in Acuña Inostroza asserted that the refusal of Chile to 
prosecute those who committed executions in the ‘Baños de Chihuio’ incident violated 
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Article 15(2) by granting immunity for these criminal acts.150 They interpreted Article 
15(2) as obliging states to try all criminal acts in accordance with international law, 
whether or not domestic law acknowledges these acts as criminal offences.151 This Article 
specifically states that the application of prevention of retroactive domestic criminal law 
does not prohibit trials and punishment, as this may be required by the demands of the 
general principles of international law.152 The phrase, does not prejudice the trial and 
punishment, means merely that the state may prosecute violators of HR in the absence of 
criminal statutes but does not mandate such a trial; it is purely permissive, that is to say, 
that it is up to the state to prosecute such acts without being legally bound to do so.153  
3.3.2 Summary Remarks 
To sum up, it seems that the ambiguity of the provisions mentioned above has led the 
Committee to disregard the right of victims to demand the prosecution and punishment 
of violators of the right to life. This position of the Committee is demonstrated by its 
interpretation of Article 2(3), in that while criminal proceedings are a necessary remedy 
for victims, it does not acknowledge that victims actually have a right to require them.154 
The Committee has regularly made a distinction between the right to a fully effective 
remedy according to Article 2(3), and the general obligation of the state to prosecute 
criminals and prevent future crimes. 155  Where civil remedies depend on criminal 
proceedings, this should not be taken to affirm a right of individual victims to receive 
criminal justice.156  
3.4 Regional HR Law 
In recent years, the nature and scope of an ‘effective remedy’ and related positive 
procedural obligations have been demonstrated by the monitoring of regional HR’ bodies 
in a rich body of case law, which has provided a legal basis for the establishment of the 
concept that a state owes victims a remedy of criminal investigation and prosecution.157 
                                                
150 Acuña Inostroza et al. v. Chile (n 146), paras 3.2, 3.4. 
151 Seibert-Fohr (n 122) 19. 
152 Ibid. 
153 Ibid. 20. 
154  Sundara A. L. Rajapakse v Sri Lanka, Communication No. 1250/2004, U.N. GAOR, Hum. Rts. Comm., U.N. Doc. 
CCPR/C/87/D/1250/2004 (2006), para. 9.3; Bautista de Arellana v Colombia (n 117), para 8.6. 
155 Seibert-Fohr (n 122) 24. 
156 Sundara A. L. Rajapakse v. Sri Lanka (n 154), para 9.5. See Seibert-Fohr (n 122) 25. 




This has, also, contributed to the establishment of the right of victims to participate in 
judicial procedures.158  
3.4.1 The Current Approach under the Inter-American Instruments  
The Inter-American system entitles individuals under Article 18 of the American 
Declaration of the Rights and Duties of Man159 to resort to the courts to guarantee respect 
for their legal rights and obtain protection of their essential constitutional rights against 
violation by authorities.160 The ACHR goes beyond this, enabling individuals to have 
‘effective recourse to a competent court or tribunal’ for protection from acts violating 
their fundamental rights, acknowledged by the ‘constitution or laws of the state or by the 
Convention’, even if these acts are committed by persons acting in an official capacity.161    
The IACtHR states that Article 25 of the ACHR concerning the right to judicial protection 
‘incorporates the principle recognized in the international law of human rights of the 
effectiveness of the procedural instruments or means designed to guarantee such 
rights’.162 Accordingly, the member states of the Convention are required to provide 
victims of HR abuse with effective judicial remedies, which must be applied in 
accordance a fair trial, as prescribed by Article 8. This is used to ensure fairness to, and 
participation by, victims of criminal acts, and also in accordance with the general duty 
which states have to respect and ensure all rights guaranteed by Article 1, paragraph 1.163 
The Court stated in the case of Velasquez-Rodriguez, which concerned the arrest, torture 
and execution of an Honduran student activist by the military authorities,164 that the 
embedding of the phrase ‘ensure to all persons’ contained in Article 1(1) of the IACHR 
establishes the obligation of member states to investigate, prosecute and punish grave 
violations of HR in accordance with Convention’s standards.165 It also asserts that the 
obligation to punish violators of HR should not be limited to cases involving criminal 
acts committed by state authorities, but should also cover crimes by private individuals.166 
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In addition, the state obligation to punish is independent of the duty to prevent and 
investigate.167 According to the Court, if the violation of criminal acts goes unpunished 
and the right of victims to life and physical integrity is unrestored, the state will have 
failed to secure the rights of victims under the Convention.168  
The large-scale failure of member states to prosecute and punish perpetrators is clearly 
attributable to the widespread recognition of impunity, which, according to the Inter-
American Court, means ‘the total lack of investigation, prosecution, capture, trial and 
conviction of those responsible for violations of the rights protected by the American 
Convention’.169 Two different forms of impunity have been distinguished by the Inter-
American Commission, namely, de jure and de facto impunity.170 While de jure impunity 
can be described as the provisions by which perpetrators of criminal acts are pardoned or 
given amnesty,171 de facto impunity applies when the state has taken inadequate measures 
to investigate, prosecute and punish offenders.172 Such impunity may be said to exist 
when states are corrupted and shield perpetrators and, also, when there is a culture of 
disrespect for the law.173 Therefore, the Court asserts that impunity in itself is a violation 
of HR174 and, therefore, member states of the Convention must ‘use all the legal means 
at its disposal to combat that situation, since impunity fosters chronic recidivism of HR 
violations, and total defencelessness of victims and their relatives’.175   
For instance, in the case of Cotton Field,176 which concerned sexual violence, torture and 
the death of women and girls, the Court noted that Mexican authorities countenanced a 
culture of impunity for such acts, leading to violation of the victims’ right to life.177 The 
Court found that the police and prosecution had failed to act or acted inadequately to 
prevent and investigate violations, which allowed them to continue.178 Moreover, the 
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Court emphasised that failure by the state to prosecute violators of the right to life was 
itself a violation of that right.179 The Court’s condemnation of impunity was also joined 
by the Inter-American Commission, which asserted that states should not only be held 
accountable for failure to prevent the violation of HR under international law, but also 
for allowing acts of violence to go unpunished. 180  Consequently, to enforce HR, 
prosecution and punishment must occur because they are the most effective means181 
which the state possesses by reason of its monopoly over punitive measures.182  
In a similar vein, Jessica Gonzalez et al. v. United States183 may also be cited. This case 
concerned the allegation of Jessica Lenahan of the murder by her ex-husband Simon 
Gonzales of their three daughters. The Inter-American Commission on HR added a social 
dimension to the case by emphasising that unless the state complies with its responsibility 
to investigate HR abuses against girl-children committed by a non-state agency and 
overturn any impunity, the culture of repetition of such violence against women will be 
enhanced. The Commission noted that although the state authorities had established two 
investigations to clarify the circumstances surrounding the death of the girls, these 
investigations were taken mainly to reveal the facts of the shooting to death of Simon 
Gonzales by the police.184 Therefore, the Commission emphasised that the state was 
obligated to investigate the Gonzales’ deaths, to establish that violence against girl-
children is intolerable, even when perpetrated by private individuals.185 Moreover, the 
Commission explained that inaction on violence against women promotes the repetition 
of violence, ‘since society sees no evidence of willingness by the State […] to take 
effective action [against] such acts’. 186  Therefore, it may be said that within the 
jurisprudence of the Court and Commission, the obligation of member states of the 
Convention to combat impunity has been firmly established.187  
3.4.1.1 The Right to Justice within the Inter-American Systems   
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The right to justice emerged with cases such as Bulacio v Argentina,188 which concerned 
the detention, beating and death of a minor by the Argentine Federal Police. The Inter-
American Court reminded member states of the Convention of their duty to investigate 
HR violations, and punish perpetrators, and that the victims of violations and their next 
of kin should have access to justice not only for their own satisfaction but for the benefit 
of all society.189  
The Inter-American Commission declared prosecution to be an essential element of both 
the right to fair trial (Art. 8) and the right to judicial protection (Art. 25). It further 
considered that denying victims a part in criminal proceedings was contrary to Article 
8.190 This is clear in the interpretation of this Article by the Commission in the case of 
Mendoza v Uruguay,191 in which the victim’s participation in the criminal proceedings 
had been denied. The Commission criticised this failure, 192  and described criminal 
procedures as appropriate to determine criminal liability and punishment. In order to 
maintain its claim that this participatory right should be respected by the state, it referred 
to the Uruguayan Code of Criminal Procedure.193 Under this statute, victims have the 
right to participate and demand that measures be taken to properly address the crime.194 
The Commission emphasised that, by virtue of Article 8, the domestic right became 
subject to the protection of the Convention and, thereby, guaranteed that each victim was 
granted access to the criminal proceedings of the court.195 It concluded that victims are 
entitled under Article 8 to a judicial investigation to reveal the facts concerning those 
responsible for the crime, and impose the appropriate punishment.196 Dismissal of the 
charges would constitute a denial of this right.197 
The Commission specifically noted that victims and their relatives have the ‘right to 
obtain justice’ through effective action against violators of their HR. 198  This right, 
according to the Commission, goes beyond merely allowing participation by the victims 
and, also, as well as the right to investigation, it requires that perpetrators be duly 
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prosecuted and punished.199 Therefore, if the state fails to prosecute and punish the 
perpetrators, this is a denial of justice contrary to the judicial right of victims under Article 
8. 200  The Commission states that this right exists independently of whether or not 
domestic law recognises a victim’s right to have criminal charges brought against the 
perpetrator.201  
Similarly, the Inter-American Court criticised the absence of effective legal proceedings. 
In the case of Paniagua Morales,202 which concerned illegal detention, ill-treatment and 
deprivation of life, the criminal proceedings instigated by two of the victims had been 
inadequately conducted.203 The criticism of the Court was that the case was not heard 
independently and impartially in an appropriate time frame, with victims not being 
permitted to take part in the process.204 Therefore, the obligation of the state under Article 
8 of the Convention had been violated.205 Also, the Court in the Street Children case 
expressed the requirements of criminal proceedings under Article 8, as the right to be 
heard, and the punishment of perpetrators through criminal prosecution.206 
To ensure the protection of the right of victims to justice, the Inter-American Court and 
Commission combined Articles 25 and 8.207 Therefore, it is a requirement both that the 
state brings violators of the right to life to justice. According to the Court and the 
Commission, the right to justice applies to all member states of American HR, 
irrespective of their domestic criminal procedure laws.208 Moreover, the Court considers 
this right as jus cogens.209 This is to say that the right to judicial protection ensured by 
these articles would be denied to the detriment of the victim should the state fail to 
investigate and prosecute violations of HR.210                    
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When these provisions are taken in conjunction with Article 1(1) of the ACHR, they 
impose a positive obligation on states to observe the right of victims to justice, thereby, 
giving them an effective remedy.211 Further, in recent cases, the Court has considered that 
there is a correlation between the denial of the victims’ rights to effective justice in a 
criminal trial and the failure to guarantee surviving victims or their families the right to 
truth through withholding information concerning the crime and the perpetrators.212 The 
Commission has emphasised that female victims of violence must be able to access 
judicial protection, truth, and an impartial investigation in accordance with international 
standards. Moreover, the state must show that this investigation is not simply a procedural 
formality and is itself responsible for finding the truth, rather than the victim or her next-
of-kin. Such a duty is essential in cases involving the right to life of girls.213  
However, it is important that the right to truth is not limited to individual victims and 
their families but also given to society, which is entitled to know the truth about the 
incidents committed and the reasons for and circumstances of serious criminal acts,214 as 
the Court asserted.215 There are different objectives between the right of society to know 
the truth, which is mainly to avoid future violence, and that of victims and their relatives, 
which is to be provided with an effective remedy for their suffering. The state must be 
held responsible if its agents have made deliberate attempts to obstruct the criminal 
process or have been guilty of grave irregularities or omissions that have ignored the right 
of victims to truth and justice.216 However, the state should not be held responsible if it 
has taken reasonable measures to ensure the rights of victims to truth and justice. This is 
to say that the state’s fulfilment of its duty to provide truth and justice to the victims in 
the criminal process is to be judged by its due diligence in providing an effective 
prosecution, not by the final results.217 The effectiveness of the criminal process can be 
undermined if victims receive unfair treatment during it. An example of this is where the 
Court considered the failure of the state to communicate information about the fate of 
victims in cases of forced disappearance, and to lead an investigation into the 
                                                
211 See, for example, the case of Villagran-Morales et al. v. Guatemala, (The Street Children Case) (n 206), paras 216-227; Aldana-
Pindell (n 112) 627; Thomas M. Antkowiak, ‘Truth as Right and Remedy in International Human Rights Experience’ (2002) 23 
Michigan Journal of International Law  977, 986. 
212 See Bámaca Velásquez Case, Judgment of November 25, 2000, Inter-Am Ct. H.R. (Ser. C) No. 70 (2000), para 201; Castillo Pez, 
Case No. 43, Inter-Am. C.H.R., paras 105-106; Barrios Altos v. Peru (n 171), para 48; see Aldana-Pindell (n 112) 625; for further 
details of the right to truth, see Antkowiak (n 211) 996-1002. 
213 See Laura L. Finley, Encyclopedia of Domestic Violence and Abuse (ABC-CLIO, 2013) 649-650. 
214 Seibert-Fohr (n 122) 70.  
215 Bámaca Velásquez v. Guatemala, Reparations, 2002 Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 91 (22 February 2002), para 77. 
216 Aldana-Pindell (n 112) 628. 




identification of those responsible and to punish them, as unfair treatment which created 
much uncertainty, anxiety and feelings of powerlessness for the families of victims.218  
3.4.1.2 Summary Remarks 
It seems reasonable to claim that Inter-American jurisprudence has established 
comprehensive procedural obligations on signature states of the Convention to 
acknowledge the rights of victims of acts of violence to justice, truth and fair treatment. 
However, the recognition of the right of victims to demand prosecution against violations 
of their rights should be taken in conjunction with the duty of the state to prosecute.219 In 
other words, such prosecution is not dependent solely on the right of victims, as it would 
be possible for them to cede this right by, for instance, not requiring the state to 
prosecute.220 The Inter-American Court removed any doubt in this matter by stating that 
the state would be in breach of its duty to secure the full exercise of the right of all 
individuals under its jurisdiction should it fail to punish an offence at the request of 
victims.221  
3.4.2 The Current Approach under European Instruments 
Under Article 13 of the ECHR,222 an effective remedy should be provided by a national 
authority if an individual’s rights have been violated under the Convention, irrespective 
of whether or not this violation has been committed by officials of the state.223 In a 
number of judgments, the ECtHR has scrutinised the combined impact of Article 13 (the 
right to remedy), Article 1 (the requirement of a state to ‘secure to everyone within its 
jurisdiction the rights and freedoms’ laid down by the Convention), Article 2(1) (the 
obligation to protect the right to life) and Article 3 (the right to be free from torture or 
inhuman treatment).224 These judgments confirm that the victim’s right of access to an 
effective remedy may also be breached when the state fails in its duties under the 
Convention.225  
                                                
218 Ibid., para 173. See Seibert-Fohr (n 122) 71. 
219 See Aldana-Pindell (n 112) 621. 
220 Ibid. 
221 See Villagran-Morales et al. v. Guatemala, (The Street Children Case) (n 206), para 99.  
222 European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) (n 74) Ch. 2. 
223 See van der Wilt and Lyngdorf (n 121) 46; Axelle Reiter, ‘Victims of ‘private’ crimes and application of human rights in 
interpersonal relations’ (2013) Temida 55, 59. 





This right of the victim to a remedy implies that the state has a positive obligation to 
effectively investigate any violation of the right to life; this was explicitly recognised by 
the Court in the case of McCann and Others v United Kingdom.226 The Court held that 
the statutory prohibition of arbitrary killing by state authorities would be practically 
ineffective	 if a procedure to review the unlawful use of lethal force by the state were 
lacking.227 Therefore, the Court asserted that the duty to protect the right to life under 
Article 2 of the Convention, in conjunction with Article 1, requires a state to establish an 
‘effective official investigation when individuals have been killed as a result of the use of 
force by, inter alios, agents of the state’.228 The inclusion of the phrase, inter alios, means 
that the duty to investigate arises whether those alleged to have been responsible were 
state agents or not.229 
The Court in Ergi v Turkey 230 adopted the same stance. Although the Court was not 
convinced beyond reasonable doubt that the accidental killing of the applicant’s sister, 
Havva Ergi, was by security forces during a counter-terrorism operation, the Court held 
that the duty of the state to investigate is not limited to killings by state agents, nor based 
on the lodging of a formal complaint by a family member about the killing. In Ergi v 
Turkey, the authorities’ knowledge of the killing created an obligation under Article 2 of 
the Convention to conduct an effective investigation into the death.231 However, the Court 
concluded that the Turkish authorities had failed to comply with Article 2, which obliged 
them to establish an effective investigation.232 
Although the scope of the obligation under Article 13 varies according to the nature of 
the complaint under the Convention, the right to a remedy must be both practically and 
legally effective, and not ‘unjustifiably hindered by the acts or omission’ of the state.233 
Accordingly, while the Court, in general, leaves some discretion to member states to 
choose appropriate remedial measures, provided they are ‘effective in law and practice’, 
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the extent of this discretion depends on the nature and gravity of the alleged abuse.234 
Therefore, because of the seriousness of the deprivation of the right to life, the Court 
considered that Article 13 requires both compensation and investigation which leads to 
punishment, allowing the complainant to be effectively involved.235 
There is some ambiguity surrounding the Court’s judgments about the interpretation of 
the state’s duty to effectively investigate and punish perpetrators of serious violations of 
HR. Some commentators have maintained that, according to the judgments of the Court, 
investigation is not an end but a means, which must explicitly lead to the identification 
and punishment of perpetrators.236 In other words, the state has a duty to punish HR 
violators,237 a duty repeatedly referred to by the Court which stressed that all violations 
of the right to life should be curbed and punished.238 Nevertheless, the Court still appears 
to be unclear about the duty to punish, as it merely insists on the duty to criminalise, and 
establish an enforcement mechanism to effectively implement the criminal law.239  
This can be clearly seen if a comparison is made between the European Court’s 
requirement to make an effective ‘investigation capable of leading to identification and 
punishment’ and the prescription of the HR Chamber for Bosnia and Herzegovina240 
which observes the European Convention on HR. The HR Chamber has repeatedly 
ordered the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina not only to hold a criminal 
investigation into HR abuses on the grounds of the European Convention but also ‘to 
bring to justice’ their perpetrators.241 	The reason behind the Court’s use of unclear 
terminology regarding the right of criminal sanction may be because the Court holds that 
the obligation of the state to carry out criminal investigation is not a duty of outcome, but 
of means. 242  Therefore, according to Seibert-Foher, punishment is not a remedial 
component and it would be a mistake to interpret the demand of the Court to conduct an 
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investigation capable of leading to punishment as confirmation of an actual right to 
punishment.243 
In Armani Da Silva v. the United Kingdom,244 the Court re-asserted its position that for 
the investigation to be effective in the context of Article 2 of the Convention, specifically 
regarding the use of lethal force by the state, those investigating must be impartial, and 
the investigation must establish the truth, in order to punish those responsible; the 
conclusions must be based on ‘thorough, objective and impartial analysis’ and 
‘sufficiently accessible to the victim’s family’.245 Thus, the authorities must take the 
necessary steps to secure evidence, including testimony and all relevant evidence.246 The 
Court found that the obligation to punish would apply only ‘if appropriate’, although it 
had initially stated that an investigation should be capable of leading to the ‘identification 
and punishment of those responsible’.247 
This obligation to conduct an effective investigation has also been emphasised by the 
Court in The Tagayeva and Others v Russia,248 in which the judgment of the Court found 
the Russian authorities had failed to prevent a terrorist attack, and conduct an effective 
investigation. This was described as ‘a high watermark for the human rights protection of 
hostages and for confirming the responsibility of states in conducting counter-terrorism 
operations under the European Convention on HR’.249 The case of the 2004 terrorist 
attack on a school in Beslan, Russia, in which about 800 children and 300 parents were 
taken hostage for over fifty hours, ended in the authorities storming the school after 
unsuccessful negotiations.250 Following this armed intervention by Russian forces, 330 
people lost their lives, including more than 180 children, and over 750 people were 
injured.251 Because some of the victims and their families were not satisfied with how the 
authorities responded to the attack, they complained to the ECtHR, asking it to examine 
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if the Russian authorities had sufficiently protected their lives and safety.252 They made 
allegations ranging from the failure of the authorities to: prevent the hostage taking, 
although they knew there was a real risk of civilians being targeted; establish the causes 
of death of 116 victims and the type of ammunition employed during the operation; and, 
adequately plan and control the rescue operation, leading to the use of excessive and 
indiscriminate lethal force.253  
The Court concluded unanimously that despite the specific and sufficient information 
available to the authorities about the intended magnitude and nature of the planned 
terrorist attack in the area, at least several days in advance, they had failed to take 
reasonable preventive and protective measures against the attack and, had thus violated 
their positive obligation under Article 2; 254  this obligation applies not only to the 
protection of identifiable individuals, but can also be invoked to afford general protection 
to society.255 The Court further found a violation of Article 2 because the investigation 
conducted by the authorities fell short of requirements for an adequate investigation.256 
In reaching this conclusion, four crucial aspects were examined in detail by the Court: (1) 
poor forensics, which led to the failure to determine the cause of death of one third of the 
victims; (2) procedural failures with essential evidence which caused ‘irreparable harm’ 
to the ability to conduct a ‘thorough, objective and impartial analysis;’ (3) the subsequent 
failure to determine the lethal force used by state agents; and (4) the failure to meet public 
scrutiny requirements by limiting victims’ access to key reports.257  Such procedural 
findings reassert the position of the Court that even in complex scenarios resulting in 
large-scale killings, the obligation to conduct effective investigation is applied.258  
In cases involving violence against women, including domestic violence resulting in 
death, criminal remedies are deemed necessary by the Court.259 In displaying its view on 
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the effectiveness of criminal investigations by states, the Court held in Opuz v Turkey260 
that, where criminal proceedings concerning an intentional killing have lasted for more 
than six years, these proceedings are not a sufficient response from the state261 and, thus, 
an obligation to conduct criminal proceedings within a reasonable time by states is also 
required under Article 2.262 Therefore, a failure in the obligation to effectively investigate 
and punish in cases of violence against women may result in a violation of the procedural 
limb of Article 2. 263  The Court also considers the failure to initiate an effective 
investigation of complaints of domestic violence and other forms of violence perpetrated 
by private actors, including rape and sexual abuse, to be incompatible with the due 
diligence standard under Articles 3 (the right to be free from torture or inhuman treatment) 
and 8 (the right to respect for private and family life) and, thus, violates these 
provisions.264 In this regard, the Court has identified that even in the absence of a formal 
request by the victim, the authorities have an obligation to begin an investigation if they 
are aware of the abuse.265 When it comes to the obligation to prosecute perpetrators of 
violence, the Court warned that ‘the more serious the offence or the greater the risk of 
further offences, the more likely that the prosecution should continue in the public interest, 
even if victims withdraw their complaints’.266 This implies, inter alia, that in addition to 
the satisfaction of the victim, a broader public interest objective can be achieved from the 
prosecution of serious offences of domestic violence, including punishment of such acts, 
providing reassurance to victims, and deterring others.267 It is important to note that it is 
in the public interest that the perpetrators of such violence are prosecuted, especially 
where victims withdraw charges due to pressure or intimidation.268 Moreover, a state has 
an obligation to punish the perpetrators of sexual and domestic violence. The Court held 
that the states have a duty to impose criminal punishments and effectively enforce the 
punishments ordered in practice.269 It also considers that, ‘long and unexplained delays’ 
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to enforce these punishments and protection orders are incompatible with due 
diligence.270 
For instance, in Valiuliene v Lithuania,271 the applicant complained that she had been 
beaten by her partner on several occasions and argued that the state authorities had failed 
to protect her sufficiently and investigate the violence against her, and to hold the abuser 
accountable, and that the criminal proceedings she had established against her abuser had 
been excessively lengthy and fruitless.272 Moreover, although the Court was persuaded 
that the national law of Lithuania provided a sufficient regulatory framework to pursue 
the crimes against the applicant, it concluded that the practices and manner in which the 
criminal law mechanisms had been implemented were defective and insufficient to 
protect the rights of the applicant, to the point of constituting a violation of Lithuania’s 
positive obligations under Article 3 of the Convention.273 In reaching this decision, the 
Court noted that, because the flaws of the actions in Lithuanian authorities’ investigation, 
criminal proceedings were discontinued due to the fact that ‘the circumstances of the case 
were never established by a competent court of law’.274 The Court noted that one reason 
to impose punishment was to deter the offender from causing further harm, and without 
having the facts of the case established by a criminal court, this aim could not be 
achieved.275  Therefore, the Court stated that it could not deem that rights had been 
adequately protected against ill treatment when criminal proceedings are ended due to the 
prosecution being time barred because of state inaction.276 
The problematic nature of recent European Court case law seems to make its judgments 
less clear than those of the Inter-American Court judgments, by failing to declare the 
substantive nature of victims’ rights or expressly address the right of punishment.277  
 
 
                                                
270 See Eklund (n 202) Ch. 2, 24.  
271 Valiulienė v Lithuania App no 33234/07 (ECHR, 26 March 2013). 
272 For further details, see McQuigg (n 204) Ch. 2, 1-4. 
273 Valiulienė v Lithuania (n  271), paras, 78, 79-86. See McQuigg (n 204) Ch. 2, 6; Jakštienė ( n 184) Ch. 2, 75. 
274 Jakštienė (n 184) Ch. 2; according to the Court, ‘the choice of the means to secure compliance with Article 3 in the sphere of the 
relations of individuals between themselves […] falls within the domestic authorities’ margin of appreciation, provided that criminal-
law mechanisms are available to the victim’. In its view, ‘it was not therefore appropriate for it to speculate on the question of whether 
the applicant’s criminal complaint should have been pursued by the public prosecutor or by way of a private prosecution’. See 
McQuigg (n 204) Ch. 2, 6. 
275 McQuigg (n 204) Ch. 2. 
276 Valiulienė v Lithuania (n 271), para 85; McQuigg (n 204) Ch. 2. 




3.4.2.1 The Reasons for Criminalisation and the Establishment of Effective 
Judicial Procedures   
The Court considers that criminal prosecution is necessary for the protection of the right 
to life and to uphold the rule of law and maintain public confidence in it. In the case of 
Öneryildiz v Turkey,278 concerning the death of 13 individuals in a methane-gas explosion 
at a municipal landfill site,279 the complainants claimed that as the state was negligent 
over the dangers of the site, it should be held responsible for the deaths of their 
relatives.280 The Court considered all the circumstances surrounding the disaster, and 
declared that the failings of state authorities amounted to more than errors of judgment or 
carelessness,281 as although the deaths were unintentional, the clear danger to life which 
the state had ignored demanded prosecution by criminal law.282 The Court further stated 
national courts must punish life endangering offences, to maintain public confidence and 
observance of the law, and prevent ‘any appearance of tolerance of or collusion in 
unlawful acts’. 283  Also, prosecution was seen as a means of re-establishing public 
confidence in the state’s criminal system.284   
Although the Court’s decisions requiring member states to criminalise and allow recourse 
to criminal law through individual cases to be brought before it, it has done so in the 
interest of general HR protection, using cases to examine how well a state has complied 
with the Convention more generally.285 Therefore, when the Court assesses to what extent 
the state has complied with its substantive and procedural obligation under Article 2 (the 
right to life) and Article 13 (the right to remedy), it is not only concerned with providing 
victims with remedies, but also with improving that state’s criminal justice systems to 
deter future violations.286  
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Many attempts have been made to persuade the Court that denial of the right to justice is 
also a violation of Article 6 of the Convention, which states that ‘everyone is entitled to 
a fair and public hearing within a reasonable time by an independent and impartial 
tribunal established by law’.287 Victims have complained that in their cases violators have 
not been prosecuted, amounting to a denial of their right to a judicial hearing. However, 
as we have noted in the parallel provisions of Article 14 of ICCPR and Article 8 of ACHR, 
the right to access the court does not also entitle the victim to the right to have the violator 
criminally prosecuted and punished.288 This is because the quotation above from Article 
6 of the Convention refers only to fairness towards the defendant, not towards the victim.  
Neither can the right of a victim to have a violator prosecuted be justified by recourse to 
the civil rights or obligations which require a fair hearing. Such rights or obligations are 
not within the remit of criminal prosecution.289 In a civil case, a victim has the right to 
claim compensation, but this is not so in criminal law, which only demands that the state 
punish offenders,290 and the European Court and Commission have repeatedly stated 
this.291 The right to a fair trial which a victim participates in as a legal process only occurs 
in jurisdictions where civil remedies depend on criminal prosecution.292 This is so in 
France, where such criminal proceedings necessarily involve the victim as a civil party in 
order to uphold their civil rights,293 as in Perez v France.294 However, in this, the Court 
stressed that the Convention does not recognise the right of the victim to have an abuser 
tried and punished.295 According to Article 6 of the ECHR, the right to a fair trial in 
criminal proceedings demands only an investigation and ‘proper examination of the 
submissions, arguments and evidence adduced by the parties’,296 not the conviction of the 
defendant.297 If this has occurred, the Court holds that ‘the applicability of Art. 6 has 
reached its limits’.298 
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3.4.2.2 The Participatory Right in the Framework of the European System   
The European system has consistently rejected the right of a victim to participate in 
sentencing procedures. In the case of McCourt v United Kingdom,299 the mother of a 
murder victim complained that her right to privacy and family life under Article 8 of the 
Convention had been violated by the state in barring her from taking part in sentencing 
procedures.300 The European Commission of HR did not accept that the actions of the UK 
court constituted a breach of Article 8 of the Convention and therefore dismissed her 
complaint.301 It is thought that the Court and the Commission will not be prepared, in the 
near future, to change its mind about victim participation out of fear that to do so may 
clash with the right of a defendant to a fair public hearing under Article 6(1).302 Despite 
this, some initial steps have been taken by member states in their domestic law to give 
some acknowledgment to victims’ participatory rights.303 Even the Court itself, while still 
denying the right of victims to have offenders brought to justice, has stated that member 
states should consider the interests of victims and witnesses in criminal trials.304 
The Court, in some cases, for instance against the United Kingdom, considered that 
Article 2 of the Convention had been violated because certain rights of victims to 
participate in the criminal process were denied.305 Whether Article 2 has been violated in 
an investigation or its results may be subject to different degrees of scrutiny from case to 
case, the Court has stated that in all UK cases ‘the next-of kin […] must be involved in 
the procedure to the extent necessary to safeguard his or her legitimate interests’.306 The 
failure of British criminal law to demand to know why prosecutors had did not prosecute, 
and the reasons for not submitting the reasons for this lack of demand to judicial review, 
was specifically criticised by the Court because it undermined the confidence of both 
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victims and the general public in the justice system.307 In addition, the Court criticised 
the fact that next-of-kin had not been given copies of witness statements before oral 
testimony, which placed them ‘at a disadvantage in terms of preparation and ability to 
participate in questioning’.308  Therefore, the Court suggested that, in these UK cases, 
although there was no violation as far as the facts were concerned, a violation of Article 
2 may have occurred because of the lack of legal aid given to victims or next-of-kin during 
criminal proceedings.309  
In this respect, the case of Finucane v United Kingdom310 provides a good example. The 
case concerns the murder of the HR lawyer Pat Finucane in Belfast in 1989 in front of his 
three children and wife, the applicant, who was also injured, by two masked gunmen of 
the loyalist paramilitary group, the Ulster Defence Association.311 The applicant alleged 
that there had been no effective investigation into her husband’s death, which had 
occurred in circumstances giving rise to suspicions of collusion between his killers and 
the security forces. 312  The Court found that the UK government had breached its 
procedural obligations under Article 2313 because the investigations following the murder 
had not fulfilled the requirements of the general principles in terms of independence, 
effectiveness, promptness and expeditiousness, and public scrutiny. The Court’s findings 
were also indicated in the Report of the Patrick Finucane Review, part of a comprehensive 
independent review into the question of state involvement and collusion in the murder.314  
The Court noted that the first police investigation in the murder lacked independence 
since it had been conducted by colleagues of the Royal Ulster Constabulary (RUC), who 
were suspected by the applicant and other members of the community of issuing death 
threats against Patrick Finucane. 315  This investigation was led by the RUC Chief 
Constable, who played ‘a role in the process of instituting any disciplinary or criminal 
proceedings’ against members of his force. In the view of the Court, there was ‘a lack of 
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independence’ about this part of the investigation, which also increased doubts about the 
‘thoroughness or effectiveness’ of the investigation of the collusion aspect.316  
Regarding the effectiveness of the investigation, the first two inquiries had not dealt 
substantially with the death of Mr Finucane.317 The wider allegations of the collusion had 
been ignored at the inquest, which was only concerned with its immediate circumstances 
and lasted for one day.318 The Court further noted that the alleged murder weapon had 
been obtained by loyalists via a member of the Ulster Defence Regiment (UDR). 
However, the officer leading the investigation stated at the inquest that none of the 
fourteen persons interviewed about the murder had any connection with the security 
forces.319 In the light of this, the Court expressed its concern that it was ‘not apparent to 
what extent the initial police investigation included inquiries into possible collusion by 
the security forces in the targeting of Patrick Finucane by a loyalist paramilitary group’.320 
After assessing the case, the possibility of collusion by the security forces in the murder 
of Mr Finucane had not been examined by the Criminal Investigation Department 
(CID).321 Moreover, the request of the applicant to make a statement regarding allegations 
of threats made by the police against her husband had been rejected by the coroner on the 
basis that it was not relevant to the proceedings.322  
The Court also examined whether the authorities had responded promptly to the murder, 
which would ‘generally be regarded as essential in maintaining public confidence in their 
adherence to the rule of law’.323 The Court found that the RUC investigation started 
‘immediately after the death and that the necessary steps were taken to secure evidence 
at the scene’. 324  Although a number of loyalist suspects were interviewed, the 
investigation had not resulted in sufficient evidence to support a prosecution.325 It noted, 
in relation to the third Stevens Investigation, which was mainly concerned with the 
murder, that it was not begun until a decade after the events.326 To achieve accountability 
in the investigative process, public scrutiny plays an essential part, and despite the level 
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of such scrutiny varying according to what is appropriate from case to case,327  the 
participation of the victim’s immediate family in the procedure should be considered. 
However, the results of the first two Stevens Investigations were not publicised and the 
applicant not informed about the findings. 328  Because of these failings, the Court 
concluded that the investigation by the RUC, as well as the Stevens investigations and the 
inquest, were not in themselves or jointly satisfactory of the requirements of Article 2. 
Thus, the Court maintained there was a failure to investigate the alleged collusion in the 
death of Mr Finucane effectively.329  
In earlier cases made against Turkey, the Court also held that Article 2 had been violated 
because the authorities had not informed the victim or close relatives of the decision not 
to prosecute.330 This lack of information was considered significant by the Court as it 
prevented the possibility of the next-of-kin from referring the Turkish court’s decision 
not to prosecute to the scrutiny of a higher authority.331 In addition, because the next-of-
kin had not been given access to the investigation or court documents, or been allowed to 
present incriminating evidence, the Court found that Article 2 had been further 
violated.332 However, these adjudications of the Court may, perhaps, be considered more 
symbolic than substantial, as the Court has made no precise declaration about the rights 
of victims to participate fully in criminal proceedings.333  
3.4.2.3 Summary Remarks 
In conclusion, the European system, as we have seen, is clearly hesitant in requiring 
prosecution and punishment to be imposed on violators of the right to life. Nevertheless, 
at least, the state has an obligation to protect the right to life of its citizens against acts of 
violence and provide them with effective remedy once these acts have actually occurred. 
Therefore, if member states fulfil their duty to prosecute perpetrators, this is a step 
towards fulfilling their obligations under Articles 2 and 13 of the Convention. 334 
However, the approaches of the HRC and Inter-American Court differ from that of the 
                                                
327 Ibid., para 71. 
328 Ibid., 79. 
329 de Silva (n 311) 436. According to the de Silva, ‘the ECHR [found that] the investigation into the murder of Patrick Finucane 
lacked the requisite independence and did not examine the question of collusion. The additional material available to me tends to 
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European Court because they explicitly impose the duty to prosecute and punish those 
responsible for the violation of the right to life. This difference underlines the willingness 
of the Inter-American Court to explicitly consider the right of victims to justice as a jus 
cogens on all member states of the American HR Convention, irrespective of their 
individual domestic criminal laws and procedures.  
3.5 Conclusions  
This chapter examined the right of victims to justice and the procedural obligations of the 
state regarding the deprivation of the human right to life, particularly by non-state actors, 
and the right of victims to participate in the criminal justice process, is recognised under 
philosophical/ethical principles, international and regional law and the jurisprudence of 
various HR bodies. It is clear that both general ethical principles, international and 
regional instruments of HR, and case law recognise, in principle, that states have a 
positive obligation to provide an effective remedy if an individual’s right to life has been 
violated, whether or not this violation has been committed by officials of the state. The 
object of this obligation, from the perspective of victims of crime, should be to revive and 
strengthen their trust in the states’ protection of them and confidence that their criminal 
justice systems will deliver them with justice.335 To completely confirm this trust, it is 
necessary that states thoroughly and effectively investigate violations of HR to reveal the 
truth and bring perpetrators to justice. In addition, states must allow victims to participate 
actively in the criminal justice process.  
While certain international standards regarding criminal investigation can be identified, 
the argument accepts that now, in the post-conflict situation in Iraq, full adherence to 
these standards cannot yet be expected, given the raft of practical limitations that Iraq 
may face in this period of transition. In addition, these international standards have 
themselves some limitations, including a combination of the limitation inherent in the 
Van Boven/Bassiouni Principles, 336  the state-actor focus of much international 
jurisprudence on investigations (therefore it does not apply to non-state actors, the subject 
of the thesis), 337  and the “good faith” investigation limit to much of the relevant 
                                                
335 See interviews held by Wemmers and Manirabona with ten victims whose human rights were violated under the previous Haitian 
regime. The interviews explored victims’ perceptions of justice and how to restore their sense of justice following gross violations of 
human rights. The interviewers noted that, from the perspective of victims, unless justice is guaranteed for victims of crime, trust in 
state authorities cannot be restored. Jo-Anne Wemmers and Amissi Manirabona, ‘Regaining trust: The Importance of Justice for 
Victims of Crimes against Humanity’ (2013) 9 International Review of Victimology 1, 4-8.   
336 See the above pages 59-60. 




jurisprudence. 338  This raises the question of whether Truth and Reconciliation 
Commissions (TRC)/Amnesties’ processes in a transitional justice scenario should be 
considered. These processes may to some extent replace adherence to such standards 
during the transitional period in Iraq.  
The truth commissions ‘have the potential to be of great benefit in helping post-conflict 
societies establish the facts about past HR violations, foster accountability, preserve 
evidence, identify perpetrators and recommend reparations and institutional reforms’.339 
An effective TRC is considered a serious alternative to address past atrocities because it 
goes beyond the establishment of mere judicial truth to a ‘global truth’. Thus, the TRC 
could perhaps constitute an integral part of the rebuilding of society and contribute to the 
promoting of national reconciliation.340 On the other hand, in their attempts to recover 
from periods of serious HR abuse, transitional states often need to balance the competing 
demands of various stakeholders. These demands vary from claims that immunity is 
required to ascertain peace, to the notion that no peace can be achieved without 
satisfactory justice.341 For instance, while some commentators applaud the prohibition of 
amnesties by the Inter-American Court, others are concerned that, in demanding 
punishment, the Court is effectively removing an important negotiating peace tool for 
societies that have experienced many atrocities.342 The arguments in favour of amnesty 
usually contend that without amnesty, peace can never be achieved. These question 
whether prosecutions are always ‘in the interests of justice’ since the attempts of states to 
prosecute those alleged to be responsible for past atrocities, in certain circumstances, may 
continue the violence. To avoid this, states need to consider the path of amnesties which 
could arguably contribute to the realisation of peace and stability.343 However, amnesties 
                                                
338  ‘Good faith’ and the term ‘genuinely’ have sometimes been used interchangeably. The latter ‘was inserted to give the 
unwillingness/inability test a more concrete and objective meaning. However, the term is highly normative, calling for good faith and 
seriousness on the part of the respective state with regard to the investigation and prosecution’. It follows, as noted above, that it 
cannot speak of ‘genuine’ investigation or prosecution under the jurisprudence of human rights bodies unless states satisfy their 
obligation by using all the legal means at their disposal to conduct serious and effective investigations and prosecutions leading to the 
identification and punishment of the responsible. See Kai Ambos, Treatise on International Criminal Law: Volume III: International 
Criminal Procedure (Oxford University Press, 2016) 306. 
339 These are ‘official, temporary, non-judicial fact finding bodies that investigate a pattern of abuses of human rights or humanitarian 
law committed over a number of years. These bodies take a victim-centred approach and conclude their work with a final report of 
findings of fact and recommendations’. For further details, see Kai Ambos, The Legal Framework of Transitional Justice: A 
Systematic Study with a Special Focus on the Role of the ICC, in K. Ambos et al. (eds.), Building a Future on Peace and Justice: 
Studies on Transitional Justice, Peace and Development (Springer Science & Business Media, 2009), para 13, pages 40-49; Priscilla 
B. Hayner, Unspeakable Truths: Transitional Justice and the Challenge of Truth Commissions (2nd, Routledge 2011) 20-23; see also 
See Daniel J. Hendy, ‘Is a Truth Commission the Solution to Restoring Peace in Post-Conflict Iraq’ (2005) 20 Ohio State Journal on 
Dispute Resolution 527, 534-538; Monica Dorothy ACIRU, Transitional Justice in Practice: Truth Commissions and Policies of 
Victims Reparation (PhD thesis, KU Leuven 2017) 54-57. 
340 Ambos (n 339), para 15, pages 44-45. 
341 Louise Mallinder, ‘Can Amnesties and International Justice be Reconciled?’ (2007) 1 The International Journal of Transitional 
Justice 208, 208, 218, 225. For further details, see Ambos (n 339), paras 3-6, 30, pages 23-28, 62. 
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may create a complicating factor regarding the state’s duty to bring perpetrators to justice, 
since they potentially make such a duty impossible to wholly fulfil.344 For this reason, 
even if the process of amnesties is justified as an attempt to foster the disclosure of 
information by perpetrators, granting a blanket amnesty for HR abuse is becoming 
increasingly untenable for states. This granting has been repeatedly held to be invalid 
even when broad satisfaction of the right to truth might be ensured.345 Therefore, the 
challenge is designing a transitional justice system that can satisfy states obligations 
concerning the unveiling of the truth and the duty to bring perpetrators to justice. Each of 
these obligations stands independently and, thus, meeting one of them will not be 
sufficient for the state to meet its obligations.346  The two obligations ‘often lead to 
complementary, rather than conflicting, transitional justice mechanisms. Just as 
prosecutions include truth-finding, so too can facts found by truth commissions assist 
future prosecutions’.347 
The points on the potential of Amnesties/TRC processes to offset international standards 
for criminal investigation and, in general, the acceptance of the transitional justice theory 
as a counter-argument to the applicability of these standards in the post-conflict period in 
Iraq, are fully developed in Chapters 5 and 6.348  
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Chapter 4: The Right to Reparation: An International Overview 
4.1 Introduction 
The provision of reparation for victims of HR violations is widely considered to be one 
of the most respected and central of legal principles.1 As mentioned in the previous 
chapter, the substantive aspect of the right to remedy involves the right of victims of HR 
abuses, particularly of the right to life, to reparation for the horrific impact of such 
criminal acts.2 The term reparation is regularly used to refer to various measures aimed 
at correcting wrongs created by criminal acts, in other words, to redress the harm caused 
to the victim, whether physical, material or moral, and, if possible, to restore the victim 
to their position before the occurrence of these acts.3  
Marked international unanimity in recent years indicates that reparation should be defined 
to include ‘material’ and ‘symbolic’ forms of redress. 4  Roht-Arriaza proposes that 
symbolic forms of moral reparation are just important as material ones, because they are 
contained in a wide range of measures, ‘most deal[ing] with a felt need for telling the 
story, for justice, and for measures to avoid repetition’.5 Both material and symbolic 
reparation are usually applied in cases of serious large-scale violations of HR.6 One main 
objective of both forms of reparation is to centre an approach on a victim who has been 
offended and to empower that victim.7 However, whether both measures of reparation are 
capable of redressing the harm depends on its nature. This is because the effects of certain 
crimes against individuals’ HR may cause such serious damage, for instance, physical 
damage, that no reparation can compensate.8 As Roht-Arriaza neatly puts it, ‘what could 
replace lost health and serenity; the loss of a loved one or of a whole extended family; a 
whole generation of friends; the destruction of home and culture and community and 
peace’.9 	Therefore, in such serious crimes, reparation may serve merely to ease the 
consequences for victims and their families 10  by acknowledging their suffering, 
                                                
1 Doak (n 3) Ch. 2, 207.  
2 See Chapter 3 of the thesis, p 48. 
3 See Naomi Roht-Arriaza, ‘Reparations Decisions and Dilemmas’ (2004) 27 Hastings International and Comparative Law Review 
157, 160; Dinah Shelton, Remedies in International Human Rights Law (2d ed, Oxford University Press 2005) 10. 
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condemning their aggressors and, to some extent, restoring humanity and dignity to 
victims.11 Further, according to Urban Walker, to respond adequately to the wrong and 
harm done to victims, ‘moral repair’ should be considered, defined as ‘the attempt to 
address offence, harm, and anguish caused to those who suffer wrong’ by ‘the process of 
moving from the situation of loss and damage to a situation where some degree of stability 
in moral relations is regained’.12 Moral repair in essence means ‘restoring or creating trust 
and hope in a shared sense of values and responsibilities’ between victims and responsible 
parties. It is about ‘setting things right’ in the first instance, for the victim’.13 Like Roht-
Arriaza, Walker acknowledges that no reparation can fully repair the damage to victims 
of serious crimes against their HR.14   
For redress, at least two aspects of the damage caused by criminal acts against an 
individual’s right to life, which could be called damage of death,15 should be considered. 
One is fixed and objective, the other variable and subjective.16 The objective aspect 
concerns the right of victims not to be deprived of the full period of an average life-time. 
This right applies to all people equally, and, it will be argued, when violated, requires 
compensation in itself independent of any pecuniary and moral redress.17 Nevertheless, 
damage of death in its objective aspect cannot be sufficiently repaired by merely 
monetary compensation and, therefore, acknowledgement of responsibility for the 
damage and correction of its injustice is an essential requirement for comprehensive 
reparation.   
The subjective aspect varies from person to person because it is linked to how much the 
individual talent and ability of a victim is diminished, and applies only to the economic 
implications of any impairment of that talent, and how valuable that talent was in the first 
place.18 Moreover, a victim’s family also deserves to be compensated for its pecuniary 
loss as well as for its grief in losing a loved one.19  
                                                
11 M. Cherif Bassiouni, ‘International Recognition of Victims Rights’ (2006) 6 Human Rights Law Review 203, 231.  
12 Margaret Urban Walker, Moral Repair: Reconstructing Moral Relations after Wrongdoing (Cambridge University Press, 2006) 6-
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13 Ibid. 7, 23-28. 
14 Ibid. 6. 
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problematic issue. See Steve Hedley, ‘Death and Tort’ in Belinda Brooks-Gordon et al, Death Rites and Rights (Hart Publication Ltd 
2007) 244.  
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To understand the role of the state to make reparation to victims of violent crimes of non-
state actors and mitigate harm, the following issues will be investigated: the development 
of the notion of state responsibility for reparation of the violation of the HR to life; the 
philosophical/ethical justification for imposing such an obligation; and, finally the extent 
of the state’s obligation in international and regional HR law to bear the burden of doing 
so. It is argued that unless victims who have lost their life are fully recognised to have the 
moral and legal right to reparation for objective, subjective and moral damage done to 
them, along with the pecuniary and moral damage to their dependants, justice has not 
been done. It follows that the state must take moral and legal responsibility for the 
comprehensive reparation of victims of crime, whether on the grounds of failing to deal 
with real and serious risk to life, or for making reparation for the fact that damage has 
occurred. Although such reparation may be insufficient to repair the damage of death, it 
should be understood to be recognition that reparative justice is needed because of the 
seriousness of the violation of the HR to life. It will be contended further that international 
and regional HR instruments are capable of playing a significant role in strengthening the 
moral and legal rights of victims to reparation.      
4.2 The Development of the Notion of State Responsibility for the Reparation 
of Violations of HR                             
The idea of the state’s obligation to make reparation for personal injuries caused by the 
criminal acts of private individuals is not new, and can be found in ancient history. Since 
approximately 2,300 BC, King Hammurabi’s legal provisions have formed the basis of 
legal protection for Babylonian and subsequent communities in the region of Iraq. 
Articles 22-24 of the Hammurabi Code provided that should an individual have been 
killed in the course of being robbed, and the person(s) responsible could not be identified, 
the city and its ruler were obliged to pay the heirs a sum in silver as compensation.20 
Although this idea of compensation for victims of crime by the state appeared throughout 
the Code of Hammurabi and other ancient legal rules, it never gained popular appeal.21 
Instead, what is entrenched in history is the idea that criminals must be responsible for 
                                                
20 See Sections 22 to 24 of the Code of Hammurabi. Robert Francis Harper (tr), The Code of Hammurabi (1904); Robert D Childres, 
‘Compensation for Criminally Inflicted Personal Injury’ (1964) 39 New York University Law Review 444, 444; Harold R. Hanson, 
‘Compensation for Victims of Crimes of Violence’ (1968) 30 Albany Law Review 325, 325; Marlene A. Young, ‘The Role of Victim 
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compensating victims and their families directly and this idea has appeared in various 
forms in different periods of history.22  
According to the classical view, reparation is rooted in the law of tort and the principle of 
state responsibility, the latter of which obliges the state to repair damage caused to other 
states.23 Victims have been left to suffer the consequences of crime since they have borne 
the responsibility to pursue the reparation of their damage in accordance with the law of 
tort,24  which, in most jurisdictions, has proved to be highly ineffective in obtaining 
reparation from offenders.25 Therefore, as Goodey rightly notes, reparation is now made 
by offenders to the state rather than the victim, and is seen as damage to the state; as a 
citizen, the victim has become the medium through which the crime occurred.26  
Regarding the principle of state responsibility, before the appearance of HR norms in 
international law, individual victims were not viewed as the subject of international norms 
or as direct beneficiaries of the legal implementation of HR;27 victims were only able to 
have recourse to the state to receive compensation from the actual perpetrators of 
violations of HR.	This is because reparation only applied in the legal framework of the 
relationship between individual sovereign states,28 and the state was viewed in customary 
international law as the protector of its citizens’ rights, and therefore, should its citizens’ 
right to life be violated within the territory of other states by the agents of such states, the 
state whose citizens have been victimised has the right to take legal and diplomatic action 
to obtain redress.29  
The dominance of HR law following World War II has contributed to the remarkable 
development of the traditional law of state responsibility. Principles whose source was 
once in the law of state responsibility have now been implanted in the international law 
                                                
22 Childres (n 20) 446; George J. Bryan, ‘Compensation to Victims of Crime’ (1968) 6 Alberta Law Review 202, 202; Pablo J. Drobny, 
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see Marvin E. Wolfgang, ‘Victim Compensation in Crimes of Personal Violence’ (1966) 50 Minnesota Law Review 223, 223-225.  
23 See Roht-Ariaza (n 3) 160. 
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LeRoy G. Schultz, ‘The Violated: A Proposal to Compensate Victims of Violent Crime’ (1965) 10 Saint Louis University Law Journal 
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25 See Drobny (n 22) 203. 
26 See Jo Goodey, ‘Compensating Victims of Violent Crime in the European Union with a Special Focus on Victims of Terrorism’ 
(2003) the National Roundtable on Victim Compensation Washington, DC: National Centre for Victims of Crime, 9; Thomas G. 
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27 See UNHR (n 127) Ch. 2, para 50; for further details, see Bottigliero (n 20) 79-88.  
28 Shelton (n 3) 7.  
29 See Ben Saul, ‘Compensation for Unlawful Death in International Law: A Focus on the Inter-American Court of Human Rights’ 
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of HR.30 This means that the state is obliged to provide reparation for the violation of an 
HR norm that it has ratified.31 HR conventions have put individual victims in a position 
to rely directly on the rules of these treaties to access rights.32	Changes in state functions 
have also increased the limits of its responsibility to repair the damage caused by its 
violation of HR treaties, which has helped to draw attention to the concerns of society 
with regard to the harmful consequences of violent crimes committed by private 
individuals against the HR of others.33 The focus of this new interest is on the role of the 
state in meeting the needs of victims when circumstances prevent the affected persons 
from receiving compensation from the person causing the damage.34  
The recognition of the new duty of the state to make reparation to victims began to emerge 
after the grave violations of HR in the Second World War in many international and 
regional HR instruments containing various concepts of the right to remedy.35 However, 
a stronger development in the recognition of the needs of victims was witnessed in 
developed countries in 1957 when Margery Fry called upon the state to bear the burden 
of paying criminal damages and work towards having a system which compensates of 
victims of crime.36 Following the above initiatives, several states established criminal 
injury compensation schemes for victims of physical injury who had not received 
monetary compensation or contributed to the commission of the injury.37 
On the international level, the 1985 United Nations Basic Principles of Justice (Victims’ 
Declaration) offer a legal basis for affirming that the state has a duty to provide redress 
for victims of HR violations. 38  Although, these principles point to the necessity of 
enabling victims to return to as full a life as possible, and offer a variety of measures that 
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Contribute to a Future European Framework?’ (2005) 13 European Journal of Crime, Criminal Law and Criminal Justice 148, 149.  
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on the Compensation of Victims of Violent Crimes has set minimum standards of compensation for victims of criminal acts. Council 
of Europe, The European Convention on the Compensation of Victims of Violent Crimes Signed in Strasbourg on 24 November 1983, 
European Treaty Series (ETS) no. 116.21, Articles 1, 2, and 4. The Guidelines on Protecting the Victims of Terrorist Acts, 2005, also 
require that victims of terrorism be eligible for compensation by the state. For further details, see Letschert and Ammerlaan, 218-219.  
38 See Principles 12, 13 and 14 of the United Nations, Basic Principles of Justice for Victims of Crime and Abuse of Power (n 107) 
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may be therapeutic or material, they fail to give details about the exact scope of such 
assistance or support.39 Nevertheless, by calling for social solidarity with victims of 
crime, such principles send an important message that, even where a state does not accept 
that it is legally bound to make reparation for damages suffered by victims of serious 
crime, it cannot simply ignore the fact that such crime has severely impacted on the 
victims.40  
The 2005 Basic Principles and Guidelines41 are considered the most important attempt to 
establish a unified system of existing international legal norms concerning the recognition 
of the right of victims of HR violations to be provided with effective, adequate and prompt 
reparation. 42  Such reparation may take various forms such as ‘restitution, material 
compensation, rehabilitation through legal, medical, and social services, [and] guarantees 
of non-repetition through institutional reform’; it also includes satisfaction by ‘truth 
telling, exhumation of human remains from atrocities, public apology, communication, 
and educational activities’.43 Reparation also needs to be proportional to the severity of 
the harm suffered by victims and obtainable by them ‘without any discrimination of any 
kind or ground, without exception’.44 The aim of the Basic Principles and Guidelines, 
therefore, is to promote justice by redressing humanitarian and HR abuses and, also, to 
emphasise that such redress should be provided to victims even if the state itself was not 
responsible for such violations.45 
4.2.1 Summary Remarks 
From the foregoing review of international and regional instruments, in principle, 
reparation for physical injuries caused to victims by non-state actors has recently been 
acknowledged as the responsibility of the state. Therefore, the state should establish 
practical mechanisms for compensation when circumstances prevent them from receiving 
it by other means. The state’s responsibility for this is based on various arguments, such 
as those made in the Explanatory Report on the European Convention on the 
Compensation of Victims of Violent Crimes; all express the same idea that crime is a 
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42 See Margaret Urban Walker, ‘The Expressive Burden of Reparations: Putting Meaning into Money, Words, and Things’ in Alice 
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social problem and solidarity with victims must be provided to limit its effect.46 As such, 
this discussion now proceeds to explore the various philosophical/ethical principles that 
may be relied upon for imposing an obligation on the state to repair the damage to victims, 
and the capability of such reparation to constitute an effective form of justice for victims 
of violent crime.  
4.3 The Philosophical/Ethical Justifications for Imposing Reparatory 
Obligations on the State  
Two fundamental justifications for requiring the state to provide redress for victims of 
violent crime may be cited: these are the notions of the state’s failure to protect, and the 
social welfare principle. 
4.3.1 The Failure to Protect  
Relying on this right of protection, some commentators consider that one main moral and 
legal justification for the state being responsible for compensation is if it fails in its duty 
to protect them adequately.47 This claim is based on the principles of social contract and 
tort law.48 The social contract requires that when individuals agree to a contract with the 
state and relinquish some of their rights, including that of protecting their right to life 
against criminal acts, the protection of these rights must then be undertaken by the state.49 
Failure of the state to provide adequate protection would constitute a breach of contract 
with citizens.50 This, according to Bentham, justifies the placing of responsibility on 
society to compensate victims when its efforts to protect them have failed.51  
It has been argued that to assume society should bear responsibility to control and prevent 
acts of violence is unfair, because society has not progressed enough to be able to know 
the causes of these acts fully or how to prevent them.52 Even in totalitarian states which 
possess all kinds of electronic devices, it is doubtful that the majority of violent crimes 
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could be prevented.53 Therefore, victim compensation should be based on reasons other 
than society’s failure to fulfil its obligation to prevent acts of violence.54 However, such 
an argument cannot entirely deny that where evidence indicates that the state, as the 
representative of society, is unwilling or unable to provide protection to its citizens, it 
must accept the consequence of this failure by compensating victims of violent crime.55  
It has even been asserted that the state’s responsibility to compensate victims should be 
understood in a wide sense, because ‘Society, in acting in furtherance of its interests of 
punishing, deterring, and rehabilitating the offender, interferes with the interests of the 
victim in obtaining compensation for his injury’.56 This is to say that not only has the state 
failed in its duty to protect its citizens from criminal acts, but also, after such acts have 
been committed, the actions of the state continue to violate the right of victims to 
restitution from offenders.57 However, it seems that reliance on the rationale of failure to 
protect to claim that the state has the duty of insulating its citizens from the consequence 
of crime has failed to gain any legal acceptance.58 This may be because such acceptance 
could imply that the state’s authorities should bear legal responsibility for the 
compensation of all victims of crime for all damage done to them by acts of others, such 
as theft and criminal damage.59 If the state did bear a legal responsibility of protection, it 
has been claimed that it would have exceeded its remit to provide a general condition of 
public order60 and, thus the assumption that the common law system of the state involves 
the promise to protect all people at all times cannot be realised. 61  In addition, the 
intervention of the state to fulfil the duty of prosecuting wrongdoings will bring more 
benefits to its citizens than they lose.62 Overall, this legal acceptance would lead to the 
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recognition that victims have a right to be compensated and, thus, would involve public 
expenditure running out of political control.63 Nevertheless, although such a rationale for 
compensation has never been fully adopted in state compensation systems,64 it has to a 
large extent become the basis for arguments that seek to compensate victims of violence, 
as a partial requirement of justice.65  
Similarly, victims of violent crime have the right to take action in tort against state 
authorities and would be entitled to receive compensation from them for the damage 
caused if these authorities, in taking upon themselves the duty to protect them from 
criminal acts, have failed to fulfil their duty of protection as a duty of care under tort.66 
According to Wolfgang, victims have a legitimate right to claim compensation for their 
criminal injuries if adequate protection by the state’s agencies is lacking ‘due to 
negligence, corruption, insufficient appropriations, or simply the obvious inability of the 
police to be in all places at all times’.67 This position has previously been taken by the 
Italian positivist Ferri.68 
However, it is important to note that, even if victims choose to sue the state for negligence 
in accordance with tort law for failing to take reasonable measures against the risks of 
harm by criminal acts,69 including terrorist acts, the state may rely on its discretionary 
policy to claim immunity for such negligence.70  Moreover, from the perspective of 
victims, ‘tort law litigation often stands for a complicated, challenging, long-lasting, 
stressful experience, which can –though hard scientific evidence is not yet available –
result in secondary victimisation. Due to the fact that some of the compensation issues 
are related to immediate needs, a long process for meeting those needs seems ill-suited’.71 
Nevertheless, although these difficulties in confronting the state with its negligence to 
protect its citizens may weaken tort claims to obtain compensation, such claims of 
negligence ‘still provide a policy rationale for governmental funding of compensation’.72  
4.3.2 The Social Welfare Principle 
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An alternative justification to the notion of failure to protect, namely social intervention, 
has been introduced to support the necessity of paying attention to the victims’ needs. It 
is often said that in civilised society the state presumably assumes the duty to exact 
retributive justice for unlawful harm to its citizens, and enables them to take civil action 
against criminals by suing offenders for damages in accordance with tort and, also, to 
afford health and social services. Once this is done, the state has no further duty in respect 
of the victim.73 If civil action is inadequate in circumstances where the offenders are not 
apprehended or lack the means to provide compensation, such possibilities are merely 
part of ‘life’s lottery’.74 However, it has been suggested that the application of this policy 
would be perceived by victims as unfair because it does not solve the problem of 
reparation and, thus, claiming that the state has no obligation to compensate rebuts the 
practice of the courts that an element of reparation should, where appropriate, be included 
in every punishment directed by the state. 75  In addition, over-concentration on the 
approach of ‘individual responsibility’ by civil and criminal courts may be insufficient to 
compensate the majority of victims of violent crimes, especially when offenders are not 
apprehended or are insolvent.76 A sense of fairness, therefore, may require the state to 
meet the needs of victims even if there is no actual fault in the administration of its duty 
of protection.77  
However, this intervention of a no-fault state to compensate victims of violent crimes 
should be accepted by society at large, because it involves the expenditure of public 
money. One rationale for such intervention is the so-called of ‘wheel of fortune’, which 
is premised on the affirmation that since the hazard of and exposure to criminal conduct 
are inherent in our complex society, then everyone in that society is a potential victim 
and, thus, the whole society should participate in the mitigation of the harm done to 
innocent victims.78  Such an assertion also asserts that ‘[crime] inevitably falls upon 
someone though the particular victim may be “selected” by chance, and […] the 
individual as victim should not have to bear his misfortune alone’; 79  thereby, 
compensation is viewed as the way in which the more fortunate recompense the les 
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fortunate.80 Accordingly, it is fair to suggest that society as a whole should share with the 
victim the consequences of a violent crime,81 because, as with terrorist acts, individuals 
may be selected as targets not simply by chance, but as symbols of a national government 
or culture.82 The terrorists do not care about individuals as long as victims are citizens of 
the government or culture which is targeted.83 Therefore, the compensating of victims of 
terrorism who have been involuntarily sacrificed ‘on behalf of the state’84 and society 
rests on the fundamental principle of fairness.85 
However, this trend has been criticised on the grounds that victims of criminal violence 
are no different from those who suffer other misfortune and, therefore, should not receive 
special treatment.86 In reply, supporters of the ‘wheel of fortune’ concept hold that victims 
of violent crime have suffered from a specific danger inherent in collective life,87 and that 
‘in our modern system of collective responsibility for sickness and injury, we have 
evolved a machinery for assuring compensation which could well be extended to injuries 
criminally caused’.88 
Consequently, an alternative rationale for the intervention of the state is based on the 
‘social welfare’ principle, which holds that society should mitigate the damage caused by 
violent crimes to one of its members just as it assists the most vulnerable individuals in 
society, such as those affected by industrial injury, and the unemployed, sick and 
elderly.89 Proponents of the social welfare concept are persuaded that it is appropriate for 
all society to share victim compensation,90 meaning that spreading the risk confronting 
each member of society to the whole society ensures the protection of each individual 
against	unexpected misfortune at very small cost to themselves.91 In addition, a sense of 
justice requires that victims should be provided with compensation92 similar to those who 
suffer other misfortune.93 The supporters of the welfare rationale also assert that, because 
criminals select their victims in a random manner and some have the ability to provide 
                                                
80 Ibid. 
81 Drobny (n 22) 206; Smith (n 47) 67. 
82 Grey (n 47) 690; Letschert and Ammerlaan (n 37) 257, 259.   
83 Grey (n 47) 690; Letschert and Ammerlaan (n 37) 257, 259. 
84 See UNHRC (n 127) Ch. 2, para 54. 
85 Grey (n 47).   
86 Drobny (n 22) 206 
87 See Wolfgang (n 22) 233. 
88 See Fry (n 36) 192. 
89 See Schultz (n 24) 242; Editors, Law Review (n 58) 539; Smith (n 47) 63. 
90 See Editors, Law Review (n 58) 539; Scott (n 59) 281.  
91 Editors, Law Review (n 58); Schultz (n 24) 242.  
92 Editors, Law Review (n 58). 




for their needs and others have not, the state has a certain interest in enacting a programme 
which ensures assistance to victims unable to afford care for their injuries by, for instance, 
private insurance.94  
However, such arguments are open to three main criticisms. First, they disregard the fact 
that these programmes of compensation for victims of violence do not have a justification 
for their existence in the same way as the social programmes to which they have been 
compared.95 In addition, welfare programmes tend to be based on the concept of the needs 
of victims, rather than on the absence of the wrongdoer to provide compensation 
directly. 96  Secondly, adopting such arguments weakens the notion of individual 
responsibility and enhances reliance on collective responsibility for victims and the 
paternalism of the state.97 Thirdly, ‘because crime rates vary substantially among racial, 
cultural, and economic groups, it is apparent that every citizen does not run an equal risk 
of becoming a victim of violence and that compensation would inevitably redistribute the 
costs of crime from some groups which at present bear a heavy portion of those costs to 
others on which they fall more lightly’. 98  This redistribution would occur even if 
compensation were only limited to those unable to attend to their injuries by private 
insurance.99  
In spite of these criticisms, there is a strong rationale to support the compensation of 
victims of violent crime through social legislation.100 In addition, many commentators 
assert that, while there are no persuasive justifications to demand the state to compensate 
victims on the grounds of failure to protect, interference with their tort rights, or a sense 
of fairness, a sufficiently strong case can be made that the state should compensate victims 
on the grounds of communal responsibility.101 However, it is important to note that the 
state’s programme of compensation in line with the social welfare concept does not mean 
that the state has a duty to do so and that victims have a right to compensation; it is rather 
a kind of humanitarian sympathy and solidarity with victims who suffer the serious 
consequence of violent crime because of the absence of redress from other sources.102 
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Nevertheless, it has been asserted by Haldane and Harvey that human life and dignity are 
dominant social priorities, and that the various forms of compensation, whether symbolic 
recognition or monetary reparation, can partially contribute to improving quality of life 
and restoring dignity to the victim.103 However, since only the state has the resources and 
ability to adopt the programmes which ensure the provision of compensation, ‘the 
damaging consequences of violent crime for the life and dignity of the victim lay a 
positive duty on the government to respond with such means as are available’.104 
If it is recognised that the state has a duty to provide such compensation, it may lead to 
the acknowledgement that victims have a right to compensation, and politicians would 
worry that public expenditure would overly escalate as victims would be legally entitled 
to whatever level of compensation was determined by the court or other official agency.105 
However, to deny compensation to victims in such programmes as a right is a 
misunderstanding of the meaning of rights. There is a difference between the existence 
of a right and the claiming of it.106 For example, it may be said that every citizen has the 
right to health care and education, but to claim them applicants should show that they 
meet the required conditions, such as an illness or the educational qualifications required 
for a particular course.107 In addition, the existence of such a right is considered to be 
limited to that which a state can reasonably afford.108 Likewise, the right of victims to 
compensation is ‘a right to an equitable share in such provision for compensation as the 
government can reasonably afford’.109 Accordingly, the lack of the state’s obligation to 
provide such compensation should not, however, ‘be confused with absence of a legal 
right to receive benefits when one has been granted by the legislature to eligible 
claimant’.110  
Further rationales for the requirement of the state to adopt compensation programmes, 
alongside the social welfare view, may be attributed to the necessity of achieving 
consequential goals.111 It is argued that to promote respect for the administration of justice 
by individuals and prevent them from taking the law into their hands to obtain redress, 
the criminal justice system should guarantee that effective reparation is provided for 
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them.112 In the same vein, it has been stressed that the lack of compensation programmes 
may deter victims from reporting offences and cooperating with state authorities in the 
criminal justice process.113 Moreover, ‘if we make the government responsible for the 
losses incurred by victims of crime, the government will then have an incentive to make 
communities safer for its citizens’.114  
However, such consequential objectives have been criticised. Atiyah asserts that, with 
some exceptions, ‘taking the law into one’s own hands’ is generally forbidden and not 
limited to victims of crimes themselves and, that ‘the state accepts no general obligation 
to make good the lack of a defendant worth suing’.115 On the other hand, in practice, there 
is little evidence that the award of compensation has contributed to convincing victims to 
cooperate with state authorities in the criminal justice process.116 One explanation for this 
is that victims may be dissatisfied with the criminal justice system from their own 
experiences, and consider that their cooperation has not contributed to the handling of 
their cases with respect and care. Even if successful, they will not substantially relieve 
their suffering;117 rather, such involvement in the criminal justice process may lead them 
to feel ‘twice-victimised’ as well as creating for them some additional problems including 
‘lost wages, time away from normal activities, anxiety and feelings of bewilderment as a 
result of their victimisation’.118 Moreover, the argument that imposing compensation on 
the state will make it more willing to protect its citizens is unsustainable in many cases. 
Nevertheless, in democratic societies, where state authorities are subject to the rule of law, 
more pressure may be placed on such authorities to review or even change their policies 
of protection when both measures making them accountable for their actions and 
responsible for compensation are supported by the whole community. 
4.3.3 Summary Remarks 
Whatever the nature of the arguments cited to justify the intervention of the state to 
compensate victims of violent crimes, the fact that the state has acceded to the necessity 
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to play a vital role in addressing damage to victims, whether on the grounds of failure to 
protect the right to life or of social intervention claims, places victims in a strong moral 
and legal position to have their right to reparation observed by the state. While these 
arguments depend for their theoretical justification on more than one philosophical theory, 
this does not by any means weaken their increasing force. 119  This is because it is 
legitimate for moral claims to be supported by different moral theories as ‘the resulting 
moral consensus is often more significant than the different routes by which it is 
reached’.120 In the same vein, where this conclusion is reached by both the failure to 
protect and social intervention rationales, the force of the argument may be considered 
particularly strong.  
Admittedly, not all the above rationales are of equal weight in convincing the state to take 
upon itself the duty to compensate victims of violent crime when such compensation has 
not been made by offenders. However, taken together they amount to a very strong case, 
and ‘any government today which sought to evade or reduce its responsibility for 
compensation would properly incur severe moral censure’.121 Therefore, it can be argued 
that the state is morally and legally bound to adequately repair the harmful consequences 
of the violation of the right to life of its citizens, whether on the grounds of its failure to 
protect them or because violation has occurred despite the state’s adequate protection, 
according to the concept of social intervention. This gives rise, however, to the question 
of what constitutes adequate reparation for the infringement of the right to life.  
4.4 Adequate Reparation for the Violation of the Right to Life  
To determine what constitutes adequate reparation for the violation of the right to life it 
is important to explore whether this violation should be considered a form of ‘damage’ to 
victims which requires compensation in itself.  
4.4.1 Does it Matter that Death Resulted from an Illegal Act? 
There is considerable disagreement among commentators on whether the death of a 
victim constitutes a form of damage in itself.122 It is difficult to imagine that a human 
being who loses their life has been damaged by death, because death is an inevitable fate 
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and the dead person does not feel or lose anything;123 therefore, to assume that the dead 
can be damaged is unconvincing because a person must be in a state of existence to 
experience damage and this is obviously not so.124 Then, where death by an illegal act has 
been instantaneous, the legal personality of that individual and their capacity to have 
rights, including the right to compensation, has ceased.125 The assumption by opponents 
that the right of the victim to compensation arises at the moment of their death is 
ultimately flawed since it rests on the idea that any potential victim has not yet died, and 
it cannot be predicted whether or when death might occur as a result of a criminal act.126 
Even if this assumption were correct, death would terminate this right because a dead 
person no longer possesses any right as their legal personality has ceased.127 Therefore, 
supporters of this position do not recognise either that a victim has been damaged by 
death or has a legal right to compensation which can be claimed by the heirs to the 
victim’s estate.128  
By contrast, the right to compensation ought to exist for a number of reasons. First, 
although it is true that death is inevitable for any human being and that no one holds that 
any compensation should be made if this happens from natural causes, where death has 
resulted from the illegal acts of others, compensation should be given as these acts have 
shortened the victim’s legitimate life expectancy.129 In addition, the argument that a 
victim who loses his life instantaneously through a third party criminal act does not suffer 
any damage seems to be contrary to reality and law, as life is most precious and humans 
usually vigorously resist being deprived of it and its enjoyment.130 The violation of the 
right to life, and the corresponding right of a victim to be compensated for its loss, is a 
matter of principle and no positive law can justifiably preclude it.131 Moreover, to assume 
that a person who is killed does not suffer any sensory pain may be doubtful, as they may 
also suffer from the psychological damage of the loss of all the usual legitimate 
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expectations associated with life.132 It has been asserted that the concept of deprivation 
which holds that death does harm a person because it deprives a person of all the goods 
that they might otherwise have achieved seems to be much more plausible.133 
Secondly, to argue that the right of a victim to compensation for the damage of death 
cannot exist at the moment of death is contrary to the source of the right to 
compensation.134 The source of this right is the illegality of acts against the right to life 
which precede death, even if just for a moment, because every action precedes its 
outcome.135 Therefore, at the moment when a victim is dying, they still have the legal 
right to compensation for all damages arising from the illegal act, a right which can be 
claimed by his family following his death.136 In other words, on death such a right is 
transferred from the deceased to their next of kin. In addition, it seems wrong to state that 
the right to compensation for victims who continue to live following injuries must be 
respected but not for those who die instantaneously from their injuries.137 Such a position 
defies logic and reason as it places an offender who ends a victim’s life instantaneously 
in a better position than one who injures a victim without bringing about death.138 Such 
an outcome may also act as an incentive that could actually encourage an offender to kill 
a victim instantaneously in order to deny or limit that victim’s right to compensation,	
which would be contrary to the primary objectives of good legislative policy which 
require that the perpetrator of an unlawful act must not be given reason to believe that the 
death of the victim does not matter in terms of an obligation for them to make 
compensation.139  
Weighing up the above arguments on the right to compensation for the damage of death, 
it can be argued that those who deny that a victim’s death is a damage in itself are in the 
contradictory position of refusing to acknowledge such a right to exist before death 
actually occurs and then, when death does occur, they still deny this right, as they consider 
that a person’s legal identity ceases to exist upon death. It is not reasonable to ignore this 
contradictory position when dealing with such serious damage as the loss of life, since a 
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lack of compensation may undermine civil accountability and civil protection and would 
lead perpetrators to conclude that they had no obligation to restore justice by healing the 
consequences of their violation of the victims’ right to life. Accordingly, justice requires 
the compensation of a victim for the illegal deprivation of their right to life. 
However, in practice, some systems of law do not consider a victim’s death in itself to be 
a damage requiring compensation, such as the Iraqi legal system, as will be discussed 
later.140 Some legal systems and the judicial rulings of other states have clearly considered 
death as a damage requiring compensation.141 An example of an award of compensation 
for death can be found in Article 248 of the Kuwait Civil Code,142 which states that if the 
violation of the right to life results from illegal acts, compensation should be provided for 
this violation, in accordance with the provisions of ‘Diya’ in Islamic law.143  These 
provisions must be made equally and without distinguishing between age, social status, 
occupation, sex or subjective issues, and moreover should not affect the right to 
compensation for financial and moral damages in accordance with the provisions of 
liability for an unlawful act.144 Moreover, the state must compensate for damage of death 
in cases where compensation cannot be obtained from other sources.145 This reflects the 
idea that the state cannot absolve itself from its moral and legal responsibility to respond 
effectively to the violation of the right to life and recognise it as a serious damage 
requiring reparation.  
4.4.2 Summary Remarks 
The death of a victim is a serious form of damage and any attempt to rely on theoretical 
objections or pragmatic reasons to deny the legitimacy and eligibility of a victim’s next 
of kin to receive compensation undermines any adequate recognition of the seriousness 
of violations of the right to life. However, a victim cannot ever be compensated for loss 
of life, and so a distinction should be made between the acknowledgment that a victim 
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has been damaged by death; thus, the victim also has the right to be compensated for the 
wrongness of the actions of those responsible for the damage and, similarly, have their 
symbolic right to retributive justice secured against those responsible, and for it to be 
recognised that no compensation can ever make up for such damage. Therefore, it is 
argued that the symbolic recognition of a victim’s right to both retributive and 
compensatory justice needs to be considered as an integral part of any domestic justice 
system in order to demonstrate that the death of a victim has been taken seriously. In the 
next part, further forms of reparation for the violation of the right to life will be examined. 
4.4.3 Other Forms of Reparations   
In cases of mass violence against the right to life, it is doubtful whether the moral, political 
and legal principles which govern the state and society are sufficient to achieve justice 
for victims of such violence. One such difficulty may be attributed to the lack of a 
comprehensive view about the various measures of reparation available to remedy the 
damage caused by violations of the right to life, or even ignorance of what these 
reparation measures are capable of doing to restore to victims their sense of dignity and 
justice. This seems to be particularly the case in Iraq, where reparation is limited to 
financial compensation only.146 Achieving justice for victims requires more than material 
compensation; as Walker notes, pure financial compensation is never sufficient to remedy 
grave harms, and is ‘not always necessary to reparations’.147 Reparations should consist 
of acts which intentionally afford appropriate goods to victims to acknowledge the 
seriousness of the wrong, the responsibility of those who did the wrong, or the liability of 
those responsible for its repair and their intention of achieving justice for this specific 
wrong.148 
This spirit and intention are crucial in determining what should be done for victims, even 
if it is appropriate in terms of the damage caused to make actual reparations.149 This 
means that any support or compensation given to victims by others, which is given in a 
voluntary spirit, as a good deed, does not in itself strictly constitute reparations since it is 
                                                
146 For further discussion, see Chapter 5, pages 223-232.  
147 Walker (n 42) 208; see also Yael Danieli, ‘Healing Aspects of Reparations and Reparative Justice for Victims of Crime against 
Humanity’ in Jo-Ann M. Wemmers, Reparation for Victims of Crimes Against Humanity: The Healing Role of Reparation (Routledge 
2014) 13. 
148 Walker (n 42) 208.  




done without the intention of bearing the responsibility either for the wrong suffered or 
for redressing it.150  
Many commentators consider that the recent moral and political conceptions of 
reparations which aim to restore dignity to victims and establish respectful, trustworthy 
and mutually accountable relationships within their communities are more important or 
even an alternative to the dominance of the legal perspective of juridical and tort-based 
measures of compensation for unjust loss or injury. 151  This is because the legal 
perspective of compensatory or reparative justice has been criticised as inadequately 
addressing grave HR abuses and injustice.152 Reparative justice is more about redressing 
‘injustice and wrongful harms that aims at the reordering of individuals’ standing, their 
relationships and their communities’.153 In addition, from the psycho-social perspective, 
reparations ‘seek relief of the suffering, distress, anger and sense of violation experienced 
by victims’.154 However, this should not undermine the role of monetary compensation 
measures when these are effective in obtaining from the parties responsible for the wrong 
done, or for its repair, the intention to provide reparative justice for victims.155  
4.4.3.1 The Communicative and Exemplifying Aspects of Gestures of 
Reparation   
While the communicative aspect seeks to send a vindicatory message to victims, 
wrongdoers, and communities acknowledging the reality of the wrong, the exemplifying 
aspect involves an act of repair which alludes to what the correct relationship should be 
between the victims and the parties responsible for making reparation.156 All forms of 
reparations, including purely material forms, have an essentially symbolic expressive or 
communicative function even though the term symbolic is mainly used for non-tangible 
measures such as the ‘publication of the truth about abuses, public apologies, memorial, 
or education projects’.157 Studies appear to suggest that ‘symbolic’ reparations are valued 
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more highly by victims than monetary ones,158 and that financial payments are, therefore, 
less acceptable and may be challenging without gestures conveying acknowledgement 
and respect.159 Nevertheless, all reparations, whether material or symbolic in nature, are 
considered by victims to be communicative gestures. 160  Walker explains that these 
communications are essential in creating ‘real effects of psychological, moral, social and 
political kinds’ and ‘if the reparative communication misfires or is poorly executed, very 
real effects often follow: the victims may be insulted, outraged, or bitterly disappointed, 
and may react with protest, withdrawal, or litigation’.161 Therefore, the communicative 
dimension is essential to any reparations programmes or gestures because it conveys an 
important vindicatory message.162 This vindicatory message may be sent explicitly by 
means of a complete apology, accepting responsibility for the wrong or its repair and the 
repudiation of the behaviour involved.163 Failure to convey this message in programmes 
of reparations would result in a lack of clarity about the attitude of the responsible parties 
towards past wrongs and their duty of justice to respond to them, or show a lack of proper 
respect or real care for those who are owed reparations.164  
However, there is the risk that reparations programmes are perceived as an isolated 
gesture if they seem to only send a vindicatory message.165 For such programmes to 
transcend this, they need to exemplify a rectified relationship that, if sustained, becomes 
the basis for acceptable and stable moral, civil, and political relations.166 The purpose of 
this exemplifying reparative function is to convey to victims and society the appropriate 
attitude for amend-makers to take to demonstrate respect, compassion and 
responsibility.167  
It has been suggested that, for the exemplification function of reparations to be convincing, 
the vindicatory message should send the right message regarding the reparations process 
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to give the hope that the right moral relationship will be established between victims and 
responsible parties, which may lead to the rebuilding of trust. In turn, this may mean that 
some confidence will emerge that gross violence will not be repeated in future.168 Further, 
it has been specifically suggested that restoration of the correct moral relationship of 
confidence, trust and hope damaged by serious wrongdoings is essential for any gestures 
or programmes which seriously intend to comprehensively repair wrongs on the social 
and civic level.169 Any serious wrongdoing against individuals raises the question of 
whether the moral standards that govern the relationship of an individual with others, and 
the interest and dignity of individuals harmed by wrongdoing, are being taken 
seriously. 170  In other words, it means ‘what are the shared norms’ of ‘our mutual 
expectations of each other’s behaviour’ and how do we ‘express the authority of those 
standards’ when they are violated and ‘authority [is] in question’.171  
It is the responsibility of communities to answer this question,172 because having taken 
upon themselves the basic duty of producing standards of responsibility, they have a duty 
to take action against violations of these standards in order to: reaffirm moral 
understandings which have been contravened by wrongdoing; clarify their scope; and, 
stabilise confidence in their authority.173 If community standards are found to lack respect 
for some of its members, the community has an obligation to take action to change 
them.174   
4.4.3.2 Problems in Achieving Reparation Gestures   
It is unlikely that the expressive function of these reparations gestures will be fully 
achieved for a variety of reasons. First, the adequacy of all reparations messages is 
restricted by the inevitable economic, political and social pressures surrounding mass 
reparations for HR violations.175 More importantly, such achievement depends on the 
willingness of the state and society to comply with these messages of reparations, 
specifically the exemplifying commitment to the repairing of future right relationship, in 
order to adequately respond to the mass violations of HR. It also depends on the actual 
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status of victims in moral, social and legal systems. This is because victims in many states, 
and specifically in Iraq, have faced marginalisation, indifference, denial and 
abandonment. It has been further suggested that despite the internal clarity of reparations 
measures and homogenous forms of justice on reparations, there are difficulties with 
reparations programmes involving victims who are ‘marginalized or [have] unequal 
status’, including women and minority ethnic or indigenous populations. This leads to 
‘disrespect or mistreatment despite a reparations effort for particular injustice at a 
particular point in time’.176 		
Secondly, the demands of different features of the expressive adequacy of a reparations 
process may create a tension between them.177 Symbolic reparations, which involve 
acknowledgment of serious wrongs to victims and the taking of responsibility for them, 
are often considered by victims to be the most fitting. On the other hand, material 
compensation may be more easily deliverable and less socially controversial when a 
society is in an unsettled political state.178 However, victims often place much greater 
value upon public acknowledgement of wrong, which explains why they may often be 
dissatisfied with money payments alone. 179  The reparative importance of money 
payments depends on whether, along with other gestures, it carries a message of 
acknowledgement of wrong, and thus affirms reciprocal accountability under shared 
standards.180 Although money in itself does not count as reparations, when the state is 
involved it is clearly a powerful means of accountability.181 Even when this is so, taking 
responsibility for wrong, which is the essence of accountability, is often of greater 
importance for victims.182 Nevertheless, in some cases money is considered by victims to 
be reparation, even when acknowledgement of responsibility or of the obligation to 
provide justice are lacking on the part of those responsible.183 
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Finally, it has been claimed that it is unrealistic to expect that gestures of reparations, 
specifically in attempting to acknowledge the reciprocal accountability relations between 
victims and those responsible for the violations or their repair, should be burdened with 
too much responsibility for the restoration of right future relationships.184 Reparation 
gestures concern what can be achieved in the present to deal with the past relative position 
of victims and responsible parties; this might be seen as ‘a bridge from a past, not just of 
unrepaired harms but also of accountability denied to a present of reciprocal 
accountability acknowledged’. This view clarifies the complexity of the ‘threats, wounds, 
tentative steps, and difficult new understandings’ so typical of reparations.185 Ideally, 
hope of better future relations between victims and responsible parties is created when 
successful reparations operations, which embody fair terms of accountability and shared 
recognition of the moral standards predicated by them, are undertaken.186  
The provision of reparations may best be understood as ‘a maker of present achievement 
in the history of relations among people or among peoples, an achievement measured by 
its distance from the past scene of wrongdoing’.187 In addition, in the aftermath of gross 
violence, the expectation that reparations by themselves are capable of achieving long-
term trusting relations may be unrealistic, since reparations ‘can only at best set an 
example and make a promise or commitment based on what achieved in the present 
instance’. 188  Where the wrongs of the past have given rise to reasonable fear, 
disillusionment, hatred, or cynicism, in the present, reparations gestures can help to create 
hope for the future, which, in turn, provides motivation to build the right relations that are 
heralded by good reparative interaction.189 
4.4.4 Summary Remarks 
It seems fair to claim that to adequately respond to the implications of violations of the 
right to life of individuals caused by serious acts of violence, the best scenario is that all 
forms of reparations gestures, both material and symbolic, must carry, in principle, an 
expressive vindicatory message. This message should include a genuine intention to 
address the implications of violence against the right to life by standing with victims, 
through acknowledgement and confirmation of their entitlement to stand in equal moral 
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relations of accountability, to witness condemnation of, and receive genuine apology for, 
serious wrongs committed, and oblige those responsible for these or for their repair to 
make amends as a matter of justice. Reparations should also be forward-looking, through 
setting an example and making a commitment based on what is done in the present to 
deal with the implications of violence in the hope that right relationships of confidence, 
trust and hope between victims, responsible parties and their communities will be restored 
in future.190 This is why it has been suggested that, in spite of the fact that problems may 
arise from the inability to achieve what this message involves, because of economic, 
political and social pressure or the marginalising of victims in states, reparations for mass 
violations of HR would, nevertheless, be incomplete should it be concluded merely with 
the fulfilment of obligations to repair these past violations in the present.191 Rather, 
reparations are the beginning of a long process of creating commitments, in the hope that 
what is done in the present will set a good example for the emergence and restoration of 
consistent right relationships between victims, responsible parties and their 
communities.192		
The community in any state where grave HR abuses occur against its members, 
specifically, has a duty to lead the social process of moral validation by which victims 
should feel confident that they are entitled to share the community’s norms of 
accountability and recognise that they are valued members of that community. This moral 
validation requires a community to respond to claims of serious wrongdoing and to 
evidence concerning it with careful attention by affirming the standards violated and by 
confirming the reality of the injury to the victim, an injury which deserves redress.193 In 
the absence of such validation by wrongdoers or the community, it could be said that 
victims and others will question whether the violation of HR and the moral standards 
governing responsibility for wrongs are being taken seriously. 194  Realistically, re-
building or re-affirming these moral standards or, even changing them because of the 
enormity of indiscriminate violence, especially sectarian violence and conflict, such as 
that suffered by the Iraqi community post-2003, is too difficult to establish unless the 
roots of violence are seriously tackled. This requires, as will be noted in the next two 
chapters, 195  anchoring reparations programmes within a holistic transitional justice 
                                                
190 See Leif Wenar, ‘Reparations for the Future’ (2006) 37 Journal of Social Philosophy 396, 404-405.  
191 See Walker (n 42) 220. 
192 Ibid. 
193 See Walker (n 152) 122. 
194 Ibid. 122-123. 




framework to enable victims and society to reconcile the past and move beyond violence 
and conflict. In a transitional justice framework, reparations are the foundation of healing 
and reconciliation since they acknowledge damage. They facilitate the healing process 
and can be the most concrete indicator of attempts by the state to redress the harms that 
victims have endured. It is especially important when such recompense also addresses the 
structures which empowered the initial violence. 196 
4.5 The Extent of the State’s Obligation in International and Regional HR 
Instruments 
This section will focus on the practices of the HRC, and the European and Inter-American 
HR systems regarding the right to reparation. 
4.5.1 Reparations under the HRC Practices   
The HRC, as interpreter of rights with universal applicability, has been able to employ 
the right to an effective remedy as a normative source and legal basis on which to demand 
reparation for victims.197 This interpretation offered by the Committee indicates that 
Article 2(3a) requires member states to make reparation to individuals whose Covenant 
rights have been violated.198 The Committee’s interpretation also obliges states to act as 
guarantors for the provision of reparation in circumstances where the violation was by 
non-state actors and they cannot provide reparation because they are insolvent or 
unidentified.199 
In considering reparation essential for the protection of HR, the Committee has required 
member states to implement different forms of reparation measures. 200  Although it 
primarily still focuses on compensation, it asserted in General Comment No. 31 that 
‘where appropriate’, the duty to repair may involve a broad set of measures other than 
compensation, including ‘rehabilitation, and measures of satisfaction, such as public 
apologies, public memorials, guarantees of non-repetition, and changes in relevant law 
and practices, as well as bringing to justice the perpetrators of HR violations’.201 Whereas 
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reparation measures of satisfaction play a vital role in addressing the gravity of acts of 
violence against the right to life, since it is their aim to restore to victims their sense of 
justice and dignity, the assurances of non-repetition have a broader effect, as they address 
the preventive aim of reparation.202  From the Committee’s perspective, payment of 
financial compensation is insufficient in itself to repair the harm done to victims of grave 
HR violations, especially in cases of enforced disappearance,203 since they involve the 
continuation of the violation by the extra suffering a victim’s family experiences until 
their fate is known and, also, because a disappeared victim remains outside the protection 
of law until state authorities disclose what has happened.204 The Committee consistently 
found that suffering resulting from the refusal or failure of the state to inform the next of 
kin of the truth is so grave as to constitute a violation of Article 7, which prohibits their 
torture and ill-treatment.205 Revealing the truth surrounding the victim’s fate is considered 
an essential right of family members in cases of serious HR violations and should be 
provided as a part of effective remedies.206 For instance, in the case of Almeida de 
Quinteros v Uruguay concerning enforced disappearance, the Committee held that it 
‘understands the anguish and stress caused to the mother by the disappearance of her 
daughter and the continuing uncertainty concerning her fate and whereabouts. The author 
has the right to know what has happened to her daughter’.207 Therefore, where family 
members continue to suffer from not knowing the truth regarding the fate of their relatives 
at the hands of the state, it has been suggested that it is impossible for the psychological 
and social aspects of reparation, including the restoration of victims’ dignity to both the 
disappeared persons and their family members, to be met.208 When this is the case, the 
symbolic meaning of any form of reparation will be undermined by the continuing refusal 
or failure of the state to end family members’ suffering by revealing the truth to their 
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loved ones.209 Moreover, as part of reparation, where disappeared persons have been 
killed, the Committee obliges the state to end the violation by searching for and, where 
possible, returning their bodies so that their families may begin to grieve and heal.210 In 
a few instances, the Committee has also requested that states offer other forms of 
reparation, such as protection from harassment211 and a formal apology.212  
The Committee usually does not demand that victims’ relatives claim reparation or 
produce evidence of the harm suffered for reparation to be made.213 However, when the 
Committee appears in these cases to have addressed the mental distress, uncertainty and 
intimidation experienced by close relatives as a violation of Article 7 of the Covenant,214 
it has not always clarified exactly whose harm is being repaired. In some cases, the 
Committee has clearly stated that the reparation is intended to redress the next of kin’s 
own injuries and moral damage,215 whereas in others it has stated that the reparation is 
based on the harm suffered by the actual victim.216 Monetary compensation is usually the 
form of reparation made to victims’ families. The Committee, however, does not 
prescribe a definite amount of compensation to be awarded to these families of the 
murdered or disappeared; it merely states that the compensation has to be ‘adequate’.217 
In addition, the Committee has specifically stated that the entitlement of families to 
compensation should not be based on a civil declaration of the death of the disappeared, 
as this would be inhumane and degrading for the families.218 
In cases where the victim has survived the violation, for instance those of torture, 
compensation is not usually granted to the next of kin.219 This has been rightly criticised 
as it considers the families of murdered or disappeared persons also to be victims, but 
rarely does so for the families of victims who survive.220 These families, thus, should be 
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considered on equal terms as those of victims who have disappeared or been murdered 
and, therefore, the suffering or harm done to them should be considered by the 
Committee.221 On the other hands, the Committee’s decisions concerning compensation 
for deprivation of the right to life seem only to consider moral and pecuniary damage and 
do not view loss of life as a damage requiring compensation in itself. Whilst violent death 
is not seen as a specific, additional damage in terms of compensation, it seems not to 
deserve compensation in its own right. Rather, a state which is responsible for the 
violation of individuals’ right to life or for its repair is often required to compensate for 
damage suffered by the families of the murdered victims. 222  
Important challenges also remain to increasing the impact and efficacy of the 
Committee’s rulings on reparations.223 Among these challenges are both the insufficiency 
of satisfaction measures and the need to further develop guarantees of non-repetition in 
cases of gross violations of HR.224 It has been noted that four reparation measures of 
satisfaction are still absent or inadequately addressed in the Committee’s rulings,225 and 
the capacity of symbolic reparations has not been appreciated, in general, in order to reach 
more victims and repair relationships with society.226 As the High Commissioner for HR 
has stated: 
By making the memory of the victims a public matter, they disburden their families from their 
sense of obligation to keep the memory alive and allow them to move on. This is essential if 
reparations are to provide recognition to victims not only as victims but also as citizens and as 
rights holders more generally.227 
The reparation measure of ensuring that similar violations do not occur again in future 
has not yet been developed or fully explored.228 The Committee has not asked for specific 
measures of non-repetition, such as the reform of law and legal systems, training of state 
officials in human standards, promotion of oversight mechanisms and campaigns to better 
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inform the public and encourage complaints, and in so doing may have missed important 
opportunities.229  
4.5.1.1 Summary Remarks 
It is fair to claim that the Covenant does not include express provisions by which the right 
of victims of HR violations to reparation, specifically the violation of the right to life, 
must be guaranteed by member states; however, through the exercise of its vital authority 
in interpreting the right to an effective remedy embodied in Article 2(3), the HRC has 
guaranteed this right to victims in the course of its review of individual cases. States under 
the jurisprudence of the Committee are required to provide victims with various measures 
of reparation, including compensation and just satisfaction, irrespective of the identity of 
perpetrators, whether state or private individuals. This requirement exists even in 
circumstances where private perpetrators are unidentified or insolvent, since states, 
according to the Committee’s interpretation, are guarantors of the right of victims to 
reparation. However, the Committee needs to give further consideration to compensation 
for the damage of death and, also, to the limits of just satisfaction measures which states 
are requested to provide in cases of infringements of the right to life. In addition, the 
Committee needs to determine precisely the measures that should be taken by member 
states to give strong effect to the requirement of the guarantee of non-repetition of 
violations of the right to life. Nevertheless, the development of the jurisprudence of the 
Committee is particularly notable when compared to the practice of the ECtHR. 
4.5.2 Reparations under the Jurisprudence of the ECtHR  
The right of victims to remedy encompassed in Article 13 is strengthened by Article 41, 
which empowers the ECtHR to provide ‘just satisfaction’ for the injured party.230 For the 
Court to exercise its authority under Article 41, the conduct of a state must constitute a 
violation of the rights and obligations contained in the Convention, the applicant must 
suffer an injury of moral or financial damage, and, finally, only partial reparation has been 
made available to victims in the domestic laws of the state, for which the Court must find 
that just satisfaction is required.231 The latter condition, according to many commentators, 
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clearly reflects the subsidiary nature of the role of the European Court in awarding 
reparation for the violation of the Convention rights.232  
However, the provision of just satisfaction by the Court under Article 41 may be limited 
merely to the issuing of a declaratory judgment which establishes that one or more 
Convention rights have been breached, reflecting the minor remedial role of the Court in 
accordance with the principle of subsidiarity.233 Nevertheless, in certain circumstances, 
the Court may accompany its declaratory judgment with the requirement that 
compensation be awarded for pecuniary and/or non-pecuniary damage caused by such 
violation. 234  The Court recognises that the next of kin of victims can be awarded 
reparation in cases of unlawful death only in the two following scenarios: (1) where they 
receive reparation on behalf of victims, as heirs, for the financial and/or moral damage 
the victims themselves; and (2) where the next of kin are considered to be autonomous 
victims and, thus, are awarded reparation for their own moral and/or material damage.235  
Where the Court finds ‘without reasonable doubt’236 that the state is responsible for death 
(substantive violation) and for the procedural violation of Article 2, such as failure to 
investigate the victim’s death, it awards pecuniary damages for loss of earning and 
potential earnings, for funeral expenses and other costs connected with the death.237 When 
the Court only finds a procedural violation of Article 2, it does not make an award for 
pecuniary damage since the state is not directly linked with the actual violation and 
damage caused. Thus, it only awards for the non-pecuniary damage to the next of kin to 
compensate for the frustration, distress, anxiety and pain suffered. 238 A more robust 
response than procedural abuses is considered when a state actor is found responsible for 
substantive rights abuse.239 In cases of domestic violence, where the Court found a breach 
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of Article 2 and/or other articles, such as Articles 3, 8 and 14, of the Convention, it 
awarded compensation for non-pecuniary damage, although smaller than claimed.240 
Non-pecuniary damage is also awarded on behalf of the direct victim when evidence 
shows that they suffered torture or ill treatment prior to death or disappearance.241  
4.5.2.1 Difficulties in Obtaining Compensation  
Victims’ next of kin face difficulties gaining compensation from the Court on behalf of 
both the victims themselves and in their own names as autonomous victims.242  
a) Monetary Compensation 
With compensation for pecuniary damages, the Court is very conservative since it will 
award relatives of victims, as successors, only moral damages, unless they make a claim 
before the Court and can prove such damages.243 In addition, the Court is unwilling to 
lessen the standard of proof for gross HR violation, which makes proof that such damages 
occurred very difficult to prove ‘beyond reasonable doubt’.244  Moreover, claims for 
pecuniary damage by family members are not usually met by the Court in full245 and only 
exceptionally has it awarded to applicants material damages as successors of the 
deceased.246 Consequently, it has been claimed that the award of appropriate pecuniary 
damages to successors has failed to be granted by the Court.247 Lack of proper redress for 
damages has serious consequences for the family, especially women and children who 
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are often left in penury, since frequently the killed or disappeared person was the 
breadwinner. 248  Similarly, family members can also face difficulties in obtaining 
compensation for their own pecuniary damages because of the death or disappearance of 
a relative.249 Despite clear evidence that the family members of the deceased have lost 
opportunities and income, and incurred costs (including funerary, medical, and legal 
expenses), the Court has not usually granted pecuniary damages to applicants; when it 
has done so, it has often required thorough substantiation of the claims.250   
b) Moral Compensation  
Difficulties also arise regarding compensation for moral damages which include the pain 
and suffering caused by the victims’ death. Although the Court considers that the graver 
the violation, the higher award,251 it lacks systematic rules to calculate what an award 
should be.252 Only when it has been proved that the victim was arbitrarily detained or 
tortured before being killed or disappearing will the Court award reparations for moral 
damages to successors on behalf of the deceased.253 For moral damages to successors, the 
Court has been inconsistent in granting them. In making such decisions, the Court seems 
to have depended on whether applicants claim moral damages on behalf of the victim.254  
As far as compensation to relatives for their own suffering because of the loss of a family 
member is concerned, the Court has adopted a narrow interpretation of what constitutes 
a violation of Article 3 of the Convention regarding prohibition of torture and inhuman 
treatment.255 It rarely considers relatives of victims who have been killed to be themselves 
victims of inhumane treatment. Even where the relatives of victims of enforced 
disappearance have been considered by the Court to have possibly suffered inhumane 
treatment, this happens only under special circumstances and the applicants are still 
required to prove the intensity of that suffering and anguish.256 
c) Other Measures of Reparation  
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The Court has often indicated that pecuniary compensation alone is inadequate to remedy 
the violation of the right to life and, therefore, has required member states to adopt further 
specific measures of reparation.257 For instance, although the Court has not explicitly 
referred to ‘the right to know the truth’, it has acknowledged that, in cases such as 
enforced disappearance, the right of the relatives of the disappeared person not to be the 
subject of cruel and inhuman treatment	as required by Article 3 of the Convention may 
be violated when the state has failed to investigate such violations and to inform the 
relatives of the results.258 The denial of this right, therefore, is not just a denial of the right 
to a remedy, or investigation or reparation, but is also painful, inhuman and debasing 
behaviour as it leads to new grief for victims and relatives.259 Some have maintained that 
when the Court takes a non-restrictive interpretation to reparation by including 
rehabilitation, satisfaction, and non-repetition, specifically in cases of gross HR violation, 
it undoubtedly adopts an attitude more in line with the aims and purpose of the 
Convention.260  
The Court has recently tended to adopt broader measures of reparation in addition to 
pecuniary compensation. 261  For instance, in the case of Aslakhanova and Others v. 
Russia,262 the Court for the first time ‘felt compelled to provide some guidance on certain 
measures that must be taken, as a matter of urgency’. This was achieved to end the 
ongoing misery of the family of the disappeared, by effectively investigating the 
kidnapping, illegal imprisonment and disappearance allegedly committed by service 
personnel, to ensure that families are given adequate compensation.263 These measures 
included creating a high level body to investigate disappearances and the allocation of 
adequate resources ‘to carry out large-scale forensic and scientific work on the ground, 
including the location and exhumation of presumed burial sites; the collection, storage 
and identification of remains and, where necessary, systematic matching through up-to-
date genetic databanks’.264 In addition to providing pecuniary compensation, the Court 
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demanded that the state clearly admit responsibility for the pain and suffering caused to 
the victims’ families.265  
In the recent case of Cyprus v Turkey, the Grand Chamber considered a claim for just 
satisfaction on behalf of two groups of victims of enforced disappearance.266 In this case, 
financial compensation for non-pecuniary damage was the only remedy claimed and 
awarded to the victims. However, the Court noted that as ‘the impact of the violation may 
[…] have impinged so significantly on the moral well-being of the applicant’, this meant 
that there was a moral aspect to the monetary award and, therefore, more was required 
than the mere recognition of wrong doing in the judgment.267 In order ‘to give recognition 
to the fact that moral damage occurred as a result of a breach of a fundamental human 
right and reflect in the broadest of terms the severity of the damage’ the Court awarded 
appropriate damages.268  
However, broader measures of reparation, such as the provision of medical or 
psychological rehabilitation, social assistance, public apologies, acknowledgment of 
international responsibility by the authorities, commemorations or tributes to the victims 
or the building of a memorial monument, have never been taken into serious consideration 
by the Court or by states involved in violations of HR.269 In addition, the Court has not 
adequately paid attention to the fact that society is also damaged by such violation and, 
therefore, is entitled to measures of reparation, especially regarding future non-
repetition.270 Despite giving some recognition to the existence of this damage to the whole 
society,271 the Court has not deemed it appropriate to order any relevant measure of 
reparation for it.272 Moreover, it has refrained from ordering other forms of reparation, 
such as the overturning of decisions of domestic authorities, the negating of domestic 
legislation that is not compatible with the European Convention, or the alteration of a 
state’s legislation.273 
4.5.2.2 Summary Remarks 
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It is clear that the Court generally narrows the interpretation of Article 41 of the ECHR 
in ordering states to provide merely pecuniary compensation for the financial or moral 
damages resulting from the violation of individuals’ right to life; even when all conditions 
of Article 41 have been fulfilled, at its discretion it may allow this compensation to be 
granted to the next of kin for damages incurred by the victims or for their own damages. 
Although the Court will in principle award moral damages to the next of kin in cases of 
disappearance and killing, it does not always award pecuniary compensation. If it does 
make pecuniary compensation, the amount is generally smaller than claimed and it 
requires thorough substantiation of such claims.274 In addition, the Court does not pay any 
attention to the loss of life as a damage in itself in awarding compensation. Moreover, the 
Court has repeatedly affirmed that the main responsibility for the determination and 
implementation of other measures of reparation lies with the respondent state and the 
Committee of Ministers.275 It has been suggested that the position of the Court, therefore, 
requires development as other international standards may better guarantee ‘redress to 
victims of HR violations’,276 such as the Inter-American Court. Nevertheless, the Court, 
in asserting that compensation must in principle be only part of redress of mechanisms in 
cases of the violation of the right to life, it recognises the need for further reparation 
measures.277 However, the Court may be said to have failed to fully enhance redress 
mechanisms by which the moral and legal rights of victims of the violation of the right to 
life to holistic reparation can be promoted against their states.  
4.5.3 Reparations under the Jurisprudence of the IACtHR 
The Court’s judgments have been described by commentators as representing ‘the most 
wide-reaching remedies afforded in international HR law’.278 Article 63(1) expressly 
authorises the Court to order three kinds of reparations for the violation of HR by the state, 
namely, the ensuring of the enjoyment of rights or freedoms, remedy for violations and 
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the award of fair compensation.279 Interestingly, it has been suggested that, unlike the 
reparation required by the European Court, the reparation orders of the Inter-American 
Court will be effective and independent of any limitation by domestic law.280 Because 
Article 63(1) makes no reference to domestic law, the Court can therefore ‘proceed to the 
determination of the measures of reparation on the basis –autonomously –of the American 
Convention itself and of the applicable general principles of international law’.281 
The Court has repeatedly stated that the authority given to it by this Article to order 
reparation for the violation of HR embodies ‘one of the fundamental principles of 
international law’. 282  Such authority allows the Court to demand the full reparation 
measures recognised by international law without any restriction in terms of domestic 
law.283 In Velasquez Rodriguez v Honduras,284 it was held that such reparation might 
entail:   
the restoration of the prior situation, the reparation of the consequences of the violation, and 
indemnification for patrimonial and non-patrimonial damages, including emotional harm.285  
The decision of the Court in this case, in recognising for the first time that the state has a 
duty, in certain circumstances, to provide reparation to victims of HR violations 
committed by non-state or unidentified actors, has been claimed to be significant.286 This 
claim is based on the Court’s assertion that the state must ‘if possible attempt to restore 
the right violated and provide compensation as warranted for damages resulting from the 
violation’.287 This may be reasonably interpreted to mean that, although the Court did not 
detail when the state would be obliged to provide compensation if the perpetrators of the 
violation of HR are unknown or are unable to provide compensation themselves, the state 
has a duty to guarantee such compensation.288 
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a) Compensation for Pecuniary and Moral Damage Suffered by Victims  
For the right of victims who have lost their lives to be compensated for the pecuniary and 
moral damages they suffered, and the capacity of this right to be transferred to their 
surviving relatives, the Court has established clear principles and presumptions regulating 
the award of compensation to successors.289 The basic principle followed by the Court is 
that the victim’s right to repair for damage experienced up to the time of death is 
transferred to their family.290 In deciding the amount of compensation for the loss of 
earnings of a person who has disappeared or been killed, the Court has considered age at 
the time of death, life expectancy in the country to which the victim belonged, and the 
particular facts of the case. This has enabled the Court to determine the income that the 
victim would have received had their right to life not been violated, and ‘based upon the 
income the victim would have received […] up to the time of [their] possible natural 
death’.291 Such compensation has been guaranteed even in cases where the applicant or 
Court or both have been unable to assess what the victims’ income would have been.292 
The Court has also awarded compensation for the moral damages suffered by victims of 
violation of their right to life to their successors on the basis that, in grave cases, such as 
killings or forced disappearances, ‘anyone subjected to aggression and abuse will 
experience moral suffering’ 293  and, therefore, once responsibility is established, no 
evidence of proof of moral suffering is required.294 This is to say that moral suffering is 
self-evident,295 in spite of the Court’s assertion that ‘the reparations must have a causal 
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link with the facts of the case, the alleged violations, the proven damages, as well as with 
the measures requested to repair the resulting damages’.296  
b) Compensation for the Damage of Death  
The Court has limited itself to order compensation for the moral and material damages 
resulting from the victim’s loss of life and never awarded such compensation in respect 
of the violation of the intrinsic value of the deceased’s life which, according to Shelton, 
is a ‘concept... linked to self-actualization of the person’, nor for the loss of enjoyment of 
life.297 Shelton explained that, although the Court has accepted the concept of awarding 
damages for the intrinsic value of life, what is called a ‘life plan’,298 it has failed to make 
any actual award.299 For instance, although the Court in the case of Loayza Tamayo, 
acknowledged the possibility of grave damage to a life plan by violations of HR, it has 
stated that ‘neither case law nor doctrine has evolved to the point where acknowledgment 
of damage to a life plan can be translated into economic terms. Hence, the Court is 
refraining from quantifying it’.300 Similarly, the Court rejected the claim of the Inter-
American Commission in the case of Bámaca Velásquez, which asserted that there was 
evidence to suggest that the victim, a guerilla leader, had planned to serve civil society 
following peace accords in Guatemala, and that his killing by the state violated his right 
to live out his life plan, as well as causing him material and moral damages.301  
While such acceptance of the damage to a life plan of the deceased is a form of recognition 
of the hedonistic value of life,302 the intrinsic value of life should be understood in a 
holistic way, focusing on the broader notion of appreciating various aspects of life, rather 
than just the victim’s professional or personal goals and aspirations.303 In addition, there 
is a distinction between the harm done to the value of life, and the moral suffering or loss 
of earnings suffered by the dependants of the victim.304 Saul further states that ‘courts 
may fail to recognize the difference between damages for the value of human life, as 
distinct from the deceased’s loss of earnings or moral suffering’.305  
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c) Compensation for the Next of Kin for Suffering 
The Court has accepted that victims’ next of kin can suffer material damages in their own 
right, including consequential damages and loss of earnings.306 Consequential damages 
have been usually recognised by the Court for a next of kin who suffered economic 
damage incurred in expenses in dealing with consequences of the violation.307 Where 
such loss has been proven or presumed to have been incurred, the Court will order the 
state to compensate for them.308 For instance, in the Cotton Field v. Mexico309 which 
concerned the abduction, sexual abuse and killing of more than 300 women and girls by 
non-state actors, the Court recognised that the next of kin of three of the girls had suffered 
consequential damage as a result both of trying to find them and then paying their funeral 
expenses.310 Like consequential damages, the Court also awarded compensation for the 
damages of loss of earnings incurred by the next of kin who were considered to have 
suffered damages in their own right.311  
Moral harm (pain and suffering) to the next of kin of victims has also been taken into 
consideration by the Court. For instance, the Court in Blake v Guatemala case, 312 
considered the next of kin of a disappeared person to be victims, since it found that their 
own right to human treatment encompassed by Article 5 had been violated.313 The Court 
considered that the burning of the mortal remains of Mr. Blake added to the Court’s 
declaration that ‘the circumstances of such disappearances generate suffering and anguish 
[in the family], in addition to a sense of insecurity, frustration and impotence in the face 
of the public authorities’ failure to investigate’.314 The crucial factor in determining 
whether the right of the next of kin of victims under Article 5 has been violated is not the 
inadequate conduct of the state authorities regarding their requests, but has always been 
the harm caused by the HR violation, in its own right, to family members.315 According 
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to the Court, the attitude of the state authorities is just one factor in determining the gravity 
of the suffering.316  
4.5.3.1 Satisfaction Measures of Reparations    
Moral reparations and future deterrence in cases of gross HR violations may well be 
important consequences derived from the measures of satisfaction required by the Inter-
American Court.317 Such remedies are non-financial in nature and meant to contribute to 
repairing the suffering and anguish caused by such violations, and to underline the 
significance of the harm done to human values by them.318 For instance, in the case of 
Cotton Field v. Mexico, 319  the Court responded positively to the request of the 
Commission and the legal representatives of the victims to order the state to provide 
victims with satisfaction measures, including acknowledgement by the Mexican 
authorities of their international responsibility for the serious damages done to victims, 
the publication of the Court’s judgment, and the construction of a memorial.320  
The Court has also regularly ordered the offending state to make an official and public 
apology to the victims or their next of kin for the violation of victims’ HR.321 For instance, 
in the case of Moiwana Village v. Suriname322 concerning the alleged massacre of over 
40 men, women and children in an attack by members of the armed forces of Suriname, 
which razed the village of the N’djuka Maroon of Moiwana in 1986, the Court asserted 
that: 
as a measure of satisfaction to the victims and in attempt to guarantee the non-repetition of the 
serious HR violations that have occurred, the State shall publicly recognize its international 
responsibility for the facts of the instant case and issue a[public] apology to the Moiwana 
community members.323 
The publication of the judgment of the Court in national newspapers is also a measure of 
satisfaction regularly ordered by the Court in cases of HR violations.324 The Court has 
also, for instance, in the case of Yatama v. Nicaragua325 required its judgment to be 
broadcast in a number of local languages using community radio to publicise the 
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verdict.326 In a recent development, the Court ordered the state to publish its judgment on 
state websites for a period of at least one year.327 Such broad publication is considered a 
necessary measure to restore the dignity of victims by informing the general public of the 
Court’s findings.328 In the words of the psychiatrist, Judith Herman, ‘remembering and 
telling the truth about terrible events are prerequisites both for the restoration of the social 
order and for the healing of individual victims’.329  
In line with the above measures of restoring dignity to victims and honouring their 
memory, the Court has further ordered states to adopt initiatives to keep their memory 
alive, such as the placing of commemorative plaques in places were victims were 
killed,330  the erection of monuments,331 and the naming of streets, schools and squares 
after victims in memory of them.332 These memory-related measures ordered by the Court 
are meant to give satisfaction to victims and be a reminder, to ensure that the violation 
will not be repeated.333 In the Street Children Case, for instance, the Court reasoned that 
its order to name an education centre after the victims and to place upon it a plaque would 
serve to awaken the nation’s conscience and help avoid repetition of harmful acts.334 It is 
important to note that reparations ordered by the Court are not solely directed to 
individual victims. In its judgments, the Court has a well-established practice of repairing 
the damage done to the entire community where violations of HR had been committed 
against entire communities with the intention of altering social relations, the dynamic of 
families, and the rest of the community.335  
4.5.3.2 Summary Remarks 
It can be said that although the right of victims to seek redress directly from perpetrators 
has been slow to be recognised in international law, the Inter-American Court’s decisions 
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on reparations have made an invaluable contribution, not only to the recognition of a 
legally enforceable right of reparation for victims of HR violations, 336  but also in 
demonstrating what regional enforcement mechanisms can make to the progressive 
development of international law. The Court has relied on the authorisation given to it by 
Article 63(1) of the ACHR to regularly order offending states to provide victims with 
compensation for material and moral damages caused by such violation; moreover, it has 
gradually become more generous in awarding such compensation.337 Although the Court 
has seriously considered the whole aspect of the damage to life, including the damage to 
the life plan, it has, nevertheless, refrained from granting compensation for the intrinsic 
value of life or hedonistic damage.338  More importantly, the Court has disregarded 
requiring the objective aspect of the damage of death (the loss of life) to be a damage 
deserving of compensation in itself. However, the Court has acknowledged that monetary 
compensation is inadequate to redress the damage of death and, therefore, has ordered 
offending states to adopt a wide range of non-monetary measures, including rehabilitation, 
satisfaction, and guarantees of non-repetition. It has done so to restore to victims a sense 
of justice and dignity, as well as to strengthen their status in their domestic legal systems.  
4.6 Conclusions 
The main aim of this chapter was to investigate the nature of international legal 
obligations concerning the right of victims to reparation for the violation of the right to 
life. International and regional instruments in recent times have stressed that it is the 
responsibility of the state to provide reparations for victims. Many rationales have been 
introduced to justify placing a duty on the state to compensate such victims. One rationale 
is that the state has a social contract with its citizens to protect them in return for their 
acceptance of limitations to the right of individuals to protect themselves against violent 
crimes. 339 Similarly, the state may be held responsible for the actions of non-state actors 
either directly or secondarily since it has the ability to exert ‘effective control’ over them 
and/or ‘a sufficiently close connection to the non-state actor to bear secondary 
responsibility for having failed to prevent them from committing their wrong’. 340 
Therefore, the failure of the state to prevent violent crimes provides a basis for 
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compensation for victims by the state.341 A second rationale is that the state should bear 
social responsibility when ‘actually producing or inducing crime in the first place. That 
is, it is claimed that the state helps produce a social environment that is conducive to 
crime and it therefore produces crime victims’.342 A third rationale is based on the concept 
of social intervention, which considers violent crime against members of a community to 
be a social problem and, therefore, requires solidarity with victims. Moreover, where a 
state has assumed major control over criminal justice, although historically victims have 
no legal claim for state assistance, the state nevertheless has a social obligation to make 
amends.343 While not all the above rationales are of equal weight in requiring the state to 
take on the duty to compensate victims of violent crime when such compensation has not 
been made by offenders, taken together they amount to a very strong case and can be said 
to put victims in a strong moral and legal position to have their right to reparations 
acknowledged by the state. However, taking the death of victims very seriously may 
imply more than financial compensation if it is, at least to some extent, to be addressed 
adequately by the state. Therefore, the best approach for a state is to fully respond to both 
the monetary and symbolic aspects of reparations.  
The most notable steps in addressing the implications of violations of the right to life by 
promoting the right of victims to receive holistic reparations may be said to have been 
made by the jurisprudence of the IACtHR. The development of its jurisprudence is 
significant when compared to the practice of the HRC and the ECtHR, which generally 
tends to narrow the scope of reparation. The IACtHR has largely followed international 
law by requiring victims to be provided not only with monetary compensation for material 
and moral damages but also with a wide range of non-monetary measures. Such 
comprehensive reparations measures ordered by the Court may send the right message to 
offending states that the adoption of reparations programmes is essential for restoring 
trust and engendering hope for future right relationship in society. This approach of the 
Inter-American Court, as has been suggested, has the ‘role [of] humanizing reparations 
in international HR law’.344 
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Chapter 5: The Status of the Rights of Victims in the Present Iraqi 
Legal System 
5.1 Introduction 
Previous chapters have discussed the moral and legal rights of victims to security, 
investigation, prosecution and punishment of violent crime by non-state actors, and 
reparation for these violations according to philosophical/ethical principles and 
international and regional standards. These discussions have established an arguable case 
for imposing positive obligations on states to secure these rights, even though how and 
how far they are established varies in form and practice from one human rights body to 
another. Moving on from these considerations about moral/philosophical and 
international obligations, this chapter will explore these obligations in the Iraqi legal 
system, both in theory and practice. It will address the following questions: what affects 
the ability of the Iraqi state to comply with these obligations? What needs reforming in 
the Iraqi state and its legal system and practice if these obligations are to be fulfilled? 
This will be done by firstly providing the background regarding the evolution of the 
criminal justice system in Iraq, and also by exploring how the failure of the transitional 
justice process post-2003 has led to the dysfunction of the criminal justice system, 
resulting in widespread violence and victimisation. It will also consider why, in the light 
of the current practical and political situation in Iraq, it is so difficult to envisage how 
such rights can be guaranteed in the day to day practice of its criminal justice system.         
Fundamentally, this chapter asks how a well-functioning criminal justice system 
guaranteeing security, redress, and the rule of law can be said to exist in Iraq, which 
continues to suffer widespread violence,1 in the context of the absence of accountability 
for the violations of the human rights of its citizens. Indeed, while the criminal justice 
system is a key pillar of stability and security, its complexity means it can only work 
correctly if several ‘interdependent parameters are fulfilled and complement each other’.2  
5.1.1 The Background to the Current Criminal Justice System  
                                                
1 See Alina Christova, ‘Seven Years of EUJUST LEX: The Challenge of Rule of Law in Iraq’ (2013) 9 Journal of Contemporary 





Historically speaking, the criminal justice system in Iraq during the 20th century was 
mainly secular because its substantive and procedural criminal legal foundations are not 
directly derived from Islamic law or Sharia,3 but modelled after the French legal system.4 
This model was introduced into the Ottoman Empire in the mid-1800s, and has since then 
continued to strongly influence the Iraqi judicial system and its substantive criminal laws 
and procedures.5 From 1920 until today, the Iraqi legal system, including criminal law, 
reflects not only Ottoman but also Egyptian and Islamic law.6 In addition, Iraqi criminal 
law, due to the British occupation in the 1920s, also ‘bears vestiges’ of English common 
law and Sharia law.7 Iraq’s original Criminal Code was in effect until early 1968, when 
it was superseded by the 1969 current Penal Code, based on the Baghdad Penal Code.8  
At present, numerous legal documents, including the Iraqi Constitution (2005), 9  the 
Criminal Procedure Code (1971) and its amendments,10 the Penal Code (1969) and its 
amendments,11 the Judicature Act (1977) and the Public Prosecutor Law (1979), provide 
the legal basis of current Iraqi criminal justice.12 Its main features stem from the fact that 
crime is seen to be committed merely against the state and society and, thus, the system 
is the cornerstone of order and stability, as well as a mechanism to punish those 
responsible for crime and deter future criminal acts. In addition, since 2003 the due 
process of protection of the rights of suspects, defendants and offenders is contained in 
various statutes which comply with international standards of human rights, the 
Constitution, 13  and substantive and procedural criminal law. 14  Thus, Iraq’s criminal 
justice system has mainly focused on controlling criminal activities considered to have 
been committed against society as a whole, and also on guaranteeing due process for the 
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rights of offenders.15 However, it is argued that it has not taken adequate account of the 
rights and interests of victims as third parties who have been seriously affected by 
criminal activities. Moreover, the term ‘victim’ has not been explicitly referred to in this 
system; instead the concept of the ‘injured party’ has been mainly used, causing an injured 
person to be considered merely as a civil plaintiff in criminal cases claiming 
compensation. This may partly be attributed to lawmakers being generally concerned with 
protecting suspects’ and offenders’ rights to fair treatment and fair trial, to the neglect of 
concern with the rights of victims. Conversely, it may be said that the Iraqi criminal 
justice system is mainly concerned with dealing with the crimes of a limited number of 
non-state actors, including crimes against the right to life. It has been incapable of dealing 
with the extremely large number of crimes against the right to life which have arisen, and 
continue to occur as a result of the social and political turmoil existing in Iraq since 2003, 
particularly because of ethno-sectarian divisions. It is accepted that many criminal justice 
systems in comparable states would have struggled to cope with the impact of a similar 
conflict situation. 
5.1.2 The Deficiencies of the Transitional Justice Process Post-2003 
In essence, it can be argued that the social and political turmoil, the incapacity of the 
criminal justice system and the neglect of the rights of victims results, in part, from the 
defects of the transitional justice process post-2003. This process failed to employ all the 
processes which a society needs to deal with widespread mistreatment, and enable 
accountability, justice and reconciliation.16 The records show that the pre-2003 regime 
committed large-scale abuses against human rights and deliberately limited any 
protection of them.17 As one commentator stated, there were a number of ‘nightmarish 
violations of the vast majority of the human rights of the Iraqi population by the Ba’ath 
regime under […] Saddam Hussein’, including numerous extra-judicial killings and 
torture, detention without due process, widespread disappearances, religious persecution 
of the Shi’a, and acts of genocide against the Kurds. 18 
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Such a long legacy of serious violations of the human rights of Iraqi citizens, specifically 
the right to life, requires that Iraqi society post-2003 should have had its own process of 
genuine transitional justice. This process should have considered Iraq’s particular 
circumstances, namely decades of war, economic sanctions (1990-2003), and severe 
damage to its principles of peaceful co-existence, moral values, legal standards, culture, 
social fabric, tribal customs, religion and ethno-sectarian identities. The addressing of 
these particular circumstances would, it is argued, have helped Iraq heal the wounds of 
the previous horrific oppressive regime, towards establishing the rule of law and bringing 
about reconciliation.19 According to many experts, the Collation Provisional Authority 
(CPA) of the occupying powers seriously failed to do this because it did not consider the 
existing and historical basis of Iraq’s violent context when shaping a reconciliation plan. 
Rather, the occupying power ranked ‘trials over truth, retribution over reconciliation, and 
corruption over transparency’.20 Many Iraqi citizens became aware of this. It has been 
noted that: 
When dealing with past abuses, it is essential to combine approaches that […] seek the truth and 
deal with […] reparations. No single mechanism can achieve all the goals necessary for a society 
to hold people accountable for their crimes, re-establish the rule of law under a legitimate 
government, and prevent abuses from happening again. But instead of setting up a truth-seeking 
mechanism, the Americans disbanded the Iraqi army, pursued a program of de-Ba’athification, 
and established the Special Tribunal to hold Saddam Hussein and a handful of others accountable 
for crimes against humanity and other international crimes under international law.21  
The chief of the International Centre for Transitional Justice, David Tolbert, has described 
the process of transition in Iraq-post 2003, both lustration and prosecutions, especially 
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the policy of De-Baathification of society, as a ‘disaster’.22 This latter policy has been 
criticised because ‘by targeting membership rather than wrongdoing, the stage was set for 
a collectivization of guilt that had a sharp sectarian edge’.23 What happened in Iraq, 
according to the Iraqi jurist Shaaban, did not meet the standards of transitional justice, 
either in context or performance. Indeed, several factors needed to have been considered, 
including: the historical sectarian tensions and mistrust between the previous oppressive 
state and society; the post-2003 collapse of the state; the demobilization of the armed and 
security forces; and, the flawed and misguided use of the De-Baathification policy. These 
factors meant that transitional justice was implemented as a tool of ‘revenge’ and 
‘exclusion’ rather than as a means of seeking truth. No genuine process of accountability 
was established to heal wounds by providing justice and reparation for victims, build 
peace, create reconciliation, and reform Iraq’s political, legal, judicial and security 
systems, to establish the rule of law and prevent a recurrence of violence.24 Consequently, 
the CPA and its policies failed to meet the needs of Iraqi citizens; in fact, they only 
succeeded in exacerbating the state of violent unrest by causing further division and 
perpetuating the climate of violence.25 A recent survey involving international legal and 
judicial participants working in Iraq since 2003 reinforced the argument that attempts to 
reform and establish an effective judicial system based on the rule of law have been 
unsuccessful. This is largely because participants lacked sufficient knowledge of Iraqi 
culture and customs, and the long-standing civil-law system on which the Iraqi criminal 
justice system is based.26 
                                                
22 See the panel discussion about transitional justice conducted by a selection of researchers, experts and thinkers (n 20) 154; the new 
report of ICTJ, entitled ‘A bitter Legacy: Lessons of De-Baathification in Iraq’ was based on significant field research and interviews 
with the Higher National De-Baathification Commission (HNDC) established in 2003 by the Iraqi Interim Governing Council with 
the responsibility of leading the De-Baathification initiatives from 2003-2011; also reviews of the process of De-Baathification in 
accordance with the Accountability and Justice Law (AJL), which was a new De-Baathification law passed by the Iraqi Council of 
Representative in 2008. By this Law, the Higher Commission for Accountability and Justice (HCAJ) was established which absorbed 
most of the HNDC’s structure and personnel. The new report clearly demonstrated that this process was ‘to a large extent needlessly 
partisan, controversial, flawed, and ineffective’ and that the HNDC and HCAJ only succeeded in heightening feelings of political 
exclusion, unfair and discrimination treatment against sectarian groups, mainly the Sunni one. For further details, see Sissons and Al-
Saiedi (n 20).  
23 See Beth K. Dougherty, ‘De-Ba`thification in Iraq: How Not to Pursue Transitional Justice’ (2014) Middle East Institute < 
http://www.mei.edu/content/de-bathification-iraq-how-not-pursue-transitional-justice> accessed 10 May 2017.  
24 See the panel discussion about transitional justice conducted by a selection of researchers, experts and thinkers (n 20) 166. 
25 Sarkin and Sensibaugh (n 9) Ch. 1, 1075-1076; the panel discussion about transitional justice conducted by a selection of researchers, 
experts and thinkers (n 20) 154-166; it is important to note, however, that the Iraqi exiles who came to power after 2003 share 
responsibility with the CPA for this failure, especially with regard to de-Ba’athification policies which were driven by them. In 
addition, ‘the decision to dissolve the Iraqi armed forces has inspired bitter controversy. Critics have argued that putting hundreds of 
thousands of potentially armed unemployed Iraqis on the streets—and removing the traditionally significant social prestige accorded 
to the Iraqi armed forces—contributed immeasurably to the creation of the insurgency that followed. Supporters have countered that 
the armed forces had already dissolved themselves’. Sissons and Al-Saiedi (n 20) 9-12.  
26 See David L. Shakes, Legal Anthropology on the Battlefield: Cultural Competence in U.S. Rule of Law Programs in Iraq (MSc 
thesis, University of Nevada, Reno 2015). This lack of understanding has also seriously impacted on attempts to establish an adequate 
post-2003 transition plan. For instance, ‘De-Ba’athification violated the cultural aversion to collective guilt’; in addition, the 
establishment of a special criminal court (the Iraqi Special Tribunal) to try Saddam and his associates has been criticized by Bassiouni 
and Hanna because it ‘was an ill-advised attempt to blend two distinct legal systems (American and Iraqi) into a single specialized 




However, the deficient post-2003 transition in Iraq caused, among other things, the 
escalation of multifaceted acts of violence, which in turn created human rights abuses, 
including political, sectarian, terrorist and gender-based violence. These acts must be 
attributed to the breakdown of the previous Iraqi state’s monopoly on violence, and the 
imposition of a divisive constitution and political system by the occupying powers and 
their allies. Among other pernicious factors was the historical tradition of violence arising 
from the cultural, tribal, and sectarian character of Iraqi society.27 The collapse of the 
state’s repressive monopoly on violence has only resulted in the dispersal of violence to 
a broad range of competing power blocs. Thus, different social and sectarian groups, 
including Shia, Sunni and Kurdish, relying on powerful religious, sectarian and triable 
identities, have through their militias engaged in violent competition for power and scarce 
resources.28 Such violence is best understood as a means of seeking a political effect or 
of bringing about a political change by altering the balance of power between competing 
groups to further their own ends.29 One of the main driving forces of this violence has 
been the rise to power of the Shia majority in political state-building, and the decline of 
the influence of the Arab Sunni minority; since the beginning of the post-2003 regime 
change from Sunni to Shia, this minority have felt a deep sense of alienation, loss and 
victimisation.30 In addition, the targeting, disenfranchisement, marginalisation, detention 
and harassment, among other adverse actions,31 of the Sunni population and its leaders, 
has resulted in increased violence in an attempt to overturn or weaken the legitimacy of 
the government. Moreover, the Sunnis consider the unfair application of the Anti-
Terrorism Law of 2005, as well as the flawed handling of the de-Baathification policy by 
                                                
27 See Mieczysław P. Boduszyński, ‘Iraq’s Year of Rage’ (2016) 27 Journal of Democracy 110, 122; Yasir Kuoti, ‘Exclusion and 
Violence in Post-2003 Iraq’ (2016) 69 Journal of International Affairs 19, 19-28; Saad N. Jawad, ‘The Iraqi Constitution: Structural 
Flaws and Political Implications’ LSE Middle East Centre Paper Series 1st November 2013, 1, 4-24; Talib Hussein Hafidh, ‘The 
Political Violence in Iraq’ (2009) Journal of International studies 95, 114-122; Ahmed Shukr Hamoud Al-Subaihi, ‘The Public 
Policies of Peaceful Living in Iraq in the First Decade after 2003’ (2017) 47 The Journal of Political Science 155, 155-188; Salma 
Talal Abdel Hamid, ‘Political Corruption as a Cause of Sectarianism’ (2015) 3 Journal of the College of Law of Al-Nahrain University 
1, 15-26; Yassin Mohammed Hamad, ‘The Negative Reflections of Political Quotas on the Institutional and Social Structure for the 
Democratic System in Iraq’ (2015) 60 Journal of International Studies 21, 31-54. 
28 See David Robert Foster, Exploring Trends in the Targeting of Violence in Iraq Throughout the Lens of Conflict Theory: March 
2003 to 2006 (PhD thesis, University of Maryland 2008) 2-3; Kuoti (n 27) 19-28; Harith Hasan Al-Qarawee, ‘Iraq’s Sectarian Crises: 
A Legacy of Exclusion’ (2014) Carnegie Middle East Center 1, 3; Hafidh (n 27) 117; in addition, the collapse of the state’s monopoly 
on violence and violence being shared between various power blocs in Iraq has blurred ‘the boundaries between what can crudely be 
called “political” and “ordinary” crime… there is no simple distinction between…violence serving the organizational goals either of 
state agencies or non-state political actors and…violence for individual gratification’. Both have been experienced in Iraq. For further 
details, see Penny Green and Tony Ward, ‘The Transformation of Violence in Iraq’ (2009) British Journal of Criminology 1, 1-19. 
29 Some groups ‘use voting and political manoeuvring to secure resources while others initiate violent attacks against the government 
or other groups that threaten their claim to power. The strategic use of violence is perceived by these groups to be an effective means 
to contest legitimacy’. Foster (n 28) 2-3. 
30 Fanar Haddad, ‘Shia-Centric State Building and Sunni Rejection in Post-2003 Iraq’ (2016) Carnegie Endowment for International 
Peace 1-6; Kuoti (n 27) 19. 
31 According to Renad Mansour, ‘the blame for the Sunni Arab predicament and the cycles of disengagement in Iraq cannot be placed 
solely on the Shia-dominated post-2003 central government. Sunni Arab representatives have made strategic choices…that exacerbate 





the Shia-dominated central government, especially during the rule of former Prime 
Minister Maliki between 2006-2014, has also led to increased violence for the same 
ends.32 Legitimacy can play a key role in ensuring stability in which the political system 
and institutions of the state genuinely seek to build trust. Such trust is necessary to 
persuade Iraqi social and ethno-sectarian groups post-2003 that the exercise of authority 
in the new Iraq is meant only to serve their legitimate expectations of having their dignity 
and human rights ensured and of living in a secure environment free from fear, 
intimidation and violence. Legitimacy requires that following social norms, according to 
Foster, is important in order to ‘gain power, and once in power [utilize] resources in a 
fashion in accordance with fairness and law’. Because legitimacy is about perspective, a 
group may be perceived as legitimate by the majority but not the minority, and whether 
this is so is an important factor in establishing if certain rival groups will cooperate. 
Legitimacy is also based on the controlling group effectively dominating other groups; a 
group perceived to be illegitimate will fail to gain public support, causing public 
confidence to fail and cracks to appear, which in turn leads to increased violence.33  
Regrettably, in the early stages of transitional justice, the building of legitimacy in Iraq 
was, unsurprisingly, highly contested. This may be because the process was imposed by 
the CPA and its Iraqi allies without careful consideration of the will of the Iraqi people 
as to the re-establishment of socially accepted rules and norms capable of ensuring that 
they could live together peaceably. A constitution which considered this could have paved 
the way to the unification of the country, and the establishment of law and observation of 
human rights; moreover, it could have dissuaded ethno-sectarian groups from seeking 
power merely to achieve their own self interests.34 According to Jawad: 
any constitution… ensure[s] the rights and liberties of the [citizens], [and] make[s] sure that the 
[state] will not encroach on them [in addition to] its other role… as the guarantor of the unity and 
sovereignty of the state… [; however] the US [reduced Iraqi] history …. and identity…to a 
                                                
32 See Boduszyński (n 27) 122; political violence in Iraq ‘is distinctive in many ways, including bombing of public spaces, the use of 
car bombs, political assassinations, election violence, and the administration of punitive justice by non-state actors, among others. The 
motivation for violence has been to subvert the government, capture political power, and establish a new system of rule or even an 
Islamic State’. Kuoti (n 27) 19-28. 
33 Foster (n 28) 26-30.  
34 The Transitional Administrative Law (TAL), which was issued by the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) and approved by the 
Iraqi Governing Council in 2004 as the new transitional constitution in Iraq superseding the Iraqi constitution of 1970, was written 
and imposed by the occupying powers without the proper involvement of the people of Iraq. In addition, according to all international 
agreements, including the Hague and Geneva Conventions, no right is given to a foreign power to change the constitution and impose 
a new one on an occupied country. By implication, such an imposition by those cooperating with the occupier is also prohibited. Also, 
the TAL employed the divisive term ‘sect’ a number of times, such as in Articles 12 and 20, despite the fact that previous Iraqi 
constitutions had not used this term and it also being rejected by most Iraqi citizens. The use of the word ‘sect’ was welcomed only 
by those taking part in the political process; it has been used to make ‘a strong argument for those demanding an expansion of the 
quota system’. See Jawad (n 27) 4-10; according to Jonathan Morrow, ‘the TAL process, though it involved some senior Iraqi political 
figures, was notoriously, if unintentionally, hasty and secretive, and was heavily influenced by US political interests’. See Jonathan 




collection of Shias, Sunnis, Kurds and other minorities…Therefore, the new constitution 
emphasised differences and divisive issues.35  
These differences and divisions created by the current constitution were mainly attributed 
to the unrealistic deadline of only two months being imposed by the occupying powers 
for the preparation of the constitution. The occupying powers, it is argued, were more 
concerned with their own political agenda than with aiming to provide a successful and 
valid transition.36 This may have resulted in the constitution’s many shortcomings and 
the numerous problems which further deepened divisions.37 In addition, the Sunni groups 
were side-lined in the establishment of the new Iraqi state as they were disproportionately 
represented in the formation of the transitional National Assembly responsible for 
appointing a committee to draft the constitution. In addition, many Sunnis were 
intimidated into resignation and/or assassinated because of their objections to the 
proposed draft.38 Because of this, the constitution was seen by the Sunni population as 
unrepresentative,39 leading them to reject it in the referendum of 2005. For example, in 
the two Sunni-dominated provinces of Salahadin and Anbar, the disapproval rate was as 
high as 82 and 97 percent respectively. 40  However, the draft constitution was still 
approved by 78% of voters, mainly Shia and Kurds.41 When a constitution lacks the 
consensus of all parties in determining the nature of a state, it is highly unlikely to 
generate trust between state and citizens, be a social contract underpinning a well-
functioning, organised, and stable society, or create a legitimate political authority.42 
Therefore, the way in which the constitution was created, written, and adopted meant that 
Sunni and other minorities rationalised violence against the government.43 Furthermore, 
                                                
35 Jawad (n 27) 4-5; see also Israa Alla Al-din Nouri, Ali Mohamed Alwan and Khader Abbas Atwan, ‘The Dilemma of State Building 
in Iraq’ (15 April 2017) Democratic Arabic Centre for Strategic, Political and Economic Studies <http://democraticac.de/?p=45610> 
accessed 14 August 2017; the constitution’s drafters overlooked that ‘the main purpose of any constitution is to serve as a covenant 
that stitches diverse communities into something resembling a unified state. Such documents… serve as important symbols worthy of 
reverence by disparate groups’. Zackary Elkins and Tom Ginsburg, ‘The Iraqi Draft Constitution in Comparative Perspective’, Centre 
for the Study of Democratic Governance, University of Illinois, no date 
<http://www.comparativeconstitutionsproject.org/files/The%20Iraqi%20Draft%20Constitution%20in%20Comparative%20Perspect
ive.doc?6c8912 > accessed 24 July 2017.  
36 See Lakhdar Brahimi, ‘State Building in Crises and Post-Conflict Countries’ (2007) 7th Global Forum on Reinventing Government 
Building Trust in Government 2, 8; Jawad (n 27) 5; Zaid Al-Ali, Iraq: Ten Years of Hubris and Incompetence, (22 March 2013) Open 
Democracy <https://www.opendemocracy.net/zaid-al-ali/iraq-ten-years-of-hubris-and-incompetence> accessed 10 September 2017.    
37  Although the TAL ‘was understandably resisted by the Iraqi people because it reflected the will of the occupying 
power…[considering] the messy outcome of the constitutional process, the long-term interests of Iraq would have been served much 
better if the TAL had been retained until peace and security had returned to that unhappy land’. Brahimi (n 36).  
38 For further details, see Jawad (n 27) 10-11; Kuoti (n 27) 19-28; the committee was mainly dominated by Shia and Kurds, and was 
lacking in any constitutional law experts or representatives of civil society organisations (especially women’s groups). Its discussions 
were held in secret and, thus, ignored public opinion. See Morrow (n 34) 3, 8.  
39  Lionel Beehner, Why Sunnis Don’t Support Iraq’s Constitution, (12 October, 2005) Council on Foreign Relations 
<https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/why-sunnis-dont-support-iraqs-constitution> accessed 25 July 2017. 
40 See ‘The Iraqi Commission Report’ (2007) The Foreign Policy Centre, 29 < http://fpc.org.uk/fsblob/861.pdf> accessed 25 July 
2017. 
41 Ibid. 
42 See Brahimi (n 36) 9.  
43 Kuoti (n 27); see also Al-Bayan Centre for Planning and Studies, National Reconciliation in Iraq: A Comparative Study, Al-Bayan 
Center Publications Series 2016, 24-25; it has been noted that Iraqis not only ‘went to vote on a permanent constitution they had not 




the wording of many of the constitution’s clauses is often problematic and, in practice, 
rather than unifying and stabilising the state and solving many of Iraq’s problems, they 
have deepened divisions in society, weakened state authority, and paved the way for the 
escalation of violence and instability.44  
The post-2003 arrangements were made to enable certain ethno-sectarian groups to 
control various branches of government in what is known as a muhasasa system.45 The 
CPA advocated the ethno-sectarian muhasasa because it ‘believed that stability would be 
served by an interim Governing Council that reflected the country’s ethno-sectarian 
balance’.46 However, it has been argued that ‘the CPA and its allies were [...] faced with 
a choice: to emphasize unity over division [...] or to treat Iraqis as incapable of governing 
themselves democratically and to reinforce the divisions within the system of government. 
Sadly, the second option had been selected well before the 2003 invasion’.47 According 
to John Agresto, who worked in Iraq as a senior adviser to the Iraqi Ministry of Higher 
Education and Scientific Research, the Ministry was focused on how to rebuild the 
education system; rather than the United States selecting qualified Iraqi representatives 
of the whole community to form a new regime, it followed a different process of selection. 
This process placed power in the hands of the loudest factions, and sharpened divisions 
between divided factions, rather than considering the wider interests of ‘moderate and 
thoughtful’ people.48 
Unlike post-conflict power-sharing in states such as Lebanon, and Bosnia and 
Herzegovina, the muhasasa system was not explicitly referred to in the constitution; 
rather, it has become a de facto system in which the division of power was spread between 
the various ethno-sectarian groups. At present in Iraq, the President is a Kurd, the Prime 
Minister is a Shia, and the speaker of parliament is a Sunni.49  In recent years, the 
muhasasa system has still had a detrimental impact in the sharing out of governmental 
                                                
44 In theory and practice, many clauses in the constitution lack of clarity and have caused problems, including the nature of the state 
and the extent of the federal system, the role of Islam, the relations between the central and regional governments, the identity of the 
state, the status of the armed forces, the problematic Article 140 concerning Kirkuk province, the allocation of natural resources, the 
De-Ba’thification law and anti-terrorism measures; particularly, the preamble to the constitution is seen to be ‘unusually long and 
contains an emphasis on religious leadership that could not be included in the actual constitution. It refers to sectarian identities rather 
than a united Iraqi identity’. In addition, the constitution emphasises ‘Islam as the state religion and the source of legislation. While 
this [in] itself is not a problem in a Muslim majority country, it potentially renders the rights offered in Articles 14 to 46 meaningless 
where the two contradict’. ‘Ultimately, the constitution had little consensus or legitimacy across broad sections of the Iraqi society 
and the vague, contradictory and ethno-sectarian language has contributed to the political strife in the country’. See Al-Bayan Centre 
for Planning and Studies (n 43) 26; for further details, see Jawad (n 27) 12-22.  
45 See Boduszyñski (n 27) 114; Al-Qarawee (n 28) 5; Kuoti (n 27). 
46 Boduszyñski (n 27). 
47 See Tareq Y. Ismael and Jacqueline S. Ismael, Iraq in the Twenty-First Century: Regime Change and the Change and the Making 
of a Failed State (Routledge, 2015) 22-23. 
48 Ibid. 23. 




institutions, both national and local, among the various Iraqi ethno-sectarian groups; this 
has resulted in poor performance, including governmental, judicial and security bodies, 
and has been accompanied by unchecked, widespread political and administrative 
corruption.50 As a result of this, disagreements and violence have unsurprisingly erupted 
among the ethno-sectarian blocs, causing terrible suffering to ordinary Iraqi citizens and 
violations of their human rights.51 It has been suggested that ‘Iraqis resent a practice that 
values membership in a particular group over merit and has led to the installation of 
incompetent and corrupt elites’; moreover, the muhasasa system encourages parties to 
organise around their identity, which deepens rifts and conflict. Because of the muhasasa 
and the party electoral system, it has become politically successful to use sectarianism as 
the basis on which to be elected, and many Iraqis view sectarianism as something the 
ruling political elites created to be able to maintain privilege and power.52 
However, the ethno-sectarian division in Iraq pre-dates 2003 far beyond the policies of 
the previous oppressive regime.53 Since the establishment of the Iraqi state in 1921, 
successive regimes have failed to address the longstanding mistrust between state and 
society at large; this has been combined with deep unresolved community social, 
sectarian, tribal, and cultural problems, which resulted in sectarian strife soon after the 
change of regime in 2003.54 The predisposition to violence in the character of the Iraqi 
people can arguably be ascribed to imbalances and contradictions in their social system 
because of traditional inherited values, tribal nepotism, ethnic and religious loyalties and 
the cultural framework that forms their moral attitudes.55 Iraqi culture is often perceived 
as violent, and the conduct and behaviour of individuals is arguably mainly influenced by 
affiliation with a tribe, which commands their loyalty and devotion to a religious and 
sectarian heritage. The latter has exploited historical events, mainly shaped by political 
                                                
50 Ibid.; Hamad (n 27) 24-54; specifically, the period following the election of first government in 2006 ‘saw the institutionalisation 
of the sectarian and political quota system’ instead of a meritocracy. For further details, see Al-Bayan Center for Planning and Studies 
(n 43) 21-24. 
51 Kuoti (n 27). 
52 See Boduszyñski (n 27) 114; see also Al-Subaihi (n 27) 177; Abdel Hamid (n 27) 15-24; the Iraqi government post-2003, therefore, 
has developed along sectarian lines, instead of fulfilling its duty without bias. For instance, the division between the main sects can 
be seen in their attitudes following the elections, ‘a poll conducted in Iraq in January of 2006 found that while two thirds of the Iraqi 
people believed that the December 2005 elections were fair and representative, 94% of Sunni’s polled believed that the elections were 
not fair, and 92% said the new government was not legitimate’. See Foster (n 28) 44. 
53 Boduszyñski (n 27) 114.  
54 Al-Subaihi (n 27) 167. Because the Iraqi state was artificially created, ‘there has been a miss-fit between “Sovereignty” and “Identity” 
of the state, the people within the boundaries of Iraq do not have a great sense of belonging to a single nation as Iraqis’. This has been 
attributed to the fact that the state ‘was not given the chance or did not seize the opportunity to develop a modernizing strategy based 
on indigenous concepts of human dignity, legitimate authority, solidarity and other fundamental aspects of social and political 
organization’. See Mohammed Ali Bapir, ‘Iraq: a Deeply Divided Polity and Challenges to Democracy-Building’ (2010) 3 
Information, Society and Justice 117, 118-124. 
55 Al-Subaihi (n 27); Fareed Jasim Hamoud Al-Qaisi, The Prevalence of Violence in Iraq: a Sociological Study and Critical Analysis 
of the Causes of Violence in Iraq (The National Centre of Legal Issues 2012) 80-94; Ali Al-Wardi, Study on the Nature of Iraqi Society 




conflicts, in order to justify violence, fostering a spirit of hostility and intolerance which 
created a suitable climate for the clash of the various components of Iraq post-2003.56  
The role of the muhasasa system in encouraging ethno-sectarian sentiment and clashes, 
however, is apparent.57 Some leaders of Islamic political groups, both Sunni and Shia, 
may have successfully fostered conflict, violence and extreme sectarian thoughts, thereby 
undermining the possibility of peaceful co-existence on the basis of tribalism and ethno-
sectarianism in order to serve their political interests.58 Accordingly, it is apparent that 
sectarian persons do not concern themselves with the moral and spiritual principles of 
their own sect but rather concern themselves only with solidarity and loyalty to their own 
sect, and enmity to other sects.59 It is important to note, however, that the vast majority 
of Sunni and Shia have lived peaceably for up to 1,000 years, without breaking sectarian 
boundaries; social mixing and intermarriage between the sects which occurred in the 
twentieth and twenty-first-century are often claimed as evidence of the weakness of Iraqi 
sectarianism.60 Peaceful co-existence, nevertheless, is not synonymous with tolerance 
which ‘presupposes an absence of discrimination against minorities and respect for the 
points of view of others’ and, for most of Iraqi history, tolerance has been in short 
supply.61 According to Haddad, ‘this does not necessitate a violent manifestation; rather 
the implication is that, without tolerance, sectarian cleavages are more easily politicised 
and utilised as offensive mobilisational tools’.62 
From the above discussion, the question arises as to how far the deficiencies of the 
transition process have adversely affected the ability of the Iraqi state and its criminal 
justice system to comply with mainstream international norms, specifically with regard 
to the upholding of the rights of victims to redress and protection, as referred to earlier in 
the thesis. It can be argued (see Sections 3, 4 and 5), that the flawed post-2003 transition 
                                                
56 Al-Subaihi (n 27); Al-Qaisi (n 55) 93; in some tribal societies, like Iraq, where shame-oriented culture is a dominant motif, emphasis 
is placed on community, authority, honour, pride, religion and ethnicity; the moral code is built around respect for this culture rather 
than compliance with domestic law. Therefore, ‘tensions occur not because laws have been broken but because someone has violated 
the proper ordering of relationships’ which can cause deep anger and shame leading to kidnappings, sectarian cleansing and suicide 
bombings. For further details, see David A. Steele, ‘Reconciliation Strategies in Iraq’ (2008) The United States Institute of Peace, 
Special report, 1-20. 
57 See Boduszyñski (n 27) 114; Abdel Hamid (n 27) 15-26. 
58 See Al-Qaisi (n 55) 139.  
59 See Fanar Haddad, Sectarian Relations in Arab Iraq: Competing Mythologies of History, People and State (PhD thesis, the 
University of Exeter 2010) 35. 
60 See Fanar Haddad, ‘Sectarian Relations in Arab Iraq: Contextualising the Civil War 2006-2007’ (2013) 40 British Journal of Middle 
Eastern Studies 115, 118; in Iraqi modern history, incidents of serious sectarian strife brokeout only in the years 1508, 1623 and 1801. 
See Report by Iraqi Academics and the Norwegian Institute of International Affairs (NUPI), More than Shi ites and Sunnis (February 
2009) 18–19; however, it is important to note that in the Middle Ages sectarian strife was common in various parts of what is today 
Iraq, See George Tarabishi, Hartaqat II [Heresies II] (Beirut: Dar al-Saqi, 2008) 15–24 cited by Haddad (n 60) 118. 





process has had (together with sectarian conflict and the impact of regime prior to 2003) 
a devastating impact on the proper functioning of the Iraqi state and its criminal justice 
system, and on attempts to re-establish the rule of laws which can be relied, to ensure 
stability, security, justice and adequate reparations. In addition, because of these 
deficiencies, no attention has been paid to the need to address the building of a new culture 
of awareness of how victimisation and the legitimate interests of victims and society at 
large must be fully taken account of if the objectives of transitional justice are to be 
achieved.  
In practice, mainstream international norms have been regularly violated, especially those 
regarding the protection of the right to life, even though clear and strict provisions 
concerning crime and punishment, fair treatment and fair trial principles are stipulated in 
today’s Iraqi criminal justice system, including the Iraqi constitution.63 However, there is 
undoubtedly a gap between the Iraqi legal system and its actual implementation, since it 
can be said that implementation has not provided victims with effective legal mechanisms, 
for instance, to bring to criminal trial those responsible for gross HR violations committed 
during the war in 2003 and the subsequent occupation of the country.64 It is also doubtful 
whether the suffering of the Iraqi people and damage to their HR by war and occupation 
will ever be recognised by the international community, even though ‘if there are any 
people in this world that deserve the right to truth, justice and reparations and guarantee 
of non-recurrence, it’s the Iraqi people’.65 Citizens of Iraq have a legitimate expectation, 
especially because of widespread acts of violence contrary to their right to life, that the 
Iraqi state should fulfil its moral and legal obligations to protect this right. If it fails to do 
so, public debate should reveal the truth about its citizens’ victimisation and consider why 
the measures provided by the state to protect them have proved inadequate. In addition, 
it should bring to justice those responsible for breaching the right to life and make 
adequate reparations.  
                                                
63 Article 19(2) of the current Iraqi Constitution of 2005 (n 9) states that ‘There is no crime or punishment except by law. The 
punishment shall only be for an act that the law considers a crime when perpetrated. A harsher punishment than the applicable 
punishment at the time of the offense may not be imposed’.  
64 The US forces and private contractors were granted complete immunity for any criminal actions, including criminal violations under 
the 1969 Iraqi Criminal Code, by Order 17 of the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA), which governed the country until an interim 
government was formed. See M. Cherif Bassiouni, ‘Legal Status of US Forces in Iraq from 2003-2008’ (2010) 11 Chicago Journal 
of International Law 1, 8; in the course of the war followed by the years of occupation, it is estimated that ‘over one million people 
have been killed, up to 5 million have been displaced, 4-5 million children have lost a parent, between one and two million women 
have become widows’. According to other sources, the number of missing people because of the war is estimated to be from 250,000 
up to one million, among them over 90,000 children of displaced families. See United Nations, General assembly, Human Rights 
Council, Joint written statement submitted by the Union of Arab Jurists, the International Organization for the Elimination of All 
Forms of Racial Discrimination. Truth, Justice and Reparations for Iraq (9 September 2013) A/HRC/24/NGO/135. 




This chapter will therefore examine the nature of such expectations by exploring the 
moral and legal obligations of the Iraqi state to meet these expectations appropriately. It 
will consider the signs that its determination and capacity to do so are increasing, and are 
likely to continue to increase, now that the worst manifestations of sectarian conflict in 
the state, due to the activities of Daesh (ISIS), have greatly diminished. It will further 
determine, in the light of previous discussion concerning the ethical and legal 
responsibilities of the state regarding the rights of victims, whether the Iraqi state is 
actually or beginning to fulfil these responsibilities, which are arguably a prerequisite for 
the establishment of lawful rule in the country, and for the legitimacy of the authority of 
the state over its citizens.  
This chapter will argue that the failure of the Iraqi state to fulfil its positive duty of 
protecting its citizens against multifaceted acts of violence by non-state actors, and of 
providing procedural and substantive remedy, is due to complex reasons largely arising 
from the failure of the 2003-transition process, but also from the deficiencies of the 
criminal justice system and its practice, which have fallen short of international standards. 
It follows that future reforms need to be adopted to restore trust in the Iraqi state and its 
criminal justice system. Such reforms should include genuine coordinated efforts on the 
part of both the government and all sections of society to produce a new transitional 
justice system and measures of reconciliation. In doing so, this will permit various 
religious, ethnic and sectarian persons to live peacefully in a viable state based on 
legitimate social contract principles, and in which the rights of victims are properly 
addressed. It will be further contended that to create gradual change in the attitude of the 
Iraqi state and its criminal justice system towards the neglected rights of victims, a new 
culture must be built which observes international standards of human rights in both 
theory and practice. Chapter 6 will consider certain signs that the Iraqi state is 
incrementally moving in the direction of adhering to such standards in future.  
5.2 The Right to Protection of the Right to Life in the Current Iraqi Legal 
System 
This section asks whether Iraqi law acknowledges the state’s obligations to protect the 
right to life of its citizens effectively against violent activities by non-state actors, and 
whether the Iraqi state and its legal system share the same values and norms of 




post-conflict context). If not, the question arises as to whether such rights are merely 
empty rhetorical statements about the protection of the right to life, and thus need 
incremental upgrading to comply with the moral and legal norms for the protection of its 
citizens.  
The main organ defining the rights and liberties of Iraqi citizens is the Iraqi constitution.66 
Concerning the obligations of the Iraqi state to protect the right to life of its citizens, 
Article 15 of the Iraqi constitution states that:  
Every individual has the right to enjoy life, security and liberty. Deprivation or restriction of these 
rights is prohibited, except in accordance with the law and based on a decision issued by a 
competent judicial authority. 
It is important to note that this article does not seem to explicitly impose a positive duty 
on the Iraqi state to protect the right to life of its citizens against violent acts. It only states 
that every individual has the natural right to life and security as well as negatively 
prohibiting the violation of this right by state authorities, unless in accordance with the 
law. However, this negative obligation has been subjected to interpretation because, for 
instance, Article 6 (the right to life) of the ICCPR, Article 2 (the right to life) of the ECHR, 
and Article 4 (the right to life) of the IACHR, could be found to provide mainly negative 
obligations. These rights nevertheless have been interpreted to include positive 
obligations that were unintended by the drafters of these conventions. The Iraqi Federal 
Supreme Court,67 according to Article 93 of the Iraqi Constitution, has jurisdiction over: 
‘overseeing the constitutionality of laws and regulations in effect’; interpreting the 
provisions of the Constitution; and, ‘settling matters that arise from the application of the 
federal laws, decisions, regulations, instructions, and procedures issued by the federal 
authority’;68 and, guaranteeing individuals and others the direct right of appeal to the 
Court in any matters concerning them, as their decisions are final and binding for all 
authorities. In principle, the establishment of this Court, according to many Iraqi 
commentators, is considered a positive step and crucial to the guarantee of human rights 
                                                
66 Article 13(1) and (2) indicates that ‘This Constitution is the preeminent and supreme law in Iraq and shall be binding in all parts of 
Iraq without exception. Second: No law that contradicts this Constitution shall be enacted. Any text in any regional constitutions or 
any other legal text that contradicts this Constitution shall be considered void’. Iraqi Constitution (n 9). 
67 This Constitutional Court was originally established under Article 44 of the Transitional Administrative Law and Law No. 30 of 
2005. These remained in place until the current 2005 Constitution came into effect. The Court comprised nine members selected and 
appointed by the Higher Judicial Council from candidates nominated by the judicial councils of all provinces of Iraq. It is currently 
firmly established under Articles 92-94 of the 2005 Constitution. Article 92 (second) states that ‘The Federal Supreme Court shall be 
made up of a number of judges, experts in Islamic jurisprudence, and legal scholars, whose number, the method of their selection, and 
the work of the Court shall be determined by a law enacted by a two-thirds majority of the members of the Council of Representatives’.       
68 Article 1 of the Iraqi Constitution of 2005 states that ‘The Republic of Iraq is a single federal, independent and fully sovereign state 
in which the system of government is republican, representative, parliamentary, and democratic, and this Constitution is a guarantor 




and freedoms as stipulated in the constitution against any infringement by state authorities 
or non-state actors. The Court also monitors, controls, regulates and legitimises the legal, 
judicial, political, economic and social relations within society; therefore, some of the 
Court’s decisions in this regard have been considered to be important in creating a sound 
rule of law in Iraq.69 Nevertheless, there is a practice of not bringing cases by individuals, 
victims and others before the Court to seek protection against any gross negligence, 
incompetence and corruption on the part of state authorities, and of making interpretations 
of the imprecise scope and nature of the protective obligation of the right to life and 
personal security contained in Article 15 in conjunction with Articles 2 and 14,70 and the 
corresponding duties these give rise to. In addition to these, there are other tremendous 
challenges to the Court’s independence and effectiveness, which renders the protective 
obligation more difficult to observe.71 It has been claimed that the Court’s role should be 
strengthened by ensuring its independence and giving it the right and duty to pursue 
constitutional oversight, irrespective of any complaints raised by one of the parties 
authorised in Article 93 of the Constitution. This is because the failure to uphold this duty 
has reflected negatively both on the protection of certain fundamental human rights, such 
as the right to life and physical integrity against any violations, and on the possible 
consideration of any required positive changes in the conduct of Iraqi institutions.72 The 
                                                
69 For further details about the importance of the establishment of this Court and some of its provisions which laid down principles in 
various political, social and economic human rights cases, but not until now in cases concerning the right to protection of the right to 
life or personal security, see Baydaa Abd Al-Jawad and Dawlat Ahmad Abd Alla, ‘The Role of the Federal Court in the Protection of 
Human Rights in Iraq’ (2011) 13 Rafidain of Law Journal 368, 368-399; Intisar Hassan Abdullah, ‘The Role of Federal Supreme 
Court in Iraq to Protect Rights and Freedoms’ (2012) 21 The International and Political Journal 287, 287-306; Khudair Yassin 
Khudair, ‘The Guarantees of human rights and how they can be developed and applied in Iraq’ (2009) 7 Journal of Kerbala University 
183, 188-193; the Court has ruled many provisions invalid when they have violated the constitutional rights and freedoms of Iraqi 
citizens. See, for instance, the Federal Supreme Court, Case No. 6/2010 of 3 March 2010, published in the High Judicial Council, the 
Judicial Bulletin (No. 17, the fourth year 2011, March and April) 11; the Federal Supreme Court, Case No. 43/2011 of 10 August 
2011 published in the High Judicial Council, The Judicial Bulletin (No. 19, the fourth year 2011 July-August and September) 42; the 
Federal Supreme Court-Iraq-Baghdad, Case No. 40/2012 on 15-12013 promulgated at the official website of the Judiciary. In one 
case, for instance, the Court ruled some provisions on deprivation of liberty as invalid. See the Federal Supreme Court, Case No. 
15/2011 on 22 February 2011 published in the High Judicial Council, The Judicial Bulletin (No. 17, fourth year 2011 March and April) 
16; in another case, the Court stated that Article 37 of the Iraqi Constitution only granted the power of arrest to the judicial authority, 
ruling that some provisions stipulated in the Customs Act No. 23 of 1984 giving the Customs Officials the power of arrest are 
unconstitutional. The Federal Supreme Court, Case No. 15 /2011 on 22 February 2011 published in the High Judicial Council, the 
Judicial Bulletin (No. 17, fourth year 2011 March and April) 16.   
70 Article 2 of the Iraqi Constitution prohibits the enactment of any laws which may contradict principles of democracy and human 
rights and freedoms of individuals. Article 14 also states that ‘Iraqis are equal before the law without discrimination based on gender, 
race, ethnicity, nationality, origin, colour, religion, sect, belief or opinion, or economic or social status’.  
71 Appointments and the structure of the Court, as well as, political interference, have come under criticisms by Iraqi experts and 
commentators. See Abd Al-Jawad and Abd Alla (n 69); Salem Roudan Al-Moussawi, The Formation of the Federal Supreme Court 
in Iraq between the Constitution and the Law: Analytical and Critical Reading (2009) 
<http://www.ahewar.org/debat/show.art.asp?aid=158837> accessed 24 April 2017. They question the conditions, qualifications and 
the authority by which judges of the Court are appointed and, also, whether the experts in Islamic jurisprudence and other legal 
scholars involved in the establishment of the Court are ‘fit to make these kinds of legal decisions and there are also questions around 
which sect’s religious rules will be followed: Sunni or Shiite?’. This has been suggested to threaten ‘the neutrality of the Court. The 
Court is supposed to work with civil laws that have been enacted for decades in Iraq. What would the clergy be doing here, if they 
don’t know anything about these kinds of laws?’. In addition, many Iraqi politicians do not want the Court to have a pro-active role 
and final say in many controversial issues relating to political conflicts, such as the legal situation of various militias which have 
operated in Iraq since 2003. See Mustafa Habib, One Court to Rule Them All: Why Not All Iraqi Politicians Want Their Supreme 
Court to Work Properly (10.12.2015) < http://www.niqash.org/en/articles/politics/5179/> accessed 24 April 2017. 




state’s negative role embodied in Article 15, therefore, may therefore be in contrast with 
recent developments in the field of HR which aim not only to protect individuals’ lives 
from the abuse of power by the state, but also to ensure this right of protection by requiring 
the state to establish legitimate adequate measures to protect its citizens from criminal 
acts by private individuals. In other words, Iraq must interpret and ensure this right in the 
light of the convergence of the vertical and horizontal aspects of HR law, which enables 
individuals to rely directly for the protection of their right to life on both of these aspects.  
Consequently, in the absence of an effective interpretation by the IFSC and a culture of 
access to justice essential to the reestablishment of the rule of law, of equality before the 
law and prevention of any future exercise of arbitrary power, the statement in Article 15 
of the Iraqi Constitution may be seen as empty as it has not, in practice, made any 
adequate provision for the protection of citizens’ lives amidst the horrific widespread 
violence in the country since 2003. This may point to the failure of the transitional process 
which was supposed to establish in Iraq clear, detailed and strict legitimate positive 
protective obligations and guarantees, as observed by some states73 and adopted by the 
World Summit in 2005;74 these should be understood, in Iraq’s case, to protect the right 
to live in dignity and equality, the right to subsistence (freedom from want) and the right 
to be free from fear and physical violence. With this understanding, there would be no 
doubt as to the right to personal security, which would include the provision of positive 
protection of its citizens’ right to life against acts of violence, either by state authorities 
or private individuals. In other words, this transitional plan was supposed to address the 
psychological impact of past victimisation ‘to convince those who fear the future that 
their concerns have been adequately addressed and that there are mechanisms in place to 
ensure that they will be able to influence the future and take steps in the constitutional, 
legislative, and judicial framework if they are unsatisfied with the current state of 
affairs’.75 Clearly, no state can provide absolute protection to citizens, ensuring that they 
                                                
73 For instance, in the South African Constitution (1996) and the Northern Irish Draft Bill of Human Rights, the right to security is 
‘expressed as a positive right and protects explicitly against threats to security or violence from non-state actors’. The former in 
Section 12 (1)(c) has established a specific right to be ‘free from violence whether from public or private sources’. The latter also 
articulates the right to security as ‘a self-standing preambular principle: everyone has the right to live free from violence, fear, 
oppression and intimidation, with differences to be resolved through exclusively democratic means without the use of threat or force’. 
This right to be protected against violence is also expressly grounded in the ‘right to dignity and physical integrity’ under section 6 of 
the Draft Bill. See Lazarus (n 16) Ch. 2, 14.  
74 A broader interpretation of the right to security, in accordance with the capabilities approach discussed in Chapter 2, has been 
adopted by the United Nations World Summit of 2005 and reaffirmed by the UN General Assembly. The Outcome Document of this 
Summit in Article 143 states ‘We stress the right of people to live in freedom and dignity, free from poverty and despair. We recognize 
that all individuals, in particular vulnerable people, are entitled to freedom from fear and freedom from want, with equal opportunities 
to enjoy all their rights and fully develop their human potential. To this end, we commit ourselves to discussing and defining the 
notion of human security in the General Assembly’. See Lazarus (n 16) Ch. 2, 15. See Chapter 2, p 16. 




will not suffer violence at the hands of private actors, but states can establish effective 
systems to provide such protection. 
However, since the correlative duties of protection, whether negative or positive, already 
exist along with the right to protection of the right to life, it may be claimed that, as the 
Iraqi state has taken upon itself, for the well-being of its society, the rights of individuals 
to protect themselves, it has the corresponding constitutional duty to establish criminal 
justice systems to protect them from any harm, including violence by non-state actors. 
This argued constitutional duty of protection implies that the Iraqi government is not only 
bound to refrain from interfering with any constitutional rights of its citizens (unless an 
exception applies), but must also assume a ‘positive’ role in providing for their 
fundamental needs, including the right to protection from violence.76 Nevertheless, in 
practice it can be argued that the negative obligation under Article 15 requiring the state 
to refrain from taking citizens’ lives without legal justification is at present not fully 
respected, and nor can victims rely on the same article to complain against the state 
authorities if they have failed to take reasonable preventive measures to protect them from 
violent acts by other individuals.77 This lack of protection of citizens’ lives, specifically 
against criminal acts by non-state actors, is clearly documented in the reports of many 
HR organisations. These state that Iraqi citizens suffer systematic violations of their right 
to life as the state authorities have failed to establish effective systems to prevent such 
violations.78  
In fact, a clear assertion of the Iraqi authorities’ positive obligation to protection appears 
in Article 7(2) of the Iraqi Constitution, which explicitly requires that the state shall 
‘undertake to combat terrorism in all its forms, and shall work to protect its territories 
from being a base, pathway, or field of terrorist activities’. Iraqi Anti-Terrorism Law79 
                                                
76 The Iraqi Constitution has clearly outlined that this positive obligation should be followed by the government with regard to the 
rights of Iraqis to work, social security, health care, and education. See Articles, 22, 30, 31, 34; Mohamed Y. Mattar, ‘Unresolved 
Questions in the Bill of Rights of the New Iraqi Constitution: How Will the Clash Between “Human Rights” and “Islamic Law” be 
Reconciled in Future Legislative Enactments and Judicial Interpretations?’ (2006) 30 Fordham International Law Journal 126,129.  
77 A case at the Federal Supreme Court found that the Court was deficient in the protection of the right to life, since it had failed to 
confirm that death sentences passed by the Iraqi Central Criminal Court (CCCI) should be implemented by the executive authorities 
only when the formalities specified by the law had been completed. However, these sentences were implemented without presidential 
approval, in violation of Article 37(8) which states that the President has the power ‘to ratify death sentences issued by the competent 
courts’. See Abd AlJawad and Abd Alla (n 69) 389-390. 
78  See the United Nations Assistance Mission for Iraq (UNAMI), Report on Human Rights in Iraq: January to June 2012 
(UNAMI/OHCHR 2012); the United Nations Assistance Mission for Iraq (UNAMI), Report on the Protection of Civilians in the 
Armed Conflict in Iraq: 5 June to 5 July 2014 (UNAMI/OHCHR 2014); the United Nations Assistance Mission for Iraq (UNAMI), 
Report on the Protection of Civilians in the Armed Conflict in Iraq: 6 July to 10 September 2014 (UNAMI/OHCHR 2014). See also 
the recent report of the United States Department of State, 2016 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices -Iraq (updated 
29.03.2017) <https://www.state.gov/documents/organization/265710.pdf> accessed 25 April 2017.  





has widely defined such activities in Article 1 to include ‘every criminal act committed 
by an individual or an organized group that targeted an individual or a group of 
individuals or groups or official or unofficial institutions and caused damage to public or 
private properties, with the aim to disturb the peace, stability, and national unity or to 
bring about horror and fear among people and to create chaos to achieve terrorist goals’. 
Therefore, the failure of the Iraqi authorities to adequately counter these activities violates 
their constitutional duty of protection. Notably, the majority of violent deaths in Iraq are 
attributed by the Iraqi authorities to the activities of non-state actors, specifically ‘terrorist’ 
groups. However, whether true or not, the fact remains that the Iraqi state is obliged to go 
beyond the obligation expressed in Article 7(2) to protect its citizens’ right to life, by 
bringing perpetrators to justice and providing adequate reparations to victims, whatever 
the source of any acts of violence. Consequently, it can be argued that even if there are 
unanswered questions concerning the specific counter-measures the state should adopt to 
respond to violence, the duty of the Iraqi state to provide adequate security and protection 
to its citizens, and to investigate, prosecute and punish perpetrators of acts of violence is 
both morally and legally established, as discussed below.80    
The Iraqi Constitution also emphasises that the Iraqi state must conform to, respect and 
implement its international obligations, including those principles relating to the 
protection of the right to life against criminal acts. In addition, no excuses are permitted 
for the state to neglect the fulfilling of these obligations. Article 8 states that the Iraqi 
government shall respect Iraq’s international obligations.81 Moreover, Article 44 of an 
earlier draft of the Constitution expressly provided that ‘All individuals shall have the 
right to enjoy all the rights mentioned in the international treaties and agreements 
concerned with human rights that Iraq has ratified and that do not contradict the principles 
and provisions of this Constitution’.82 This article, except for the last clause, is a narrower 
version of Article 23 of the Transitional Administrative Law (TAL), which was Iraq’s 
                                                
80 See Chapter 5, pages 154-155, 159-160, 168-190 and 213-218. It should be noted that the ‘positive’ legal right to security could 
arguably be broadened, in addition to its current apparent emphasis on protection of a specific individual, or individuals, from 
foreseeable harm. While social contract principles provide a normative basis for arguing the state’s responsibility to provide protection 
to the right to life of its citizens, or those who reside within its jurisdiction, from non-state violence and, thus, serve as a theoretical 
foundation for such a ‘positive’ right to security, the positive obligations imposed by the HR instruments on states to protect life and 
prevent injury from such violence could arguably provide a normative legal basis for such broad protection. See Turner (n 22) Ch. 2, 
25, 75. See the discussion in Chapter 2, pages 11-14; see also the case of The Tagayeva and Others v Russia (n 248) Ch. 3, p 75-77; 
see also Chapter 3, pages 49-51.   
81 Article 8 of the Iraqi Constitution states that ‘Iraq shall observe the principles of good neighborliness, adhere to the principle of 
non-interference in the internal affairs of other states, seek to settle disputes by peaceful means, establish relations on the basis of 
mutual interests and reciprocity, and respect its international obligations’; see Ashley S. Deeks and Matthew D. Burton, ‘Iraq's 
Constitution: A Drafting History’ (2007) 40 Cornell International Law Journal 1, 32-34.  




provisional constitution after the invasion of the country in 2003 until the validation of 
the current Iraqi Constitution of 2005.83 Under this article, Iraqi people are guaranteed 
the ‘rights that befit a free people possessed of their human dignity, including the rights 
stipulated in international treaties and agreements, other instruments of international law 
that Iraq has signed and to which it has acceded, and others that are deemed binding upon 
it, and in the law of nations’.84 It is important, however, to note that ‘the Constitution does 
not make clear whether the international agreements are deemed to be a source of 
legislation or are separate from domestic law. Nor does it make clear whether 
international treaties take priority over national laws if any contradiction emerges 
between them’. In addition, the IFSC has not so far debated these issues.85 
In order to ensure the rights to which Iraqi people are entitled in the constitution and in 
international standards of HR, including the right to protection of life, the Iraqi Council 
of Representatives enacted Law No. 53, in accordance with Article 102 of the constitution 
which established for the first time in 2008 an independent High Commission for Human 
Rights (HCHR).86 In its first Annual Report of 2013 about the status of human rights in 
Iraq, the commission asserted that Iraqi authorities, legislative, executive and judicial, 
have an obligation to ensure that all reasonable measures are taken to protect the right to 
life of their citizens against acts of violence and, if they occur, to identify and prosecute 
those responsible.87 This is in line with the commission’s mandate in accordance with 
Law No. 53 to: 
Ensure the protection and promotion of respect for Human Rights in Iraq; Protect the rights and 
freedoms stipulated in the Constitution, international laws, treaties and conventions ratified by 
Iraq; [and to] strengthen, promote and develop human rights principles and culture.88 
                                                
83  The Administration for the State of Iraq during the Transitional Period, 8 March 2004, at 
<http://www.refworld.org/docid/45263d612.html>. See Deeks and Burton (n 81) 35.   
84 Deeks and Burton (n 81). 
85 Iraq is considered ‘as a ‘dualist’ rather than a ‘monist’ country regarding the implementation of international treaties. Even if an 
international treaty is ratified by Iraq, it is not possible for it to be directly applied by Iraqi judges or accepted as a part of the national 
law unless the treaty is incorporated into domestic law and published in the official gazette’. See Almusawi (n 17) 38, 83. 
86 For further details, see the Institute for International Law and Human Rights, Iraq’s High Commission for Human Rights: Bylaws, 
Regulations, and Legal Framework, a Manual (1st edition 2012). 
87 Iraq’s High Commission for Human Rights, First Comprehensive Annual Report about the Status of Human Rights in Iraq for the 
year 2013, issued from the Board of Commissioners in accordance with Article 4 (8) of Law No. 53 of 2008 (2014) 37.  
88 Institute for International Law and Human Rights (n 86) 7; the Iraq’s High Commission for Human Rights has granted by Law No. 
53 a broad mandate to cover many procedures, including:   
(i) ‘Receipt of complaints from individuals, groups and civil society organizations concerning violations prior and subsequent to the 
entry into force of the Act; 
(ii) Conduct of preliminary investigations of human rights violations in the light of the information received; 
(iii) Verification of the complaints received, and the conduct of preliminary investigations if the circumstances so require; 
(iv) Taking action on human rights violations by referring them to the Department of Public Prosecutions so that it can institute legal 
proceedings and notify the Commission of the outcome’. See United Nations, Human Rights Committee, Consideration of reports 
submitted by States parties under article 40 of the Covenant: Fifth periodic reports of States parties due in 2000 Iraq (CCPR/C/IRQ/5) 
12 December 2013, 11; as noted by the Human Rights Committee, however, many difficulties face the Iraqi’s High Commission to 
carry out its mandate, including ‘lack of adequate resources and constraints in practice to effectively discharge certain mandated 
activities, such as visiting and inspecting places of deprivation of liberty’. The HRC states that ‘The State party should adopt the 




At international and regional level Iraq has ratified several treaties.89 Among these are the 
ICCPR90 which, as noted in Chapter 2, imposes a positive duty on states to protect the 
right to life of their citizens under Articles 6 and 2 of the Covenant.91 Similarly, Iraq 
ratified the Arab Charter on Human Rights (ACHR) of May 22, 2004 which came into 
force on March 15, 2008. In Article 5 this charter stipulates that ‘every human being has 
the inherent right to life’ and ‘this right shall be protected by law. No one shall be 
arbitrarily deprived of his life’.92 In addition, it asserts that states party to the charter are 
obliged to ‘ensure’ that all individuals subject to their jurisdiction enjoy the rights and 
freedoms encompassed by the charter, including the right to life.93 As the Iraqi state has 
ratified the above conventions, it must fulfil their imperatives and seek to prevent their 
violation, punish violators, and ensure that appropriate reparation.94 
It should be noted, however, that the provisions of other international legal instruments 
such as the ECHR and the ACHR (which, as noted in Chapter 2, impose a positive 
obligation to protect the right to life),95 are obviously not legally binding on the Iraqi state. 
Nevertheless, the Iraqi state may still have an obligation to comply with certain principles 
and normative provisions because HR law is not limited merely to those rights which a 
state has ratified by treaty,96 but also includes certain rights and correlative obligations 
which have come to be part of customary international law. Therefore, these rights bind 
                                                
independently, in conformity with the Paris Principles. It should ensure that the Commission has sufficient financial and human 
resources, that it is equally accessible to all persons throughout the State party’s territory, and that all public authorities fully cooperate 
with it’. See paras 7 and 8 of the UN Human Rights Committee (HRC), Concluding observations on the fifth periodic report of Iraq, 
6 November 2015, CCPR/CO/IRQ/5, <http://www.refworld.org/docid/5669387c4.html> accessed 20 September 2016.  
89  These Covenants include: the ICESCR (n 131) Ch. 2; International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial 
Discrimination (ICERD), Signed 1969, ratified 1970, entered into force on 12 February 1970; International Convention on the 
Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women (adopted 18 December 1979) United Nations, Treaty Series, vol. 1249, 
p. 13 ; the Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC), 20 November 1989, United Nations, Treaty Series, vol. 1577, p. 3, acceded 
1994, entered into force on 15 July 1994, including the Optional Protocols to the CRC7, Ratified by Law 23 of 2007; the International 
Convention for the Protection of All Persons from Enforced Disappearance, 20 December 2006, Ratified 23 November 2010; the UN 
Convention against Torture and the Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, 10 December 1984, United Nations, 
Treaty Series, vol. 1465, p. 85, Ratified in 2011, ratified in 2011. 
90 Iraq has been signed this Covenant in 1969, ratified by Law 193 of 1970, published in the Official Gazette, Issue 1926 of 7 October 
1970, came into force on 23 March 1976.   
91 See the general discussion in Chapter 2 of the thesis, pages 26-30. 
92 League of Arab States, Arab Charter on Human Rights, May 22, 2004, reprinted in 12 Int'l Hum. Rts. Rep. 893 (2005), entered into 
force March 15, 2008. 
93 Ibid. Article 3; the Charter does not include a strong supervision mechanism which enables individuals whose HR have been violated 
to have their petitions heard. It has been suggested that this ‘may indicate the fact that Arab states are not keen on having a judicial 
body capable of not only dealing with individual petitions but also rendering legally binding decisions’. See Dalia Vitkauskaite-
Meurice, ‘The Arab Charter on Human Rights: the Naissance of New Regional Human Rights System or a Challenge to the 
Universality of Human Rights?’ (2010) 1 Jurisprudence 165, 175; state parties to this charter have only agreed to establish an Arab 
HR Committee, to which reports are to be submitted about the status of HR within their jurisdiction, in accordance with the 
requirements of Article 48. However, this Committee, at present, has received only four reports from state parties and Iraq was not 
among these. See Mohamed Y. Mattar, ‘Article 43 of the Arab Charter on Human Rights: Reconciling National, Regional, and 
International Standards’ (2013) 26 Harvard Human Rights journal 91, 93. 
94 See the United Nations Assistance Mission for Iraq (UNAMI), 2010 Report on Human Rights in Iraq (UNAMI/OHCHR 2011).  
95 See the discussion in Chapter 2 of the thesis, pages 30-40. 
96 It is noted that the legal rights contained in these conventions are informed by the morality of HR and the idea that by virtue of 
being human, we have certain moral rights. These universal HR were agreed to be protected internationally by the ECHR and ACHR. 
The ECHR in its preamble clearly states that the convention aims to secure ‘the universal and effective recognition and observance’ 




any state, even those which are not party to certain treaties.97 This is acknowledged by 
various Iraqi laws, such as Article 23 of the TAL98  and Law No. 53.99  Customary 
international law is considered an important foundation of HR law and counter-terrorism 
provisions, as it comprises,  
rules of law derived from the consistent conduct of States acting out of the belief that the law 
required them to act that way. It results from a general and consistent practice of States followed 
out of a sense of legal obligation, so much so that it becomes custom. Customary international law 
must be derived from a clear consensus among States as exhibited both by widespread conduct 
and a discernible sense of obligation.100  
For customary international law to be established, it is necessary for both objective and 
subjective elements to exist in principle; they should be derived from the general, 
continual and uniform practice of states accompanied by legal opinion (opinio juris) in 
the sense that they believe that such practice is obligatory under international law.101 
Legal obligations can follow from this process and, therefore, it ‘rests on the implicit 
consent of states as they engage in, or acquiesce in, a particular practice’; it is sufficient 
for implicit consent to be ‘general’, and not ‘universal’.102 There are basic fundamental 
rules in customary international law based on jus cogens,103 a principle deeply embedded 
in international law; as a result of this, a state cannot opt out of these fundamental rules 
via a convention or other means. Therefore, these rules ‘are regarded as being peremptory 
in nature and […] non-derogable. The prohibitions against torture, slavery, genocide, 
racial discrimination and crimes against humanity are widely recognized as peremptory 
norms’, 104  absolute in nature and universally accepted as fundamental principles of 
customary international law. 105  Some rules of customary international law can be 
                                                
97 For instance, ‘many of the rights set out in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, as well as some of the rights defined in the 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, reflect norms of customary international law’. See United Nations, Handbook 
on Criminal Justice Response to Terrorism (n 134) Ch. 2, 19. 
98 See The Administration for the State of Iraq for the Transitional Period, 8 March 2004 (n 83).  
99 The Institute for International Law and Human Rights (n 86) 7. 
100 See Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (n 122) Ch. 2, 55. 
101 See Andrew Clapham and Mariano Garcia Rubio, ‘The Obligations of States with Regard to Non-State Actors in the Context of 
the Right to Health’ (2002) Health and Human Rights Working Paper Series No 3, 20; state practice should be understood to mean 
‘any act or statement from which views about customary law can be inferred; it includes physical acts, claims, declarations in abstracto 
(such as General Assembly resolutions), national law, national judgments and omissions’, in addition to the treaties and decisions of 
international courts. See Tawhida Ahmed and Israel de Jesús Butler, ‘The European Union and Human Rights: An International Law 
Perspective’ (2006) 17 The European Journal of International Law 771, 778; ‘normative statements contained in nonbinding texts 
[soft law] can generate a political impact equal at times to that of legally binding instruments and can give rise to customary 
international law through state practice’. Dinah Shelton, ‘Normative Hierarchy in International Law’ (2006) 100 The American 
Journal of International Law 291, 292-293.  
102 See Maria Eriksson, Defining Rape: Emerging Obligations for States Under International Law? (Martinus Nijhoff Publishers 2011) 
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objected to them. It ‘posits the existence of rules of international law that admit of no derogation and that can be amended only by a 
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For further details, see Shelton (n 101) 292, 297. 
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105  Torture, for instance, ‘is impermissible under any circumstances, including war, public emergency or terrorist threat. The 
prohibition is so strong and universally accepted that it is now a fundamental principle of customary international law. This means 




established by international and regional conventions, including the ECHR and IACHR, 
and certain judgments of various tribunals and courts may be considered as practising 
these.106 However, although these judgments serve as a means of interpretation, providing 
a ‘law-determination’ function, they do not create the rules. In other words, ‘it is generally 
understood that decisions by, for example, the ad hoc tribunals [and courts] do not 
constitute state practice, since…[they] are not state organs, but a finding by an 
international tribunal [and court] of a customary rule constitutes persuasive evidence of 
such a fact. The decisions may also contribute to the emergence of customary rule by 
influencing state practice’.107 
The doctrine of due diligence advocated by various HR bodies, and discussed in previous 
chapters,108 obliges states to seek to prevent acts of violence, whether committed by state 
or private parties, and, should violence occur, to provide adequate procedural and 
substantive remedies. This application of the doctrine of due diligence represents ‘a fairly 
new development within the concept of state obligations, enlarging the scope under which 
acts a state can be held responsible’. 109  The notions of positive obligation and due 
diligence overlap110 and it is now considered that ‘virtually all rights and freedoms require 
affirmative action on the part of the state, no less through the due diligence standard’, 
especially with regard to the state’s responsibility for acts of violence by non-state actors 
in the field of HR.111 It has been particularly important in establishing state obligations 
regarding domestic violence, for which the state can be held responsible if it 
systematically fails to protect women.112 An important second Special Rapporteur on 
Violence Against Women of 2006, entitled ‘The Due Diligence Standard as a Tool for 
the Elimination of Violence Against Women’, issued by Yakin Ertürk,113 provides firm 
guidance on the use of the due diligence standard to judge whether state measures to 
address domestic violence and provide justice for victims are adequate. 114  Ertürk 
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comprehensively surveyed international law, including many of the HR documents and 
case law, such as the jurisprudence of ECtHR and IACtHR, and stated that these provide 
evidence that there is ‘a rule of customary international law that obliges States to prevent 
and respond to acts of violence against women with due diligence’.115 Using the due 
diligence standard, Ertürk called for states to ‘prevent, protect, prosecute and provide 
compensation and map out the parameters of responsibility for State and non-State actors 
alike in responding to violence’.116 She concluded that the due diligence standard had 
reached so high a level of international consensus that it has become a rule of customary 
international law which should be universally recognised and applied.117 This can be 
attributed partially to the innovative and creative interpretive approach of regional HR 
bodies, including the ECtHR and IACtHR.118 Therefore, it may be argued that the general 
consensus is that no less than a minimum standard of due diligence is required in cases 
of domestic violence for the state to fulfil its positive obligations, has reached such a level 
as to become customary international law. It has even been claimed that Ertürk’s 
statement ‘can arguably be applied to all forms of gender-based violence, including 
honour-related violence’. 119 
Clearly, as discussed, the Iraqi state is subject to international legal norms, in particular 
those which impose positive obligations for due diligence standards to provide effective 
protection of the right to life of individuals against multifaceted acts of violence by non-
state actors. This includes gender-based violence and violence resulting from terrorism, 
political sources, and criminal acts, regardless of whether these obligations are contained 
in customary international law or in the HR treaties to which Iraq is a party. Due diligence 
is also essential in holding the Iraqi authorities accountable where circumstances indicate 
that non-state actors, such as militia, insurgents and terrorists, have perpetrated acts of 
violence with the support or acquiescence of these authorities. In addition, it may be 
possible to attribute indirect responsibility to these authorities in cases were non-state 
                                                
115 Ertürk (n 113), para 29; see Hasselbacher (n 188) Ch. 2, 198-199; Houchins (n 188) Ch. 2, 8-20; Eriksson (n 102) 202; Jeni 
Klugman, ‘Gender based violence and the law’ Background Paper for World Development Report 2017, 13.  
116 The report in para 82 states that ‘The due diligence obligation of protection requires States to ensure that women and girls who are 
victims or at risk of violence have access to justice as well as to health care and support services that respond to their immediate needs, 
protect against further harm and continue to address the ongoing consequences of violence for individual woman’. Ertürk (n 113); 
Hasselbacher (n 188) Ch. 2, 199-200. 
117 Hasselbacher (n 188) Ch. 2, 199.  
118 Two landmark decisions issued by the ECtHR demonstrate the acknowledgement and application of the emerging due diligence 
standard in the context of domestic violence. The Court relying on international materials and referring to Ertürk’s report of 2006 on 
the due diligence standard, has quoted her conclusion that there is a rule of customary international law, which ‘obliges States to 
prevent and respond to acts of violence against women with due diligence’. See cases of Bevacqua v. Bulgaria App no 71127/01 
(ECHR, 12 June 2008), paras 52-53 and Opuz v. Turkey App no 33401/02 (ECHR, 9 June 2009), para 79; for further details, see 
Hasselbacher (n 188) Ch. 2, 200-215; see the discussions in Chapters 2 and 3 of the thesis, pages 32-36, 37-39 and 76-78. 




actors are responsible for perpetrating criminal acts, such as domestic violence, should 
the authorities have failed to discharge their positive obligations on due diligence. There 
has been a lack of a functional criminal justice system and institutions since 2003, as will 
be examined later,120 and of an adequate response to the widespread violence, and an 
effective interpretation of the constitution’s HR clauses by the IFSC. This is combined 
with the absence of any tradition for victims to bring cases before Iraqi courts which 
allege that state authorities have failed to fulfil positive obligations. With a full 
understanding of the complex and volatile situation in Iraq, these deficiencies could be 
gradually addressed by building a new culture in Iraq, as part of a comprehensive 
reformation programme. This would include a valid interpretation of the constitution’s 
provisions for HR by the IFSC, and the establishment of adequate preventive measures 
and enforcement mechanisms to protect these rights, especially the right to life, against 
acts of violence. This could be combined with the promotion of a culture of proper access 
to justice and accountability, by tackling the impunity of both the Iraqi authorities and the 
perpetrators, and the establishment of adequate measures of reparation. Developing case 
law and the evolution of far-reaching jurisprudence on the part of ECtHR and IACtHR 
establishes certain norms and principles regarding these positive obligations which could 
partially help to promote this new culture, thus adding weight to the ICCPR’s exposition 
of the obligations to be observed by the Iraqi state. By observing some of these norms, 
the Iraqi state can adopt behaviour which facilitates change in domestic HR policies, 
including national policy, laws and practices, and the mobilising of civil society to 
substantially improve the level of HR protection.  
Clearly, the Iraqi authorities, in accordance with Article 2(2) of the ICCPR, are required 
to take positive steps to effectively implement the rights enshrined in the covenant, 
including the protection of the right to life.121 This indicates that it is insufficient for the 
Iraqi state merely to claim that its constitution recognises the state’s commitment to 
ensure the protection of the right to life as required by the covenant; it must also employ 
the principle of effectiveness. The principle of effectiveness is more than the positing of 
a mere theoretical concept of protection; it is achieved only by providing positive practical 
measures. Thus, there is no doubt that the Iraqi state cannot in any way claim to fulfil its 
duties of protection under the covenant by simply remaining passive or taking inadequate 
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measures of protection. This requires that Iraq establish both effective criminal law 
provisions and institutions capable of implementing them to provide protection for its 
citizens’ right to life.  
Admittedly, the legacy concerning respect for individuals’ HR in Iraq, especially their 
liberties, has long been lacking under the previous oppressive regime and, at present, there 
are no good reasons to believe that such rights are fully guaranteed by the state 
authorities.122 Although it is possible that they may be better protected under the post-
2003 democratic regime, especially once ISIS is eradicated, the use of criminal law in the 
provision of this protection may weaken a primary function of the newly instituted HR 
norms in Iraq, which is to counterbalance any illegal, coercive state measures that 
interfere with its citizens’ liberties. Therefore, it is better to avoid linking such a protective 
obligation with Iraqi criminal law and, instead, to rely on the concept of state sovereignty 
according to which the essential function of a state is to provide security for its citizens. 
However, the legitimacy of any criminal law practical measures taken by the Iraqi state 
would depend on whether these measures comply with the rule of law and obligations to 
respect HR. They must, therefore, be subject to the censure of Iraq’s judicial system 
taking account of international and regional instruments of HR law.  
The only preventive measure in current Iraqi criminal law to deter private individuals 
from violating the right to life is the threat of prosecution under the Iraqi Anti-Terrorism 
Law, and of capital punishment.123 However, this is unlikely to adequately address the 
enormous number of current violations. The HRC has expressed deep concern in the light 
of information about the tendency of the Iraqi authorities and their judicial system to give 
a broad interpretation to the Iraqi Anti-Terrorism Law, using it to charge individuals with 
unsubstantiated offences in order to tackle the large number of acts of violence.124 It 
asserted that, although the Iraqi state needs to adopt measures to counterattack these acts, 
it:   
should adopt the steps necessary to address the breadth of the definition of terrorism and to ensure 
that any existing or new counter-terrorism legislation, including the draft law before the 
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legislature, is fully compliant with the Covenant. It should also ensure that measures taken to 
combat terrorism are fully compatible with its obligations under the Covenant.125 
Another consideration is that, as Iraq has been a party to the covenant since 1971, it must, 
according to Article 40(2), submit periodic reports to the HRC on the measures it has 
implemented to give effect to covenant rights, and ‘on the progress made in the enjoyment 
of those rights’, including the right to life. However, the committee has only received four 
reports submitted before 2003.126 Regrettably, for the ten year period 2003-2013, the 
current Iraqi regime has only submitted one report concerning the protection of HR.127 
This delay may have breached the duty to make regular reports, by which process the 
HRC hopes to ‘induce states parties to adopt further measures to guarantee the effective 
enjoyment of the rights in law and practice’.128 In this delayed report, the Iraqi authorities 
asserted that the 2005 constitution, in accordance with Article 2 of the covenant, in as 
much as it respects and ensures the rights within the covenant, is the main means of 
guaranteeing respect and protection of these rights in Iraq, via the emphasis it puts on the 
essential norms and principles of HR, particularly in part two, Articles 14-46, concerning 
rights and freedoms, such as the right to life, security and freedom (Article 15).129  
Although this assertion reflects, in theory, the commitment of the Iraqi authorities to 
‘respect and ensure’ the protection of the right to life, it can be argued that, in practice, 
they have grossly failed to do so. The appropriate measures of prevention, as the IACtHR 
asserted, should include all ‘legal, political, administrative and cultural [means] that 
promote the protection of human rights and ensure that any violations are considered and 
treated as illegal acts [and] may lead to punishment of those responsible and the obligation 
to [provide]  for damages’.130 On this basis, the Iraqi authorities appear largely to have 
failed to employ such measures.131 Instead, they have been involved in splitting Iraqi 
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society and ignoring the value of promoting peaceful coexistence between diverse ethnic, 
religious and sectarian groups. This has weakened the legal and judicial system, creating 
a hostile environment for the right to life, promoting a culture of impunity, and exploiting 
the resources of Iraq, for those in power to achieve their own political, ethnic, and 
sectarian interests.132 Therefore, it may be alleged that the authorities have culpably failed 
to observe their positive obligation in practice. Such a failure is evident in many serious 
examples, to be examined later, including widespread gender-based violence, enforced 
disappearance, persecution of minority communities, and a woeful security policy. There 
are also unlawful arrests, detentions and torture under the pretext of combatting counter-
insurgency and terrorism, by employing fake bomb detection devices at security 
checkpoints, and in the fall of Mosul to ISIS, followed by ISIS massacres and 
humanitarian atrocities. 
However, these allegations of culpable failure cannot be addressed at the international 
level since, although Iraq has ratified many UN international conventions, it has not yet 
acknowledged the competence of international bodies, including the Committee on 
Enforced Disappearances, the Committee Against Torture and the Committee on the 
Elimination of all Discrimination against Women, to exercise jurisdiction over various 
cases of acts of violence which Iraqi victims may have wanted to be brought before them. 
Specifically, Iraq has not signed the Optional Protocol of the ICCPR which would give 
individuals the right to appeal before the HRC in relation to the failure of the Iraqi 
authorities to take reasonable measures to protect their right to life. Iraqi authorities, 
nevertheless, may be said to have to comply with the requirements of the Committee, 
which obliges states to take all necessary preventive measures to protect the right to life 
of their citizens when they are aware that an imminent threat to their lives exists. This is 
because ‘states parties’ to the Covenant are referred to in general by the Committee in its 
General Comment on Article 6, and also in its decisions concerning victims’ petitions, 
which require not only that the offending states comply with their positive obligations, 
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but also that all other states fulfil them,133 including Iraq. As Iraq is a member of ICCPR, 
it must comply with the HRC’s requirement to take on the positive obligation to prevent 
violation of its citizens’ right to life by other private individuals. Thus, even if the Iraqi 
state claims that its legal system does not include such a positive obligation, it is 
nevertheless legally bound to abide by the higher requirements of the HRC and, therefore, 
arguably it must conform to them, regardless of whether or not it allows its citizens to 
make complaints against it if should it fail to protect their right to life. It can be argued, 
therefore, that since the Iraqi authorities are aware that there is constant and serious 
endangerment of the lives of its citizens, including suicide bombers, car bombs, 
kidnapping and assassination operations, sectarian violence, and persecution of minority 
religious groups, they must take all reasonable precautionary measures according to due 
diligence, to fulfil their obligation of protection. The failure of the Iraqi authorities to do 
so may be said to violate their obligations under the ICCPR. 
The state authorities have persistently attributed the difficulty of fulfilling these 
obligations in practice to the dire security situation in both Iraq and the surrounding 
regions, particularly the conflict in neighbouring Syria. This latter especially has greatly 
affected the capacity to protect the right to life of Iraqi citizens and, moreover, the rate of 
violence has risen since 2008, reaching its worst level in 2013.134 However, arguably the 
Iraqi government cannot be entirely exonerated from failing to address the problems and 
threats arising from the security situation, which is partly due to its inability (so far) to 
build competent and functional institutions to deliver public services and tackle 
corruption. This has undermined both the mechanisms and processes in place to protect 
citizens from non-state actor violence, and the process of investigating crimes and 
revealing the truth about why and by whom they have been committed. The fragility of 
the Iraqi state and its criminal justice system can also be attributed to various other serious 
deficiencies, including the failure of the transitional process post-2003, which was 
followed by political unrest and violence, the reinforcement of sectarian and ethnic 
divisions in the government and society as whole, the rise of religious extremism and 
militia,135 and the absence of complete control over its affairs because of the interference 
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of many states seeking their own interests. However, the principal reason for the increase 
in the rate of violence was the numerous policy failures by the state. Since the state failed 
to punish acts of violence, this reignited the ‘cycle of violence’ and sense of 
‘marginalization and injustice of the state’s brutal practices’, as well as ‘fann[ing] the 
flames of extremism’.136  
This means that the state’s policy, especially under Prime Minister al Maliki, has not only 
been responsible for creating a hostile environment, instability and endangering the right 
to life of individuals, and thus producing victims of crime, it has also contributed to the 
creation of criminal, insurgent, terrorist and extremist groups, including ISIS. This policy 
was exemplified mainly by the use of de-Ba’athification and sectarianism, especially 
against the Sunni population, to marginalise their role in political affairs, and employ 
excessive counter-terrorism measures against them based on Anti-Terrorism Law,137 
including widespread unlawful arrests, detention, torture, acts of enforced disappearance, 
and extra-judicial executions committed by government and pro-government Shia 
militias.138 When ISIS assumed control of Mosul, Iraq’s third-largest city, much of its 
population seemed to support ISIS, or were at least indifferent to it, in preference to 
‘Maliki’s repressive and sectarian rule’.139 Research suggests that a backlash and protest 
by a population against a state’s policies is highly likely to occur, as in the case of 
Northern Ireland, when these policies, in response to violence, employ excessive brutality 
by security forces which violate human rights. Such a backlash often shifts support to 
violent actors, ultimately increasing the level of violence.140  
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It could be said that if Iraq signed the Optional Protocol of the ICCPR and observed its 
duty to regularly provide periodic reports to the HRC, this would put pressure on the Iraqi 
authorities to change their policy towards the causes of violence, improve their attitude 
in practice to the fulfilment of their positive obligations of protection, and create 
accountability should they fail to do so. Such pressure would be strengthened if a huge 
number of Iraqi victims were permitted to appeal before the Committee, alleging that the 
Iraqi authorities have failed to comply with their obligations under the covenant. It would 
also reverse the entrenched culture of Iraqi citizens, under which it is assumed that the 
behaviour of Iraqi authorities is untouchable and above the Iraqi judicial system, when 
the constitutional obligation of protection is not upheld.141 At present, there is no effective 
domestic judicial mechanism to claim gross negligence by the authorities in fulfilling the 
duty of protection. Therefore, allowing victims to complain to the Committee after all 
domestic judicial complaints available in the Iraqi legal system had been exhausted 
(unless this proved to be impossible or would result in a severe threat to the complainants) 
would send a strong message that such claims must be effectively addressed in the Iraqi 
judicial system.  
In principle, the conduct of Iraqi authorities and security and military forces is subject to 
the provisions of the Iraqi Penal Code and other penal codes.142 For instance, Articles 322 
to 341 of the Iraqi Penal Code requires the punishment of any public service individuals143 
if their conduct, whether intentional or not, violates their legal duties and also causes 
damage to individuals. These articles address various circumstances in which public 
officials breach their duties, wilfully or not, as prescribed in the laws, regulations, 
instructions and orders. These breaches include administrative and financial corruption 
as well as other multifaceted violations due to gross negligence in the performance of 
public office, abuse of power and serious breaches of public service.144 Victims affected 
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by official misconduct have the right to initiate a criminal complaint and no constitutional 
immunity would apply to prevent the victims from suing them. In addition, victims can 
rely on tort liability principles in Iraqi civil law to sue the authorities for damage from 
their failure to fulfil their duty of protection in accordance with due diligence.145 In 
practice, it is important to note that until now there have been no criminal or civil cases 
brought by victims against the authorities on the grounds of the breach of their positive 
obligation, because this obligation is neither entrenched in the Iraqi legal system nor 
followed by the courts in practice. This raises the question as to the extent to which the 
HRC and other international bodies’ norms with regard to positive obligations have any 
influence on the attitude of the Iraqi authorities. 
If the HRC were to receive regular reports from the Iraqi authorities concerning the status 
of the protection of HR in Iraq, it would be enabled to monitor whether or not these 
authorities were complying with their positive duty to protect the right to life, and to 
suggest any modifications to their laws and practices to provide the protection required. 
In the latest report by Iraq in 2013, mentioned above, the Iraqi authorities asserted their 
‘belief in the effectiveness and usefulness of the human rights treaty mechanisms which 
are highly instrumental in furthering the international human rights protection system’.146 
This, in principle, may be said to reflect the belief of the Iraqi state that victims should be 
allowed to appeal before the committee. In discussing this report with the Permanent 
Representative of Iraq to the United Nations Office in Geneva, Mohammad Sabir Ismail, 
the committee urged Iraq to sign the First Optional Protocol and apply the provisions of 
the covenant in the Iraqi courts.147 Sabir informed the committee that the signing by Iraq 
of the First Optional Protocol of the covenant would be considered by the inter-ministerial 
bodies, and that, ‘as for the status of the Covenant in the Iraqi legal framework, according 
to the Law of Treaties No. 111 (1979), international treaties took precedence over national 
laws. All judges had to abide by the adopted international instrument. The national judge 
always feared an appeal of his decision, thus he scrutinized everything before issuing a 
                                                
The Crime of Gross Negligence in the Performance of Public Office (2008) 3-34 < 
http://www.nazaha.iq/search_web/moneycrime/1.pdf>.   
145 Articles 215, 219 of the Iraqi Civil Law No. 40 for the Year 1951. 
146 United Nations Human Rights Committee, Consideration of reports submitted by States parties under article 40 of the Covenant: 
Fifth periodic reports of States parties due in 2000 Iraq (n 88) 3. 
147 After considering this fifth delayed Iraqi report, the Committee raised a list of concerns to be answered by the Iraqi authorities, 
including counter-terrorism measures in accordance with Anti-Terrorism Law No. 13 of 2005, the death penalty, the right to a fair 
trial, the independence of the judiciary and the use of torture particularly to gain confessions. See Human Rights Committee reviews 
the report of Iraq in 27 October 2015, 




sentence’. 148  In its concluding observations on the fifth delayed report of Iraq, the 
committee asserted that the state should be more energetic in trying to raise awareness of 
the covenant and how it might be applied in domestic law to guarantee the consideration 
of its provisions by the courts. Moreover, it should also look at the First Optional Protocol 
to the covenant which would facilitate an individual complaint process.149 
Further, in the light of the report of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, which 
found evidence that ISIS150 had committed war crimes, genocide and crimes against 
humanity, including widespread and systematic violations of the HR of numerous groups, 
including Christians, Shi’a, and Yezidi, 151  the committee asserted that everyone, 
especially ethnic or religiously vulnerable persons, should be protected from violence and 
HR abuse. Violations are required to be rigorously investigated by an independent 
authority, and perpetrators must be tried and adequately punished, with appropriate 
reparations given to victims.152  
However, it cannot be ignored that the Iraqi state, as Sabir asserted, faces serious 
challenges providing protection and security to its citizens since ‘terrorist acts being 
committed against Iraqi people were unprecedented in their cruelty and some […] 
amounted to genocide’ and that ISIS ‘was not an internal terrorist organization, but a 
transnational one. It was based on funding and smuggling networks’. 153  Therefore, 
because of such challenges, there can be no justification for imposing a disproportionate 
duty of protection on the Iraqi authorities alone. Nevertheless, such challenges should not 
be an excuse to justify the failure of government policy to fulfil their protective obligation 
regarding due diligence. The failure to observe due diligence standards of protection for 
citizens as stipulated by the HRC, the ECtHR, and the IACtHR is evidenced by many 
serious examples, and some will be examined next. 
5.2.1 Sexual orientation and gender-based violence  
                                                
148 Ibid.; in practice, however, ‘there is a regrettable tendency for Iraqi judges in domestic courts to be reluctant to apply these ratified 
international treaties: they seem to feel that only codified laws should be applied in any event’. Unless the provisions of international 
treaties are codified in domestic law, courts are likely to be reluctant to directly apply those provisions in practice. See Almusawi (n 
17) 39; this means that to bring the Iraqi legal system, both in theory and practice, into line with positive obligation doctrine, this 
doctrine needs to be explicitly included in this system if it is to be observed in the Iraqi courts. 
149 See para 6 of the UN Human Rights Committee (HRC), Concluding observations on the fifth periodic report of Iraq (n 88).   
150 ISIS considers itself to be a jihadist group and ‘it claims religious authority over all Muslims across the world’. However, it is 
widely regarded as a ‘terrorist organisation’. For further details, see Col. S.C. Dhiman, Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) 
Reconciliation, Democracy and Terror (Neha Publishers & Distributors, 2015) 5-8. 
151 United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, ISIL may have committed war crimes, crimes against humanity and 
genocide: UN report (19 March, 2015), 
<http://www.ohchr.org/EN/NewsEvents/Pages/DisplayNews.aspx?NewsID=15720&LangID=E> accessed 20 September 2016. 
152 See para 20 (a) and (c) of the Human Rights Committee (HRC), Concluding observation on the fifth periodic report of Iraq (n 88). 




A recent report employing HR testimonials and interviews with advocates of Iraqi 
community-based LGBT persons regarding the protection of their HR indicates that they 
have been subject to constant discrimination and extreme violence, including acts of 
unlawful killing, torture, cruelty, and ill-treatment based merely on their real or perceived 
sexual orientation or gender identity. Since 2003, it has been claimed that this violent 
treatment occurred regularly and with impunity, and involved various segments of society, 
including ‘civilians, militia members, religious leaders, police and security forces, 
government officials, healthcare workers and others’. 154  For example, many violent 
incidents were reported in 2009, 2012, and 2014 in Sadr City, areas of Baghdad, and other 
provinces, as a result of the targeting, intimidating, abducting and killing of many people 
under suspicion of being gay, ‘emo’ or on the basis of other sexual orientations. This was 
done with the support or acquiescence of Iraqi authorities, especially police and security 
forces. It has been suggested that such organised campaigns of violence by militia groups 
were incited by fatwas or other religious invectives of certain religious clerics.155 The 
report concluded that ‘the Iraqi government has an obligation to protect individuals from 
acts that violate these provisions of the ICCPR, whether committed by state actors or by 
private persons’ and ‘it must indiscriminately address such violations by exercising due 
diligence to prevent, punish, investigate, and provide redress for such acts’.156 It has also 
stated that the ‘government of Iraq has failed in its obligation under the ICCPR to take 
proper measures to give effect to the rights recognized therein, to ensure effective 
remedies in cases of violations, and to prevent systemic impunity’.157  
                                                
154  Iraqueer et al., Dying to be Free: LGBT Human Rights Violations in Iraq (2015) 1-12 
<http://www.law.cuny.edu/academics/clinics/hrgj/publications/ICCPR-Iraq-Shadow-Report-LGBT-ENG> accessed 20 September 
2016; see also The International Women’s Human Rights (IWHR) et al., Living with Fear: Torture and Discrimination Committed 
against LGBT Persons in Iraq (2015) 1-12 
<https://www.madre.org/sites/default/files/PDFs/Iraq%20LGBT%20Shadow%20Report%20to%20CAT%20FINAL.pdf> accessed 7 
August 2017.    
155 Iraqueer et al. (n 154) 3-4; The International Women’s Human Rights (IWHR) et al. (n 154) 3-4; Timothy Williams and Tareq 
Maher, ‘Iraq’s Newly Open Gays Face Scorn and Murder’ (7 April, 2009) New York Times 
<www.nytimes.com/2009/04/08world/middleeast/08gay.html> accessed 7 August 2017; Green and Ward (n 28) 8. 
156 Iraqueer et al. (n 154) 3. 
157 In its 2013 delayed report to the HRC, ‘the Government of Iraq states that the principles of equality and participation are enshrined 
in its Constitution. However, the only time the report makes reference to lesbians or gays is in defending the State’s discrimination 
against them in protest and organizing activities. The Report fails to discuss or even acknowledge the LGBT population in Iraq beyond 
this open embrace of discrimination, which it justifies by referring to “the teachings of the Islamic sharia”. The use of custom or 
religion to justify discrimination and other human rights abuses is not permitted under international human rights law. For example, 
this Committee found that the protections of the right to religious freedom in Article 18 of the ICCPR “may not be relied upon to 
justify discrimination against women by reference to freedom of thought, conscience and religion.” The Iraqi government may not 
rely on Shari'a or any other religious teachings or practice to justify discrimination under the ICCPR’. Ibid. 1, 11; the HRC has required 
that the Iraqi state ‘adopt robust measures to effectively prevent acts of discrimination and violence against such persons and ensure 
that all acts of violence against them are effectively investigated; perpetrators brought to justice; and victims compensated. It should 
also collect comprehensive data on cases of violence against persons on the basis of their sexual orientation or gender identity’. See 




The fragility of the Iraqi state and its criminal justice system has been reported by many 
international organisations and NGOs to have specific and additional consequence as to 
its ability to fulfil its positive obligations to ensure the protection of women’s human 
rights. 158   Since 2003, females have been subjected to a variety of systematic and 
widespread gender-based abuses, including abductions, killings for political, sectarian, or 
criminal reasons, domestic violence, enforced disappearances and displacements, honour 
killing, rape, and sexual slavery, by such armed groups, militia, members of law 
enforcement agencies, and their family and community. 159  There is a lack of 
comprehensive legislation, administrative, judicial, and educational systems in Iraq which 
would provide and promote the protection of all females and create a cultural awareness 
of the desirability and means of combatting gender-based violence, especially domestic 
violence.160 In fact, the Iraqi Penal Code of 1969 in many articles actually reinforced the 
cultural attitude of widespread acceptance by society of domestic violence perpetrated 
with impunity.161 For instance, when husbands resort to physical violence against their 
wives and children, as stated in Article 41 of the Penal Code, it is permissible ‘within 
certain limits prescribed by law or by custom’; however, the same Article does not specify 
the legal criteria defining these limits to determine when they have been breached.162 
Domestic violence against women and girls within families has reportedly increased and 
is grossly under-reported in Iraq, with a prevalence of physical violence against women 
by husbands at around one in five according to one study, while another found that 56.4% 
of Iraqi men believe they have the right to beat their wife if she disobeys. Even where law 
enforcement does act, legal personnel may be harassed and threatened by victims’ family 
members seeking to terminate legal proceedings’.163 In addition, the Penal Code allows 
                                                
158 See United States Department of State, 2016 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices-Iraq (n 78) 47-51; United States 
Department of State, 2013 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices – Iraq 
<https://www.state.gov/documents/organization/220565.pdf> accessed 24 February 2018, 47-51 ; The United Nations Assistance 
Mission for Iraq (UNAMI), Report on the Protection of Civilians in the Armed Conflict in Iraq: 1 November 2015 – 30 September 
2016; The United Nations Assistance Mission for Iraq (UNAMI), Report on the Protection of Civilians  in the Armed Conflict in Iraq: 
1 May – 31 October 2015; Koolaee And Akbari (n 134) 1-19.  
159 See United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), Eligibility Guidelines for Assessing the International Protection 
Needs of Asylum Seekers from Iraq (31 May 2012) 34. 
160 It has been reported that ‘most violence against women and girls appears to be perpetrated with impunity. According to a number 
of reports, the main reason why victims of gender-based violence refrain from reporting sexual abuse and rape, forced marriage, 
domestic violence and female genital mutilation (FGM) is the fear of retaliation by the perpetrator or the family/community for tainting 
their “honour”. Reports further indicate that women often fear that they would not receive protection from law enforcement agencies 
and courts, given that gender-based violence is often treated leniently while certain forms of violence, including domestic violence, 
trafficking and FGM are not criminalized by Iraqi law’. Ibid.  
161 See International Women’s Human Rights (IWHR) et al., Women’s Human Rights Violations in Iraq: in Response to the Fourth 
Periodic Report of the Republic of Iraq (August 31, 2015) 12; United States Department of State (USDS), 2016 Country Reports on 
Human Rights Practices –Iraq (n 78) 49; USDS, 2013 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices –Iraq (n 158) 47. 
162 UNHCR (n 159) 36; USDS, 2016 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices –Iraq (n 78) 49; USDS, 2013 Country Reports on 
Human Rights Practices –Iraq (n 158) 47; see Boshra Al Obeidi, ‘Violence Against Women In the Community and in the Provisions 
of the Iraqi Penal Code No. 111 of 1969’, 2-32 <www.gjpi.org/wp-content/uploads/1.doc> accessed 7 August 2017.      




the punishment of rape with a maximum sentence of life imprisonment in circumstances 
where the victim has died; in other rape cases punishment may be dropped against 
perpetrators, even after sentencing, if they marry the raped victims, even if they are under 
the legal age of 18.164 Marriage with a perpetrator, according to those advocating it, ‘will 
restore the woman’s honour, which, they say, has been tainted by rape or sexual assault, 
thereby avoiding a potential “honour killing” by her family or tribe’. This reasoning, 
however, fails to consider how marriage to a rapist may force the victim to experience 
further daily emotional, and possibly physical, trauma.165 Rape victims do not usually 
report it to authorities or pursue legal remedies because of the ‘social stigma and societal 
and often familial retribution against both the victim and perpetrator’.166 Where women 
do decide to report sexual violence, they face harassment and abuse from Iraqi police and 
may even be accused of adultery or prostitution. More than 97% of women in one survey 
said that because of fear of damaging their reputation or the belief that Iraq’s law 
enforcement agencies could or would not be able to address gender-based violence, they 
would were unwilling to report problems to police.167 Furthermore, Article 409 of the 
Iraqi Penal Code may also be said to promote a culture of impunity regarding honour 
killings, which, according to many reports, remain a serious problem since punishments 
are a maximum of three years or even voided altogether on the grounds of ‘honourable 
motives’ if the accused is on trial for killing his wife or a female dependent because of 
the suspicion that the victim was committing adultery. 168  Indeed, there is no legal 
guidance on what constitutes ‘honourable motives’, which lends itself to extensive 
interpretation and exploitation in all areas of Iraq, and moreover ‘honour crimes’ are 
usually treated with impunity due to general social recognition, even by law enforcement 
officers.169 An additional type of honour killing has also been imposed by armed groups 
rather than victims’ families.170 For instance, the United Nations Assistance Mission in 
Iraq (UNAMI) has received reports indicating that in Basra there have been multiple 
                                                
164 Ibid. 11. See Article 398 of the Iraqi Penal Code (n 11); USDS, 2016 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices –Iraq (n 78) 49. 
165 Despite the Iraqi Personal Status Law of 1959 requiring the consent of both parties to a marriage, observers have noted that ‘fear 
of further reprisals and social stigma is said to be likely to coerce a woman or girl into a marriage with the abuser. Also in the case of 
abduction, including abduction with (attempted) rape, the punishment will be void in case the perpetrator marries the victim. As a 
result, …very few perpetrators of rape are known to have been convicted’. UNHCR (n 159) 36. 
166 International organisations and local NGOs have reported ‘family-imposed movement restrictions, cultural norms, or stigmatization 
prohibited or discouraged female victims of sexual crimes from accessing psychosocial support services’ and, further, health ministers 
in the Iraqi Kurdistan Region, especially in internally displaced camps ‘were unwilling to treat sexual assault survivors due to cultural 
norms, and if they did give care, it was inadequate due to capacity limitations in the health-care sector’. Ibid. 49. 
167 IWHR (n 161) 12. 
168 See Articles 128(1), 130 and 409 of the Iraqi Penal Code (n 11); for further details, see UNHCR (n 159) 37-38; USDS, 2016 
Country Reports on Human Rights Practices –Iraq (n 78) 52; Green and Ward (n 28) 4-6.  
169 UNHCR (n 159) 37. 




‘honour’ crimes by militia, with police records detailing execution-type killings, 
reportedly for ‘adultery or “un-Islamic conduct”.171   
Honour crime is specifically reported to be at a high level in the Iraqi Kurdistan Region 
(KRG) despite the passing of government legislation (No.8 of 2011) to address gender-
based violence, including: physical, psychological and verbal abuse of girls and women; 
female genital mutilation; spousal rape and threats, and child abuse.172 For instance, in 
2013 HR advocates documented dozens of cases of abuse and killings of women by their 
male family members in the KRG.173 Despite Article 29(4) of the Iraqi constitution 
explicitly forbidding ‘all forms of violence and abuse in the family’, the central 
government of Iraq has not enacted wide-ranging national regulation to deal with 
domestic violence, and it remains non-criminalised. This failure to avert, indict and guard 
victims from domestic violence means women remain vulnerable to domestic violence 
and acts of revenge.174 The HRC, in its concluding observations on the delayed fifth 
periodic report by Iraq, expressed its concern at the lack of adequate legislation to combat 
violence against women.175 It stated in paragraph 26 that all forms of violence against 
women should be eliminated by the Iraqi state, to be achieved by redoubling efforts in 
three main ways. First, it should facilitate the reporting, investigating and making of 
reparations for gender-based crimes, and the protection of victims. Secondly, it must 
urgently change legislation to ensure women are safeguarded against violence by 
repealing ‘honourable motives’ as a mitigating circumstance for murder, and preventing 
the exoneration of rapists who marry their victims, as well as guaranteeing that all types 
of violence against women become criminalised and receive adequate punishment. Third, 
the state must raise more awareness of the unacceptable and adverse consequences of 
violence against women, and of the resources and protection available to victims; it 
should also begin programmes for domestic violence offenders to modify their behaviour, 
                                                
171 UNAMI, Report on Human Rights in Iraq: 1 July to 31 December 2007 (UNAMI/OHCHR 2007), para 33; according to the Basra 
Security Committee, 79 women were killed by Basra militia or vigilantes in 2007 for ‘violating Islamic teachings’, 44 died in ‘honour 
killings’ and seven were killed for political reasons. Reports from ambulance drivers indicate the real numbers are much higher. In 
the first 11 months of 2008, ‘81 women in the city have been murdered for allegedly bringing shame on their families’. It is unclear 
how many of the killings were ‘genuine’ honour killings motivated by shame, how many were by militia or vigilantes, and how many 
of the latter were carried out in response to denunciations from relatives or neighbours. Ibid. 
172 Honour killings appear to be concealed as accidents or suicides, reported as suicide to ‘ avoid prosecution,’ or as suicide because 
of the ‘fear [of] being killed by their families’. The KRG has pledged to deal with  ‘honour killings’ and other violence against women, 
but most cases go unpunished, or, in the rare instances of conviction, are leniently punished. See Ibid. 37; IWHR (n 161) 13. 
173 IWHR (n 161) 13. 
174 Ibid.; for further details, see Iraqi Organisations et al., Seeking Accountability and Demanding Change: A report on Women’s 
Rights Violations in Iraq (2015). See the discussion in Chapters 2 and 3, pages 28-30, 32-36, 37-39, 67-68 and 76-78. 




and develop training activities for state officers to help them react appropriately to all 
violence against women.176 
The Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women also asserted that 
the Iraqi state should adopt holistic measures to comply with due diligence to prevent, 
investigate, prosecute and punish violence against women and girls, by state or non-state 
actors.177 This should be achieved by reforming the whole security sector to incorporate 
a gender-sensitive and gender-responsive perspective, and to establish systematic training 
programmes concerning respect for women’s HR. In addition to enforcing the law, 
accountability mechanisms must be established to combat impunity and corruption, and 
the judiciary must be reformed to ensure it remains independent and impartial, and has 
integrity in the delivery of justice.178  
In tackling widespread domestic violence, the Iraqi state adopted between 2013 and 2017 
an Anti-Violence against Women Strategy and a National Strategy on the Advancement 
of Women in Iraq, respectively, which both demanded legislation on domestic violence. 
An Anti-Domestic Violence Law has been drafted but remains unratified by the 
parliament.179 It could be argued that this draft law still considers domestic violence to be 
a private matter, subject to various social, religious, cultural, and tribal customs, and not 
a violation of HR requiring the state and criminal justice system to adopt measures to 
fulfil its positive obligations as required by international norms of HR. This argument can 
be supported by scrutinising the draft law, criticised by Human Rights Watch for not 
meeting the international standards required to adequately prevent and respond to 
domestic violence. Although one stated aim of the draft law is to prevent and limit the 
spread of domestic violence, which it has described as a ‘crime’, it has failed to: precisely 
define what constitutes domestic violence;180 protect all victims of domestic violence;181 
and, set out penalties for crime(s) of domestic violence and additional penalties for 
                                                
176 Ibid. 
177 See the UN Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women, Concluding observations on the combined fourth to 
sixth periodic reports of Iraq, U.N. Doc. CEDAW/C/IRQ/CO/4-6, March 10, 2014, para 10. 
178 Ibid. 
179 See Human Rights Watch, Domestic Violence in Iraq: Commentary on the Draft Anti-Domestic Violence Law in Iraq (March 
2017) 1. 
180 The draft law defines domestic violence as ‘any action, omission, or the threat to do so within the family, and the consequent 
material or moral damage’, contrary to international standards. According to the 2012 UN Women’s Handbook for Legislation on 
Violence Against Women, any legal definitions of domestic violence should include ‘physical, sexual, psychological, and economic 
violence’. ‘Coercive control’ should also employed in any definition of psychological and economic violence. It ‘includes a range of 
acts designed to make victim subordinate and/or dependent by isolating them from sources of support, exploiting their resources and 
capacities for personal gain, depriving them of the means needed for independence, resistance and escape and regulating their everyday 
behavior’. See Ibid. 3. 
181 This is because the draft law defines domestic violence within the family and does not include ‘those in intimate relationships but 




situations that aggravate the circumstances of the violence.182 In addition, it has failed: to 
repeal all penal code provisions (including Articles 41, 398 and 409), which enshrined a 
culture of impunity; 183  to establish adequate measures to protect victims, punish 
perpetrators, and ensure access to proper redress for abused victims, since it prioritises 
reconciliation over the provision of protection and justice for them.184 The prioritisation 
of reconciliation in cases of domestic violence raises serious concerns about the 
tremendous social and economic pressure it places on women to prioritise family unity 
over their own protection.185 Mediation in all cases of violence against women and at all 
stages of legal proceedings should be forbidden as it prevents these cases from receiving 
proper scrutiny by the judicial authority. In promoting reconciliation as an alternative to 
justice, the draft law ‘incorrectly presumes that both parties have equal bargaining power, 
reflect[ing] an assumption that both parties may be equally at fault for violence, and 
reduces accountability for the offender’, thus, undermining protection for the victim of 
domestic violence.186 In addition, although international standards place concrete duties 
on police, prosecutors, and other law enforcing or investigating officials dealing with 
cases of violence against women, the draft law, however, makes no mention of police 
officers and neither does it detail absolute duties for them when responding to cases of 
violence against women, except for the Department of Family Protection. This omission 
is key, since the police play a significant role and can help ascertain if a victim should 
pursue justice or not.187 
Although the draft law gives the Department for Family Protection and the Higher 
Committee for Anti-Domestic Violence the task to propose programmes for the reduction 
and prevention of domestic violence, it has failed to determine which prevention measures 
should be included to adequately protect victims. Prevention of domestic violence ‘should 
include measures such as awareness-raising activities; development of educational 
curricula on violence against women, women’s human rights, and promotion of healthy 
                                                
182 Human Rights Watch noted that ‘Article 20 of the draft law provides penalties for breach of protection orders [which consider 
among the most effective legal remedies available to complainants/survivors of violence against women], and Article 22 sets out that 
offenses in the law act as aggravating circumstances, but does not stipulate what they are’. Ibid. 4, 13. 
183 The UN Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women in its concluding observations (n 177), para 18 (d), called 
on Iraq to ‘review the draft law on domestic violence with a view to ensuring that penalties are imposed on perpetrators of violence 
against women and harmonize the Penal Code and the Code of Criminal Procedures accordingly’; see Human Rights Watch (n 179) 
5. 
184 This is because the draft law indicates that one objectives is to ‘work on family reconciliation to protect families and the society as 
a whole’. The draft law in Article 19 further states that ‘the judge should refer the parties to the Department of Social Research for 
reconciliation, and where reconciliation fails, the court shall take legal action. It also provides that legal procedures to prosecute the 
perpetrator are to stop once reconciliation has been reached’. Human Rights Watch (n 179) 7. 
185 See Human Rights Watch, Iraq: Strengthen Domestic Violence Bill (19 March 2017) <https://www.hrw.org/news/2017/03/19/iraq-
strengthen-domestic-violence-bill> accessed 14 August 2017.    
186 Ibid. 




relationships; and sensitizing the media regarding domestic violence’;188 however, none 
of these measures have been specified in the draft law.   
5.2.2  Enforced Disappearance and Violence against Minority Communities 
The phenomenon of enforced disappearance is another ugly facet of the widespread 
violence in Iraq post-2003. The government is unwilling to acknowledge that it still 
happens, as it is considered to be a past problem and, also because it has partial 
responsibility for the sheer scale and systematic practice of disappearances and 
abductions conducted both by its security forces and affiliated militias. This, combined 
with arbitrary arrests, torture and extrajudicial executions, has been found to contribute 
effectively to the increase in disappearances.189  Due to the continuing crises of the 
security situation, comprehensive statistics about the number of missing persons is 
lacking. However, a study conducted by the International Commission on Missing 
Persons (ICMP) estimated that between 250,000 to over one million persons have 
disappeared in Iraq.190 Following serious sectarian violence between 2006 and 2008, the 
International Committee of the Red Cross reported that ‘some 20,000 bodies were 
deposited at the Medico-Legal Institute in Baghdad, less than half of whom have been 
identified. Unclaimed bodies were buried in various cemeteries around the city’. 191 
Working closely with Iraqi non-governmental organisations and HR bodies regarding 
enforced disappearances, and having reviewed thousands of cases, the Geneva 
International Centre for Justice (GICJ) observed that some victims were taken by police, 
security forces, and uniformed militia; their families lack information about the charges 
                                                
188 Ibid. 23. 
189 See Geneva International Centre for Justice (GICJ), Iraq: Enforced disappearance: A Widespread Challenge, Shadow report 
submitted to the UN Committee on Enforced disappearances in the light of reviewing Iraq’s report in 9th session 7 to 18 September 
2015, 5; Dirk Adriaensens, Always Someone’s Mother or Father, Always Someone’s Child: The Missing Persons of Iraq (17 
December 2010) <http://truth-out.org/archive/component/k2/item/93422:always-someones-mother-or-father-always-someones-
child-the-missing-persons-of-iraq> accessed 8 August 2017. 
190 Geneva International Centre for Justice (GICJ) (n 189). 
191  See The Magazine of the International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement, The Missing: a hidden Tragedy 
<http://www.redcross.int/en/mag/magazine2008_1/4-9.html> accessed 24 February 2018; sectarian violence escalated to an horrific 
extent in Iraq, and following the bombing of one of the holy Shia places in 22 February, 2006, ‘mixed areas, particularly in the capital, 
exploded into an orgy of sectarian violence that continued until relative calm was restored in mid-2007. While there were many factors 
contributing to the grisly death toll in Iraq, it was surely no mere coincidence that following the […] bombing, civilian deaths steadily 
rose to reach an astonishing high of 3,159 deaths in July 2006’. According to Haddad, ‘the sharp deterioration from the ‘default setting’ 
of sectarian coexistence [between Shia and Sunni] to the exception of sectarian violence was unlike anything experienced in living 
Iraqi memory. In effect, the impossible had happened: sectarian identity, in and of itself, rather than, for example, affiliation to a 
political grouping associated with a particular sect, became the cause and target of unbridled violence.’. He noted that examples of 
hostile sectarian public utterances by sectarian groups, including ‘the songs, poems, speeches and other public displays of sectarian 
fervour.... show the terrible price that people pay when sectarian difference is politicised and mobilised into sectarian violence’. See 




or place of detention. Indeed, many of the arrested have been found dead and tortured, 
while the fate of others remains undetermined.192  
The GICJ noted that although in Section 1, Article 9(b) the Iraqi Constitution of 2005 
prohibits the existence of any militia ‘outside the framework of the armed forces’, militias 
have widely flourished in Iraq. Illegal pro-government militia operate ‘in total impunity’ 
and ‘continue to perpetrate human rights abuses and violations of international law’.193 
The GICJ has observed that oftentimes the militias and army cannot be distinguished as 
some are part of the armed forces. However, even militia outside the armed forces have 
not been made subject to the law by the government, and therefore the issue with the 
militia is that both types are conducting HR abuses.194 
The GICJ has also asserted that there are more than 50 militias in Iraq with the authority 
of arrest, detention, torture, and summary execution. In 2014, the pro-government militia 
‘Al Hashd Al Shaabi’ (Popular Mobilisation Units or PMU), a combination of mainly 
Shia volunteers, was established by a religious fatwa and government order in June 2014 
with the intention of removing ISIS from western Iraq.195 This militia is reportedly 
responsible for horrific crimes against people in ISIS controlled areas, and has 
systematically destroyed entire villages with the agenda of widespread sectarian 
cleansing. 196  Amnesty International has documented crimes by PMU militia in and 
around Baghdad and in other provinces, and noted that since June 2014 PMU militias 
have executed extrajudicial or unlawful killings, and tortured and kidnapped thousands 
of victims, some of whom were later found fatally shot. Thousands more are remain 
missing following their abduction.197 In a 2014 report, the same organisation asserted that 
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193 Ibid. 14-15. 
194 Ibid. 
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beholden to a foreign state, history may come to judge Nov. 26, 2016, as being the date when the last opportunity for salvaging the 
project of a unified Iraq was cast overboard’. See Baria Alamuddin, The Dangers of Legitimizing ‘Al-Hashd Al-Shaabi’ (28 November 
2016) Arab News <http://www.arabnews.com/node/1016496/columns> accessed 2 December 2016. 
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Shia militias enjoy absolute impunity, and that central government is largely to blame for 
permitting them to operate outside the law. Their existence is thus both the cause and 
result of the increasing lack of security and stability, and prohibits any chance of an 
effective, accountable security and armed forces which can protect the whole population, 
enforce the law equably, and implement a fair justice system which sustains equality 
before the law and other human rights.198 
The Iraqi legal system is considered entirely unable to address these ongoing abhorrent 
crimes, because it does not precisely define or clearly criminalise enforced 
disappearances, as required by the International Convention for the Protection of All 
Persons from Enforced Disappearance, and international law.199 In its review of the 2014 
report submitted by Iraq, the Committee of Enforced Disappearances (CED) noted the 
shortcomings in the Iraqi legal system, the inadequate performance by some authorities, 
and the incomplete compliance with its obligations under the convention. The CED 
therefore demanded that the Iraqi state takes all measures necessary to ensure that 
enforced disappearance becomes part of domestic law as an offence in itself (Article 2 of 
the convention), and also that it be considered a crime against humanity criminalised in 
line with Article 5.200 The committee further noted the lack of accurate information on 
persons subjected to enforced disappearance, which it feels is necessary to devise 
appropriate public policies to prevent, investigate, punish and eliminate such crimes, and 
to guarantee the right to know the truth about the disappearance and receive reparation 
for it.201 It further expressed concern at not receiving information about the number of 
cases of enforced disappearance allegedly perpetrated in Iraq since 2003 by state bodies 
or militias acting with the authorisation, support or acquiescence of state officials; nor 
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Convention, 13 October 2015, CED/C/IRQ/CO/1.  




was information received about whether investigations were conducted and, if there were, 
their outcomes or sentences.202          
Because of the apparent lack of political will, there is no proper governmental framework 
to deal with any enforced disappearances occurring since 2003. Although several laws 
have been passed in recent years, these do not address all the aspects of disappearances.203 
Furthermore, all court cases in recent years occurred before 2003.204 
The ethnic and religious minorities in Iraq have been widely targeted in recent years due 
to the lack of the protection by the state. For instance, like other Iraqis, the small minority 
of Christians (3 per cent of the population) used to live peacefully, but since 2003 they 
have been targeted with violence and terrorism because of their religion and vulnerability. 
Criminals are aware that such groups are unable to defend themselves and that no one 
protected them.205 During the severe sectarian violence from 2006 to 2008, Christians no 
longer felt secure and many fled because they had no ‘tribal connections to rely on’ and 
realised that ‘they were far more vulnerable to attack’.206 In September 2008, specifically 
in Mosul, there were many threats, murders, and bombings against Christians,207 resulting 
in the displacement of approximately 2,000 families. Following these, a committee of 
high-ranking officers was established to investigate and determine whether any security 
leaders had failed in their duties.208 The findings of this committee’s unpublished report 
asserted that security officers had not protected Christians and ignored threats to them. 
Regardless, the same military unit had remained accountable for safeguarding the area 
for more than four years, and, although certain officers were blamed, they were not made 
answerable. To compound this, the committee stated that the operational command of 
Ninewa lacked clear procedures for security crises and its officials had no clear idea of 
the situation in the area that it was meant to control. Moreover, the activities of the 
province’s security forces were not coordinated with the governor, leading to more crime 
and displaced Christians.209 
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The report’s findings and urgent recommendation to replace the military unit and pursue 
the criminals responsible for intimidating the Christian community made no difference to 
the upholding of the rights of this community to be protected by the state and, thus, attacks 
against it continued to occur in the following years.210 
Similarly, the Yazidi community and others have also been vulnerable to attacks. For 
instance, on 14 August 2007, in the deadliest single suicide attack since 2003, 500 people 
were killed when four suicide bombers detonated four trucks loaded with explosives 
devices.211 In particular, systematic and serious HR violations, including mass executions, 
abductions, and persecution of various Iraqi ethnic and religious communities have 
increased significantly in the territory and cities, including Mosul, which has been 
occupied by ISIS. According to the UN High Commission for Human Rights, these 
violations amount to war crimes, genocide, and crimes against humanity.212 
5.2.3 Ineffective Security Policies  
Since 2003, Iraq has faced unprecedented and terrifying violence, including car and 
suicide bombings targeting public markets, residential neighbourhoods, and 
governmental offices; this has resulted in tens of thousands of civilians being killed and 
wounded. The usual security measures adopted to prevent such atrocities have been to 
surround these places and the main entrance to cities with concrete barriers and security 
checkpoints, and to deploy thousands of troops on the streets.213 The authorities are thus 
aware of the high risk that civilians will be targeted by terrorists and, thus, inefficiency, 
negligence or collusion on the part of security measures may be said to violate the state’s 
positive obligation to protect the right to life of its citizens with due diligence. However, 
the Iraqi security services have been criticised for largely failing to identify imminent 
                                                
forces, making them unable to adequately perform their public duties. In addition, Iraqi citizens lack trust in these forces as their 
conduct is not based on the rule of law and on meeting the legitimate interests of citizens; rather, they employ various militia and 
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bomb attacks and, thereby, the inspection checkpoints and entry points to Iraq’s cities 
have failed. Moreover, after these bombings, the security services failed to restore order 
to the ensuing chaos.214 Ironically, the Iraqi security authorities have not hesitated to say 
that the targeting of civilians ‘is proof that terrorist forces have failed to reach vital 
targets’, causing anger and frustration among the civilian population.215 
The failure of security forces to protect citizens against bomb attacks should not only be 
related to preventive measures at check points and other places, but should be placed in a 
wider context since the crises in the entire Iraqi political, judicial, social and security 
systems share responsibility. While it is true that many governments would find such a 
security situation very challenging, the hundreds of terrorist bomb attacks against 
civilians have occurred for various reasons, including political competition,216 collusion, 
corruption, absence of accountability, sectarian strife, a weak intelligence system, and a 
lack of professionalism and coordination between security forces.217 
Al-Ali suggested that ‘the government has made a mess of a security policy: first by 
deploying faulty equipment to protect its citizens, and secondly by creating unnecessary 
security risks through its own terrible practices’.218 He further asserts that ‘corruption is 
so widespread that it even impacts on citizens’ security, to the extent that security forces 
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are obliged to use a useless piece of plastic to protect themselves and the country from 
car bombs’.219 
This assertion is strongly supported when the case of the bomb detection device, known 
as Advanced Detection Equipment (ADE) 651, is considered. The Iraqi government spent 
approximately US $85m on this device, for general use at security checkpoints as a key 
defence against car bombs.220 However, thousands of Iraqi people have been killed and 
injured in recent years due to the complete ineffectiveness of ADE 651, manufactured by 
an irresponsible British company (ATSC Limited) founded by Jim McCormick.221 The 
scandal of the ineffectiveness of this device led to a joint BBC and Cambridge University 
investigation in 2010, in which the device’s technology was investigated by testing cards 
provided by the supplier.222 The investigation found that the cards had no effective means 
of detecting a specific type of explosive, or any digital or electronic information, and thus 
ADE 651 was not fit for purpose. Following this, it was concluded that the device was a 
fake, a finding also reached in other investigations, including by the US military.223 
After the BBC investigation, UK law enforcement banned ADE 651,224 and criminal 
prosecutions were conducted both in Iraq and the UK.225 General Al-Jabiri, who was head 
of the counter-explosives department at Iraq’s Ministry of the Interior and responsible for 
purchasing the device, was jailed for four years in 2012 on the grounds that the devices 
were overpriced and based on false technology.226 James McCormick and six others were 
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charged by the UK Crown Prosecution Service in 2012.227 Investigations revealed that 
ADE 651 had been modelled on failed golf ball detectors on sale in the US,228 and 
McCormick was jailed for ten years in 2013 had several properties and a yacht 
confiscated.229 The judge remarked that the sale of these hopeless devices for vast profit 
had substantially contributed to ‘causing death and injury to innocent individuals’, and 
that McCormick’s ‘culpability as a fraudster ha[d] to be placed in the highest category’.230  
Incredibly, despite these developments being widely known and concerning the people 
of Iraq, the Iraqi government did not stop using this ineffective device at security 
checkpoints at this point. Clearly, the government should have opened an immediate, 
thorough, and independent investigation as to how the deal for ADE 651 was concluded 
without scientific scrutiny, and senior officials who made the deal should have been 
brought before the courts. Instead, the government attempted to mislead the public by 
stating that the devices had been partially effective, and blamed security forces for not 
following instructions on their use. At a press conference in 2013, Nouri Al-Maliki 
(president 2006-2014), who was at that time responsible for securities issues as the head 
of both the Ministries of Defence and Interior,231 stated that three separate committees 
had looked into the issue. He continued to blame the soldiers, and stated that while some 
of the devices were effective, only those in ‘the court case […] were fake. As for the 
devices that are real, their problem is that using them correctly requires experience.’232  
This statement was undoubtedly an attempt to conceal both the ineffectiveness of the 
device, and that there was corruption in the deal between the Iraqi government and ATSC 
Limited. However, at the same time, ‘car bombs continued to rip apart the lives of the 
people that the government pretended to protect with a piece of plastic that was worse 
than useless’ and not one senior official took responsibility for the corrupt deal.233 For 
instance, in July 2016 the worst single terrorist attack since 2003 occurred, which was the 
deadly bombing by ISIS in Karada, Baghdad (home of mainly Shia Muslims), killing over 
250 people. An explosives-packed vehicle was detonated just after midnight, when the 
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area was busy with families shopping for Ramadan celebrations.234 Unconfirmed reports 
claimed that the vehicle used in the attack had passed through security checkpoints 
equipped with fake bomb detectors.235 As a consequence, there were widespread protests 
by citizens expressing their anger and dissatisfaction with security measures, especially 
at the checkpoint protecting Karada. They demanded that officials be held accountable, 
including the head of the Karada district. The prime minister at the time of writing, Haider 
Al-Abadi, then banned these fake devices from security checkpoints countrywide, 
dismissed various security officials in Karada, and subjected them to investigation, and 
also began an investigation at the Interior Ministry concerning the ‘corrupt deals’ 
regarding ADE 651. Despite this, ADE 651 was, according to one police officer in 
Baghdad, still in use following the Prime Minister’s order.236  
The example of ADE 651, therefore, indicates that the Iraqi government bears a heavy 
responsibility for the deaths and injuries of citizens led to believe that their government 
would take all reasonable measures with due diligence to protect them from bomb 
explosions and, specifically, that such an ineffective device would protect them from 
death or injury. The state’s appropriate scientific experts had a duty, for the safety of its 
citizens, to test the effectiveness of ADE 651 before purchasing it. Although under Article 
61(2) of the Iraqi Constitution, the Iraqi Council of Representatives has a duty to monitor 
the performance of the executive authority jointly and individually, including the prime 
minister and his ministers before the council,237 it has failed to take serious action against 
government incompetence and corruption in this case, and has failed to use its right of 
withdrawing confidence in a particular minister or in the whole council of ministers. This 
failure by the council can be attributed to invested political interests and lack of concern 
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for providing protection and justice for Iraqis. Nevertheless, the decision of the current 
prime minister in relation to this device indicates that a change of stance may be gradually 
occurring.    
5.2.4 The Fall of Mosul City and the Speicher Massacre 
A further example of the serious failure of the Iraqi authorities to provide protection of 
right to life is evident in the seizure of Mosul by ISIS in June 2014, and the subsequent 
seizure of cities near Baghdad, including Anbar. The collapse of the Iraqi security and 
military forces has been attributed to widespread corruption.238 The damage inflicted on 
these and other Iraqi institutions by corruption is partly due to the muhasasa system, 
which, as noted earlier, required the governments of national unity formed in 2005, 2006 
and 2010 to fulfil sectarian and ethnic quotas.239 In addition, the strength of these forces 
was broken by the previous prime minister, Nouri al-Maliki, who used these institutions 
for what has been perceived as his own narrow political interests, instead of building a 
capable and strong army and security institutions to provide protection to the country and 
its citizens.240 It has been further asserted that ‘the incompetence of the Iraqi security 
forces, the ineptitude of its counter-insurgency doctrine and massive morale and desertion 
problems have all contributed greatly to the ISIS’ resurgence in Iraq. The lacklustre and 
dismal performance of the Iraqi army may perhaps be the [largest factor in] allowing the 
ISIS to seize such vast swathes of territory’.241 The seizure of Mosul and other cities 
resulted in serious brutal and barbaric acts against civilian Iraqis. According to reports by 
the UNAMI, hundreds of thousands of Iraqis fled their cities, and thousands were subject 
to killing, injury, torture and servitude, among them Christians, Yazidi, Faili Kurds, 
Kaka’e Sabaeans, and Shabak and Shi’a groups, as well as Sunnis who opposed ISIS.242 
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For instance, in June 2014, reports from many sources, including ISIS itself, revealed that 
ISIS had brutally slaughtered approximately 1,700 unarmed soldiers and students of the 
Air Force College in the Speicher Base in Tikrit.243 According to one survivor’s account, 
the camp was in chaos because soldiers were aware of the collapse of the army in Mosul 
and the advance of ISIS towards Tikrit and other cities.244 He said that approximately 
3,000 soldiers ‘decided to flee’ wearing civilian clothes since they were left alone in the 
Camp by their officers.245 After they had walked a few miles away, they were captured 
by 50 ISIS militants who took them to the palace grounds in Tikrit, and ‘over the next 
three days, the militants carried out wave after wave of killings around the palace and 
elsewhere in Tikrit’.246 As a consequence, dozens of angry families of missing soldiers 
have protested and still protest in many cities in southern and central Iraq. They require 
the state authorities to reveal the fate of their sons, the truth about what happened to them, 
and that justice be granted. Although the Iraqi Council of Representatives appointed a 
parliamentary committee to investigate the Speicher atrocity, its final report of March 
2015247 failed to meet the requirements of the victims’ family members. This report gave 
the reasons contributing to these massacres, including the collapse of the morale of the 
armed forces after the fall of Mosul, which had a negative impact on the soldiers at Tikrit. 
In addition, this negative impact was compounded by financial and administrative 
corruption in the security and armed forces, the negligence and incompetence of their 
units, and the hostility towards them in the region caused, in part, by illegal activities 
against the local populations. 248  Although the report concluded that there was joint 
responsibility, stretching from the highest commanders to the lower officers of the above 
forces for the failure to prevent such massacres,249 no criminal or political action has ever 
been taken by the Iraqi parliament or public prosecutor in response. 
In the same vein, the Iraqi parliamentary committee constituted to reveal the reasons and 
persons responsible for the fall of Mosul in 2014 issued its final unpublicised report in 
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July 2015. It accused the Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki, and dozens of top political and 
military officials, of negligence, corruption, conspiracy and incompetence, which allowed 
ISIS to seize control of Mosul, and recommended that all those named in the report be 
tried before a judicial body.250 The report found that despite repeated warnings from 
intelligence sources that ISIS was planning to seize the city, the top army officer for 
Mosul, Mahdi Ghrawi, was on vacation and his units ‘had less than a third of the soldiers 
they were supposed to have on the day of the battle’.251 The report said that the ‘armed 
forces lacked effective command and control, with multiple competing decision-making 
centres’ and, that ‘senior commanders who made “grave” mistakes during the assault 
were appointed for political reasons rather than for their experience’.252 According to the 
report, the fall of Mosul ‘was an event that surprised the world. But those who were 
informed about the security situation in the province realised this was going to happen 
eventually’.253 The report also accused Maliki of not having an accurate ‘picture of the 
threat to Mosul because he chose commanders who engaged in corruption and failed to 
hold them accountable’.254 In his response to these charges, Maliki wrote on Facebook 
that ‘what happened in Mosul was a conspiracy planned in Ankara, then the conspiracy 
moved to Irbil’, and that ‘there is no value in the […committee’s] result, which was 
dominated by political differences and was not objective’. 255  Maliki has admitted, 
however, that the ‘political class, including me, should not have any role in drawing the 
map of the political process in Iraq in future, because it has grossly failed’ to govern the 
country.256 The Speaker of Parliament said in his statement on receiving this report that 
‘no-one is above the law and accountability to the people’ and that ‘the judiciary will 
punish perpetrators and delinquents’. 257  Although the findings of the report were 
approved by the Iraqi Council of Representatives and it was referred to the judiciary for 
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action to be taken against those responsible for the fall of Mosul, to date no judicial action 
has been taken.258   
5.2.5 Summary Remarks 
Many articles on the Iraqi Constitution set out, though not explicitly, the legal basis for 
imposing a positive obligation on the Iraqi state, not just to take preventive measures to 
protect its citizens’ right to life from its own illegal actions, but also to address the 
infringement of this right by private parties. In addition, Iraq has an obligation under 
international standards to secure and protect its citizens’ right to life against violent crimes 
by non-state actors. These international standards place a positive obligation on the Iraqi 
state to guarantee the protection of the HR to life both vertically and horizontally. 
However, it seems reasonable in light of serious widespread violations of the right to life 
post 2003, to claim that the above mentioned examples, and awareness of the daily life 
experienced by many Iraqi citizens and victims, indicate that this guarantee has not been 
respected. In spite of the fact that the Iraqi authorities knew or should have known that a 
real and immediate risk to the life of their citizens existed, they failed to take appropriate 
measures in accordance with the due diligence principle to prevent the activities of 
criminal, terrorists and militias. In other words, these criminal activities by private parties 
against individuals could likely have been prevented if the authorities had taken their duty 
of protection seriously. Instead, they have greatly contributed to criminal activities by 
adopting a policy marked by gross negligence, corruption, incompetence, unlawful 
security and sectarian policies, unwillingness and/or powerlessness to establish effective 
preventive measures, whether legislative, judicial, administrative, social or cultural, to 
promote the protection of the HR of Iraqis. Consequently, the authorities must bear direct 
responsibility for failing to fulfil their moral, constitutional and international duty of 
protection.  
Thus, it is argued that the legitimate expectations of the Iraqi citizens that the state 
authorities are obliged to protect their right to life, both ethically and legally, have not 
been met and, therefore, the legitimacy of the authorities over their citizens is likely to be 
deficient, for which they must be accountable. This is supported by the recent frequent 
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demonstrations by Iraqis in southern and central Iraq, and Baghdad, against the serious 
lack of public service, including security, and the corruption in all state authorities.259 
Such demonstrations indicate, in part, that trust in the Iraqi state and its criminal justice 
system to provide protection has been undermined. In addition, the demonstrations also 
may be a positive sign of the willingness of people and civil society organisations to play 
a role in overcoming the ethno-sectarian divisions exacerbated by government policy, and 
to impress on the government that corruption and impunity must be tackled. This would 
then facilitate the emergence of a new culture of awareness in the hope of changing the 
attitude of the government and mobilising a healthy civil society. A survey in 2016 of the 
opinions of Iraqis who protested in 2015 and 2016 against the muhasasa system, 
corruption and the lack of basic fundamental services, especially security, showed that 95 
percent of the protestors consider Iraqi politicians to have been ‘very responsible’ for 
creating divisions and hindering reconciliation, and ISIS was accused of being ‘very 
responsible’ for fomenting sectarian division by more than 89 percent of them.260 The 
majority of Iraqi citizens consider the sectarian quotas to be directly responsible for the 
poor performance of Iraqi institutions and that the most important step that could be taken 
to foster political reconciliation would be to end the quota system.261 This may be said to 
indicate that the ethno-sectarian system of government tends to undermine the efficacy 
of the government’s function and affects the interaction between the architecture of the 
Iraqi governance order and its legitimacy. There is a growing belief among ordinary 
citizens that the formal state of Iraq is illegitimate; they do not trust their institutions, 
including parliament, the judiciary, the executive, and the political parties.262  
Genuine reforms, therefore, need to be established to overcome the consequences of the 
failure of the 2003 transition, which resulted in placing the political system in constant 
crisis, leading to the emergence of political unrest and violence, lack of peace in society 
and many conflicts arising from the multiplicity of loyalties, values and affiliations.263 
The language of dialogue and tolerance has disappeared and been replaced by the 
language of intolerance and extremism; the phenomenon of political and social 
disintegration has paralysed and weakened the state, resulting in violence or even civil 
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war. 264  This crisis in the political system has blocked effective strategies for the 
reconstruction of a viable Iraq. The politicising, sectarian, and ethnic divisions and the 
platform for quotas have hindered the rebuilding of a well-functioning Iraqi state and 
created serious consequences for its efficiency, as well as threatening it with stalemate 
and calcification. As a result, successive Iraqi authorities have been both fragile and 
lacking in efficiency.265 
Because of this, it cannot be said at present that Iraq possesses a system of upholding HR 
in which the Iraqi state and its institutions feel bound by the will of their citizens’ 
expectations, their constitution, and international HR norms, to fulfil its positive 
obligation of providing protection against violence from non-state actors. At best, citizens 
can only acquire certain human benefits from the state and its institutions, but not on the 
specific basis of HR. In a fragile country and conflict-torn society where unprecedented 
and multifaceted violence occurs, especially by illegitimate militias and ISIS, the value 
of life is meaningless and violent deaths have been reduced to mere statistics. Given the 
absence of the rule of law and an effective judicial system, combined with mistrust in 
state institutions and deep ethno-sectarian divisions, it is necessary to be decide what 
ought to be done to restore stability, order, peaceable coexistence, and tolerance, as well 
as prevent the recurrence of violence and emphasise that the primary reason for the 
existence of the state is to protect its citizens. This is to say that it may be necessary to 
consider how to reform, on moral, philosophical and political principles, Iraq’s flawed 
social contract as contained in the current constitution, which only compounds divisions 
and differences rather than creating consensus and unity, as part of a genuine and 
inclusive transitional justice programme, to address large scale violence and victimisation 
since 2003, and repair damage to the norms and values of peaceable coexistence. 
Changing the hearts and minds of Iraqi citizens, as will be noted later,266 towards peace, 
stability and reconciliation depends, to a large extent, on the possibility of improving the 
legitimacy and accountability of state authority, which has the responsibility for adopting 
the above programme in the hope that a new relationship of trust between various ethnic, 
religious, and sectarian groups will gradually emerge and that the repeated failures of the 
Iraqi state to ensure the protection of its citizens’ HR, especially the right to life, will be 
overcome. In addition, the Iraqi legal system and its practice must conform to the 
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requirements of international and regional human rights instruments demanding the 
guarantee of the right to security of innocent citizens, both positively and negatively, by 
creating institutions capable of doing this. This requires the law-making bodies and 
criminal courts to take compelling, concrete measures to strengthen the domestic 
protection for those at risk of losing their lives by criminal acts, as well as subjecting any 
failure by state authorities to accountability for not observing due diligence. Admittedly, 
it cannot be denied that the above discussed adverse factors which have undermined 
public faith in the Iraqi legal system make it likely that any future demands for positive 
obligations to be observed will also not be heeded. However, there is some hope that the 
Iraqi government may gradually accept the positive obligations in question, though such 
acceptance is unlikely, at present, to be anything other than partial and incremental, 
following the gradual improvement of the security situation due to the recent major 
successes of the Iraqi army in regaining territory from ISIS, especially the liberation of 
Mosul city. Once ISIS has been completely ousted from Iraq, the horrendous experiences 
which the Iraqi people have suffered may give rise to a renewed appetite for reconciliation 
and peace. 
Although Prime Minister Abadi, who came to power on a platform of reconciliation and 
the tackling of corruption and sectarianism, has faced serious challenges at all levels, he 
has, nevertheless, successfully defeated ISIS and driven them out of many parts of Iraq, 
thus restoring some confidence in the government among various sections of society, 
including Sunnis, Shias and other ethnic and religious communities. He has had success 
in promoting his own vision of state consolidation with his focus on rebuilding the 
security sector.267 If these successes are consolidated by the adoption of comprehensive 
reformation measures, gradual improvement of legitimacy and relations of trust between 
citizens and government may be re-established, and the state may begin to honour its 
positives duties towards its citizens.           
5.3 The Victims’ Right to Justice in the Iraqi Criminal Justice System 
Alongside the lack of protection, vast numbers of Iraqi victims are denied justice in their 
state’s criminal justice system, but there remains a question as to how far the Iraqi state 
is morally and legally bound to meet victims’ expectations, and instil confidence that 
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justice can be fulfilled, as demanded by general ethical principles and the international 
and regional HR laws referred to in Chapter 3. In other words, the question is whether 
Iraq possesses a criminal justice system capable of: (1) fulfilling its positive procedural 
obligation to conduct thorough and impartial investigations into the loss of life by any of 
its citizens; (2) clarifying the circumstances surrounding the occurrence of such violations; 
(3) giving reasons for the failure of the state to take adequate preventive measures to 
protect the right to life of its citizens; and, (4) identifying, prosecuting and punishing 
those responsible for these violations. 
Since 2003, considerable efforts have been made by military and civilian agencies, 
including experts in criminal justice and the rule of law from the Iraq under the CPA, to 
establish a functioning and fair criminal justice system. This system needed to be capable 
of restoring the trust and confidence of Iraqi citizens as a system which would not be used 
in unlawful persecution, as under the previous regime.268 These efforts have resulted in 
the CPA making significant changes to the Iraqi criminal justice system, both legal and 
structural.269 Legal alterations to the Iraqi Penal Code (1969) and the Criminal Procedures 
Code (1971) have strengthened law enforcement and brought these codes into line with 
international HR values by removing unjust sections and adding fundamental due process 
protection for defendants.270 The establishment of the Iraqi Central Criminal Court (CCCI) 
by the CPA in accordance with the CPA Order No. 13271 is one of the most important 
structural changes to the Iraqi judicial system,272 proposed as essential for ‘promoting the 
development of a judicial system in Iraq that warrants the trust, confidence and respect of 
the Iraqi people’.273 According to Farhang, the ‘decision to create a national criminal 
court was intended to guarantee a forum in which the most serious crimes –those 
involving threats to public order and safety –could be tried quickly and effectively, in a 
forum that could also serve as a model for other Iraqi criminal courts’.274 
In this sense, the Court, in accordance with Article 18(1-2) of Order No. 13, has been 
given nationwide criminal jurisdiction, including investigative and trial jurisdiction over 
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all criminal acts and, specifically, the mandate to focus on cases of terrorism, organised 
crime, governmental corruption, and other serious crimes. 275  Like other Iraqi 
investigative and trial criminal courts, the Court should implement Iraqi substantive and 
procedural criminal law and, in particular, for all criminal acts should apply the Iraqi 
Criminal Procedure Code (ICPC) 276  relating to arrest, detention, investigation, 
prosecution and punishment.277 
To determine the adequacy of the Iraqi criminal justice system, it is important, in the light 
of the large increase in violations of the right to life in Iraq and the alleged deficiency and 
corruption of state institutions, to understand how the duties of investigation, prosecution 
and punishment in criminal cases have performed, both in theory and practice, within the 
civil-law criminal justice system. The ICPC requires that in response to the discovery or 
report of a crime, an initial investigation must take place involving all the necessary 
agencies of the government, especially the police and judicial investigators and 
investigative judges.278 When the police arrest a suspect or an individual presses for 
charges to be made for the crime, a criminal case is initiated in Iraqi law.279 According to 
Article 1(a) of the Code, a complaint in criminal cases can be brought by the injured party, 
his representative, or a government official of the judicial system. It states that: 
Criminal proceedings are initiated by [a] complaint submitted to an investigative judge, a [judicial] 
investigator, a policeman in charge of a police station, or any crime scene officer by an injured 
party, any person taking his place in law, or any person who knows [of] the crime […]. In addition 
any one of those listed can notify the Public Prosecution unless the law says otherwise. In the 
event of a witnessed offence the complaint may be submitted to whichever police officers or sub-
officers are present.280 
Such a complaint, according to Article 9(a) of the ICPC, ‘should include the claim for 
criminal justice which is a petition that penal measures be taken against the perpetrator 
of the offense and for the penalty to be imposed on him’.281 In determining criminal 
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liability, the inquisitorial approach is employed in the Iraqi civil-law criminal justice 
system.282 An investigative judge leads the enquiry,283 questions suspects, victims and 
witnesses, collects evidence prior to trial, and submits findings to the trial-judge, which 
are ‘conclusive and are only re-opened at the trial at the trial-judge’s discretion’.284 In 
doing so, the investigative judge possesses wide-ranging authority over the inquiry, its 
structure and testimony, the witnesses, and public access.285 If the judge is satisfied that 
sufficient evidence has been gathered to support that an alleged crime has been committed, 
a decision on referral, ‘ihala’, for trial will be made.286 Therefore, it can be said, as one 
commentator asserted, that the investigative judge is the foundation of the Iraqi criminal 
justice system, as a neutral authority whose task is to impartially locate all available 
evidence.287  
In contrast with the wide authority granted to investigative judges, Iraqi public 
prosecutors are given narrow powers and cannot make independent decisions in the 
investigative and trial stages. 288  In the investigative stage, public prosecutors are 
subordinate in the investigation and supervise the work of police and judicial investigators, 
but can if required challenge the decisions of the judicial investigators and subject them 
to judicial review.289 Even at the trial stage, the role of the public prosecutors is limited 
as they are not ‘dedicated to ensuring the conviction and punishment of the defendants’,290 
but merely concerned with reviewing the completeness of the case file and providing 
recommendations to the judges trying the case; thus, it seems their job is very much 
administrative in nature.291 Beyond this limited role, because of their duty to ensure 
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justice throughout the criminal justice system, the prosecutors are charged with wide and 
varied responsibilities,292 including ‘the supervision of the legality of the proceedings, 
filing means of redress, inspecting detention centres and submitting related reports’.293  
Where a criminal case is considered serious, such as murder, both because the nature of 
the offence and the punishment assigned to it by the law it will be referred by the 
investigative judge to a trial before a panel of three judges, 294 such as in the CCCI and 
the felony courts. All questions of law and facts are decided by these judges, who then 
reach a verdict.295 According to Article 213(a) of the Criminal Procedure Code, the judges’ 
verdict is based on their satisfaction with evidence given during the inquiry or hearing. 
This evidence includes ‘admissions reports, witness statements, written records of an 
interrogation, other official discoveries, reports of experts and technicians, background 
information and other legally established evidence’.296 In addition, all statements made 
during the trial, including those made by a victim who was dying, may be deemed 
essential evidence.297 However, such trials employing the inquisitorial approach do not 
emphasise oral evidence or cross-examination by counsel, and the trial is largely a public 
summary of written evidence compiled by the investigating magistrate.298 
Where trial judges are satisfied on the basis of evidence that perpetrators have committed 
murder, the defendants will be officially charged with these crimes,299 tried, and, if a 
verdict of guilty is reached,300 may be sentenced to death.301 This punishment is inevitable 
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days, starting from the day after the ruling has been issued’; Warnock (n 271) 52; Article 12 of the Judicial Organization Law No. 160 





in accordance with Article 406(1) of the Iraqi Penal Code.302 In addition, Article 4 of the 
Iraqi Anti-Terrorism Law imposes the death penalty on those convicted of committing 
terrorist acts, including against citizens’ right to life, and also ‘anyone who […] incites, 
plans, finances, or assists terrorists to commit the crimes stated in this law shall face the 
same penalty as the main perpetrator’.303  
Lawmakers consider this punishment essential for justice and society’s stability, since it 
deters vengeance and crimes against the right to life in future. From the perspective of 
Iraqi citizens, especially victims, because of the daily mass killings of innocent people, 
provision of this retributive punishment in its own right against perpetrators is the only 
criterion used to measure that the Iraqi authorities and their criminal justice system 
comply with their moral, legal and constitutional duty of providing justice. This is because 
it may currently be said that deterrence has lost force, since some perpetrators, such as 
extremists, militias, terrorists and insurgent groups, commit atrocities against Iraqi 
innocent people without fear of punishment. In addition, within Iraqi society, tribal, ethnic 
and sectarian affiliations are deeply entrenched, and so failure to provide retributive 
justice by the Iraqi authorities, for whatever reason, such as unwillingness or inability to 
do so, may lead to serious acts of vengeance. Therefore, victims have a legitimate 
expectation that the above procedural obligations of investigation, prosecution and 
punishment be guaranteed in the Iraqi criminal justice system, not merely notionally but 
also practice in order that retributive justice be granted to them.  
However, even if the Iraqi authorities fulfilled these legal procedural obligations, they 
would not provide victims with the right to adequate remedies for the consequences of 
the crimes committed against them. Instead, crimes are still seen as committed mainly 
against the state and society and, therefore, the main reason behind any fulfilment by the 
state authorities of their procedural obligations is to ensure respect for law, order and 
stability, and prevent future crimes. Victims are considered under Article 58 of the ICPC 
only as a source of information and as witnesses in the investigative and trial stages and, 
thereby, it seems that they have been ignored in the Iraqi criminal justice system as 
persons who have suffered harm from the crimes. As noted by one Iraqi academic, despite 
the high scale of victimisation in Iraq, victims have been given little attention, not only 
                                                
302 Article 406(1) of the Iraqi Penal Code of 1969 (n 11) has laid down the various circumstances in which perpetrators may face the 
death penalty. 




in the criminal justice system and victims’ service programmes, but also in the domestic 
academic literature. He states that building a new awareness culture and an 
accommodation of the urgent need to uphold the rights of victims should be the core 
interest of criminal law-makers, academic institutions, social sectors, and NGOs to 
address the rights of victims as acknowledged by international legal norms (see previous 
chapters of the thesis) and, thus, restore the balance between their rights and those 
afforded to offenders in Iraqi law.304  It is argued that the Iraqi state has a positive 
obligation to provide victims of violent crimes with effective remedies in accordance with 
international HR norms.305 This requires that the Iraqi authorities should consider victims’ 
rights as directly affected persons who deserve to know the truth surrounding the 
circumstances of the violations against them and, who also need justice and fair treatment 
throughout criminal proceedings. In fulfilment of these requirements, the authorities need 
to apply the due diligence doctrine in all stages of the criminal process, especially in the 
investigative stage, since it is crucial to the process of revealing all the facts leading to 
the identification of those responsible for the violations, irrespective of whether or not 
they are officials of the state, to prosecute and punish them.  
In practice, however, it can be argued that the state authorities and their criminal justice 
system have failed to fulfil the positive duty of investigation, prosecution and punishment 
and, thereby, have failed to uphold the rights of victims to truth and justice. In addition, 
victims have not been treated fairly, had their dignity respected, or voices adequately 
heard in the criminal proceedings. This means that trust in the legitimacy of the Iraqi 
judicial process has been questioned, not only because of the aforementioned reasons, but 
also because it has failed to restore victims’ sense that retributive justice has been 
accomplished. This failure may be attributed mainly to numerous serious problems and 
challenges facing the Iraqi criminal justice system, which have prevented the 
establishment of a functional judicial system based on the rule of law and compliance 
with international HR norms, particularly regarding the recognition of the rights of 
victims. 
5.3.1 Problems and Challenges Facing the Iraqi Criminal Justice System 
                                                
304 See Mohammed Abdul Mohsen Saadoun, ‘Protect the Rights of Victims of Crime in Iraqi Law’ (2015) 22 Journal of Kufa Legal 
and Political Science 209, 209-225.  
305 However, while certain international standards regarding criminal investigation can be identified, the argument accepts that now, 
in the post-conflict situation in Iraq, full adherence to these standards cannot yet be expected, given the raft of practical limitations 
that Iraq may face in this period. In addition, these international standards have themselves some limitations. See the discussion in 




Challenges to the Iraqi criminal justice system (ICJS) arise from the intolerable amount 
of violence, lack of judicial independence and judges, and a lack of protection for them. 
However, there is also the problem of the defective nature of the ICJS and the role of 
judges within it, the flawed ideology of the investigative process, and the widespread 
corruption and impunity of the Iraqi authorities overall. Some of these problems were 
detected by international legal and judicial professional experts working closely on 
programmes with Iraqi legal and judicial bodies following 2003, in an attempt to improve 
the ICJS and the rule of law in Iraq.306   
Initially, criticisms have been made of the literal traditions of Iraqi civil law which have 
contributed in making the Iraqi judicial system ‘uncreative’ and ‘mechanistic’.307 This 
indicates, as Frank correctly noted, that ‘aspects of the civil-law bureaucracy inhibit 
transparent judicial proceedings and make corruption more difficult to detect’ but, also, 
that Iraqi judges ‘display a trait common in bureaucrats from totalitarian countries: lack 
of initiative’.308 The dysfunctionality of the judicial system caused by the dominance of 
bureaucracy and the failure of initiative among the vast majority of the Iraqi judges cannot, 
however, be separated from the overall ‘political fractiousness and inefficiency among 
Iraqi institutions’.309 The latter may be said to have played a crucial role in weakening the 
entire system of the judicial process and its ability to reassure Iraqi victims that violations 
against the right to life will be thoroughly and impartially investigated, prosecuted, and 
punished. Moreover, the investigative process has its own serious problems because of 
the lack of sufficient mechanisms to collect evidence and establish the facts, and the 
traditional bad practice in applying these mechanisms. 
During many judicial investigations, personal testimony is preferred to forensic and other 
non-testimony evidence. 310  However, as Warnock correctly noted, ‘the primacy of 
testimony is firmly entrenched. […] So compelling is the preference for witness 
testimony that, while the rules regarding physical evidence are minimal or hardly 
referenced in the Code, the details regarding calling of witnesses are extensive’.311    
                                                
306 See Christova (n 1) 429-432; Warnock (n 271) 52; Frank (n 4) 52.  
307 Costantini (n 288) 535; Frank (n 4) 21; in the traditions of the civil-law system, ‘the judge is assigned a comparatively minor, 
inglorious role as a mere operator of a machine designed and built by scholars and legislators’ and, therefore, it ‘correspondingly 
devalues the use of judicial precedent favored in the common law tradition’. Costantini (n 288) 535.  
308 Frank (n 4) 21, 28. 
309 Costantini (n 288) 535. 
310 Shakes (n 26) 37-38. 




The social position of witnesses is also considered by Iraqi judges to be an important 
factor in determining their credibility.312 This reliance on social position is considered 
irrelevant and unreliable in other western judicial systems, specifically the Anglo-
American system, which mainly assesses the facts through physical and scientific 
evidence.313  In addition, in acquiring evidence in criminal cases, including those of 
terrorism, the Iraqi courts rely on secret informants or confessions. The Human Rights 
Watch observed that, in many cases brought before the CCCI, no forensic evidence was 
presented and, therefore, reliance for prosecution and conviction has mainly been placed 
on secret informants’ statements and interrogation.314 The ICPC empowers investigative 
judges hearing specific serious crimes, including those against national security and 
terrorism, to consider evidence from secret informants.315 To address the severe security 
challenges of recent years, mass arrests of individuals for alleged crimes have become a 
common measure of judicial practice,316 and can be executed merely on information 
provided by secret informants against individuals.317 Verification of this information has 
been lacking in the ICJS in recent years, and international and national HR reports have 
noted that the judiciary has frequently failed to verify information received from secret 
informants.318 
Over-reliance on secret informant testimony has been criticised because of the lack of 
proper judicial verification of such secret information, many of whom are alleged 
criminals who have suffered months or years of pre-trial detention.319 Worse still, reliance 
on secret informants, as observed by Warnock in one Iraqi trial, has resulted in an accused 
being convicted of terrorist acts and condemned to death on the testimony of one or two 
anonymous witnesses.320 Reliance on secret informants has been considered to contradict 
                                                
312 According to Shakes, ‘More than one Iraqi judge told me that fingerprints were not as important as knowing the social background 
and history of the witnesses’. Shakes (n 26) 37-38. 
313 Ibid. 37. 
314 Joseph Logan, The Quality of Justice, Failings of Iraq’s Central Criminal Court (Human Rights Watch 2008) 18. 
315 Article 47(2) of the Iraqi Procedure Code (n 10) states that “If the complaint is about offences against the internal or external 
security of the state, crimes of economic sabotage and other crimes punishable by death, life imprisonment or temporary imprisonment 
and the informant asks to remain anonymous, and not to be a witness, the judge has to register this with the notification in a special 
record prepared for this purpose, and conduct the investigation according to the rules, considering the information included in the 
notification without mentioning the informant’s identity in the investigative paper”. Costantini (n 288) 548; Almusawi (n 17) 149. 
316 See the Annual Reports of the Iraqi Ministry of Human Rights, the Conditions of Prisons and Detention Centres, Human Rights 
Report (Baghdad, 2010) 77; Almusawi (n 17) 149. 
317 Almusawi (n 17). 
318 Ibid.; Logan, (n 314) 30; see also UNAMI Reports, Reports of the Iraqi Ministry of Human Rights, such as the Annual Reports of 
the Iraqi Ministry of Human Rights, the Conditions of Prisons and Detention Centres, Human Right Report (Baghdad, 2008) 87; and 
other international NGOs, including Amnesty International reports between 2004 and 2013, such as Amnesty International, Iraq: A 
Decade of Abuses (Index: MDE 14/001/2013, March 2013) 46. 
319 Logan (n 314) 21; it has been reported that ‘The use of informants became widespread leading to accusations that many people had 
been detained solely on the basis of false information provided by secret informants’. Amnesty International, New Order Same Abuses: 
Unlawful Detentions and Torture in Iraq (September 2010) Index: MDE 14/006/2010, 19. 




the provision of due process and fairness as laid down in the Iraqi Constitution.321 In the 
same vein, although the Iraqi Constitution and the Iraqi Criminal Procedure Code prohibit 
the use of torture and ill-treatment to obtain confessions,322 the courts in practice often 
rely on them to gain convictions, especially in cases against individuals under Iraqi Anti-
Terrorism Law.  
This has been used to accuse and condemn thousands of people of ‘vague offences’,323 
even when the accused have claimed they were tortured to extract a confession.324 These 
illegal practices in collecting evidence, reportedly combined with a ‘lack of due process 
and fair trials, long periods of pre-trial detention without judicial review, lack of ability 
to pursue a meaningful defence or to challenge evidence, abuse in detention, [and] torture’ 
                                                
321 Logan (n 314) 21; Article 19(5) and (6) of the Iraqi Constitution states that ‘The accused is innocent until proven guilty in a fair 
legal trial’ and that ‘Every person shall have the right to be treated with justice in judicial and administrative proceedings’. See 
Costantini (n 288) 549; although Articles 47-49 of the Iraqi Procedure Code strictly regulate how informants and their information of 
crimes should be dealt with by the police, large numbers of secret informants have been accused of malicious lies, fraud and deceit 
against innocent people for various reasons, such as ethno-sectarian, tribal and vengeful political motives. Between 2003-2008, secret 
and dubious information reached a very high level, and resulted in an increased number of investigative military, police and security 
force bodies, which usually issued arrest orders based on this inaccurate information and detained without good reason those alleged 
to be responsible for criminal or terrorist acts. Miscarriages of justice have occurred as a result, and have contributed to widespread 
insecurity and disorder in society. Furthermore, those found innocent after several years of illegal imprisonment have been given no 
right to an official apology, restoration of their dignity, integrity and social position destroyed by false accusations and rightful 
compensation for moral and material damages. For further details, see Adnan Sdjan Al-Hassan, The Responsibility of the State to 
Compensate Victims of Miscarriages of Justice (Egypt Murtaza Foundation of Iraqi books, 2011) 17-29; see also Ammar Abbas 
Husseini and Zain El Abidine Awad Kazem, ‘Alternative Legal System for Secret Informants’ (2014) 4 Al Muthana Journal of 
Administrative & Economic Science 225, 243, 256; Sabah Mesbah Mahmoud, ‘The Legal Nature of Criminal informant in the Iraqi 
Penal Code’ (2012) 14 Journal of the College of Law, Al-Nahrain University 62, 62-92. 
322 Article 37, Section 3 of the Iraqi Constitution of 2005 states that ‘All forms of psychological and physical torture and inhumane 
treatment are prohibited. Any confession made under force, threat, or torture shall not be relied on, and the victim shall have the right 
to seek compensation for material and moral damages incurred in accordance with the law’. In addition, Article 127 of the Iraqi 
Procedure Code states that ‘the use of any illegal method to influence the accused and extract an admission is not permitted. 
Mistreatment, threats, injury, enticement, promises, psychological influence, or use of drugs or intoxicants are considered illegal 
methods’. See Warnock (n 271) 37; under Article 333 of the Iraqi Penal Code ‘Any public official or agent who tortures or orders the 
torture of an accused, witness or informant in order to compel him to confess to the commission of an offence or to make a statement 
or provide information about such offence or to withhold information or to give a particular opinion in respect of it is punishable by 
imprisonment or by penal servitude. Torture shall include the use of force or menaces’. The Iraqi Penal and Procedure Codes, in the 
opinion of one Iraqi academic, do not recognise that torture is a crime against the right of individuals to be free from any physical or 
psychological harm. Also, under Articles 218 and 213 of the Procedure Code, there are two different approaches dealing with it. While 
Article 218 considers that any confession obtained by torture is illegal, Article 213 allows penal courts to rely on confessions extracted 
by torture if they can be confirmed by any other evidence, or even convict a suspect solely on a coerced confession. For the deficiency 
of the ICJS and recommendations to deal with the crime of torture, see Wasfi Hashim Abdul Karim, ‘Torture in Iraqi Penal Code’ 
(2015) 193, 216-253 <http://www.iasj.net/iasj?func=fulltext&aId=44547> accessed 9 November 2016.       
323 For further details, see Almusawi (n 17) 248-258; the GICJ noted in its recent report that ‘Since 2014, Iraq has stepped up its use 
of torture, to “combat terrorism.” This has empowered state authorities (militia, police units, security forces, intelligence services and 
the army) to conduct torture practices […] to extract information from detainees and obtain “confessions.” […].These coerced 
statements or confessions continue to be relied upon by Iraqi Courts to convict defendants on trial for serious charges, where often, 
the result is the death sentence’. The GICJ, GICJ’s Submission on Iraq (n 204) 3; confessions of accused persons are much relied 
upon as a basis for conviction. See the Iraqi Court of Cassation, Case No. 505, General Commission on 24/5/2010 in which the Court 
decided, as long as a confession by the defendant includes sufficient detail, a conviction can be based on this confession, even if the 
admission has been obtained by invalid means and then retracted. See also the cases brought before the Central Criminal Court, 
Baghdad, Second Branch, Case No. 891 of 2009; Criminal Court, Baghdad, Third Branch, Case No. 2082 of 2012; Central Criminal 
Court, Baghdad, Second Branch, Case number 1479 of 2012, Branch 2 ruled on 3 December 2012. These cases have been referred to 
by Amnesty International, Iraq: A Decade of Abuses (n 318) 37, 55, 56; see Almusawi (n 17) 99, 259-260. 
324 See the report of Norway: Landinfo – Country of Origin Information Centre, Iraq, Rule of Law in the Security and Legal system 
(8 May 2014) <http://www.refworld.org/docid/5385bad94.html> accessed 20 September 2016; Logan (n 314) 19; Almusawi (n 17) 
251-253.  According to the UNAMI, ‘There is significant evidence of continued widespread mistreatment and abuse, on occasion 
amounting to torture, of persons in detention centres and prison facilities in Iraq [...] From information gathered by UNAMI, it appears 
that different methods of physical and psychological coercion were used during interrogation in order to obtain confessions and to 
extract information. In some instances detainees had not been permitted to read or have read to them confessions before they signed 
[...]. UNAMI strongly condemns the torture or ill treatment of detainees in Iraq and urges the Government of Iraq to take urgent steps 
to respect its international and constitutional legal obligations and to bring this situation to an end’. UNAMI, Human Rights Report: 




reveal that the legal provisions of the ICJS are not being adhered to in practice,325 leading 
to many miscarriages of justice.326 In contradiction to obligations under international law 
and HR norms, which require the right to be free from torture and other forms of ill-
treatment to be absolute, no matter what the conditions and circumstances may be and 
even in a time of emergency, the Iraqi authorities justify resort to such abuse by claiming 
that they do so because of rising civil disorder, including terrorism and organised crime.327 
The HRC has expressed its deep concern regarding the widespread allegations of 
miscarriages of justice in Iraq and has urged the Iraqi authorities not to rely on confessions 
attained in violation of Article 7 of the Covenant; further, should defendants allege that 
their statement was made under torture or ill-treatment, then this should be adequately 
investigated. It is also down to the prosecution to prove that the confession was made 
willingly.328 Most deserving of attention is any allegation which has led to the imposition 
of the death sentence following a confession given under duress or torture, or other 
standards of Article 14 of the Covenant.329 The Human Rights Committee also said that 
if the state persists in the death penalty, the state should take all measures, not excluding 
legislation, to guarantee that the death penalty is only for the most serious crimes (within 
the meaning of Article 6(2) of the Covenant). Moreover, it argued that the death penalty 
should never be mandatory, and that a pardon or sentence commutation should always be 
possible, notwithstanding the crime. The state ought also to ensure that, if imposed, the 
death penalty is never enacted in violation of the Covenant or fair trial procedures.330  
Similarly, the Committee Against Torture (CAT) observed in 2014 that it was concerned 
about coerced confessions being reportedly widely practised by the ICJS, and stated that 
adequate steps must be taken to ensure that confessions obtained by coercion are not 
admissible, except for when employed against a person accused of obtaining a confession 
                                                
325 Christova (n 1) 431; see the GICJ, GICJ’s Submission on Iraq (n 204) 5. 
326 Almusawi (n 17); the GICJ, Iraq: Torture & Ill Treatment, Shadow report submitted by to the 55th session of the United Nations 
Committee Against Torture, from 27 July to 14 August 2015, 7-20; the practice of the Iraqi courts which were reported by UNAMI’s 
experts in 2013 indicate, in some instances,  that ‘persons were convicted on capital charges and sentenced to death based solely on a 
confession– even where it was alleged by the accused that the confession had been obtained through dures’. UNAMI, Human Rights 
Report (June 2013) 12. 
327 Almusawi (n 17) 252; see Human Rights Watch, The New Iraq? Torture and ill-treatment of detainees in Iraqi custody (January 
2005); however, it has been noted by the Amnesty International that ‘Corruption has been a significant factor affecting the pattern and 
process of detentions, with some people apparently being detained by Iraqi security forces not because they were suspected of 
committing offences or to pose a threat to security but essentially to extort money from them and their families’. See Amnesty 
International, New Order Same Abuses: Unlawful Detentions and Torture in Iraq (n 319) 16. 
328 See para 30 (c) of the UN Human Rights Committee (HRC), Concluding observations on the fifth periodic report of Iraq (n 88). 
329 Ibid., para 27; according to Almusawi, ‘it may be argued here that if the law imposes the death penalty, the court should not be 
blamed for imposing that sentence. […] even if the death penalty is enacted in Iraq law, the judges must ensure fair trials and they 
cannot absolve themselves of responsibility […there is criticism regarding a lack of due process and the widespread use of invalid 
evidence to obtain convictions at trial. In particular, trials often rely on confessions to determine guilt even if they may have been 
extracted by invalid means during pre-trial interrogations’. Almusawi (n 17) 61. 




through torture. Moreover, if it is alleged that a statement was obtained via torture, the 
burden of the proof lies with the prosecution and courts. The state must also train law 
enforcement officers, judges, and lawyers to detect and investigate such confessions, and 
act against judges who do not react appropriately to claims of torture when made during 
judicial proceedings.331  
Despite the positive steps of engaging international and local organisations, and spending 
vast sums on training security forces and those working within the ICJS to bring their 
conduct within HR norms, and reduce illegal practices leading to miscarriages of justice, 
these steps have thus far been in vain.332 These illegal practices against both the accused 
and defendants have caused acts of violence to flourish, since those subject to these 
practices ‘are more likely to engage in criminal activity than if their constitutional rights 
have been maintained and the rule of law is respected’.333 They also create deep feelings 
of disrespect for and distrust in the entire ICJS amongst citizens. It seems, as Human 
Rights Watch asserted, that the ICJS is ‘plagued with arbitrariness and opacity’, and 
indeed the governments of the US and UK have not held their troops to account for abuses 
while in detention, or for extra judicial killings in Iraq, and this may have emboldened 
the current government excuse similar abuses, failures in law and order, and lack of 
accountability.334 
Part of the problem of the widespread lack of respect for, and trust in, this system may 
lie in the powerlessness of Iraqi public prosecutors to actively oversee the integrity of the 
whole criminal process (from the time of arrest, through the collection of evidence, to the 
trial) to ensure better protection of defendants’ rights335 and the rights of victims to reveal 
the truth and provide justice. At present, the role of public prosecutors, particularly in the 
protection of defendants’ rights, has been described as ‘worse than useless’, and 
                                                
331 The Committee also expressed its concerned about ‘the wide range of offences for which the death penalty is imposed, as well as 
the high execution rates in the State party. It is further concerned about the failure to fully respect and protect international and 
constitutional guarantees of due process and fair trial standards in death penalty cases’. It stated that ‘The State party should ensure 
that if the death penalty is imposed it is only for the most serious crimes and in compliance with international norms. It should consider 
taking measures for an immediate moratorium on executions and a commutation of sentences’. See United Nation, Committee Against 
Torture, Concluding Observations on the Initial Report of Iraq, August 2015, U.N. Doc. CAT/C/IRQ/CO/1, paras 20, 22. 
332 Al-Ali (n 5) Ch. 1, 182. 
333 Ibid. 
334 Human Rights Watch, Iraq: A Broken Justice System: Ten Years after Invasion, Opponents Punished, Trial Rights Ignored (2013), 
<https://www.hrw.org/news/2013/01/31/iraq-broken-justice-system> accessed 20 September 2016; see also GICJ, Iraq: Torture & Ill 
Treatment (n 326) 7-20. 




prosecutors never raise any objections, even when the evidence of abusive practices is 
overwhelming.336  
The enforcement mechanism for punishing abuses of HR through the criminal process 
has grossly failed, as political and legal obstacles have prevented abusers from being sued 
in Iraqi courts since 2003.337 Since 2011, the main legal obstacle to the prosecution of 
government officials for these abuses should have been removed as Article 136(b) of the 
ICPC officially deleted the clause that ‘the transfer of the accused for trial in an offense 
committed during performance of an official duty, or as a consequence of performance 
of this duty is possible only with permission of the minister responsible’. 338 Despite this, 
abusive practices have routinely continued to occur with impunity within the ICJS.339 
Such impunity has resulted in many politicians and senior state officials taking part in 
murder, torture, and incitement to violence, supporting terrorist groups, militias and 
organised gangs, and stealing public funds without fear of justice, as they enjoy political, 
partisan, and sectarian protection.340  
A problem clearly arises when such a corrupt system decides the fate of defendants, since 
‘to a significant extent, one’s determination of justice is based in large part on whether 
one finds justice in doing right by society (i.e., punishing the guilty despite any corruption 
or misconduct by the government investigators)’.341 This problem may govern the whole 
                                                
336 Ibid. 183; however, despite the complex and volatile political and security situation in Iraq post-2003, public prosecutors have 
attempted to examine the legality of the judgments of the criminal courts, in particular those of the Iraqi Central Criminal Court (CCCI) 
in cases of terrorism. For instance, the public prosecutor petitioned the Federal Court of Cassation to overturn the judgment of the 
CCCI in 24/11/ 2008 to impose the death penalty on the defendant for participating in many terrorist acts in Baghdad, because of the 
untrustworthiness of the secret informants used and the forced confession obtained while in prison. After considering all the relevant 
evidence, the Court decided on 29/01/2010 that the evidence against the defendant was inadequate and, thus, the decision of the CCCI 
was incorrect and illegal. Despite the importance of this new decision, miscarriages of justice have arguably characterised much of 
the ICJS. See Al-Hassan (n 321) 26-29; further relevant judicial decisions can be found in Salman Obaid Abdullah, Selected Judicial 
Decisions of the Federal Cassation Court, Criminal Division, Parts 2-4 and 8 (The Encyclopaedia of Iraqi Laws, 2009, 2010, 2015).   
337 See Logan (n 314) 19-20; considering the difficulty of gathering evidence against officials alleged to be involved in abuses, unless 
death or the loss of a limb is involved, blame cannot be established. Therefore, investigation and prosecution of abuses involving 
torture or ill treatment are rare and accountability only acknowledged in a few cases where victims have died or lost limbs. For instance, 
in the 2008 case of Kata, who died in custody, it took more than a year to receive a response after Amnesty International wrote to the 
Iraqi Ministry of Justice, calling for an impartial investigation to establish the reasons for his death. Amnesty International learned 
that his death resulted from torture by officials in the course of interrogation. However, the officials who were investigated were 
released under amnesty law. See Amnesty International, A Decade of Abuses (n 318) 62; Almusawi (n 17) 271-272; this situation is 
further exacerbated by the fact that rare successful prosecutions end in lenient or reduced punishment which is insufficient to meet the 
severity of the abuses committed. Amnesty International, New Order Same Abuses: Unlawful Detentions and Torture in Iraq (n 319) 
19.  
338 For further details, see Costantini (n 288) 564-567. 
339 For further details about the lack of accountability and the culture of impunity for officials who violate human rights in Iraq, see 
Almusawi (n 17) 271-275; the Human Rights Watch, for instance, documented in its 105th report, “No One is Safe’: Abuses of Women 
in Iraq’s Criminal Justice System” (6 February 2014) a widespread abuse of the rights of women in detention. It noted that ‘Iraqi 
authorities are detaining thousands of Iraqi women illegally and subjecting many to torture and ill-treatment, including the threat of 
sexual abuse. Iraq’s weak judiciary, plagued by corruption, frequently bases convictions on coerced confessions, and trial proceedings 
fall far short of international standards. Many women were detained for months or even years without charge before seeing a judge’. 
Human Rights Watch, Iraq: Security Forces Abusing Women in Detention: Torture Allegations Underscore Urgent Need for Criminal 
Justice Reform (6 February 2014).   
340 Jameel Ouda, ‘The phenomenon of impunity and its social impacts: Iraq an example’ (2013) Aafaq Centre for Research & Studies 
< http://aafaqcenter.com/index.php/post/1833 > accessed 20 September 2016. 




process of the ICJS, and highlights the uncertainty as to whether true justice is being 
pursued, as government officials are not accountable for any personal abuses, 
miscarriages of justice, or corruption. However, it is important to note that any effort to 
call this government to account for its failure to observe true justice will be in vain unless 
the false ideology governing the rule of law in Iraq changes radically both in theory and 
practice. This is because law in Iraq, as in other Muslim Middle Eastern countries, appears 
to be different in both conception and application from that of Western democratic states 
and HR bodies. It has been correctly observed that the key aspect of rule of law theory in 
a liberal state is to ensure an individual’s liberties against arbitrary state power and 
powerful individuals. This is sensible in Western societies, or those where the individual 
is the basis of society, as such persons can form professional or political associations or 
parties against the state. However, in societies where tribal structures and traditions are 
key, and the state is a league of particular tribes, it is more difficult to establish an 
effective rule of law. Therefore, the creation in Middle East Muslim countries of the rule 
of law system is debatable, given that that there are ‘different conceptual constructs than 
[…] in Western liberal democracy, particularly […] the concept of law’.342 
This is to say that the false ideology on which the rule of law is based in these Middle 
Eastern countries, including Iraq, bolsters the power of the state and stresses the 
obligations and duties of its citizens to the detriment of their individual rights. In contrast, 
the Western legal tradition holds ‘the state accountable to its citizens, based on rights of 
the individual’,343 and it is on this basis that the state can be called to account for any 
breaches of these rights.344 Article 5 of the Iraqi Constitution states that ‘the law is 
sovereign’ and ‘the people are the source of authority and legitimacy’, but the Iraqi 
authorities frequently act against the law and, thus, abuse and negate the authority and 
                                                
342 The way religion has influenced the judicial system in Iraq-post 2003 is indicated by a well-respected Iraqi judge, who stated that 
‘the purpose of law and government was to create an environment in which Iraqi citizens could be good Muslims’. See Shakes (n 26) 
33-34, 36; according to the GICJ, ‘there has been a total destruction of the notion of justice. The rule of law has now been replaced 
by a state of anarchy and sectarian violence’. GICJ, GICJ’s Submission on Iraq (n 204) 4.   
343 Shakes (n 26) 34; however, it must ‘be recognized that ROL capacity building cannot be conducted in an operational vacuum. 
Some degree of security must exist for technical advisors to focus on a State’s compliance with its own laws, building a functional 
court system, protecting the due process rights of pre-trial detainees and the many other ROL capacity-building missions’. See Richard 
Pregent, ‘Rule of Law Capacity Building in Iraq’ (2010) 86 International Law Studies 323, 324. 
344 The power of tribes and militias has grown since the fall of the Iraqi state in 2003 as the new weak ethno-sectarian state authorities 
allow them a degree of power and authority to maintain order and security, and settle various civil, commercial and criminal disputes 
by their own tribal customary law. This has resulted in tribes, through their militias, taking the law and justice into their own hands, 
imposing penalties and determining blood money by establishing a de facto judicial autonomy. See Oumayma Omar, ‘Iraqi tribes take 
law and justice into their own hands’ (22 Jan 2016) The Arab Weekly <http://www.thearabweekly.com/?id=3486> accessed 13 




legitimacy given to them by their citizens by violating their own constitution and HR 
norms.  
It may be said, therefore, that when endemic abuse occurs in the ICJS in the collection of 
evidence in murder cases, without the requirement of accountability on its part, it cannot 
be expected that this system can gain the respect and trust of Iraqi citizens, and guarantee 
the rights of defendants. In addition, it would not be able to conduct a thorough and 
impartial investigation into these cases and expose those responsible. In the absence of 
effective mechanisms to collect material and scientific evidence in Iraqi criminal 
proceedings compatible with the requirements of the Iraqi Constitution, the Criminal 
Procedure Code and HR norms, the rights of both defendants and victims are violated. 
This is because the restoration of a sense of true justice to Iraqi victims requires the 
existence of a thorough and impartial investigative process, leading to the facts of murder 
cases without prejudice, bias or ambiguity, so that those actually responsible are 
prosecuted and punished. The HRC has required that ‘all serious human rights violations 
are independently, promptly and thoroughly investigated; that perpetrators are brought to 
justice and adequately sanctioned as soon as feasible; and that victims receive full 
reparation’ from the Iraqi authorities.345  
Given the vital role of the investigative judges in Iraq’s criminal inquisitorial method of 
revealing the facts and perpetrators, it can be said that their failure to observe due 
diligence in dealing with multiple murder cases by relying on ineffective, illegal 
mechanisms has resulted in most of these cases being recorded as by persons unknown 
and they have, therefore, gone unpunished.346  Since 2003, Iraqi civilians have been 
subjected to extreme acts of violence against their right to life without thorough and 
impartial investigation, in accordance with due diligence, to prosecute and punish those 
responsible. Some groups who have committed such acts have links with influential 
political, judicial, and sectarian forces in Iraq, and have provided them with cover.347 For 
instance, credible allegations of serious HR violations have been made since 2014 against 
the PMU militias during the conflict against ISIS, including extrajudicial executions and 
other unlawful killings, torture, enforced disappearances, and abductions in many Sunni 
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areas. Moreover, although the Iraqi government announced investigations, there are still 
no published findings or any information on bringing members of PMU militias to 
justice.348 Amnesty International noted that, in one incident, despite announcements of 
investigations by Prime Minister Abadi into the killings of at least 56 Sunnis in Barwana 
allegedly by the PMU and security forces in 2015, ‘no findings have been made public 
and no member of the PMU or security forces has been held to account’.349 Regarding 
these credible allegations of serious HR violations by PMU militias and Iraqi security 
forces, Amnesty International has asserted that the state should conduct independent and 
thorough investigations into HR violations, including enforced killings and 
disappearances, and, where guilt is established, there must be adequate punishment, 
‘without recourse to the death penalty’, and reparations for victims. Moreover, ‘the scale 
and gravity of war crimes and other human rights violations committed by militias’ must 
be publicly acknowledged, so that all ‘crimes under international law will be prosecuted, 
regardless of rank and affiliation’.350  
The UNAMI also stated that in the light of serious violations of HR by ISIS ‘ensuring 
accountability for these crimes and violations will be paramount if the Government is to 
ensure justice for the victims and is to restore trust between communities. It is also 
important to send a clear message that crimes such as these will not go unpunished’.351 
Still, this clear message seems to be lacking as Iraqi authorities have grossly failed to 
fulfil their positive procedural obligations and, instead, have tried to conceal their 
unwillingness, showing a degree of incompetence, corruption and gross negligence which 
                                                
348 See Amnesty International, Iraq: Turning a Blind Eye (n 138) 5. 
349 Ibid. 17; in addressing violations of HR during the conflict against ISIS, Prime Minster Abadi stated in September 2016 that ‘Those 
who have committed crimes, they have to be punished. But we have to be very careful in bringing the law. We have to follow the rule 
of law. .. And I think we have been managing well in the areas which have been liberated. There are excesses, which are unacceptable 
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International asserted that it ‘is not aware of any members of the PMU who have been prosecuted or convicted for HR violations. 
Amnesty International’s requests to the Iraqi authorities for information on whether any members of the PMU had been charged or 
tried for HR violations since 2014 – most recently in a memorandum addressed to the Prime Minister on 21 September 2016 – have 
gone unanswered’. Ibid. 12-13. 
350 Ibid. 40; the IHCHR is supposed to address complaints of HR violations in Iraq, but ‘is ineffectual and insufficiently utilized in the 
documentation and investigation of disappearances’. See the Centre for Victims of Torture (CVT), Enforced Disappearances: 
Ambiguity Haunts the Families of Iraq’s Missing (n 199) 4; the Committee of Enforced Disappearances (CoED) has also stated that 
‘All cases of enforced disappearance perpetrated in any territory under its jurisdiction are investigated thoroughly, impartially and 
without delay by an independent body, even if there has been no formal complaint’. It also criticised Article 40 of the Iraqi Penal 
Code, which stipulates that public officials are not guilty of crime if they are implementing orders from a superior which they are 
obliged or feel obliged to obey. This criticism is because these orders may have potential implications on the ‘implementation of the 
obligation to bring to justice all those involved in the perpetration of enforced disappearances’. The CoED required the state to ‘take 
the legislative measures necessary to ensure that domestic legislation specifically provides for: (a) the criminal responsibility of 
superiors in accordance with Article 6(1)(b) of the Convention; and (b) the prohibition of invoking superior orders or instructions to 
justify an offence of enforced disappearance in accordance with Article 6(2) of the Convention’. See paras 20 (a), 26 and 27 of the 
United Nations, Committee on Enforced Disappearances, Concluding observations on the report submitted by Iraq (n 200). 
351 See UNAMI, Report on the Protection of Civilians in the Armed Conflict in Iraq: 11 December 2014 – 30 April 2015 (n 242); 
Amnesty International and other organisations have also documented brutal crimes, including war crimes and crimes against humanity, 
committed by ISIS since 2014 against various social, ethnic and religious communities in territories under its control. Amnesty 




has led to most crimes against HR, especially the right to life, going unpunished. This is 
despite their claim that although there are many security challenges facing Iraq, they have 
taken all measures needed to bring perpetrators to justice.352 Specifically, in most cases 
of terrorist attacks using car and suicide bombings, which have continually devastated the 
country since 2003, evidence remains scarce.353 The usual response of the state authorities 
to criticisms of failures with security measures, and to prevent such attacks in accordance 
with due diligence, is to establish inquiries about these attacks, often without any effective 
outcome. Any details of attacks revealed by the authorities have generally been 
descriptive, merely explaining the circumstances of the attacks, the general reasons 
behind them, and the materials used, rather than providing precise information about 
perpetrators, whether any have been brought to justice, and if there was negligence by the 
security services.354 Brig. Gen. Talib Khalil, the Interior Ministry’s Director-General of 
Criminal Evidence, has asserted that the process of gathering evidence is extremely 
effective in uncovering violent crimes.355 This assertion, however, does not reflect reality. 
As Al-Shalah noted, it would be expected that the Iraqi Interior Ministry’s Criminal 
Evidence Directorate (CED) would control the scene on arrival to collect essential 
forensic evidence, but instead ‘chaos and frantic activity usually prevail’, so that evidence 
which might prevent further terrorist attacks and lead to prosecution is lost before the 
CED even arrives.356 
                                                
352 See Human Rights Committee reviews the report of Iraq in 27 October 2015 (n 147). 
353 Abbas (n 213).  
354 For instance, a Parliamentary Commission was established to investigate the reasons behind the deadly terrorist attack on the 
Karada district in 2016 by ISIS, and whether there was any collusion or negligence on the part of security forces. It concluded that 
security flaws and negligence contributed to the attack, combined with the chaos and inefficiency of measures employed to deal with 
such attacks. These include: 
- The authorities received several warning messages, but circulated only one message. 
- Large numbers of human resources personal working in the field of intelligence lacked the qualifications to do so. 
- Those in senior positions did not have sufficient experience. 
- The car bomb travelled 80 km and passed through two security checkpoints before entering the Karrada district. 
- Ammonium nitrate, aluminium c4 and calcium carbide were responsible for the suffocation of those who were caught in the blast. 
- Fire hoses were leaking, causing the water to seep away and evaporate quickly. 
- There were not enough ambulances to transport the injured to hospitals. See Al-Shalah (n 235). However, a government investigation 
several months after the explosion was said to be equivocal and, according to the families of the Karada explosion’s victims, a proper, 
thorough government investigation was never conducted. See Dima Gharbawi Shaibani, ‘I went back to Baghdad a year after the 
Karada bombing’ 3 Jul 2017 <http://www.aljazeera.com/blogs/middleeast/2017/07/baghdad-year-karada-bombing-
170703140441465.html> accessed 24 Feb 2018;  Mortada Al-Khateeb, International Investigation for Baghdad-Karradah explosion,  
2016 <https://www.change.org/p/un-international-investigation-for-baghdad-karradah-explosion> accessed 4 Feb 2018. Corruption 
and suspicions of collusion and distortion of facts have also been raised regarding the establishment of the facts. For further details, 
see Hadeel Al-Sarraf, the Full Story of the Explosion of Karrada: Courrption and Suspicions of Collusion and Distortion of the Facts, 
10 July 2016 <http://elsada.net/13875/> accessed 24 Feb 2018. As discussed in Chapter 3, p.63 and pp.82-4, sometimes the 
effectiveness of the investigations process to establish the facts could be undermined by the existence of collusion, as the case of Pat 
Finucane demonstrated in the Report of the Pat Finucane Review. In this context, given the scarce and unreliable information revealed 
in the investigations process about some acts of violence by non-state actors in Iraq, in particular the Karada district case, the alleged 
HR violations by the PMU, enforced disappearances, and the Speicher case, it can be argued that the potential collusions in such 
investigations cannot be excluded, among others factors, from contributing to the failure to establish the truth. See also the discussion 
on pp.230-231.  





Similarly, investigation into enforced disappearances seems to be non-existent because 
of the unwillingness of the government even to acknowledge disappearances. However, 
the GICJ has observed that enforced disappearances in Iraq have not decreased, and that 
there is credible information showing that there are more than ‘420 secret detention 
facilities in Iraq, and [that] between 2-5 June 2016, at least 643 men and boys disappeared 
from Saqlawiya, Iraq, in the aftermath of the “liberation campaign” allegedly intended to 
retake the city of Fallujah from ISIS’. Moreover, by May 2017, no further information 
about the investigation into these disappeared persons had been released by the 
government, which, according to the GICJ, means that ‘there must be an urgent and 
proper investigation into every person reported missing in Iraq.357 
Even when criminals responsible for HR violations have been convicted and punished, 
justice for victims has been denied and/or undermined. For instance, the Iraqi authorities 
are guilty of gross negligence due to failing to prevent mass escapes of these criminals 
from prisons, and indeed these persons will probably commit further violent acts in future. 
In one incident, ‘hundreds of convicts, including senior members of al Qaeda, broke out 
of Iraq’s Abu Ghraib jail as comrades launched a military-style assault to free them’.358 
According to official government sources, around there are around 500 escapees, most of 
whom were ‘convicted senior members of al Qaeda and had received death sentences’.359 
The freeing of criminals from prison has usually been conducted by armed groups 
colluding with prison officials and security guards.360 In addition, justice has also been 
denied to victims when authorities have introduced general amnesty or special pardon 
legislation because of internal political or external pressure to release prisoners.361 For 
instance, General Amnesty Law No. 19 of 2008 resulted in the immediate release of 
criminals, senior corrupt ministers, and administrators and the suspension of legal 
proceedings against them.362 Thousands of prisoners were released by a special pardon of 
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358  Kareem Raheem and Ziad al-Sinjary, Al Qaeda militants flee Iraq jail in violent mass break-out (23 July 2013), 
<http://www.reuters.com/article/us-iraq-violence-idUSBRE96L0RM20130722> accessed 20 September 2016. 
359 Ibid. 
360 See Ouda (n 340).  
361 Adam Center, Mechanisms to Prevent Impunity, 08-06-2017 < https://annabaa.org/arabic/rights/11342 > accessed 3 March 2018.   
362 Ibid; the General Amnesty Law No. 19 of 2008 was published in the Official Gazette, issue 3938, 17th March 2008; the regulations 
of this law, like other general amnesty laws, are subject to the Iraqi Criminal Code (Articles 150-153) and the Criminal Procedures 
Code (Articles 300, 301, 304, 305). see Dhiy Abd Alla, ‘Amnesty as a Cause of the Expiration of the Criminal Case in the Iraqi 
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of the occupying powers. 80% of those detained were Sunnis. See Angeline Lewis, The Coalition Provisional Authority in Iraq, 2004-
2008: Transitioning from Administrative Internment to Criminal Justice-Based Detention Operations, in  Gregory Rose and Bruce 
Oswald, Detention of Non-State Actors Engaged in Hostilities: The Future Law (BRILL, 2016) 131; it has been noted further that 
‘Government and political leaders from all parties in Iraq have granted amnesties even to people who have committed violations of 




2013 following pressure from demonstrations in various parts of Iraq.363 These different 
de facto or de jure practices of impunity are contrary to the Iraqi state’s obligations under 
HR norms which require adequate remedy to victims and are in themselves a violation of 
HR. 
Iraq’s divided society has suffered since 2003 from a lack of security, social and political 
upheaval, widespread mistrust, and numerous atrocities, including ongoing armed 
conflict and indiscriminate violence, specifically sectarian, in addition to wide scale 
miscarriages of justice, and this means that the demand for retributive justice is neither 
always achievable or the single best solution. Therefore, to address such upheaval and 
atrocities gradually, and encourage tolerance and reform alongside gradual improvement 
in the dire security situation, especially as territory is regained from ISIS, the Iraqi 
Parliament has recently approved a new Amnesty Law, No. 27 of 2016.364 Article 1 states 
that individuals convicted for crimes punishable by death, or who are the subject of other 
penalties which have deprived them of their liberty since 2003 are eligible to apply for 
amnesty, without being absolved from their civil or disciplinary liability. Article 2 also 
states that these provisions shall apply to all accused persons, whether or not legal action 
has been taken against them, and whether cases are at the investigation or trial stages; 
excepted from these provisions are those who have committed or been convicted of 13 
types of crimes listed in Article 4 of this law, such as ‘acts of terror resulting in death or 
permanent disability, human trafficking, rape, money laundering and embezzlement and 
theft of state funds’.365 The investigating judges and competent courts must apply the 
provisions of this law within thirty days for cases brought before them and if a person has 
been considered ineligible for amnesty, they can appeal within 30 days to the Federal 
Court of Cassation in respect of felonies and Court of Appeal with regard to lesser 
crimes.366 In addition, those convicted of crimes excluded by Article (4) of this law, 
including those convicted under Article 4 of the Anti-Terrorism Law, who claim that their 
confessions were made under duress or that legal action was taken against them based on 
                                                
on Iraq, Iraq’s Amnesty Law (27 July 2008) <http://musingsoniraq.blogspot.co.uk/2008/07/iraqs-amnesty-law.html> accessed 30 
August 2017.  
363 Ouda (n 340). 
364 According to a political commentator, the law was demanded by Sunni Muslim politicians as part of a political settlement process 
allowing the current Prime Minister, Haider al-Abadi, to form a government in 2014, and that ‘its delay was largely related to the 
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Controversial Amnesty Law (n 364). 




the statements of a secret informant, can request that their cases are reviewed objectively 
or apply for retrial by judicial commission.367  
However, political and legal objections have been made to the Iraqi Amnesty Law 
because of the possibility of pardoning of terrorists, dangerous criminals and corrupt 
officials, which could lead to further social and security upheaval.368 Some groups of MPs 
planned to appeal against the law before the IFSC on the grounds it is a ‘gift for terrorists 
and members of [ISIS], and a betrayal of the blood of the martyrs and victims’, and would 
allow the release of ISIS muftis who passed fatwas on behalf of ISIS.369 One MP claimed 
that many amendments had been made to the Amnesty Law to ensure that those released 
would not pose a threat to society, and especially to prevent terrorists from exploiting this 
law.370 He further adds:  
while the predominantly Shiite National Alliance tried its best to prevent the release of convicted 
terrorists, legislators from the all-Sunni Iraqi Forces Coalition had sought to expand the law to 
include people convicted under Article 4 of the Anti-Terrorism Law, as they believe innocent 
people, mainly Sunnis, were wrongly prosecuted under the act for political reasons during the two 
terms of Prime Minister Nouri Al-Maliki. In the version of the law that ultimately passed, 
individuals serving Article 4 sentences can apply for amnesty as long as their alleged crime did 
not result in someone’s death or disability.371 
The original draft of the law submitted by the current Prime Minister, Haider Al-Abadi, 
includes only eight articles and, according to one legal expert, these ‘should have covered 
specific issues’, before parliament added another eight controversial articles without any 
consultation with the government.372 It has been said that some of these controversial 
articles ‘are very dangerous’ and could lead to unwarranted ‘retrials for all those 
convicted of criminal offences, terrorist acts, rape, robbery and theft’.373 For instance, 
there has been criticism of the statement in Article 4, paragraph 2 that any terrorist whose 
crimes did not result in the death or permanent disability of victims could be pardoned.374 
In addition, there is the question of what happens to those accused or convicted under 
Iraqi Anti-Terrorism law for encouraging sectarian strife or civil war by arming citizens, 
or encouraging or funding these. It is possible that they could be pardoned because their 
illegitimate attitudes have not directly caused death or disability. Also, while the original 
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<http://www.niqash.org/en/articles/politics/5371/> accessed 6 July 2017. 
369 Al-Monitor, Iraqi Parliament Approves Controversial Amnesty Law (n 364). 
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draft excluded those convicted of kidnapping from seeking a pardon, pardons are now 
possible if their crimes did not result in the death or permanent disability of a victim under 
Article 4, paragraph 6.375 Al-Abadi has criticised these amendments and complained that 
‘a few days ago security forces found kidnapped children during a raid. Under the 
amended amnesty law, those kidnappers could be released,’376 despite the probability that 
they intended to sell the children for their human organs, and it is unknown whether they 
had committed other crimes, as they would not be prepared to confess because of the 
amnesty.377  Indeed, Al-Abadi stated his belief that ‘parliamentarians had introduced 
criminal elements to the new legislation’.378 Further, Article 4, paragraph 10 of the law 
paves the way for the accused, and those convicted of stealing state funds or engaging in 
administrative or financial corruption, to be pardoned if they pay back what they have 
stolen. This clearly makes it problematic for those Iraqi politicians who are attempting to 
fight political corruption, by adding to the difficulty when those accused of corruption are 
senior officials who may try to reduce the amounts they are alleged to have stolen. 
Moreover, anyone who falsified documents to gain state employment or financial 
privilege may also be pardoned according to Article 4, paragraph 10 of the law, although 
this was not so in the original draft.379 
Under Article 6 of the law, where prisoners convicted of terrorist or criminal offences 
have served one third of their sentences, they can apply for amnesty by requesting to ‘buy’ 
their way out of the remainder of their sentence; this would require them to pay IQD 
10,000 (around US $7.50) for each remaining day, which would not be difficult for 
wealthy convicts.380 One MP stated that, by receiving these payments, it would seem that 
thieves and terrorists are contributing to state funds.381 Concerns can also be raised that 
by giving those in the judiciary and the Ministries of Justice and the Interior the authority 
to decide whether to accept ‘buy outs’ of the sentences of prisoners might make them 
susceptible to bribery.382 In a positive step, a special judicial committee was set up in 
accordance with Articles 7 and 9 of the law to decide whether those convicted of terrorist 
or criminal acts should be granted a re-trial to ensure that no miscarriage of justice 
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occurred. However, there is a danger that members of the committee may be subject to 
political pressure or even have their lives threatened if their decisions do not serve the 
interests of the various parties involved in judicial litigation.383 Furthermore, victims or 
their families are required under Article 3 of this law to consent to pardoning prisoners, 
and this may place them in danger or under pressure should they refuse, as prisoners may 
have contacts outside jail who could threaten them.384  
The above criticisms and concerns raise serious questions about whether this law will be 
capable of being part of a national reconciliation plan to bring lasting peace and stability 
to Iraq. Indeed, it may be that this Amnesty Law, as it stands, cannot contribute to 
reconciliation in society; this is because like previous amnesty laws,385  it is merely 
politically motivated to satisfy certain political parties, without considering whether there 
is the social climate for the acceptance of this law as regards to any terms of apology and 
forgiveness. In addition, its application might further undermine the rule of law and 
encourage impunity for perpetrators since it appears to impair justice and, thus, weaken 
the observance of the Iraqi state’s obligations to punish HR violations.386 However, even 
if these lawmakers genuinely aimed to restore social and political calm, they should have 
recognised that many post-2003 violent crimes were politically motivated and part of the 
power struggle between various political forces and others, especially since the state itself 
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was active in the conflict.387 Indeed, this law does not make a clear distinction between 
politically motivated crimes and other crimes, showing an absence of political vision and 
will to address political violence.388 Due to the lack of a clear definition of terrorism, the 
interpretation of Articles 2 and 3 of the Anti-Terrorism Law by those holding political 
power is very broad and includes many violent offences under the term ‘terrorist acts’ or 
‘crimes of state security’. This enables officials dealing with various political actors or 
armed militias that were carrying out acts of violence to refer to them as ‘out of law’ 
rather than ‘terrorists’.389 Addressing the political violence in this law is necessary as a 
part of confidence-building in any proposed undertaking of transitional justice or national 
reconciliation after ISIS is defeated; this will send a positive message to conflicting 
political parties that they need to change their attitude in future.390   
The Amnesty Law gives no consideration to any necessity to heal the wounds of victims 
and society in order to reconcile past atrocities, for instance, by obliging those subject to 
this law to disclose the truth and offer apologies as a precondition of being freed or 
granted immunity from prosecution. This approach has been followed by some states, 
such as South Africa, which granted limited and conditional amnesty in exchange for 
testimony and disclosure of the truth about past HR violations as a prerequisite of national 
reconciliation.391 Limited amnesties may help draw as complete a picture as possible 
about violations, as, without some promise of amnesty, perpetrators are unlikely to testify. 
However, critics maintain that such amnesties encourage a culture of impunity, sacrifice 
and justice, and may also ‘run counter to a state’s obligations to punish human rights 
violations under international treaties’.392 The South African Truth and Reconciliation 
Commission (SATRC), in response to such criticisms, stated that the amnesty was 
essential to the success of revealing all possible truth about past atrocities, of which the 
main sources of information were perpetrators.393 Moreover, the commission further 
highlighted that if justice is only seen as punitive, the advantages of restorative justice for 
victims regarding ‘correcting imbalances, [and] restoring broken relationships’ are 
missed.394 
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Even though the Iraqi Amnesty Law places certain limitations and conditions in the 
interest of revealing the truth, the law alone cannot bring positive change unless it is part 
of a genuine and holistic post-conflict transitional justice plan in which certain 
prerequisite conditions, including legal, judicial, administrative, institutional, social, and 
cultural reforms are adopted.395 If these conditions are even partially accomplished, a 
positive psychological atmosphere of political and societal initiatives devoted to fact-
finding, acknowledgement of wrong doing, apology, forgiveness, and a culture of 
remembrance would gradually emerge, leading to healed memories. If this occurs, then 
trust may be rebuilt, relationships restored, and future violence avoided. 396  Such a 
positive psychological atmosphere requires, amongst other things, as discussed later,397 
serious consideration as to whether the establishment of a truth and reconciliation 
commission system would be appropriate to address the violence committed since 
2003,398 particularly that by ISIS, and any alleged abuses by security forces and pro-
government militias because of the inadequate enforcement of procedural standards of 
justice during the period of internal armed conflict in parts of the country since 2014.399  
Justice is necessary for all victims, especially of ISIS, to enable them to rebuild their lives. 
This, as a recent report of UNMAI and the UN Human Rights Office emphasised, is 
particularly essential for victims of ISIS’s sexual violence.400 The report asserted that the 
Iraqi government must ensure that the thousands of women and girls, in particular from 
the Yezidi and other minority communities who survived rape and sexual assault under 
ISIS, receive care, protection and justice.401 Under domestic law and international HR 
law, the Iraqi state has an obligation to ensure that all these victims can access justice and 
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reparations,402 including the prosecution of perpetrators in accordance with the law, due 
process and fair trial standards, guaranteeing a gender-sensitive manner which will not 
‘perpetuate victimization or […] “revictimise” women and girls subjected to such 
crimes’.403  
The report, however, noted that the ICJS largely fails to ensure the appropriate protection 
of victims due, in part, to the inadequacy of Iraq’s laws to criminalise perpetrators of 
sexual and domestic violence against women and, thus, these laws would impede the 
prosecution of ISIS for such crimes.404 To facilitate access to justice and ensure the care 
and protection of victims in legal and judicial proceedings, significant legislative and 
institutional changes will be needed.405  
At present, the struggle for a procedural remedy of justice for ISIS victims, where possible, 
seems far from achievable with continued flawed trials falling short of international 
standards. For instance, 36 men were executed on 21 August 2016 for their part in the 
Speicher massacre, in which approximately 1,700 unarmed soldiers and cadets were 
killed by ISIS in June 2014, as referred to earlier.406 The 36 men were convicted and 
found guilty in a trial that lasted only a few hours, using a conviction mainly based on 
confessions; it was thus defective because of ‘breaches of the right to a fair trial, including 
the court’s failure to adequately investigate the defendants’ allegations that their pre-trial 
“confessions” were extracted under torture’. 407  This execution followed public and 
political pressure to hang all ‘terrorists’ after the suicide bombing in Karada in 2016, for 
which ISIS claimed responsibility. 408  Such flawed trials and executions further 
undermine trust in the ICJS and fail to heal the wounds suffered by ISIS victims. 
According to Human Rights Watch, the Speicher massacre was a very grave crime and, 
if the accused had been given a fair trial, this would have been an important indication of 
Iraq’s commitment to reform its justice system. The uncovering of the events at Camp 
Speicher is owed to the victims’ families and, indeed, to all Iraqis.409 It further states that, 
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to make ISIS perpetrators accountable and help heal their victims, as well as generate 
faith in the ICJS, it is imperative that trials are fair.410         
It may further be said that victims of crime who belong to poor, marginalised sectors of 
society, and other vulnerable groups, cannot access legal remedies as they often have no 
knowledge of such remedies or their entitlement to help from the judicial authority, 
lawyers or NGOs.411 These obstacles explain why there are so few complaints by victims 
and, consequently, why many do not avail themselves of their right to remedy.412 As a 
Rule of Law officer with the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) observed, 
‘one of the biggest obstacles to protecting human rights in Iraq is that citizens, particularly 
the most vulnerable groups, are not aware of how to fully obtain their rights and 
protections afforded by Iraqi law’.413 To strengthen how victims’ access justice, ‘a new 
legal help desk in Baghdad’s Rusafa Courthouse was inaugurated […] to provide free 
legal services to indigent Iraqi citizens as part of a larger effort to strengthen the 
administration of and citizens’ access to justice in the country’.414 This help desk seeks 
to ‘build a culture of rights’ by relying on ‘community activism’ to see that citizens know 
about their rights and that any claims ‘are resolved more efficiently’.415 According to the 
Iraqi Chief Justice, such efforts should improve the state of HR in Iraq.416 However, 
although this is a positive step, it may be considered a small local gesture, and what is 
actually needed is an extensive programme to help victims’ access justice across Iraq.  
Likewise, the Iraqi inquisitorial system has thus far not provided fair treatment for victims 
concerning their right to be fully informed about cases, or have perpetrators brought to 
justice and punished in fair trials. In the example of the Speicher massacre, the Central 
Criminal Court’s spokesperson, Abd al-Sattar al-Bir-Qadar, declared that while 28 
defendants were convicted, 604 suspects remained unaccounted for.417 Even for the 28 
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individuals executed, the criminal proceedings lacked detail, including the role each 
defendant played, and who they killed or helped to kill.418    
It is important for all Iraqi victims to have clear and fully detailed answers to such 
questions, and to know that the judicial process and its outcome are fair. Thus, 
enhancement of trust in the morality and legitimacy of the ICJS depends on implementing 
retributive justice and victims perceiving that they have been treated fairly throughout. 
Although the Iraqi Constitution in Article 19, paragraph 6, asserts that ‘every person shall 
have the right to be treated with justice in judicial and administrative proceedings’, the 
nature and extent of this right has not been fully addressed by the IFSC. This is because 
there is no tradition of cases brought by victims or others alleging unfair treatment in 
criminal proceedings. It can be argued that unless this issue is brought to light by 
academic researchers, NGOs, civil society activists, and the media, in order to build a 
new tradition, there is no possibility that the rights of victims to fair treatment in criminal 
proceedings will be officially acknowledged. In principle, although the ICPC grants 
victims some concession to participate in criminal procedures,419  this concession, as 
noted by Jasim and Saadoun, does not fully follow the evolution of the concept of victims’ 
rights. 420  The Iraqi state must conform to mainstream HR norms regarding the 
participatory rights of victims and, therefore, its criminal justice system must 
acknowledge them, at least in principle. However, it is doubtful whether these rights will 
ever be recognised in Iraq, as in practice this system may be said to be incapable of 
changing its ideology of considering crimes only as offences against society as a whole; 
this is despite hundred thousands of Iraqi citizens having lost their lives or being injured 
by violence. In addition, the fragility of the process of criminal investigation and the 
widespread existence of impunity makes this system incapable of respecting victims’ 
rights.  
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It is important to note, however, that many other reasons have combined with this fragility 
to undermine the rights of victims to the truth and have their perpetrators brought to 
justice in accordance with international legal norms of HR. The fragile ICJS has not been 
able to cope with the high level of acts of violence, insurgency and terrorism which have 
had ‘a hazardous effect on the functioning of the entire system’ in accordance with HR 
norms and the rule of law;421 this is because it has usually, until recent times, only had to 
deal with ordinary, day-to-day crimes. In addition, there has been a recent considerable 
shortage of judges, which has caused increasing delays in the investigation and 
adjudication of cases.422 Further, threats, intimidation, and violent attacks against the 
police, judges and others working in the judicial system also cause delays.423 These 
attacks have been by insurgents, terrorists, and various militias, probably working with 
the knowledge of the Iraqi authorities. Similarly, because of security concerns about acts 
of violence, it is common practice for investigative judges to work from their chambers 
rather than attend crime scenes to gather evidence.424 This is contrary to the Criminal 
Procedure Code which imposes on them a duty to immediately attend scenes of crimes to 
question any witnesses, for instance.425 Moreover, the entire ICJS has suffered from 
widespread political interference to gain impunity for corrupt state authorities, 426 
including security forces and sometimes judges. 427  This interference may also have 
tended to cover the authorities’ unwillingness and gross negligence to conduct thorough 
and impartial investigation into acts of violence, and to prosecute and punish perpetrators.  
This political interference has undermined the independence of the judicial system set up 
in accordance with the Iraqi Constitution, which clearly affirms that ‘no power shall have 
the right to interfere in the judiciary and the affairs of the justice’.428 According to one 
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commentator, the courts’ role requires ‘sufficient independence, impartiality and capacity 
to discharge that function’ and ‘these challenges are coupled with a broader range of legal, 
political and practical obstacles facing victims in bringing human rights actions in a 
climate of excessive secrecy and securitization, specifically in the counter-terrorism 
field’.429 The HRC has clearly noted the lack of independence of the ICJS and has stated 
that the state should ‘ensure the full independence and impartiality of the judiciary in 
practice’ making it able to operate without ‘pressure or interference’. Moreover, judges, 
lawyers and court officials require ‘effective protection’ from ‘intimidation, threats 
and/or attacks’.430 It seems, however, that ‘the government of Iraq […] is busy protecting 
itself, and everything else is secondary’.431 Nevertheless, these secondary matters, such 
as the fulfilment of the procedural obligations of investigation, prosecution and 
punishment as required by HR norms, are crucial from the perspective of Iraqi citizens, 
specifically victims, if their government and the ICJS can be said to have any legitimate 
authority.  
5.3.2 Summary Remarks  
It seems reasonable to claim that the consequences of large scale violence against the HR 
of Iraq’s citizens, especially the right to life, should be healed by providing effective 
procedural remedies of investigation, prosecution and punishment, as required by general 
ethical principles and the HR norms. It is essential to substantiate any claim by Iraqi 
authorities and the ICJS, in order for them to have legitimacy over their citizens. The Iraqi 
authorities’ gross failure to comply with this is a result of the ICJS suffering from various 
adverse factors, including political, legal and judicial problems arising from widespread 
corruption, impunity and incompetence on their part. Specifically, the failure of the Iraqi 
judiciary to comply with international standards and HR norms of arrest, indictment and 
investigation, as well as its failure to comply with fair trial standards, may be decisive in 
the widespread phenomenon of arbitrary detention and charges, unsubstantiated 
investigations, systematic torture of accused, and the acceptance of false confessions; this 
has robbed the accused of forming a real and rational defence, and quick judgments are 
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made which seem to have been prepared.432 It comes as no surprise, therefore, that these 
authorities have some unwillingness or inability to provide adequate remedies, notably 
uncovering the facts of acts of violence. Indeed, it seems that they have frequently 
blocked the ICJS by actually hiding facts to protect themselves. In such cases, victims 
may be said to have felt deprived of their legitimate expectation of the protection of their 
right to life, and remedies for its violation, which have been sacrificed in the political, 
ethnic and sectarianism interests of authorities acting without accountability. Victims feel 
isolated having to face the consequences of acts of violence alone, and have despaired of 
hearing the truth about the circumstances of these acts, and of those responsible being 
brought to justice. In order to create a sound legal basis for the rule of law in the ICJS in 
respect of the rights of victims, in principle it is important for Iraqi citizens, specifically 
victims of crime, to be part of both internal and external pressure by various non-
governmental and civil organisations, in addition to HR instruments. These will compel 
the state to bring its criminal justice system up to standard and then fully implement it in 
practice to fulfil the requirements of general ethical principles and HR bodies. It follows 
that whoever has been directly or indirectly involved in the commission of crimes against 
the right to life of Iraqi citizens must be brought to justice through the above pressures on 
the state to create a legitimate criminal judicial body and process based on the rule of law. 
This will ensure an impartial, thorough and effective investigative process capable of 
revealing beyond reasonable doubt the facts about these crimes, and to convict and punish 
those responsible. Further, changing the rooted false ideology regarding the concept of 
the rule of law in Iraq is essential; state authorities must be held to account when they fail 
to observe the rights of victims. It is necessary that victims should not be treated merely 
as witnesses and providers of information in the criminal process if they are to be 
guaranteed their true rights. In turn, this should strengthen the rights of victims throughout 
the criminal investigation process by ‘incorporating generally recognised international 
standards, such as the right to participate in criminal justice proceedings, the right to 
challenge decisions of the investigation, prosecution and the court and the right to 
notification and pursuance of other legal remedies’.433 In the light of the extremely serious 
problems and contradictions being faced at all levels, it should be acknowledged that 
these legitimate objectives will only be achieved gradually. This requires comprehensive 
reforms as part of the transitional justice process, in the hope of: rebuilding trust between 
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various communities and the state; repairing the moral relationship of living together 
peaceably; and, strengthening the legitimacy and trustworthiness of the authority of the 
state. In doing so, there will be robust domestic institutions, such as an upright executive, 
an independent legislature and prosecution system genuinely governed by the rule of law 
in the interests of its citizens’ HR. This authority must be subject to accountability if it 
fails the due diligence principle, which requires that justice be administered in accordance 
with the expectations of victims. Therefore, only if this authority fulfils the above 
requirements can it claim to have legitimacy in the sphere of HR.  
5.4 The Right to Redress under Iraqi Law 
Large-scale acts of violence against the HR of Iraqi citizens, in particular the right to life, 
have had an horrendous impact on the victims. The Iraqi authorities, as noted above, have 
contributed to this and other various upheavals and divisions in Iraqi society. Moreover, 
it is argued that both the authorities and wider Iraqi society have let victims suffer the 
impact of physical, material and moral damage in isolation, with no adequate remedy. For 
these reasons, victims feel they lack recognition of their sufferings, that there is no 
condemnation of what has happened to them, that no sincere apologies have been made, 
and there has been no opportunity to restore their humanity and dignity; thus, they cannot 
trust that what happened to them will not be repeated. In fact, the Iraqi state only grants 
victims of acts of violence the right to meagre monetary compensation for specific 
damages, and gestures of reparation are inadequate.434 The following sections will clarify 
how victims’ rights to redress have been granted by the Iraqi legal system since 2003. 
5.4.1 Tort Liability under Iraqi Civil Law     
Initially, before 2003, compensation for crimes against the right to life of Iraqi citizens 
had to be provided solely by the perpetrators in accordance with Iraqi criminal and civil 
law. Thus, the state has no subsidiary role should compensation not be available from the 
perpetrators, either because they have not been apprehended or they are insolvent. 
Criminal complaints are not limited to the seeking of criminal justice by the imposition 
of punitive actions against perpetrators; they also encompass claims for civil redress.435 
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This is to say that the Iraqi legal system links the claim for prosecution with private tort 
liability, as ‘crimes are essentially torts where the state sues on behalf of the victim (and 
society at large)’.436 Therefore, according to Article 10 of the ICPC, victims can bring a 
civil case against perpetrators for moral and material damages suffered in any offence 
against their rights, 437  including the right to life. Compensation for these damages, 
particularly those resulting from violations of the right to life, was explicitly included in 
the Iraqi Civil Law of 1951 and still applies. Although this law has no provision for the 
inviolability of the human right to life, it does incorporate many articles concerning the 
rights of damaged persons to compensation for physical injuries and their consequences 
in accordance with tort liability principles.438  
Article 202 of this law states that ‘every act […] injurious to persons such as murder, 
wounding, assault, or any other kind of inflicting of injury entails payment of damages 
by the perpetrator’. 439  Although the wording of this article expresses the need to 
compensate victims for many kinds of damage, such as physical, moral and material 
damage, many commentators have doubted whether the objective aspect of the damage 
of death (loss of life) itself was included.440 They consider that the injured party who died 
following the incident has suffered only moral and material damage. Moral damage, as 
provided for in Article 205 of Iraqi Civil Law indicates, in general, that the right to 
compensation for moral injury should also be covered and, in particular, any attack on the 
freedom, reputation, honour, or social status of victims makes the perpetrator liable for 
compensation.441 It is important to note, however, that this article does not explicitly refer 
to compensation for physical and psychological harm to victims unlawfully deprived of 
their right to life.442 In addition, the article inhibits the transfer of compensation for moral 
damage to third parties, which requires the value of such compensation to be determined 
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pursuant to an agreement or final judgment.443 It follows that where victims having the 
right to compensation for such damage have died before agreeing the amount of 
compensation, or where there is no final judgment determining the amount of 
compensation, victims’ right to claim damage does not pass to their heirs.444 This position 
may have led to a significant weakening of the transference of the right to compensation 
for moral damage. Indeed, the legislature seems intent on narrowing compensation for 
such damage, as reflected in the practices of the courts.445 This is despite the fact that 
justice requires that no man-made legal obstacles should affect the right of the heirs to 
claim for the physical and mental pain suffered by the deceased before death.446 Victims 
have the right to compensation for such pain, beginning from the actual time of the assault 
until death, no matter how short. In addition, it is a denial of justice only to recognise the 
right to compensation for victims who remain alive and can claim and obtain a final 
decision through the judiciary, or can reach agreement with the responsible parties, as this 
deprives victims who lost their lives of compensation on the grounds of lack of agreement 
or final judicial decision. This is in contrast to the practices of HR bodies which, as 
discussed in Chapter 4, hold that the heirs of victims should be allowed to claim for the 
pain suffered by their deceased relative, otherwise the perpetrator would evade 
responsibility for the moral damage inflicted.447     
Victims may also suffer various material damages, such as medical expenses, loss of 
earnings and funeral expenses, for which compensation is required (Article 207 of the 
Iraqi Civil Law). 448  The courts in Iraq generally compensate for these damages 449 
commensurate with the damage and loss sustained by victims, provided that such damage 
and loss is the direct result of unlawful acts against the right to life of individuals.450 For 
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instance, the Iraqi Court of Cassation stated that the heirs of the deceased can make an 
independent claim in the competent court to require material compensation which their 
deceased relatives deserved because such compensation is part of the estate.451 Iraqi Civil 
Law has also obliged the perpetrator, in accordance with Article 203, ‘to pay 
compensation to dependants of the victim who have been deprived of sustenance on 
account of the murder or death’ and irrespective of whether such dependants are heirs.452 
However, it is worth noting that this article does not give the right to compensation for 
material damage unconditionally to dependants of the deceased, but requires that they 
should have no other sources of dependency. This is, where dependency is available from 
other sources, they are not to be compensated by the perpetrator for such damage.453 
Indeed, the Iraqi Court of Cassation tends to reduce the liability of the person responsible 
for the bodily injury whenever possible, and does not oblige them to compensate for 
damage caused to the victim’s family, including missed opportunities to grow, study, 
obtain work, or earn money.454 In one decision, the Court ruled that as the plaintiffs of 
the deceased victim were not his/her dependents, the plaintiffs were not entitled to 
material compensation and study expenses, because, according to Article (203), they 
lacked dependency.455 This has been criticised on the grounds that the availability of 
dependency from other sources should not justify the denial of compensation for such 
damage.456 In addition, compensation under Article 205 of the Iraqi Civil Law ‘may be 
awarded to spouses and immediate relatives of the family of the victim resulting from 
moral injury’ caused by the death of the victim.457  
                                                
physical integrity of human beings, and the weakening of legal provisions regarding civil liability, arising from fatal and non-fatal 
bodily injuries. For further details, see Kassir (n 445). 
451 See the Iraqi Court of Cassation’s decision No. 2595/ Administrative 1/ 1985 in 23/9/1985; Al-Anaibi (n 16) Ch. 4, 148; Kassir (n 
445).  
452 Al-Ameri (n 445) 131; Al-Anaibi (n 16) Ch. 4, 138. 
453 Hajij (n 435) 18; Kassir (n 445). 
454 See Kassir (n 445). 
455 See the decision of the Court of Cassation No. 303 / Civil First / 1978 in 11/5/1978 cited by Al-Ameri (n 445) 22; the Court also 
ruled that if the deceased victim is a boy under the age of 12, no financial compensation should be given for his death on the grounds 
of lack of dependency. The compensation shall be limited to the damage sustained without the potential damage. The decision of the 
Court of Cassation No. 77 / Civil First / 1975 in 21/5/1978; Ibrahim Al-Mashahdi, Judicial Principles in the Jurisdiction of the Court 
of Cassation (Legal Research Centre, Baghdad: Ministry of Justice, 1988) 280. 
456 It has been claimed that it is unjustifiable for the Iraqi judiciary not to compensate for the material damage on the grounds that the 
dependency must be realised upon death. Kassir (n 445); the decisions of the Court of Cassation are still ambivalent about awarding 
compensation for material damage and about which victims are entitled to claim, despite the explicit text of Article 203 referring to 
the necessity of invoking dependency in order to award such compensation and determine who deserves compensation for such 
damage. For further details, see Rushdi (n 440) 150-155; Al-Anaibi (n 16) Ch. 4, 139; Kassir (n 445). 
457 Stigall (n 439) 42; in this regard, the Court of Cassation ruled that as it is recognised that the loss of the plaintiff’s husband had 
caused her pain and grief, she was entitled to compensation under Article 205. See its decision No. 362/ M1/1978 in 12/7/1978, 
published in the Collection of Judgments, Number 3, 1978; For further details, see Al-Anaibi (n 16) Ch. 4, 139-144; see also its recent 
decision No. 243 in 31/08/2009 available at <http://thejusticenews.com/> accessed 6 September 2017; however, the Iraqi judiciary 
has been hesitant to grant compensation for moral damages, especially for compensation to young children for the moral damage 
resulting from the death of their father or mother. In some cases, for instance, the Court of Cassation awarded such compensation for 
them on the grounds that they feel pain or sadness due to the death of their relatives. See the decisions of the Court of Cassation No. 




The Iraqi courts’ jurisprudence, especially when victims have been illegally deprived of 
their right to life, has generally not recognised the death of victims as a damage in itself 
and, thereby, rejected compensation for it.458 In the opinion of the Court of Cassation, the 
compensation of heirs for the death of a deceased relative is based on the dependency 
they have personally been deprived of and not on the basis that they have received the 
right, as legal heirs, to compensation for the death of the deceased.459 It seems that the 
Court mixes up the damage of death as an independent damage for which victims deserve 
to be compensated,460 and the rights of their dependants to be compensated for their own 
financial loss. According to a judge of this Court, as the idea of compensation for the 
objective aspect of the damage of death (loss of life) is controversial among jurists, and 
whatever their views may be, the Iraqi judiciary does not require compensation for such 
damage at present.461  
Iraqi Civil Law also includes general provisions for victims to sue the Iraqi authorities 
for damages, if the authorities have failed to observe due diligence while fulfilling their 
public duties, including the provision of protection and adequate procedurals remedy. In 
addition to the general principle of the tort liability in Iraqi Civil Law, which requires that 
any person causing damage to others is obliged to pay compensation, Article 219 of the 
same law stipulates in paragraphs 1 and 2 that ‘government, municipalities and other 
institutions that provide a public service […] are responsible for the damage caused by 
their employees, if the damage arises from a breach of their obligations while carrying 
out their duties. The employer can be exonerated of the responsibility if he proves that he 
has taken all necessary precautionary measures to prevent the occurrence of damage or 
that the damage would have occurred even if he had taken these measures’.462  
According to this Article, for the agencies of the Iraqi state to be held responsible for 
damages to victims from acts of violence by non-state actors, there must be an error on 
the part of their employees in the course of their duties, such as negligence, lack of due 
                                                
the Court denied such compensation. See, for instance, its decision No. 456/ D /84083 in 29/4/1984 referred to by Al-Fadl (n 445) 70-
71; see Kassir (n 445).   
458 See Kassir (n 445); Al-Anaibi (n 16) Ch. 4, 46. 
459 See its decisions No. 691 / III civil / 1971 in 5/7/1971; No. 30/ Public Body/ 1971 in 6/11/1971; Al-Anaibi (n 16) Ch. 4, 38. 
460 See the discussion in Chapter 4, pages 105-108. 
461 See Ibrahim Al-Mashahdi, ‘Evolution of Judicial Trends in Iraq on Moral Compensation’, (2001) Journal of Legal Studies, 89; Al-
Anaibi (n 16) Ch. 4, 46; Jabr (n 435) 66; in the opinion of one commentator, the basis of civil liability which governs bodily injury in 
the Iraqi Civil Code is inadequate to address the large scale of acts of violence against the bodily integrity and the right to life, 
especially since 2003. For further details, see Kassir (n 445). 
462 The Iraqi Civil Law (n 145); Article 215 para 2 of this law also states that ‘Public officials, however, are not responsible for damage 
done by their acts [which caused injuries to a third parties] when ordered by superiors to perform them. In such circumstances, it is 
incumbent on the public official to establish that he believed the act he performed was lawful and that his belief was reasonable’. See 




diligence and/or illegal acts; there must also be a causal relationship between the damages 
and the employee error.463 That is, in the absence of such an error and causal relationship, 
victims have no grounds to sue according to the tort liability system. It is important to 
note that the responsibility of any state agency for the illegal activities of their employees 
is based on assuming that there has been an error, on the part of an agency, in monitoring 
and guiding employees over which it should have actual authority as they perform their 
duties. Therefore, victims only need to prove this subordinate relationship between an 
agency and its employees.464 This assumed error by an agency applies even when the 
employee responsible for the wrongdoing and, thus, the damage to the victim, cannot be 
identified. For instance, the Court of Cassation has ruled that the government must bear 
responsibility for the death of one individual shot by police, even if the identity of the 
officer who fired the fatal bullet is unknown.465 Therefore, an agency must refute the 
assumed error if it is to absolve itself from any responsibility.466  
If a government agency is alleged to have failed to provide protection, whether this failure 
is on the part of its employees or the agency itself, it may try to refute this. An agency 
may claim in accordance with Article 219 (2) that it has taken all reasonable steps to 
prevent criminal acts affecting the right to life of its citizens, or claim that the damage 
would still have occurred despite them having been taken, and that it should, therefore, 
be cleared of any allegations of failure. In addition, such alleged failure can be dismissed 
if an agency can prove that it neither knew nor ought to have known of the existence of a 
real threat to an individual’s life. Nevertheless, as noted above, there are several serious 
examples of alleged culpable failure by Iraqi government agencies to protect the right to 
life of its citizens and provide adequate procedurals remedies once acts against the right 
to life have occurred; it may be said, in the light of HR norms, that these agencies were 
aware of real threat to the lives of their citizens and seriously failed to respond. Moreover, 
they have failed in their duties to act with due care to investigate, prosecute and punish 
perpetrators adequately. Therefore, they can be accused of violating their duty of 
protection and failure to provide adequate procedural remedies in accordance with HR 
norms and Iraqi tort liability (Article 219); hence, victims, in accordance with Article 219, 
                                                
463 For further details, see Al-Hakeem et al. (n 440) 259-267; Burke Faris Hussein, ‘The Tort Liability of Provincial and Local Councils: 
An Analytical Study into Iraq Legislations’ (2014) 16 Journal of the College of Law /Al-Nahrain University 139, 154-160.  
464  Al-Hakeem et al. (n 440) 259-267; Abbas Ali Mohammed Al-Husseini, Civil Responsibility of the Journalist (PhD thesis, 
University of Baghdad 2003) 98.  
465  See Amin Al-Rubaie, Research about the Responsibility of the State for the Actions of its Employees (2013) 
<http://ameenlawyer.blogspot.com/2013/11/blog-post.html > accessed 22 September 2016.  




can bring cases claiming that state agencies should compensate them for damages, 
because these agencies have failed to observe due diligence in their public duties. 
However, it seems doubtful that the Iraqi tort liability system can enable victims to obtain 
compensation for damages caused by private individuals, on the basis of failure by 
government agencies to observe due care in the performance of their duties.467 This may 
be because Iraqi agencies have traditionally been held responsible by the courts for 
compensation for damages only when caused by illegal acts or a failure to act by their 
own employees.468 Because of a false deep-rooted ideology which places the bolstering 
of the power of the Iraqi state above the legitimate HR of its citizens, it seems that duties 
such as the prevention of crimes, and the investigation, prosecution and punishment of 
perpetrators, are still considered only as a means to ensuring stability, order and respect 
for its coercive power. Thus, the implementation of these duties is subject only to its own 
absolute discretion. In addition, the muhasasa system is used to ensure that a government 
of national unity is formed on sectarian and ethnic grounds, but is also partly responsible 
for high ranking officials seeing their public duty as a means to gain privilege, authority, 
and immunity, and not as serving the public interest.469 Therefore, compensation claims 
for the failure of the Iraqi authorities to protect against violence by non-state actors, and 
employ an adequate procedural remedy afterwards, have never been made before the Iraqi 
courts as they are considered to be outside the limited remit of the traditional tort liability 
system. Indeed, victims cannot make solid cases against authorities on these grounds 
under tort liability because these positive obligations are not embedded in Iraqi legal and 
judicial systems; thus, it is doubtful that victims can be adequately heard and granted 
compensation by the Iraqi courts.  
                                                
467 Courts in Iraq currently do not hear compensation cases against the state, especially with regard to terrorism, as Law No.20 of 2009 
involves the establishment of commissions in each Iraqi province to receive claims of compensation. See the decision of the Court of 
Cassation No. 567/public body/ 2009 in 24/ 05/2010, published in the Journal of Judicial Publications, Supreme Judicial Council, 
No.1 (2011). For further details, see Ali Katea Hajem, ‘How far the Government Commitment to Compensating the Victims of 
Terrorism in accordance with Law No.20 of 2009’ (2013) 1 Ahl Al-Bait Journal 111, 111-122.  
468 See Ali Katea Hajem, ‘Compensation of the Moral Damage as a Result of Military Mistakes: a Study of the Amended Law 20/2009’ 
(2014) 1 Ahl Al-Bait Journal 452, 456; for instance, in the case concerning the death of a daughter by landmine explosion, the Iraqi 
Court of Cassation ruled that the Ministry of Finance, rather than the former Ministry of Defence (responsible for landmines before 
being dissolved in 2003, when its assets reverted to,the Ministry of Finance) should compensate the daughter’s mother for moral 
damage because it failed to take adequate measures to remove landmines and, thus, prevent them from being a danger to individuals. 
The Iraqi Court of Cassation’s decision No. 1336/1398/Appeal/ 2010 in 26/10/2010. See Othman Salman Ghailan Al-Aboudi, State 
Responsibility for Compensation for Military Damages, Journal of Legislation and Judiciary 
<http://www.tqmag.net/body.asp?field=news_arabic&id=2083&page_namper=p5> accessed 6 September 2017; see also its decision 
No. 2664/Appeal Body/2013 in 25/11/2013 at <http://www.tqmag.net/body.asp?field=news_arabic&id=2214&page_namper=p_no2> 
accessed 6 September 2017.    
469 According to Dodge, ‘the corruption eroding the Iraqi state from within is an integral part of a muhasasa system that has, in effect, 
privatised the Iraqi state. The system has allowed the Iraqi political elite to strip state assets for personal gain and to fund the parties 




Although the Iraqi state and its institutions are required under HR norms to comply with 
these positive obligations and, consequently, all alleged violations should be adequately 
heard by the Iraqi courts, the courts only apply Iraq’s own legislation, especially regarding 
criminal and civil liability, and do not adhere in practice to these norms. The Iraqi state 
claims that these norms (specifically those in treaties to which Iraq is a party, such as the 
ICCPR) have legal superiority over Iraqi domestic laws and that all judges have to abide 
by them or face an appeal against their decision;470 however, in reality this is untrue. 
According to the Iraqi Constitution, these norms should have ‘the same legal force as the 
Iraqi laws’471 but in practice Iraqi judges only adhere to domestic laws without ‘applying 
the provisions contained in the international conventions ratified by Iraq’. 472 
Incorporating provisions such as the positive obligations of protection and remedy into 
the Iraqi tort liability and criminal justice system, as well as guaranteeing their application 
by the courts, is essential if the rights of victims to redress are to be strengthened. This 
would provide victims with a rational basis and suitable mechanisms to sue the Iraqi 
authorities for their failure to fulfil these positive obligations. Although the strengthening 
of the rights of victims to sue authorities is urgently needed to establish accountability for 
the damages suffered by victims, the application of tort litigation may not always be 
possible as acts of violence have often been against poor, marginalised and vulnerable 
social groups who probably cannot afford to go to court. Even if it is possible for some 
victims, the complicated procedures are lengthy and stressful and likely to result in 
secondary victimisation.473 
5.4.2 The Role of the Iraqi State in Creating Redress for Victims  
                                                
470 This claim is made by the Permanent Representative of Iraq to the United Nations Office at Geneva in the course of reviewing the 
report of Iraq by the Human Rights Committee in 27 October 2015 (n 147). 
471 See Geneva International Centre for Justice (GICJ) (n 189) 8; Iraqi HCHR Report about Implementation of the International 
Convention (Protection of All persons from Enforced Disappearance) in August 2015, 2 < 
http://tbinternet.ohchr.org/Treaties/CED/Shared%20Documents/IRQ/INT_CED_NHS_IRQ_21392_E.pdf > accessed 8 September 
2017.   
472 Geneva International Centre for Justice (GICJ) (n 189); the Iraqi HCHR also pointed out that ‘the national judge in Iraq, particularly 
in the criminal courts, adhere literally by Iraqi criminal law provisions and does not consider the other provisions contained in 
international conventions ratified by Iraq’. Iraqi HCHR Report about Implementation of the International Convention (Protection of 
All persons from Enforced Disappearance) (n 471); according to one commentator, ‘the Iraqi legal tradition with regard to the 
relationship between international treaties and the national law stands as a stark anomaly… There is a regrettable tendency for ratified 
international law not to be directly applied by domestic courts and notes the unwillingness of courts to do so. With regard to the hope 
of resolving this problem in post-Saddam Iraq, “one would expect some level of encouragement of national courts to engage 
international law, and some willingness on the part of the courts to do just that. That nothing of the sort has happened […] the courts 
themselves seem quite reluctant to use it in any event”’. See Almusawi (n 17) 39; for further details about the reluctant of courts in 
Iraq to apply international law norms, see Haider Ala Hamoudi, International Law and Iraqi Courts, in Edda Kristjánsdóttir et al. (eds.), 
International Law in Domestic Courts: Rule of Law Reform in Post-Conflict States (Intersentia, 2012) 111-113. 




Although monetary compensation alone, as noted in Chapter 4,474 insufficiently addresses 
the horrific impact of mass violations of HR, especially the right to life, such as that 
suffered by Iraqi victims post-2003, financial compensation is difficult or impossible 
under Iraqi tort liability. This may be because of the lack of functional institutions based 
on the rule of law, the lack of effective legal and judicial mechanisms for victims to sue 
state authorities for their failure to protect and provide justice with due diligence, or the 
impunity enjoyed by many perpetrators; nevertheless, whichever is the case, victims have 
little chance of compensation. When the types of violence in Iraq are considered (gender-
based violence, suicide bombers, car bombs, assassinations, enforced disappearances, and 
ethno-sectarian violence –often motivated by the desire to achieve political, sectarian and 
ethnic interests), it is no surprise that those responsible, such as illegal militias, insurgents, 
and terrorist groups, are difficult to identify and sue, as they enjoy political, sectarian and 
ethnic protection. Even when identification is possible, victims fear revenge should they 
bring complaints. In cases where acts of violence are purely criminal, in terms of taking 
advantage of widespread chaos and disorder, and the perpetrators are identified and 
apprehended, such individuals are often insolvent and so unable to compensate victims. 
As a result, it becomes impossible for many victims and their families to receive 
compensation for their injuries and, therefore, the Iraqi state finds itself under pressure to 
respond to the extensive social upheaval caused by violence and bear responsibility for 
providing the compensation required.475  
In this sense, the Iraqi policymakers have passed specific orders and legislation covering 
compensation for certain crimes to restore social equilibrium. In 2004, Ministerial Order 
No. 10 was issued to compensate those killed or injured in terrorist acts, irrespective of 
whether they were employees in public services or ordinary citizens.476 Although this 
order seems to acknowledge, for the first time, the need for the Iraqi state to compensate 
                                                
474 See pages 106-113, 120-121 and 137-129. 
475 It is less clear whether non-state armed groups in the recent conflict in Iraq, including ISIS and other militias operating under the 
umbrella of the Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF) or outside of it, should be responsible for providing reparations to victims of their 
violations, or whether this role should be left for the Iraqi state. Moreover ‘it is not always feasible or desirable to compel armed 
groups to provide reparations. […] in the aftermath of a conflict […] they may not have the resources or political will to pay reparations. 
Governments may also refuse to deal directly with armed groups by including them in the reparations process, as doing so could 
impart those groups with a degree of legitimacy. [It is therefore] unrealistic to expect that ISIS will play a direct role in granting 
reparations to its victims […] However, one avenue to explore is whether assets confiscated from the group or its members could be 
used to fund a reparations effort implemented by the Iraqi government or the international community. On the other hand, militias 
active on the anti-ISIS side may continue to exist after the conflict and some enjoy a higher degree of legitimacy [with] the Iraqi 
government. These groups might be engaged in the reparations process [and held] accountable for violations […] Appropriate 
reparations […] should not be limited to compensation […] but could also include […] public apologies’. See Clara Sandoval and 
Miriam Puttick, Reparations for the Victims of Conflict in Iraq: Lessons learned from comparative practice, Ceasefire Centre for 
Civilian Rights and Minority Rights Group International, November 2017, 23-24 <http://minorityrights.org/wp-
content/uploads/2017/11/Reparations-in-Iraq-Ceasefire-November-2017.pdf> accessed 24 November 2017. 
476 See Imad Fadel Rakab, ‘Obligation of the State for Compensation for the Crimes of Terrorism in the Iraqi Legislation’ (2010) 1 




families of deceased victims, it has been criticised for several reasons. Firstly, although it 
has required compensation for death or bodily injury by terrorist crimes, it has not 
awarded compensation for the monetary and moral damage caused by these, nor has it 
required that compensation be made for other acts of violence. Secondly, the Ministry of 
Finance has limited compensation payable to relatives and the amount paid has been 
meagre, covering only damage by terrorist acts committed after 1/6/2004. Finally, the 
procedures by which families of the deceased can obtain compensation are complex.477  
Compensation of victims has also become a constitutional duty, as Article 132 paragraphs 
2 and 3 of the Iraqi Constitution requires the state to guarantee compensation for families 
of those killed or injured by terrorist acts, and the regulation of this compensation is done 
by law.478 As a result, Iraq-initiated Law No. 20 of 2009 supersedes Order No. 10, in 
order to create redress for those affected by military operations and errors, as well as 
terrorist activities.479 The purpose of Law 20, according to its first article, is to provide 
redress for any person harmed by military operations or terrorist activities from 2003 
onwards, after determining the gravity of damage and need for compensation, and how 
this is to be claimed. Compensation should cover both the dead and the missing due to 
military or terrorist operations,480 as well as ‘total or partial disability, injuries that require 
temporary treatment, property damage and damage affecting work or study’.481 For such 
compensation to be provided to victims, the law requires the formation of a central 
committee in Baghdad and subcommittees in various provinces. 482  They receive 
applications from victims or their legal representatives to estimate the value of the 
compensation, and submit these to the Ministry of Finance for payment.483 In cases of 
death, the law clearly states that no more than 60 days should elapse before the 
compensation is paid to the relatives of the deceased, which include, parents, sons, 
daughters, siblings, husbands or wives. 484  These relatives should receive a monthly 
payment and land if they have none.485 It is important to note that this law is a safety net 
in cases where victims cannot obtain compensation from other sources, and it clearly 
states that victims may not combine the compensation stipulated in this law with 
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478 The Iraqi Constitution of 2005 (n 9). 
479 The Iraqi Compensation Law (n 434). 
480 Ibid. Article 2 (1). 
481  See Assyrian International News Agency, ‘Iraq to Compensate Victims of Terrorism’, Military Operations (2009), 
<http://www.aina.org/news/20091004144057.htm > accessed 22 September 2016.  
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483 Ibid. 
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compensation for the same damages given in accordance with other laws; where victims 
have been compensated under other laws in an amount lower than this law requires, the 
difference between the two should be rectified.486 Although this law, as suggested by Al-
Qaisi, has established the legal right for victims to obtain redress for damages rather than 
compensation merely being given as a grant,487 both this law and its implementation have 
been widely criticised. 
5.4.2.1 Criticisms of Law No. 20 of 2009 and its Practice 
It has been suggested that compensation under this law is symbolic and insufficient for 
the gravity and impact of the damage, especially from terrorist acts.488 For instance, 
according to aid experts, although widows can claim compensation ‘for a spouse killed 
by terrorism’, ‘this allowance is insufficient –especially for widows in rural areas who 
usually have more children, less education and fewer employment opportunities’.489 In 
addition, ‘because of governmental institutions’ lack of capacity, limited reach to many 
areas outside of Iraq’s cities, overly-complicated application processes, and sometimes 
because of corruption, many widows and other welfare recipients do not receive their 
allowances’.490 Long procedures and waiting times for such allowances causes stress, 
desperation and anxiety for the families of the deceased. For instance, it took years for 
the mother of a child almost killed by shooting to receive compensation.491 She said, ‘my 
only child was shot multiple times in 2004 when she was only nine years old, and we did 
not receive compensation until 2014 – ten years after she was shot and suffered 80 percent 
paralysis’.492 Moreover, the law sets the financial compensation for relatives of deceased 
                                                
486 Article 8. 
487 See Hanan Mohammad Al-Qaisi, ‘The Basis of the State’s Responsibility for the Damage Caused by Military and Terrorist 
Operations in Iraq: Study in Law No. 20 for the Year 2009’ (2012) Journal of Judicial and Political Science 142, 142-159; see also 
Bokan Abdullah, Compensation for Victims of Terrorism in accordance with Law No. 20 of 2009, 
<http://bokanabdulla.blogspot.co.uk/2015/06/20-2009.html>  accessed 22 September 2016. 
488 According to Article 9 of this law, the financial compensation for employees of the armed forces, internal security and other security 
services has been set as follows: ‘5 million dinars for death [Approximately 2450 pounds]. 5 million dinars for incapacitation (defined 
as 75%-100%). 2.5 to 4.5 million dinars for incapacitation (50%-74%). 2 million dinars for incapacitation (less than 50%). For all 
others, the compensation is set as follows: 3.75 million dinars for death [Approximately £1875], 3.75 million dinars for incapacitation 
(defined as 75%-100%). 2 to 3 million dinars for incapacitation (50%-74%). 1.75 million dinars for incapacitation (less than 50%)’. 
See Assyrian International News Agency (AINA) (n 481). 
489 Agency for Technical Cooperation and Development et.al, Fallen off the Agenda? More and Better Aid Needed for Iraq Recovery 
(2010) 11 <http://www.internal-displacement.org/assets/library/Middle-East/Iraq/pdf/Iraq-more-and-better-aid-needed-jul-2010> 
accessed 22 September 2016.  
490 Ibid.  
491  Maymouna Al-Basil, Iraq’s Terror Victims Face Neglect over Compensation Claims (2015), 
<http://www.alaraby.co.uk/english/features/2015/11/5/iraqs-terror-victims-face-neglect-over-compensation-claims> accessed 22 
September 2016. 
492 Ibid.; these extensive delays are partly due to the slowness of the Ministry of Finance to implement the law in mid-2011, and even 
then claims averaged two years to complete. In addition, the claim process is quite onerous, involving complex documentation which 
is very costly for victims to gather. Moreover, the ongoing security situation made it harder to obtain supporting documents, and 
initially victims had to submit claims in the area where the incident occurred, even if they lived elsewhere. With the advance of ISIS 
in 2014, this made matters worse and the subcommittees in Kirkuk, Ninewa, Anbar, and Salahuddin governorates suspended their 




armed forces, internal security and other security services personnel at a different level to 
that granted to relatives of deceased civilian victims.493 According to a spokesman for the 
central government’s victim compensation committee, ‘the families of the deceased and 
missing who belong to the military or security forces will receive a grant of around 5 
million Iraqi dinars [$4,300], while the families of civilians will receive around $3,200 in 
compensation. Meanwhile, both types of families will receive a monthly salary of around 
$300’.494 The former of these grants is based on arbitrary discretion in a clear violation 
of the standard by which damage caused by the unlawful violation of the right to life 
ought to be measured. This should be a single objective standard applying to everyone 
because all people are equal, and so estimated compensation should not differ. As a 
member of the Iraqi High Commission for Human Rights stated, such a law allocating 
unequable financial compensation to civilian victims of terrorism is ‘insulting’ to 
victims.495 This does not in any way diminish the rights of the Iraqi security forces to be 
compensated for higher amounts, not on the grounds of loss of life alone, but because 
their loss of life has occurred while performing their duty of protecting the state and its 
citizens.  
It may be said that this law and its practice does not take into account redress for victims 
for every form of violence which has occurred in Iraq. Rather, it has arbitrarily limited 
such redress only to victims of certain military and terrorist acts, without precisely 
defining what particular acts are included. For instance, according to the Geneva 
International Centre for Justice (GICJ), the ‘missing’ referred to in this Law is a very 
vague concept and the ‘GICJ wonders how this could apply to the enforced 
disappearances, especially when there is no law that criminalizes these practices. 
Furthermore, there is no measure taken in order to prevent enforced disappearances’.496  
                                                
493 See Article 9 of this law (n 434). 
494  Omar Al-Shaher, Iraq Payes $300 Million to Terror Victims, 17 April 2013, <http://www.al-
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damage. Therefore, the judiciary should play a role in considering requests for compensation to be more equitable for redressing 
victims. See Hajem (n 467) 133-139; Hajem (n 468) 481-483. 
495 Al-Basil (n 491). 
496 GICJ (n 189) 8; see also the Centre for Victims of Torture (CVT), Enforced Disappearances: Ambiguity Haunts the Families of 
Iraq’s Missing (n 199) 3-4; For example, ‘the focus of Law 20 clearly excludes major types of violations that have been central features 
of the conflict [with ISIS]. For example, victims of [enforced disappearance], sexual violence, children recruited into forced military 
service, and those suffering from psychological trauma have no recourse to remedies under Law 20. Also missing from the law is a 
collective approach to reparations for those who have been victimized on the basis of their group belonging, as is the case for many 
of Iraq’s ethnic and religious minorities’. Moreover, ‘the Law 20 framework is clearly insufficient on its own to cover violations 




Victims of enforced disappearance, according to the GICJ, do not have any legal 
privileges in the area of reparation, compensation or rehabilitation under the 
compensation system in this law.497  This is despite the Iraqi state’s claim that ‘this 
mechanism is an important way for victims and their families to obtain redress for any 
injury they suffered as a result of activities including abductions and enforced 
disappearances carried out by armed groups, terrorist bands and criminal 
organizations’. 498  The GICJ has noted that ‘there are a lot of obstacles in the 
implementation of this law, from the very slow procedures to corruption and the influence 
of religious figures or political parties on the way, and to whom, the compensation should 
be paid’.499 The Iraqi High Commission of Human Rights (HCHR) has criticised the Iraqi 
legal system because victims of enforced disappearances have no right to reparations, 
including compensation, rehabilitation, restoration of dignity, or guarantees of non-
repetition.500 General provisions for compensation place no financial obligation on the 
state because it considers that this should only be made by perpetrators. The HCHR 
demands the adoption of legal provisions for reparations consistent with the seriousness 
of the crime, in line with HR norms, and especially with the demands of the Convention, 
to which Iraq is party, regarding enforced disappearances.501 The Committee of Enforced 
Disappearances (CED) also noted that the comprehensive reparations required by the 
Convention under Article 24 are not included in Iraqi domestic law.502  
The Iraqi state has also failed to provide redress for other vulnerable groups of victims of 
acts of violence, especially gender-based violence in its legal system or in Law No. 20 of 
2009. For instance, according to one report: 
the Government of Iraq has failed in its obligation under the ICCPR to take proper measures to 
protect and promote women’s human rights, to ensure effective remedies in cases of violations, 
                                                
497 GICJ (n 189); see also Hassoun Obeid Hajij and Mazen Khalaf Nasser, ‘Compensation for Crime of Enforced Disappearance: 
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498 See United Nations, Committee on Enforced Disappearances, Consideration of Reports Submitted by States Parties under Article 
29, Paragraph 1, of the Convention: Reports of States parties due in 2012, Iraq, 26 June 2014 (CED/C/IRQ/1) 9. 
499 GICJ (n 189) 8. 
500  See Iraqi HCHR Report about Implementation of the International Convention (Protection of All persons from Enforced 
Disappearance) (n 471) 6.  
501 Ibid. 
502 The Committee stated that the Iraqi state should ‘guarantee that any person who has suffered harm as a direct result of an enforced 
disappearance obtains reparation in accordance with Article 24(5) of the Convention and prompt, fair and adequate compensation, 
even if no criminal proceedings have been brought against the potential perpetrators or the latter have not been identified. In this 
respect, the State party should establish a comprehensive system of reparation that is fully in line with Article 24(4-5) of the 
Convention and other relevant international standards and guarantee that any measures taken in respect of the rights of victims are 
gender sensitive and take into account the special situation of children affected by enforced disappearances’. See paras 31 and 32 of 
the Committee on Enforced Disappearances, Concluding observations on the report submitted by Iraq Committee of Enforced 




and to prevent systemic impunity. While all Iraqis face daily insecurity due to terrorism and civil 
strife, women and girls experience additional and specific abuse because of their gender.503  
In this sense, the HRC has expressed deep concerns regarding these reports, and required 
the Iraqi state to ensure that all cases of violence against women ‘are promptly and 
thoroughly investigated, that perpetrators are brought to justice, and that victims have 
access to full reparation and means of protection’.504  Similarly, the UN Committee 
Against Torture (CAT) stated that the state should ensure that victims of such violence 
‘obtain redress, including fair and adequate compensation’.505 
It can even be argued that the meagre compensation provided in accordance with this Law 
merely for terror victims is given not with the intention of comprehensively rectifying the 
injustice suffered by the victims, but to give the misleading impression that justice has 
been served in order to quell legitimate anger and protests that the authorities have 
seriously failed to fulfil their positive obligations of protection and provision of 
retributive justice. The Iraqi state, according to official information, paid more than $300 
million to victims of terrorist acts from 2011 to 2013 as compensation for damages 
caused.506 Payment may be acceptable to some victims as the best that can be obtained in 
the light of the severely unsettled civil and political situation in Iraq, and could imply that 
they consider it to be an acknowledgment of wrong, even when the Iraqi authorities have 
not acknowledged responsibility. However, payment alone may be considered by other 
victims to be insufficient. For instance, in the Speicher case, no corrupt and incompetent 
politician or military official has so far accepted responsibility or been held to account 
for gross failure to prevent the barbaric killing of approximately 1,700 individuals by ISIS. 
In addition, the legitimate and regular demands of families to know the truth about what 
happened to their loved ones, achieve justice for them, bring about acknowledgment of 
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1; see also the report of Iraqueer et al., Dying to be Free: LGBT Human Rights Violations in Iraq (n 154). 
504 See para 26 (a) the UN HRC, Concluding observations on the fifth periodic report of Iraq (n 88); as large parts of areas under the 
control of ISIS have been retaken by the Iraqi security forces, the UNAMI urged the state ‘to consider what steps need to be taken to 
ensure the protection, recovery, reintegration and redress for the thousands of women and girls who have been subjected to rape and 
other forms of sexual violence including physical and psychological violence’. See UNAMI, Promotion and Protection of Rights of 
Victims of Sexual Violence (n 399), para 13.  
505 United Nations, Committee Against Torture, Concluding Observations on the Initial Report of Iraq (n 331), para 24. Also, the 
Committee has noted that although the Iraqi state asserted that its legal system provides victims with civil remedies in cases of torture 
and ill treatment, it ‘did not provide information on reparation and compensation measures ordered by the courts or other State bodies 
and actually provided to victims of torture or their families since the entry into force of the Convention in the State party’. The 
Committee stated that ‘the State party should immediately take legal and other measures to ensure that all victims of torture and ill-
treatment are identified, obtain redress and have an enforceable right to fair and adequate compensation, including the means for as 
full rehabilitation as possible’. Ibid., para 31. 
506 Al-Shaher (494); for further details about various claims for compensation which processed by the Central Committee and 




wrong, and receive a sincere apology, have always been disregarded by the state 
authorities.507  
Although some families are poor and barely earn enough to have a decent standard of 
living, they do not consider payment and privileges provided by the government to 
compensate for lack of news about the fate of their relatives or as addressing their other 
legitimate demands.508 From their perspective, the severe injustice they suffered cannot 
be satisfied by mere monetary compensation and other inadequate gestures of reparation 
granted by this law, especially with no sincere intention by the state and society at large 
to accept responsibility for wrong or adequately redress it.509 This attitude may have 
created a growing belief that compensation provided in accordance with the Law of 2009 
is insufficient to adequately address the psychological pain suffered by these families, 
and that the receipt of monetary compensation is a betrayal of their relatives.  
The brutal murders in the Speicher case and other incidents are closely linked to the ethno-
sectarian violence dominant in Iraq post-2003, caused by hatred which has likely been 
encouraged by state authorities, politicians and various militias and extremist groups.510 
This has resulted in the families of the deceased experiencing strong feelings of anger, 
neglect, insult and isolation on the part of both the state and society at large.511 The 
Speicher massacre has ‘left significant psychological scars within society, notably the 
belief that what happened is sectarian liquidation which greatly affects coexistence within 
society’.512 The psychological impact, the constant threat to peaceful coexistence and the 
breakdown of the mutual accountability of shared ideals of living in peace brought about 
by ethno-sectarian divisions remain unaddressed by society, like the psychological 
                                                
507  Salam Maki, The Government and the Rights of the Families of the Speicher Massacre, 
<http://www.newsabah.com/wp/newspaper/26323 > accessed 22 September 2016. 
508 Ibid. 
509 Ibid; it has been noted that this Law ‘is heavily focused on compensation. While compensation has many merits, it is not always 
the most appropriate form of reparations for some types of violations. For example, victims suffering from physical and mental health 
issues as a result of serious violations should have access to rehabilitation, which in turn requires access to adequate health services 
for a prolonged period of time. In such a context, paying compensation for such services would not necessarily allow victims to deal 
in the best way possible with the harm suffered. Similarly, redressing wrongs committed against entire groups might entail other 
measures in addition to compensation, such as satisfaction (including truth-recovery and memorials) and guarantees of non-repetition’. 
See Sandoval and Puttick (n 475) 23. 
510 Maki (n 507); a recent bombing attack on the Karada district, Baghdad, resulting from sectarian divisions and claimed by ISIS, 
approximately 300 civilians were killed and another 200 were injured. ‘Many of the victims were women and children who were 
inside a multi-storey shopping centre and dozens burned to death or suffocated’; ‘Many people were left angry at the government’s 
failure to protect them after the devastating bombing blaming the lack of security through checkpoints that allowed the explosives to 
make their way into neighbourhoods’. See Maryse Farag, The Price of War Heart-breaking image of a badly burned girl who survived 
an ISIS suicide attack captures the agony of Iraq, (14th July 2016) The Sun <https://www.thesun.co.uk/living/1447331/this-
heartbreaking-image-of-a-badly-burned-girl-who-survived-an-isis-suicide-bomb-attack-captures-the-agony-of-iraq-torn-by-
war/>accessed 20 September 2016.   
511 Maki (n 507).  
512  Wassim Bassim, IS Massacre Leaves Families of Victims Stunned, 28 August 2014, <http://www.al-




suffering of the families of the deceased.513 Society has largely ignored and neglected the 
psychological pain of these families, and not even expressed solidarity by participating in 
frequent protests to demand disclosure concerning the fate of relatives and the lack of 
truth and justice for them; nor has society acknowledged its part in accepting 
responsibility to help heal the deep wounds of these families.514 It seems, according to 
one commentator, that both the state authorities and society are responsible for a massive 
secondary victimisation of the victims of the Speicher massacre because they have failed 
to address their legitimate expectations of adequate remedy.515  
However, recent campaigns led by more than 55 Iraqi civil society organisations, 
lawmakers and popular media figures sought to collect a million signatures to demand 
that the state authorities reveal the truth behind the Speicher massacre.516 This may be 
considered a positive indication of the emergence of collective pressure by society on 
state authorities to change their attitude towards the Speicher and other cases. However, 
until recently, as claimed by the mother of a victim, investigations by government 
commissions to reveal the truth and fate of the victims have been fruitless.517 She claims 
that for three years relatives of victims tried to discover the fate of their loved one, even 
though they went to Tikrit and the surrounding area where the massacre took place.518 
She criticised the judicial and prosecuting authorities for not addressing the families’ 
sufferings and not passing any information about the investigation and the steps taken to 
achieve justice. In her opinion, information about the massacre had concealed, including 
the involvement of tribal leaders who had not condemned the massacre or offered to help 
find victims’ bodies.519 She also claimed that no senior officers of the Ministries of the 
Interior and Defence, nor any political figures, had been held accountable, largely because 
of political collusion to provide justice for these young victims of treachery. Despite this, 
she said that victims’ families would not be silent or forget the slaughter of their loved 
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one, but would continue to seek the truth and bring justice those involved, whether 
terrorists, leaders, politicians or tribal sheikhs.520 
Similarly, the denial of the right to truth in cases of enforced disappearance has been 
routinely ignored by the state authorities since 2003. To comprehend the distress of the 
family of a disappeared person and shed light on such large scale events, the Centre of 
Victims of Torture (CVT) conducted interviews with family members of the 
disappeared.521 These interviews revealed the exacerbated suffering of family members 
because of the kidnapping of their loved one, and the lack of action by state authorities 
and the community: 
their neighbors could hear their screams, but no one did anything to help. At this time period, they 
describe how everything changed and they couldn’t tell who was an enemy and who was a friend, 
compounding the feeling that there’s no protection and that there is no appreciation for human life. 
These feelings of helplessness, isolation and degradation from the authorities and from their own 
community can exacerbate the emotional and psychological problems related to the loss, thus 
increasing the suffering related to disappearances.522 
Because of the strength of the militias, some of the interviewers pointed out the 
powerlessness and inability of the local authorities to investigate disappearances. Other 
interviewers referred to collusion between Iraqi authorities and the perpetrating militias. 
As a result, members of families of disappeared persons still suffer and have been denied 
their right to truth.523 As noted earlier in the practice of HR bodies, such denial may 
amount to cruel, inhumane treatment or torture of the families of the disappeared.524 It 
seems that the Iraqi authorities and legal system, as noted by Iraqi HCHR, have so far 
been unwilling to address such dreadful disappearances and continued to ignore their 
positive obligation under HR norms and international law to adequately redress the 
suffering of the families of the disappeared.525  
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In an attempt to begin to address the horrific impact of violence on victims and the 
deficiencies of the compensation system and its practices, the Iraqi Council of 
Representatives recently approved the First Amendment Law (No. 57, 2015) of the Iraqi 
Compensation Law, 2009.526 This requires that the state adopt programmes providing 
care, facilities and assistance to victims of terrorist operations, including kidnapping and 
disappearances, in the various legal, economic, social, financial, health, educational and 
cultural fields.527 To achieve this, a new department should be established in the ‘Martyrs 
Institution’ which was founded mainly to take care of victims of the pre-2003 regime.528 
In addition, although the level of monetary compensation has not been increased, civilian 
victims of terrorist operations will now be provided with the same amount as state 
employees.529 Moreover, the amendment states that access by relatives to rights under 
this law, such as monetary compensation, a monthly payment, and other symbolic 
gestures, does not preclude their right other rights provided by criminal and civil liability 
or other laws.530 This means that the state must take responsibility for ensuring these 
rights, irrespective of whether or not victims may have other rights from other sources. 
Furthermore, the wives and children of those killed as a result of terrorist operations must 
be given a house, apartment or piece of residential land, irrespective of whether or not 
they already own one, and this must be expedited.531 Regrettably, this attempt to address 
the great psychological and material impact suffered by the victims of various acts of 
violence seems far from adequately understood by the Iraqi authorities, or sufficiently 
responded to. Even more, in the light of the recent economic crisis in Iraq, ‘victims of 
terror and violence complain of neglect and unfair procedures viewed as attempting to 
discourage victims from claiming compensation’532 and, thus, this already inadequate 
attempt to improve the compensation system is highly likely to fail. 
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5.4.3 Summary Remarks  
It is reasonable to conclude that the Iraqi state and its ineffective legal system, which have 
failed to observe their positive obligations to protect their citizens from acts of violence 
by non-state actors, do not subsequently provide them with a procedural remedy of justice 
when such acts have occurred. The horrendous implications of their victimisation are also 
compounded because they are left to suffer the physical, psychological and material 
consequences of the failure by the state and society to provide them with an adequate 
substantive remedy. Because of the involvement of various political parties, government 
officials, militias, terrorists and extremist groups largely motivated by sectarian-ethnic 
differences in the commission of acts of violence in Iraq, victims are unable to rely on 
their ineffective criminal and civil liabilities and judicial systems to act against the 
perpetrators of these acts. Perpetrators largely enjoy impunity due to sectarian and ethnic 
governmental protection, so that even should they be apprehended and brought to trial, 
there is no guarantee that true justice would be done and victims compensated.  
Victims may also fear revenge if they make complaints against perpetrators and may 
suffer stress arising from long and complex judicial procedures and from the uncertainty 
of the outcome. In addition, some victims cannot afford the judicial route. To respond to 
the sheer scale of victimisation in Iraq, the state has attempted to bear the responsibility 
of providing redress to the families of the deceased by adopting a compensation system. 
HR norms and philosophical and ethical principles place a positive obligation on the Iraqi 
state to provide adequate reparation measures as a remedy for all victims of acts of 
violence, whatever their nature, specifically, in respect of the violation of the right to life. 
However, the compensation system adopted by the state, and, in particular, the 
Compensation Law No. 20, 2009, seems to have utterly failed to meet such an obligation. 
As noted above, although this law established legal rights to redress for victims, it has 
largely limited its scope to mere meagre monetary compensation and other inadequate 
gestures for certain groups of victims of terrorism. In addition, practices show that victims’ 
claims for compensation under this law have been seriously impeded by bureaucratic 
procedures, as well as the negligence and corruption of state authorities. Victims have 
also been denied the possibility of availing themselves of the mechanism existing at 
international level to bring complaints against the state authorities before various HR 
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bodies, such as HRC, about the inadequacy of this law and other measures in the criminal 
and civil liability system to provide adequate redress for the damages and suffering 
endured, since these authorities have not, until now, ratified the Optional Protocols of 
various treaties to which Iraq is a party.  
To heal, to some extent, the great injustice and humiliation suffered by Iraqi victims and 
their families since 2003 and address the serious implications of such widespread acts of 
violence and victimisation, the Iraqi state must adopt a genuine and inclusive transitional 
justice programme in which accountability, truth recovery, reparations, legislative and 
institutional reform and reconciliation will be vital for any future stability and peaceful 
coexistence. This should include, in the first place, as noted in Chapter 4,533 symbolic 
reparation measures to provide satisfaction by revealing the truth about the circumstances 
of these violent actions, the perpetrators of them, and the fate of so many victims, 
especially those who suffered enforced disappearance. Further steps would involve 
repairing the psychological and physical damage done to the victims and their families, 
official acknowledgment and condemnation of the wrong done, apologising for the 
atrocities and crimes committed against them, and the commemoration of the victims. 
This commemoration should honour the victims and their families and remind future 
generations of the atrocities in the hope that similar crimes will not be repeated. Moreover, 
monetary compensation should be provided to families of deceased victims for the 
objective aspect of the damage of death (loss of life) and the material and moral damage 
resulting from it.  
It is equally important that these measures of symbolic and material reparations should 
not be limited merely to redress for past and current atrocities. Rather, a strong message 
should be sent out to victims, wrongdoers and society as a whole acknowledging the 
reality of such atrocities and the need to heal them, paving the way to restoring confidence, 
trust and hope, which have been seriously damaged not only by these atrocities, but also 
by the wilful indifference of corrupt and ethno-sectarian authorities. In this context, there 
is a need to tackle the roots of the current violence and the vulnerability of victims by 
genuinely engaging in serious discussions to address the shortcoming and flaws of the 
2003-transtion and its implications, in the hope of conducting institutional reforms and 
the re-establishment of the rule of law. Trust in the Iraqi state and between communities 
                                                




themselves needs to be restored; ethno-sectarian divisions need to be bridged; religious 
and sectarian extremism should be curbed; official corruption and impunity needs 
eradication; and moral relations guaranteeing the peaceful co-existence in society of each 
citizen, whatever his/her religious, ethnic or sectarian background, should be repaired. It 
is argued that national identity and citizenship need to be strengthened to ensure that every 
citizen possesses equal HR. Thus, clear, respectful and secular norms of accountability 
must be restored to overcome the political, social, ethnic and sectarian divisions created 
by the state authorities and exacerbated by illegitimate militias, and criminal and terrorist 
groups. Lessons also need to be learned from past and current violence and it must be 
ensured that such violence will not be repeated in future. This may be considered crucial 
for any future shared norms of moral, civil and political accountability in the interaction 
between Iraqi citizens. However, the question of how some of the above can be achieved, 
in practice, and in particular how the state and society can reconcile the violence and 
victimisation, is complex and multidimensional. The future prospects and difficulties of 
establishing inclusive transitional justice processes will be discussed in the next chapter 
as a part of the conclusions overview. 
As will be discussed further in Chapter 6, one method –but not in isolation –of seeking 
incrementally to address the failings of the Iraqi state would be for Iraqi citizens 
themselves to take ‘substantive steps’ to ‘establish a healthy civil society reflecting social 
contract principles’. Such steps, it will be argued, can and should be taken with the 
support of governmental bodies, and other authorities. This will obviously be a very 
lengthy task but at present the security situation is gradually improving, especially as 
territory held by ISIS steadily diminishes. There are indications in this chapter, as 
discussed, which support the notion that the Iraqi government in the post-ISIS situation 
may gradually accept the positive obligations in question, while awareness of these may 
gradually have an impact on citizens’ expectations of government. Thus, a degree of 
implementation of such obligations may gradually have an impact in building trust and 
improving relations between citizens and government. It will therefore be argued that the 
application of positive obligations to protect the right to life will not simply introduce 
another raft of unfulfilled norms into the legal order. This theme will also form a central 




Chapter 6: Overall Conclusions  
This thesis examined the status of the HR of victims, and was prompted by the continuous 
and widespread indiscriminate violence perpetrated by non-state actors in Iraq, especially 
following the controversial occupation in 2003 by the United States and its allies. 
However, it was also inspired by the recent and ongoing atrocities by ISIS, which have 
caused so much injury and death. It has specifically addressed how far the Iraqi state and 
its legislation have met the legitimate expectations of its citizens; in other words, it has 
been argued that the state should protect HR, especially the right to life of citizens, in 
theory and practice, against violence by non-state actors. Furthermore, it has been argued 
that the state should, as an aspect of satisfying the demands of that right, investigate the 
crimes, prosecute and punish offenders, and make reparation to victims. To this end, the 
thesis has examined the state’s positive obligations in accordance with philosophical, 
ethical, international and regional HR principles, and cases of the violation of HR brought 
before various HR bodies, in particular the HRC, ECtHR and IACtHR. It argued, 1 
however, that identifying such positive obligations does not imply that their acceptance 
in Iraq is likely to be anything other than partial and incremental. 
These ethical principles, and in particular social contract theory, have underpinned 
contemporary discussion about the right to security and the legal framework required for 
the state to adequately protect its citizens’ right to life. It is by mutual agreement that 
individuals form a state, to whose authority they submit themselves, and to which they 
delegate many of their rights; in return, the state accepts a monopoly of force intended to 
protect both them and their rights. To be valid, this contract must entail free consent, 
reciprocity, and moral obligation. Social contract theory embedded in the cultural norms 
of a state is essential to the establishment of the legitimate rights of individuals to security, 
justice, and compensation. It follows that any moral negligence, unwillingness, or 
culpable failure to ensure these rights is a breach by the state of its social contract with 
its citizens, as is any unjust or excessive coercion by the state itself against them. In such 
circumstances, in principle, citizens should have the right to hold the state to account and, 
if necessary, even replace the government.  
                                                




Although social contract theory is open to criticism (see Chapter 2), 2  it does have 
compensatory strengths. It provides a firm criterion on which to decide what ought to be 
done to move from the absence of the rule of law towards an adequate judicial system 
which upholds the rule of law to maintain stability and peace. General acceptance of the 
validity of social contract theory, along with the concepts of fragility, political settlement, 
and legitimacy, often appears to be able to play a role.3 This is especially so in the case 
of Iraq, which has experienced serious conflict between various ethnic, religious, and 
sectarian groups. In such a fragile state, where political policy is disordered and 
legitimacy is weak, public authorities cannot fulfil basic public duties, including the 
protection of their citizens and, hence, state and society cease to be bound by their mutual 
obligations. 4  Conflict can arise and public authorities may lose their monopoly on 
legitimate violence if the state and society cannot renegotiate their social contract, and so 
it is the lack of acceptance of a social contract which underpins this fragility.5 In addition, 
‘an inclusive political settlement is one where the social contract is robust and legitimate’ 
and, thus, such a settlement may include the social contract in the ‘participatory 
constitution-making, transitional justice, and affirmative action measures to redress past 
patterns of social exclusion and inequality, thereby to promote social cohesion’. 6 
Accordingly, the social contract’s aims are arguably compatible with some objectives of 
transitional justice. In other words, the two theories are not mutually exclusive. 
However, where a state lacks a legitimate social contract because of flaws in its 
constitution, as in Iraq, it is nevertheless possible to discern some tentative signs,7 of 
acceptance that it is obliged to obey basic ethical principles. In general, states enforce law 
and order in society by prohibiting and preventing citizens from resorting to violence 
rather than to the law in their relationships, to protect against the violation of their right 
to life by punishing anyone who has violated it. Instead, the state shoulders these duties 
by enshrining norms of mutual accountability in its criminal justice system, which are to 
be respected by its citizens. This reciprocity means the state has a moral responsibility to 
fulfil its own duties adequately and provide compensation if it fails to do so. Therefore, 
the rights of individuals to have their right to life protected, have perpetrators brought to 
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justice if this right is violated, and be compensated, are fundamental requirements of 
social contract theory and ethical principles; all criminal justice systems, it is argued, 
should conform to them. This ideal has not been upheld in Iraq, but there are signs post-
ISIS that it is gradually moving.  
Recent developments in international and regional HR conventions, particularly under 
the jurisdiction of the HRC, ECtHR and IACtHR, demonstrate that states have a positive 
obligation to take, with due diligence, preventive measures to protect its citizens’ HR, 
especially the right to life, from its own illegal actions, and it should also protect them 
from infringement by others. In addition, effective procedures and substantive measures 
of remedy must be established to investigate, prosecute and punish those responsible for 
breaching the right to life; adequate reparation also needs to be provided by the state and 
its criminal justice system if an individual’s right to life has been violated under the 
conventions, irrespective of whether or not this violation is by state officials. To fulfil 
these positive obligations adequately, the state should employ the principle of 
effectiveness in its criminal justice system by providing legitimate law enforcement 
mechanisms to prevent criminal acts of violence against the right to life from being 
committed. Should any such acts have occurred, states must then establish and truthfully 
reveal their circumstances, and provide reasons for its failure to prevent them. They must 
also punish perpetrators and provide adequate reparation, both symbolic and monetary. 
The key to compliance with these obligations, as established by various cases brought 
before the HRC, ECtHR and IACtHR, lies in the existence of robust domestic institutions, 
namely, a responsible executive, an independent legislature, an impartial and effective 
prosecution system, and a healthy civil society.   
Iraq is a member of various conventions such as the ICCPR, and its criminal justice 
system is under the jurisdiction of the HRC and other bodies; it is thus required to obey 
customary international law, including due diligence. This has reached so high a level of 
international acceptance, at least in domestic violence cases, that it is acknowledged by 
various HR bodies such as the ECtHR and the IACtHR. Therefore, Iraq has a positive 
obligation to protect its citizens’ right to life from widespread, indiscriminate acts of 
violence and provide procedural and substantive remedies when this right is violated. As 
noted above, since 2003, serious attempts have been made by various international and 
domestic legal and judicial experts and organisations to help Iraq reform its criminal 




administrators of these systems, establish the rule of law, and ensure the HR of Iraqi 
citizens. Stringent positive and negative obligations required by HR norms have been set, 
especially the protection of the right to life, and provision of justice and reparation, at the 
core of the Iraqi Constitution,8 to establish an effective mechanism to enforce them in 
practice. In addition, the creation of common ground and a healthy civic atmosphere has 
attempted to establish a peaceful, political democratic situation, in which whoever 
exercises authority is subject to the rule of law, and those who negligently or intentionally 
fail to uphold the interests and HR of Iraqis must be accountable. It is hoped that this will 
prevent the atrocities of the pre-2003 regime being repeated, and that their HR are 
respected and ensured in future. In practice, however, these attempts have largely been in 
vain. Nevertheless, post-ISIS there are gradual signs that Iraq may is beginning to 
implement a positive obligation, as recognised by the ICCPR, to protect the right to life 
of citizens even against non-state actors.  
6.1 What Has Gone Wrong in Iraq and Who Should be Blamed?  
It is important to understand the problems in the Iraqi state and blame those responsible 
for seriously undermining the establishment of functional state departments based on the 
rule of law, effective criminal justice, and the judicial systems capable of ensuring the 
rights of victims. This is crucial to the restoration of trust and the hope for better 
recognition of these rights, and the adoption of shared norms of mutual accountability so 
severely damaged by acts of violence. The existence of indiscriminate violence and the 
suffering of Iraqi citizens since 2003, and even the atrocities and prolonged instability of 
the state before this, has been attributed to the improvised and artificial manner in which 
Iraq was established by external powers.9  It is argued that this artificial creation is 
unviable and bound to suffer from violence because it was constituted without gaining 
the loyalty of the population,10 whose consent and interests were not considered. Despite 
belonging to diverse ethno-sectarian backgrounds, Iraqis were forced to live together and 
have thus continued their ‘long history of antagonism and hatred’.11  
                                                
8 See Chapter 5, pages 145-150, 211-212 and 224. 
9 See Peter W. Galbraith, The End of Iraq: How American Incompetence Created a War Without End (Simon and Schuster, 2007) 7; 
Jochen Hippler, Nation-Building by Occupation? –The Case of Iraq <http://www.jochenhippler.de/html/iraq_-_nation-
building_by_occupation.html> accessed 16 October 2017; see also Leslie H. Gelb, The Three-State Solution, 25 Nov, 2003, The New 
York Times <http://www.nytimes.com/2003/11/25/opinion/the-three-state-solution.html> accessed 16 October 2017; Al-Ali (n 5) Ch. 
1, 243-244; Dodge (n 12) Ch. 1, 9. 
10 Gelb (n 9); Dodge (n 12) Ch. 1. These commentators argue in favour of ‘a radical model of decentralization or for splitting the 
country into three separate Entities’. Bouillon (n 14) Ch. 1, 283.  
11 Al-Ali (n 5) Ch. 1, 243-244; see also Fadel Abbas Mahmoudawi, ‘The Role of Peaceful Coexistence in achieving National Unity’ 
(2016) The International and Political Journal 83, 83-84; Mona Hamdi Hikmat, ‘The concept of Peaceful Coexistence and its 




However, this argument has been deemed ‘facile’ because it does not accord with the 
facts, and nor does it address real problems in Iraq, since it diverts attention to disputed 
conceptions about ancient history.12 According to academic studies, even before the 
establishment of Iraq, most local populations within its territories ‘were aware of 
belonging to a single cultural and political entity’.13 In addition, despite the way Iraq was 
created, ‘the problem was not that the concept and entity of the state remained alien to 
Iraqi society, or that a common Iraqi identity did not exist or grow’.14 There were also 
few recorded incidents of sectarian violence,15 and, even so, the current violence in Iraq 
cannot be attributed solely to Iraq being an artificial construct.16 Indeed, many states in 
similar circumstances as Iraq are stable despite their citizens being of diverse cultural, 
ethnic, and religious backgrounds,17 and some have even more severe divisions than Iraq 
but have overcome them in the interests of peace and development.18 For example, South 
Africa has become a successful democracy, establishing clear and strict rules of 
government and benefitting from sound leadership.19 The only way that the Iraqi state’s 
establishment is relevant is how ‘it affects Iraqis’ current sense of belonging’ and, thus, 
there is ‘nothing to prevent the inhabitants of the country from living together 
peacefully’,20 if they have the will.   
Consequently, the causes of the current serious problems facing Iraq lie elsewhere, 
particularly in the lack of well-functioning criminal justice and judicial systems 
independent of the executive, which can effectively uphold the rights of victims and call 
to account anyone who breaches the shared norms of living in peace, irrespective of their 
religious, cultural, or ethno-sectarian backgrounds. It has been suggested that a serious 
analysis should examine how the state has been governed since 2003.21 Dodge suggested 
that rather than laying blame on the manner in which Iraq was created, and the power of 
pre-state religious identities, we should focus on how Iraq has been weakened since 2003, 
and how it might be reformed in the future.22 However, in laying blame, we should also 
consider other factors, including ‘greed, incompetence, corruption, personal ambitions, 
                                                
12 Al-Ali (n 5) Ch. 1; Hikmat (n 11). 
13 Al-Ali (n 5) Ch. 1; see also Kamal A. Hassan, ‘Peaceful Coexistence in Iraq Approaches & Guarantees’ (2014) 3 Journal of College 
of Law for Legal and Political Sciences 357, 368-371. 
14 Bouillon (n 14) Ch. 1, 283; Hikmat (n 11) 339-340.  
15 Haddad (n 60) Ch. 5, 118. 
16 Hikmat (n 11) 339-340; Al-Bayan Center for Planning and Studies (n 43) Ch. 5, 37. 
17 Al-Bayan Center for Planning and Studies (n 43) Ch. 5, 34-36. 
18 Ibid. 
19 Ibid. 
20 Al-Ali (n 5) Ch. 1, 244. 
21 Ibid.; Hikmat (n 11) 344-346; Mansour (n 267) Ch. 5, 4-8. 




[and] foreign interference’ as ‘sectarian divisions have not in themselves been an 
impediment to progress; rather they have been deliberately politicised [in an attempt] to 
divert […] attention from […] performance in the government’.23 However, while it must 
be acknowledged that political competition between Shiites and Sunnis in Iraq is over the 
right to rule rather religion, the above suggestion ignores how religion can be embraced 
as a primary mark of identity, leading to increased divisions and violence, ‘even when the 
actual conflict [between them] has little or nothing to do with issues of faith’. 24 
Nevertheless, Haddad suggested that the inability of Iraqi regimes to establish a state 
which embraces both Sunnis and Shias is based on the state’s ‘narrative’ and not ‘the 
basics of sectarian relations’. That is, it is the former and not the latter which ‘prevent[s] 
state nationalism from incorporating both sectarian nationalisms’.25   
Moreover, three demographically wide-ranging surveys of national public opinion 
between 2013 and 2015, found that, while ethnic and sectarian conflict is often thought 
to be caused by traditional group rivalries, it is, rather, bad governance which has created 
the lack of stability in Iraq. That is, the marginalised rely less on violence and their 
particular sectarian group when they feel the government is ‘responsive, accountable, and 
fair’. The survey also concluded that the growth of ISIS in Iraq was due less to 
sectarianism than problems of governance, and that while ‘the two reinforce each other, 
                                                
23 Al-Ali (n 5) Ch. 1, 244. The claim of the Iraqi government, in its report submitted to the Committee on Enforced Disappearances 
in July 2014, that the existence of violence in the country resulting, to some extent, from the activities of religious and ethnic groups 
working against the interests of the state is not ‘representative of the real situation and its legal implication’. According to the Geneva 
International Centre for Justice (GICJ), ‘In Iraq, there is no fight between ethnic or religious groups. What we find is a complex 
situation of internal conflicts due to the climate of insecurity and violence created by the government itself by its practice of allowing 
injustices and committing human rights violations. This internal situation is becoming particularly worrying because of the 
participation of the militias’. Geneva International Centre for Justice (GICJ) (n 189) Ch. 5, 15-16. 
24 See Steele (n 56) Ch. 5, 5. 
25 Haddad (n 59) Ch. 5, 49; Fanar Haddad, in his doctorate thesis on sectarianism, claims that sectarian affiliations should be considered 
as group identities rather than political or religious factions. ‘Sectarian identity has often been viewed by Iraqis as a problem in and 
of itself. That the subject has been regarded as taboo for most of modern Iraqi history has prevented an open debate on the subject 
hence its polarised characterisation. Those who subscribe to membership of a sect or a faith will have to engage in acts of physical 
and verbal enunciations that validate and assert that identity – in the religious context this may arise out of divinely ordained 
obligations. This makes the desire of successive Iraqi regimes to ignore the sectarian divide especially problematic as these are 
identities that are difficult to conceal. Without an acceptance of their existence and without accepting and allowing for the assertion 
of these identities (in ritual for example) sectarian antagonism becomes all but inevitable. What is required is recognition and 
acceptance of strong and varied sectarian identities as legitimate building blocks of Iraqi identity and nationalism’. He also asserts 
that ‘Ethnic and confessional plurality in Iraq is not, in itself, a challenge to the Iraqi nation state or Iraqi nationalism; rather, it is the 
failure of the state to transcend these divisions that has complicated what should be secondary identities. Ironically, it can be argued 
that the state’s insistence on ignoring ethnic and confessional divisions and its search for uniformity are one of the main complicating 
factors of sectarian relations in Iraq’. Haddad (n 59) Ch. 5, 39, 42, 276-281. According to Haddad, ‘when members of a community 
feel their identity is threatened, they will increasingly act in accordance with that identity’s points of reference rather than their own 
individualistic ones or wider forms of identification, such as national identity’. See Haddad (n 60) Ch. 5, 134. He asserts that “the 
extreme escalation of the sectarian tensions, turning into violence, in post-Saddam Hussein Iraq were not the inevitable result or 
conclusion of the sectarian divide Iraq have experienced since its very foundations were lain. Nor was it representative of the 
relationship between the groups, because for more than 1000 years, the “...Sunnis and Shias have, by and large, coexisted peacefully 
but without breaking down sectarian boundaries”. Rather, the sectarian tensions that in 2006-7 culminated in violence, that by many 
observers have been described as a civil war, were the outcome of socio-political developments and sectarian identities that 
increasingly were expressed and understood in opposition to the ‘other’ ”. See Ahmad Wesal Zaman, Henning Møller Christensen 
and Tobias Lund Sørensen, Iraqi Reconciliation: How the Ethno-Religious Groups Perceptions of Justice have Affected Reconciliation 




sectarianism is more often an outcome of bad politics’. The survey exemplified this by 
describing how the replacement of Prime Minister Nouri Al-Maliki in 2014, with the 
more conciliatory Shia politician Haider Al-Abadi, resulted in reduced popularity for 
insurgents among Sunnis.26 
Some analysts have argued that Iraqi citizens are to blame for the poor performance of 
their elected representatives since 2005, and the resulting serious problems. They assert 
that if the whole society cannot ‘produce a better crop of politicians, then it has only itself 
to blame’.27 However, whether or not the selection of political representatives is based on 
reasonable grounds such as competence, eligibility and integrity, if a genuine, stringent 
and effective legal and judicial system based on the rule of law had been created, it would 
have guarded against illegal, inadequate or corrupt conduct by these representatives, since 
they would have been held accountable. Nevertheless, it cannot be denied that in the 
absence of a wholesome civil society in Iraq able to assert itself sufficiently to bring about 
a trusted and legitimate political system and leadership, there is no prospect of change. 
Blaming citizens also signals to those currently in power that they can ignore and violate 
the rights of Iraqi citizens with impunity. In the absence of safeguards and a wholesome 
civil society, it is unsurprising that the principles of HR stipulated by the Iraqi 
Constitution and criminal justice system since 2003 are merely empty rhetoric, peddling 
illusions about the actual rights of Iraqi citizens.  
In Chapter 5, the study of these rights and their correlative positive obligations showed 
that complex factors have played a central role in paralysing the Iraqi state and its criminal 
justice system. These factors mainly arose from the failure of the 2003 transition, which 
was implemented as a tool of ‘revenge’ and ‘exclusion’, and resulted in a flawed 
constitution and divisive ethno-sectarian system, fuelling the political conflict and 
widespread corruption, insurgency, terrorism, armed militias and extremism. In addition, 
the criminal justice system and its implementation fail to comply with international 
standards, as the rights of victims have been ignored, despite remarkable recent 
developments by international bodies to require states to acknowledge the rights of 
victims of crime, both in theory and practice. Iraq has struggled with multiple institutional 
and legislative problems which have greatly limited its ability to respond with due 
                                                
26 K. Proctor, and B. Tesfaye, Investing in Iraq’s Peace: How Good Governance Can Diminish Support for Violent Extremism, Mercy 
Corps, December 2015, 13 
<https://www.mercycorps.org/sites/default/files/Investing%20in%20Iraqs%20Peace_Final%20Report.pdf> accessed 3 October 2017. 




diligence to the widespread acts of violence by non-state actors, including gender-based 
violence, enforced disappearance, torture, and violence by terrorists and armed militias. 
This has fostered a climate of impunity and allowed the repetition of violence.  
6.2 The Future Prospects and Difficulties of Establishing an Inclusive 
Transitional Justice Process    
Following the defeat and expulsion of ISIS from areas in west Iraq, an unprecedented 
window of opportunity has opened to enable progress towards transitional justice and 
national reconciliation. This opportunity has been enhanced by the unity that emerged 
during the fight against ISIS and has been uniquely led by the real concerns of citizens 
throughout the country.28 Although the defeat of ISIS may formally end hostilities, this 
alone is insufficient to overcome the entrenched bitterness, grievances and mutual fears 
of different communities as a result of the prolonged and violent nature of conflicts in 
Iraq. In societies transitioning from violence, war, oppression and HR violations, there 
are various mechanisms of transitional justice, including judicial proceedings, the 
prosecution of perpetrators, and reliance on truth commissions as a non-judicial means of 
establishing a record of wrongdoing and acknowledgement of violations. The reformation 
of oppressive institutions and establishment of reparations for victims have become 
‘central ingredients in the “menu” of reforms recommended by international 
organisations, donor agencies and outside experts’.29 These have seen reconciliation as a 
requirement for lasting peace in divided communities, assuming that when political 
settlement has been reached from the top-down, there is a bottom-up process to handle 
unresolved issues of the conflict and prevent the recurrence of violence. As a precondition 
for building peace and such a settlement, therefore, state institutions and communities 
need to reconcile the past.30 Achieving sustainable peace and reconciliation, and breaking 
the cycle of violence and revenge in Iraq needs to be balanced with the urgent need to 
heal the wounds of victims and communities affected by these conflicts. This can be 
                                                
28  UNDP, Support for Integrated Reconciliation Programme: Project Summary (12 March 2017) 
<http://www.iq.undp.org/content/iraq/en/home/operations/projects/democratic_governance/reconciliation.html> accessed 18 
September 2017. 
29 Martina Fischer, Transitional Justice and Reconciliation: Theory and Practice, in B. Austin, M. Fischer and H.J. Giessmann (eds.), 
Advancing Conflict Transformation: the Berghof Handbook II (Barbara Budrich Publishers, 2011) 406. 
30 Ibid. The concept of reconciliation lacks a clear definition as there are slightly different understandings about the level at which 
reconciliation should occur, what exactly needs to be done during reconciliation, and what would be considered a ‘successful’ outcome. 
Despite this variability, ‘the process of reconciliation might be defined as the act of creating or rebuilding friendship and harmony 
between rival sides after the resolution of a conflict, or transforming the relations between rival sides from hostility and resentment to 
friendly and harmonies relations, a long-term endeavour that will require former enemies to form new relations of peaceful coexistence 
based on mutual trust and acceptance, cooperation and consideration of each other’s needs’. See Nevin T. Aiken, Identity, 




achieved via accountability and redress, but will also depend on whether comprehensive 
policies and mechanisms can be established to penetrate the social fabric and ensure the 
involvement of all or most of society.31 This complicated and challenging goal requires 
the adoption of a hybrid approach through coordinated society wide efforts; this means 
the institutions, elites and policy makers as well as communities and their leaders. This 
means that neither the top-down nor bottom-up approach alone can achieve such a goal.32 
Considering that previous reconciliation attempts since 2003 failed for many reasons and 
launched only empty slogans, often targeted at specific elites, this served to weaken civic 
participation. In addition, as the relationship between reconciliation and the demand for 
accountability and transitional justice has been seriously neglected, reconciliation has not 
received the attention it requires. 33  The goals of reconciliation employing a hybrid 
approach can be defined as follows:  
1) Social learning that develops mutual trust among former enemies that replaces past feelings of 
threat, fear, suspicion or hostile perceptions.  
2) Creating a shared identity that members of all different communities can identify with. This 
does not mean existing identities are ignored or eliminated but merely the creation of a collective 
identity and sense of mutual interest that bridges the communal identities it encompasses. 
3) Changing the antagonistic societal beliefs enemies hold about one another that reinforce the 
sense of enmity. Leaving such beliefs unaddressed risks delegitimising the reconciliation process 
and perpetuating justifications for violence. 
4) Social learning that renders violence and violent action illegitimate and violence being 
perceived as “unthinkable”. The creation of a secure environment as well as legitimate means of 
resolving conflicts peacefully is vital towards this goal. 
5) Addressing structural and material sources of inequality and deprivation in regards to rights and 
resources and creating a sense of equality.34   
Achieving these goals through the adoption of an inclusive transitional justice process 
requires addressing a number of the aforementioned endemic issues, especially concerns 
about deficiencies in protection, justice, and redress in the ICJS. Some of these endemic 
issues will be considered now. 
6.2.1 Endemic Suspicion, Mistrust and the Breakdown of Relationships among 
Ethnic, Sectarian and Religious Communities  
                                                
31 See the Al-Bayan Centre for Planning and Studies (n 43) Ch. 5, 33; Steele (n 56) Ch. 5, 1-20. 
32 The Al-Bayan Centre for Planning and Studies (n 43) Ch. 5; for further details, see Zainab Mohammed Saleh, ‘Transitional Justice 
and National Reconciliation and their Mechanisms of Application in Iraqi Society’ (2014) 6 Larq Journal for Philosophy, Linguistics 
and Social 157, 157-167. 
33 UNDP, Support for Integrated Reconciliation Programme: Project Summary (n 28); Yousef Anad Zamile and Zainab Mohammed 
Saleh, ‘Transitional Justice and National Reconciliation: An Anthropological Cultural Reading’ (2016) 21 Larq Journal for 
Philosophy, Linguistics and Social 226, 239-241; therefore, strategies need to include reconciliation efforts, at national and local level 
in the social and political domains. Such efforts require three elements: healing the suffering of victims and restoring trust to rebuild 
the state and create a peaceful society; educating people with the skills necessary to achieve this; making changes in state and society 
to promote peace among the diverse groups. Those of different identities have often been in conflict and this must be addressed to 
build appropriate relationships. They need to be educated to engage in dialogue to resolve their differences and, thus, contribute to 
peaceful co-existence. Entered into with good will, it can clarify misconceptions and build trust. Steele (n 56) Ch. 5, 11-12. 




Society in Iraq has been traumatised by conflict and violence since 2003, in addition to 
that of the oppressive regime before it. To move forward, the long history of conflict, 
tension and mistrust in Iraq’s many communities must be confronted,35 but this involves 
dealing with controversial socially sensitive and divisive issues. Nevertheless, when 
accounts of those who have suffered remain untold, this can cause ‘feelings of communal 
resentment and victimisation to linger, rendering peace unsustainable in the long term. In 
addition, the opportunity to record and confront history gives victims of violence an 
opportunity to remove the stigmatisation of victimhood and have a degree of closure’.36  
Reconciliation programmes adopted in South Africa are a feasible model, and have 
already been used as a guideline for some post-2003 policies in Iraq.37 The function of 
the Truth and Reconciliation Commission of South Africa was not primarily aimed at 
dispensing punishment, but was rather to ‘correct […] imbalances, [and] restor[e…] 
broken relationships – with healing, harmony and reconciliation’.38 Significant power and 
resources were given to this Commission at government level to receive and investigate 
the accounts of victims, irrespective of gender, race, class, religion or association. As 
noted earlier, the perpetrators of crimes were encouraged by the Commission to testify in 
return for limited and proportional amnesty.39 Moreover, to determine the broad patterns 
of exclusion, HR violations and key facets of violence, public institutional hearings were 
conducted which focused on the legal, media, health, business and labour sectors.40 At 
grass roots, community and religious leaders supported these efforts to reconcile the past; 
for instance, Nelson Mandela and Archbishop Desmond Tutu ‘utilised both Christian and 
traditional African values such as ubuntu to highlight reconciliation, confession and 
forgiveness’.41  
The above model, in many respects, could be applied to the situation in Iraq. 
Reconciliation policies could be implemented in both top-down and bottom-up 
approaches. The current Iraqi Prime Minster, Haider Abadi, came to power in 2014 on a 
platform of reconciliation and the curbing of corruption and sectarian policies which were 
perceived to have led to the ISIS occupation of parts of Iraq. He received broad support 
from various sections of Iraqi society, including Iraq’s leading Shia religious leader, 
                                                
35 Saleh (n 32) 172-173; Al-Bayan Centre for Planning and Studies (n 43) Ch. 5, 34. 
36 Al-Bayan Centre for Planning and Studies (n 43) Ch. 5; see also Aiken (n 30) 195-197. 
37 Al-Bayan Centre for Planning and Studies (n 43) Ch. 5, 34-35. 
38 Aiken (n 30) 68; Hollywood (n 16) Ch. 5, 75. 
39 Aiken (n 30) 69; Al-Bayan Centre for Planning and Studies (n 43) Ch. 5, 35. 
40 Aiken (n 30) 70-71; Al-Bayan Centre for Planning and Studies (n 43) Ch. 5. 
41 Ubuntu means ‘Humaneness’; it is ‘a philosophy that envisions crime as a threat primarily to the interconnected web of relationships 




Ayatollah Ali Al-Sistani, and a cross-section of the Shia and Sunni communities.42 His 
efforts to tackle corruption and sectarianism and to strengthen the authority of the state, 
especially following the widespread demonstrations in 2015, faced significant challenges 
from the loyalists of various parliamentary political parties, who decelerated these 
reforms and even reversed them, claiming them to be unconstitutional.43 However, it may 
be said that Abadi has latterly had some success in restoring confidence in his government 
by promoting his own vision of state consolidation, because of his focus on rebuilding 
the security sector, subjecting the PMU to control, and successfully driving ISIS from 
many parts of Iraq.44 In addition, a National Reconciliation Committee was established 
in 2016 to advise the Prime Minister on reconciliation in Iraq,45 and his reconciliatory 
policy appears to be a shift in attitude from the Al-Maliki era and the military, making 
the Iraqi government more willing to implement policies of reconciliation effectively.46 
Such policies may aid the creation of a climate in which positive HR obligations will be 
more successfully accorded realisation in practice. 
This policy shift has created the acceptance that a political settlement alone is insufficient 
and, thus, it is necessary to adopt a bottom-up approach for reconciliation policies to 
succeed. Iraq’s rich tribal, ethnic and religious texture should be seen as an opportunity 
for reconciliation rather than as a challenge; community leaders can enhance the 
legitimacy of reconciliatory policies and widen the audience for them if they are able to 
adopt the idea of AlWihda Al-Wataniyya (national unity).47 It is especially important for 
the promotion of reconciliation that moderate voices and favourable attitudes of 
community leaders should prevail. For instance, Ayatollah Al-Sistani has consistently 
condemned sectarianism and galvanised cross-sectarian and cross-religious support.48 It 
is encouraging that some reconciliation initiatives have recently occurred at grass roots, 
                                                
42 Ibid. 29, 35; Proctor and Tesfaye (n 26) 26.   
43 According to Zaid Al-Ali, “all Iraqi politicians and members of parliament claim to be in favor of reform … but of course they all 
engage in corruption. They’ll all vote in favor, but when it comes to implementing the plan, they’re going to put up obstacles. And 
that’s not new, that’s something that’s been happening for the past 10 years”. Priyanka Boghani, Is Abadi’s “Good Faith” Enough to 
Reform Iraq? 13 August 2015, <http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/frontline/article/is-abadis-good-faith-enough-to-reform-iraq/> accessed 22 
September 2016; it has also been suggested that ‘Political parties do not believe in any reform, as they are part of the system of 
corruption in the state. Any backing of reforms by the parties is only a formality, while they refuse any changes or curtailment of their 
privileges for the benefit of the people’. King Faisal Centre for Research and Islamic Studies, the Civil Protest Movement in Iraq Post 
July 31, 2015: Formation Mechanisms and Future Scenarios (October 2015) 13; many criticisms have been made by Al-Ali about the 
plan of the current Iraqi Prime Minister, Abadi, to reform the Iraqi Constitution, the political process and the judicial system. Zaid Al-
Ali, ARTICLE: Premature excitement about Iraq’s new government reforms, 15 August 2015, <http://zaidalali.com/2015/08/article-
premature-excitement-about-iraqs-new-government-reforms/> accessed 22 September 2016.     
44 See Mansour (n 267) Ch. 5, 16, 23; it has been asserted that one positive sign for future Iraqi reconciliation and the establishment 
of mutual trust and cooperation across Iraq’s communities is that a group of Sunni tribes and Christian fighters have joined the 
predominantly Shia Hashd al-Shaabi (PMU) to fight ISIS. See Al-Bayan Centre for Planning and Studies (n 43) Ch. 5, 37.   
45  PAX and Impunity Watch, Iraq Alert V: Breaking the Cycle of Division: Justice for all Iraqis, (4 July 2017), 2 
<http://www.iraqicivilsociety.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/07/Iraq-Alert-PAX-and-IW-July-2017.pdf> accessed 5 October 2017. 
46 Al-Bayan Centre for Planning and Studies (n 43) 35. 
47 Ibid.  




supported by the government and civil society. For instance, after the liberation of Mosul 
in 2017, a national reconciliatory campaign called ‘Hala Bekom’ (You Are Welcome) 
was launched by young activists from different provinces of the middle and south of Iraq, 
aiming to unite young people from Mosul and Iraq’s southern and middle provinces in a 
spirit of reconciliation.49 100 young Sunni men who lived under the occupation of ISIS 
were hosted by young Shia Iraqis to reflect on their shared heritage and national identity. 
One campaign coordinator opined that it was necessary to restore the confidence of the 
young people of Mosul to refute the prevailing notion that other provinces viewed them 
with suspicion and mistrust because of ISIS’s control of their city.50 In the presence of 
Mosul residents and tribes who sacrificed their children in the battles to liberate Mosul, 
these 100 young Sunni people told of their suffering under ISIS. They also expressed their 
concerns about the poisonous and hateful sectarian thoughts propagated by ISIS against 
the Shia population, designed to lead them to believe that Shias hate Sunnis and want to 
take revenge.51 They expressed their gratitude and condolences to the families who had 
lost loved ones in the fight to liberate their city from ISIS. The proficiency of the security 
forces, especially the Counter-Terrorism Service as a model of multi-ethnic and cross-
sectarian nationalism, in the liberation of Mosul and the support and cooperation which 
they received from the population, may have helped the public regain some trust.52 This 
also sends a reassuring message to the community that they are now more willing to 
change their previous sectarian and oppressive behaviour, having learned the hard way 
about protecting citizens, irrespective of their background. Such gestures of reconciliation 
show the resilience of Iraqi society and its ability to heal rifts which terrorism, extremism 
and sectarianism have wrought.53 Continuing dialogue and humanitarian communication 
between Sunnis, Shias and other ethnic and religious groups at grass roots level, with the 
support of the Iraqi government and other institutions, enables them to express and 
acknowledge sufferings, fears, injustice, humiliation, victimisation, and other grievous 
experiences in recent years, as well as give reassurance for the future. All this is necessary 
                                                
49 See Alhurra, Hala Beekm. Mosul Taste the Generosity of the South, 27 Apr 2017, <https://www.alhurra.com/a/iraq-hala-bykum-
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50 Ibid. 
51 Ibid. 
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53 See Zaid Al-Ali, Post-ISIL Iraq: Breaking the Cycle of Violence: Failure to Prosecute Perpetrators of Extrajudicial Killings in Iraq 
could be Dangerous, 21 July 2017, Aljazeera <http://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/opinion/2017/07/post-isil-iraq-breaking-cycle-




to rebuild trust and create peaceful coexistence.54 If there is no effective mourning process 
concerning victimhood and the acceptance of loss, which ‘encompasses religious ritual 
as well as empathetic understanding, traumatized individuals and communities cannot 
prevent their understandable hurt and anger from developing into revenge and counter-
aggression’. 55  In the fragile state of Iraq post-2003, restorative justice 56  has been 
neglected. 57  To remedy this post-ISIS, promoting restorative justice programming 
alongside the rule of law will be of vital importance. For instance, by using 
interethnic/intersectarian working groups which have grown out of various training 
workshops, restorative justice programmes can be developed.58 The expression of fear 
and acceptance of loss by these working groups ‘can provide a natural starting point in 
the identification of specific justice concerns’.59 Since restorative justice also requires 
attention to the needs of all parties trying to resolve their differences and identify their 
obligations, the acknowledgment of these mutual needs and responsibility for 
wrongdoing can help disparate groups discover common and/or compatible justice 
concerns, as well as provide the impetus towards corrective measures.60  
 A comprehensive policy which integrates communities through cooperative interaction 
needs to be built upon the initial successes of forgiveness and reconciliation. Without 
efforts to integrate communities torn apart by sectarian conflict through dialogue and 
                                                
54 Moving towards reconciliation in the context of widespread violence in Iraq requires careful consideration and understanding of 
many complex factors, such as the nature of past traumas, victimisation, stereotyping, shame-oriented culture, tribal customs, and the 
values of Islamic religion, in order to break the pattern of revenge, and victimisation and transform relationships. Depending on the 
interpretation of these factors by the adversarial groups, each can play a positive or negative role in reconciliation, which includes 
mourning, the confrontation of fears, the identifying of genuine needs, the acknowledgment of responsibility, the necessity of seeking 
retributive and restorative justice, and the willingness to forgive. For instance, although past traumas make victims fear that what they 
have endured will happen again, if reconciliation is to occur, people must not be controlled by victimhood. However, it can be observed 
that in Arab culture there is an unwillingness to confront and acknowledge fears because this would appear to demonstrate weakness 
and shame. Considering that people in the midst of conflict are ‘legitimately afraid of many things: threats to personal safety, social 
transformation, economic crisis, political manipulation, and so forth. Iraqi Sunnis fear Iranian influence over Shiite political parties 
running the government as well as attacks by Shiite militias and Iraqi police. Shiites fear loss of long-awaited political power as well 
as attacks by Sunni insurgents. Kurds fear loss of autonomy and potential independence. All groups fear foreign control, indigenous 
threats to security, and the loss of dignity and honor’. For further details, see Steele (n 56) Ch. 5, 1-20. 
55 Ibid. 7-8. 
56 Restorative justice as defined by Howard Zehr is ‘a process to involve, to the extent possible, those who have a stake in a specific 
offense and to collectively identify and address harms, needs, and obligations, in order to heal and put things as right as possible.’ 
Howard Zehr. The Little Book of Restorative Justice (Good Books, 2002) 37.  
57 Although exposure and retributive justice are very important for the maintenance of a stable society, they represent only the negative 
side of justice. For a positive vision of the right relationships between all elements of society, a fully adequate understanding of these 
requires consideration of the norms and values on which they are founded. In the case of Iraq, ‘development of these norms involves 
creative interaction between ancient tribal customs, Islamic understandings of law, and Western democratic ideals. The understanding 
of justice in Iraqi society is influenced by the shame-oriented culture of the society’s tribal roots. In such cultures, the moral code is 
built around respect for, and duty toward, others rather than compliance with abstract laws. Mutual obligations become far more 
important than individual rights. Greater emphasis is placed on conformity to one’s primary group than on punishment. In Iraq today, 
however, the infractions both within and between tribes and religious communities are extremely serious, thus significantly escalating 
the punitive response and turning what, in more stable times, might have been an emphasis on restorative justice into a very intractable 
version of retributive justice, one that relies on the law of vendetta rather than law based on inalienable rights. At the same time, the 
fundamentally communal understanding of justice, especially if it were infused with a broad conception of hospitality, might provide 
a basis for reconstructing an Iraqi adaptation of restorative justice’. Steele (n 56) Ch. 5, 11-12. 






positive contact, as in Northern Ireland, negative perceptions and stereotypes cannot be 
sufficiently dispelled when inter-community relations remain ‘superficially courteous’. 
This is because, even though they are in close contact, they remain isolated. In such an 
environment, feelings of suspicion and animosity fester and are often expressed in ‘forms 
of low-intensity sectarian violence such as vandalism, fighting and property damage’.61 
Education from an early age and positive contact are considered the most effective ways 
to ensure the achievement of integration and positive cross-communal perceptions.62 Iraqi 
society may be able to rebuild trust and cooperation across its communities if policies are 
fine-tuned to its specific circumstances and applied to the national education curriculum, 
with the support of community leaders taking part in less formal and more grass roots-
oriented programmes. To provide a strong foundation for the future, such programmes 
are vital for social cohesion throughout Iraq, not merely in cities with mixed 
populations.63 
The international community can also play a positive role in promoting reconciliation 
initiatives at local and national levels in Iraq, especially in mixed areas divided by ethnic, 
sectarian and religious conflict.64  For instance, to facilitate reconciliation and social 
cohesion,  the UNDP has established a three part nationwide programme as follows: ‘a 
national mass media campaign to educate the public on the benefits and urgency of 
reconciliation; the provision of funding to civil society groups to organise local 
community gatherings to discuss local divisions and how to overcome them; and a 
national memory project designed to collect accounts of atrocities and abuses’.65 A future 
transitional justice effort could also be served by these and might become part of a 
national reconciliation agreement. For instance, the South African passage from apartheid 
to full democracy has benefited from these instruments.66  
However, in a society like Iraq, one can assume that society can only move forward and 
adequately begin the process of reconciliation necessary to the construction of a peaceful 
                                                
61 Aiken (n 30) 76-77; Al-Bayan Centre for Planning and Studies (n 43) Ch. 5, 36. 
62 Al-Bayan Centre for Planning and Studies (n 43) Ch. 5.  
63 Ibid. 
64 Reconciliation efforts have been initiated by the United States. One of the most notable successes was the brokered reconciliation 
between Shia and Sunni residents in Tikrit in Salah al-Din Province, where up to 1,700 Shia air force cadets were massacred by ISIS 
fighters. This reconciliation has been attributed to the work of the US Institute of Peace (USIP) and local NGO Sana. Coordinating 
their work with the UN and the Iraqi government, the USIP had teams of local Iraqis, experienced in conflict resolution and who had 
worked in other hot spots. In addition, the new programmes addressing the trauma suffered by Iraqis were also considered by the US 
embassy, since the extreme brutality they had suffered was considered to be a major impediment to security and stability at community 
level. For further details, see Culbertson and Robinson (n 52) 60-63.  





and stable post-conflict society if past and present atrocities are openly acknowledged 
and addressed. Ensuring accountability, justice, truth-seeking and redress for victims is 
also an important part of future successful transitional justice and reconciliation initiatives 
in Iraq. To this end, it has been suggested that the transitional justice process in Iraq needs 
to have ‘clear goals, proper planning, sufficient means, the support of strong and unbiased 
authorities, and a scrupulous assessment of the situation on the ground of the crimes 
allegedly committed and of victims’ needs’.67 Consulting the population, particularly 
those involved in and affected by the recent violence, about their needs, fears and goals, 
and by collecting and evaluating their opinions and involving them in the whole process 
of transitional justice, is the first step in giving victims and affected communities the 
opportunity to be heard; this will provide the process with greater legitimacy in achieving 
its aims.68 It is crucial that, in order to formulate legitimate and meaningful strategies for 
transitional justice, local attitudes and social reconstruction need to be carefully 
considered.69 Properly managed, these strategies would be very likely to help to avoid 
division and future resentment; also, any dissatisfaction or distrust which may arise 
among the population because of the previous failed transitional justice processes, as 
noted earlier in the case of Iraq, needs to be recognised and acknowledged.70 The failure 
of the transitional justice process post-2003 highlights the need to avoid its divisive 
approach and positively adopt the above strategies in any new process of transitional 
justice post-ISIS, to follow what Iraqis want and expect. This would also provide a sound 
foundation on which to build Iraq as a united state following years of division and 
conflict.71 
In order to realistically pursue the objectives of transitional justice, a combination of 
judicial and non-judicial mechanisms need to be considered by the Iraqi government.72 
Judicially, the investigation and prosecution of violations of HR and humanitarian law 
should be included, as a large section of the population may be calling for amnesties. In 
                                                
67 The Institute for International Law and Human Rights et al., Crossroads: The Future of Iraq’s Minorities after ISIS, (2017) 27. 
68 Ibid.; Zamile and Saleh (n 33) 241. 
69 The Institute for International Law and Human Rights et al. (n 67) 28; International Centre for Transitional Justice (ICTJ) and the 
Human Rights Centre of the University of Berkeley, Iraqi Voices: Attitudes Toward Transitional Justice and Social Reconstruction 
(n 19) Ch. 5, 7.  
70 By looking at recent examples of national consultation linked to transitional justice, the Truth and Reconciliation Commission was 
established in Nepal after the civil war (1996 to 2006); the ongoing peace process between the Colombian government and the armed 
opposition Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia; the transitional justice in Sri Lanka undertaken by the new government after 
the general election of 2015, they could provide some useful elements about the challenges of such a process. Building on these 
examples, both positive and negative, a process of transitional justice ‘is likely to yield more concrete results and engender more 
public support if it is preceded by broad consultations with affected communities’. See the Institute for International Law and Human 
Rights et al. (n 67) 28. 
71 Ibid. 29. 
72 Ibid. 30; Dylan O’Driscoll and Dave van Zoonen, The Hashd Al-Shaabi and Iraq: Subnationalism and the State, (2017) Middle East 




this way, steps could be taken towards ensuring that Iraq’s legal obligations are met while 
also meeting the needs of the people.73 This is important as the rule of law and the 
accountability of violators and justice may be undermined if soft and overly optimistic 
solutions are adopted.74 It has been noticed that international and national discussion 
about accountability in Iraq has mainly focused on ISIS crimes, neglecting abuses and 
crimes by other perpetrators.75 This neglect has been attributed to a lack of political will 
by the Iraq government.76 Considering Iraq’s recent dealings with the legacy of the 
Ba’athist regime, it is apparent that selective or victors’ justice is divisive, and counters 
efforts to bring peace and reconciliation, which could lead to further conflict.77 It has been 
suggested that any inclusive transitional justice needs to address all or most serious crimes, 
abuses and distrust, irrespective of the background of the perpetrators and victims. It 
should prioritise victims’ and affected communities’ participation in the shaping of policy 
and their voices should be heard,78 thus upholding the rights of victims to be included in 
truth-seeking, reparations, guarantees of non-repetition and other measures.79  
However, Iraqi and international strategies in focusing on reconciliation as part of 
stabilisation have so far neglected other aspects of justice. 80  It seems that between 
                                                
73 The Institute for International Law and Human Rights et al. (n 67) 29. 
74 It has been suggested that ‘Iraqis should be asked whether they trust their own judicial system enough to carry out impartial 
investigations and prosecutions of the most serious crimes. The need to survey the opinions of the Iraqi people is paramount, especially 
since any effort towards transitional justice should avoid imposing ‘special’ tribunals without first assessing their perceived legitimacy 
among the population. The opinions of Iraqi jurists and judges, regardless of their affiliation or their belonging to a particular 
community, should be surveyed to avoid past mistakes and contribute towards the legitimacy of future criminal proceedings’. Ibid. 
75 PAX and Impunity Watch (n 45) 1-3; it has been noted that ‘there is disagreement over the scope of what crimes should be addressed: 
Some states argue that only ISIS crimes should be prosecuted; legal experts respond by noting that choosing one group as perpetrators 
is problematic and in many respects not in conformity with international humanitarian and criminal law’. See the Institute for 
International Law and Human Rights et al. (n 67). 
76 PAX and Impunity Watch (n 45). To date, the prosecution and accountability initiatives in Iraq indicate the unwillingness of the 
Iraqi government to request assistance from the international community. ‘International support is further complicated by Iraqi 
enforcement of the death penalty and a reluctance to allow all sides of the conflict to be prosecuted, including for violations or crimes 
allegedly committed by government or pro-government forces. There is no real legislative framework to domestically prosecute 
violations of international humanitarian and criminal law’. The Institute for International Law and Human Rights et al. (n 67) 29. 
77 See PAX and Impunity Watch (n 45) 1; The Institute for International Law and Human Rights et al. (n 67) 28; O’Driscoll and van 
Zoonen (n 72) 35. 
78 PAX and Impunity Watch (n 45) 1-4.  
79 Ibid. It has also been suggested that ‘as Iraq seeks to close the chapter on nearly four years of destructive conflict with ISIS, it is 
vital that measures be put in place to help individuals and, by extension, Iraqi society as a whole, to recover from the atrocities that 
have taken place. While this transition will require a range of concurrent interventions, reparations should be a central part of the 
equation. Not only do reparations have intrinsic moral value, but they are enshrined in international legal obligations to which Iraq is 
party’. In addition, ‘in order to be effective, any post-conflict reparations scheme in Iraq needs to cover violations by all parties to the 
conflict. Otherwise, the process could be seen as one-sided and could risk inflaming tensions and perpetuating divisions. This issue is 
particularly challenging given the multiple and diverse armed actors that have participated in violations during the most recent phase 
of conflict. These include ISIS and other armed opposition groups, the Iraqi Security Forces, the Peshmerga, militias operating under 
the banner of the PMF, members of the US-led coalition and other foreign states [… ] It is important to note that, in order to deliver 
the maximum benefits to victims, reparations should not be implemented in isolation from other transitional justice measures. 
Reparations would be less effective if provided to victims without recognition of responsibility, full investigation of the violations 
suffered and disclosure of the truth about what happened. Properly conceived, reparations can also enhance other policy interventions, 
such as humanitarian assistance and development projects, which are particularly important in contexts of poverty and deprivation to 
ensure that victims can take full advantage of reparations. Therefore, creating dialogue between relevant stakeholders responsible for 
such interventions is crucial in Iraq to ensure that points of potential cooperation and synergy are soon identified. With careful planning, 
a jointly implemented, comprehensive transitional justice and reconstruction process would enable the recognition of victims, build 
trust in state institutions, and foster reconciliation and democratization’. Sandoval and Puttick (n 475) Ch. 5, 23, 27. 
80 Reconciliation initiatives at national and local levels, with the support of international and regional actors, have fallen short of 
including the voices of victims and affected local communities in their deliberation. For further details, see PAX and Impunity Watch 




stabilisation and justice initiatives there is little coordination or dialogue, and that 
reconciliation programmes do not include measures which address the rights of victims. 
It is understandable that there is reluctance to include justice measures in reconciliation 
plans due to the post-2003 justice policies, which were perceived by many Iraqi citizens 
as victors’ justice, creating winners and losers.81 Nevertheless, where massive crimes are 
not properly addressed and access by victims to adequate remedies or redress is neglected, 
it is argued that no reconciliation is possible in Iraq.82 In addition, a narrow approach of 
only investigating or prosecuting crimes has been adopted, often only addressing the 
abuses of one party to the conflict, namely ISIS.83 For instance, the Iraqi authorities are 
currently assembling evidence about the crimes committed by ISIS, and a recent justice 
initiative by Iraq’s Supreme Judicial Council declared that a ‘special judicial body to 
investigate the terrorist crimes committed against Yezidis’ will be established.84 Also, in 
addition to documentation and truth-seeking, some civil society actors have sought 
accountability for the crimes of ISIS against various minority groups.85 Although these 
seem to be positive signs of progress in the right direction, it is crucial to learn from the 
                                                
81 PAX and Impunity Watch (n 45) 4; O’Driscoll and van Zoonen (n 72) 35-36. 
82 PAX and Impunity Watch (n 45). 
83 Ibid. In addition, the UN Security Council resolution 2379 issued in September 2017 asked the Secretary General to establish an 
independent investigative team to support domestic prosecution of ISIS crimes in Iraq. However, ‘the resolution’s most obvious flaw 
is that it is limited in mandate to acts committed by ISIS, despite the fact that other parties to the conflict, including Iraqi and Kurdish 
forces, government-allied militias, and the US-led coalition, are all responsible for their fair share of violations. Moreover, while the 
emphasis on criminal accountability is justifiable given the severity of violations committed, it is questionable whether it is enough to 
prompt the type of reconciliation and healing desperately needed in Iraq’. See Miriam Puttick, The Illusion of Justice: When Will 
Reparations be Served to Iraq’s Victims? 9 Nov. 2017, <http://www.ipsnews.net/2017/11/illusion-justice-will-reparations-served-
iraqs-victims/> accessed 28 November 2017. It has also pointed out that the resolution ‘misses an historical opportunity for 
comprehensive justice, where all possible international crimes would be impartially assessed, setting a strong foundation for 
restorative justice. Given the crucial need to build trust among all ethnic and religious groups in Iraq, any accountability effort must 
necessarily address the grievances of all groups affected by human rights violations and atrocity crimes’. see UNHR, Office of High 
Commission, End of visit statement of the Special Rapporteur on extrajudicial, summary or arbitrary executions on her visit to Iraq, 
24 November 2017, <http://www.ohchr.org/EN/NewsEvents/Pages/DisplayNews.aspx?NewsID=22452&LangID=E> accessed 29 
November 2017. 
84  Rudo, Yezidis Cautiously welcome Iraq Court Tasked with Prosecuting ISIS, 12 June 2017 
<http://www.rudaw.net/english/middleeast/iraq/12062017> accessed 10 October; the KRG of Iraq has also established in September 
2014 a High Committee for the Identification of Genocide Crimes, which include a Commission of Investigation and Gathering 
Evidence. ‘The Commission, headed by an investigative Judge, has documented a multitude of ISIL crimes committed against all 
religious minorities, including mass-killings, disappearances, rape and enslavement, the use of child soldiers, forced displacement, 
etc. They have done so by interviewing dozens of survivors, victims and witnesses; excavating mass graves; exhuming bodies; 
undertaking sound forensic work, etc. From this they have been able to identify a range of perpetrators’. See UNHR, Office of High 
Commission, End of Visit statement. (n 83). 
85 PAX and Impunity Watch (n 45) 3. With regard to the provision of justice to the victims of the last three years conflict, two 
intersecting yet distinct mechanisms and processes have been highlighted: ‘the formal investigations into individual responsibilities 
and the trials of perpetrators (criminal justice approach), and the documentation of all crimes committed, including those amounting 
to crimes against humanity and genocide (also referred to as a Truth Commission approach). Both should be predicated on the active 
and safe participation of witnesses and victims, their recognition, and acknowledgement of the harm and suffering that they have 
endured. With regard to the former objective, no doubt investigation and prosecution of the multiple and large-scale violations of the 
last three years is a complex task. However, if these challenges are not met and accountability is limited to the crimes of ISIS and CT 
[Anti-Terrorism Law] trials, or is not ensured at all, this will result in widespread impunity. The consequences for Iraq’s future peace 
and stability will have serious adverse repercussions indeed. As highlighted by experiences with post-conflict transitional justice, ‘if 
formal institutional mechanisms are not able to deliver results at the scale cases call for, other forms of intervention can provide 
recognition to victims and promote social integration.’ An option will be to initiate a proactive documentation of violations, based on 
the safe participation of victims. The government, with the support of international actors and civil society, could take steps to establish 
a documentation/ truth-seeking process to collect testimonies and evidence. This process may or may not include the preparation of 
case files so that formal investigations could proceed at a later date, and formal accountability delivered’. See UNHR, Office of High 




mistakes of recent justice initiatives, such as the case of the Camp Speicher massacre. 
The trial for this crime of 36 alleged ISIS perpetrators sentenced to execution not only 
fell short of the international standards for a fair trial, but also failed to give the families 
of the victims adequate space or the information necessary to participate meaningfully in 
the proceedings and, thus, they did not receive an effective remedy and vindication.86 
Most of these justice-related initiatives lacked the necessary communication strategies, 
as they have paid little attention to the participation or even the consultation of victims, 
affected communities and local civil society; instead, they seem to employ standardised 
solutions which do not properly address local situations.87  
To move forward and avoid reinforcing the growing divisions within Iraqi society, past 
mistakes of transitional justice need to be avoided when creating a possible new 
transitional justice process.88  Accordingly, this process must not be perceived to be 
selective, and must address the history of HR abuses from both past and current conflict. 
The needs of victims in terms of their rights and participation in the process of achieving 
justice must also be addressed in order for wounds to heal. Finally, transitional justice 
must also be ‘Iraqi-made, led and driven.’89 
Based on this, transitional justice needs to consider how the processes of reconciliation 
can be used to complement retributive justice rather than undermine it.90 Non-judicial 
mechanisms, such as truth commissions, if employed alongside judicial ones, may make 
                                                
86 PAX and Impunity Watch (n 45) 3, 5. The UN Special Rapporteur on extrajudicial, summary or arbitrary executions, Agnes 
Callamard, has recently urged the government of Iraq to ensure that ‘the military defeat of ISIL [or ISIS] translates into a victory for 
accountability and an end to impunity’. She further states that ‘as military threats from ISIL recede, the country has now entered a 
transitional phase which is both complex and fragile, presenting the opportunity to break with the past [...] There is a risk that old 
tensions arise where these have not been mended, and that grievances that were set aside for the duration of the conflict may return’. 
While she welcomes the government’s commitment to ensure that the possible crimes against humanity be investigated in order to 
bring justice for victims, she pointed out that ‘hasty judgment and execution of ISIL members for acts of ‘terrorism’ is a disservice to 
the country’ [… ] ‘The people of Iraq, the victims and survivors of the conflict, deserve a legal framework and a judicial response that 
properly reflect the nature of the crimes committed, which are on a par with atrocity crimes investigated and tried in other parts of the 
world. Such a role cannot be performed by a counter-terrorism law’ […] ’A new Iraq requires the confidence of all communities. That 
will be achieved only if all allegations, [including illegal deprivations of life] are thoroughly investigated, victims’ voices are heard 
and perpetrators are promptly brought to justice. It also demands prompt reparations and remedies for the victims’. See UN Iraq, Iraq: 
Full justice for all sides is key to lasting peace, says UN expert after official visit, 27 November 2017,< 
http://www.uniraq.com/index.php?option=com_k2&view=item&id=7753:iraq-full-justice-for-all-sides-is-key-to-lasting-peace,-
says-un-expert-after-official-visit&Itemid=605&lang=en > accessed 29 November 2017.  
87 In Iraq, needs and fears vary from area to area, and for groups of victims and affected communities, distinctive solutions are required 
which go beyond prosecution. For instance, ‘while removing some perpetrators from areas where violations have been committed 
through convictions and imprisonment, criminal prosecutions alone cannot create the necessary conditions to ensure safe return for 
those displaced by the conflict’. See the Institute for International Law and Human Rights (IILHR) et al. (n 67) 27, 29; in addition, 
‘the prominence of prosecutions in initiatives aimed at dealing with crimes committed against Yezidis risks repeating the mistake of 
the past by neglecting to integrate the broader needs of victims and affected communities [such as] […] the excavation of mass graves 
on Mount Sinjar and identification of human remains […] or policies to deal with sexual and gender-based violence and abuse’. PAX 
and Impunity Watch (n 45) 5. 
88 PAX and Impunity Watch (n 45) 6. 
89 Ibid. 
90 IILHR et al. (n 587) 30; transitional justice post-ISIS Iraq is a recent example of the ongoing series literature debates as to which 
institutional strategies might best achieve the goals of justice and reconciliation in transitional societies, specifically the truth versus 




a significant contribution to the process of achieving accountability, as in South Africa.91 
Crimes can be uncovered by a truth commission working with a domestic court or 
international convenors, and provide the necessary transition from a chaotic, post-conflict 
situation, with, after consultation, possible helpful legal mechanisms.92 For serious crimes, 
evidence can be collected and filtered by the commission and then referred to a higher 
court. The lack of a prior agreement or willingness of each body to cooperate, as in Sierra 
Leone, makes the path of accountability more difficult to follow.93 In its filtering or 
investigative role, the truth commission must have robust standards for dealing with 
evidence, including witness testimonies and forensic evidence, to guarantee that later 
court cases are not prejudiced by poor procedures.94  
Truth commissions as a primary example of non-judicial restorative mechanisms could 
perhaps contribute to the rebuilding of society, even though there is no consensus about 
their long-term political and social implications, whether positive or negative.95 Their 
impact may be in promoting reconciliation and counteracting cultures of denial by 
providing acknowledgement of suffering and contributing to healing.96 When truth is 
revealed by public and official authorities, redress for victims, individual and social 
healing and reconciliation may be achieved. 97  Truth-seeking and truth-telling 
mechanisms are especially needed in divided communities after conflicts between ethnic 
and religious groups, as in the case of Iraq; this is because these communities, although 
living next to each other, continue to maintain their distinct identities, encouraged by 
extremists ‘eager to tie responsibility for past crimes and HR violations to their ethnic or 
religious adversaries’.98 A truth commission is considered to be a means of counteracting 
this by seeking to ‘engage and confront all of society in a painful national dialogue, with 
serious soul-searching, and an attempt to look at the ills within society that make abuses 
possible’. 99  The potential usefulness of a truth commission can go beyond this by 
                                                
91 IILHR et al. (n 67); No Peace Without Justice (NPWJ), Closing the Gap: The Role of Non-Judicial Mechanisms in Addressing 
Impunity (NPWJ, 2010); it has also asserted that an effective way to complement judicial mechanisms which address other post-
conflict justice needs, including truth, reparation and reconciliation, is to consider the path of bringing victims and offenders together 
on a voluntary basis through truth commissions. In addition, ‘local, informal tribal solutions may contribute to striking a balance 
between justice and reconciliation by offering an acceptable mechanism through which to process large numbers of alleged 
perpetrators’, such as Gacaca Tribunals in Rwanda. See O’Driscoll and van Zoonen (n 72) 36.   
92 IILHR et al. (n 67). 
93 Ibid.; No Peace Without Justice (NPWJ) (n 91) 158-161. 
94 IILHR et al. (n 67). 
95 Ibid; see also Eric Brahm, ‘Uncovering the truth: Examining Truth Commission Success and Impact’, (2007) 8 International Studies 
Perspectives 16, 17-19. 
96 Fischer (n 29) 410. 
97 Ibid. 
98 Ibid. 
99 See Neil J. Kritz, Policy Implications of Empirical Research on Transitional Justice, in Hugo van der Merwe, Victoria Baxter and 





deterring the condemnation of perpetrators, promoting democracy by strengthening the 
rule of law, and showing a commitment to HR.100  
A suitable arena for the management and potential resolution of conflicts, investigation 
of past crimes, and organisation and mobilisation of resources for the reconstruction of 
Iraq may be provided by a truth commission. It may be a desirable outcome of any 
preliminary consultation that such a commission is established to address local concerns, 
and be embraced by the Iraqi people themselves.101 The use of trials and truth commission 
hearings could improve national unity by allowing victims and perpetrators the space to 
create ‘a shared national historical narrative’.102 Relations between communities may also 
be improved by revealing the suffering which has occurred, and understanding how 
atrocities came to be committed, which in turn can help to prevent repetition. They can 
further be used to inform new legislation ‘within the framework of national reconciliation. 
Here one can think of anti-corruption measures’.103  
However, despite these potential advantages, truth commissions are not a cure-all, as 
some commissions established in post-conflict nations have not learned the lessons of 
previous commissions.104 A partnership with a vibrant civil society is one such important 
lesson,105 as is the notion that ‘[T]o be as effective as the [South African] TRC, truth 
commissions must be independent, well-resourced and endowed with subpoena power; 
must hold public hearings when necessary; and must be able to name the accused 
publicly’.106 It is crucial, therefore, that in Iraq the establishment of a truth commission is 
considered alongside the already existing National Reconciliation Committee (NRC), and 
there should be a comprehensive understanding of what their aims are and how they can 
meet the criteria mentioned above. For these bodies to make progress, their independence 
and impartiality must be ensured. They need to be well-funded and in a secure 
                                                
100 IILHR et al. (n 67) 30.  
101 Ibid.   
102 See O’Driscoll and van Zoonen (n 72) 36.   
103 Ibid. 
104 The Truth and Reconciliation Commission established by the Sun City Accord for the Democratic Republic of the Congo is an 
example of this. Its mandate is to ‘consider political, economic, and social crimes committed from 1960 until 2003 in order to establish 
truth and help bring individuals and communities to reconciliation.’ The Commission, by most accounts, was improperly established, 
proven entirely ineffective, and lacks legitimacy. See Hollywood (n 16) Ch. 5, 72-75. 
105 The Swiss Peace Foundation, in a government report entitled Dealing with the Past Foundation, explains that ‘without the active 
participation of civil society and without the resultant sense of public ownership of and investment in the process, a truth commission 
could produce a technically accurate history of the conflict and abuses, but the report might be relegated to an academic shelf […] As 
a consequence, a nation in which the institutions and organizations of civil society have been wholly decimated by civil war or by a 
long period of harsh repression will not, in general, be an appropriate candidate for a truth commission’. Ibid. 73. It is also claimed 
that a top-down approach may be appropriate if a state does not meet such criteria in order to lead the efforts of reconciliation. Kritz 
(n 99) 18; however, apart from a strong civil society, it has become clear in the light of enormous shortcomings facing truth 
commissions revealed by research that ‘there is a need for reliable alliance partners in parliaments, governments and administrations 
who are willing to engage in institutional reforms and establish the rule of law’. Fischer (n 29).  




environment without fear or intimidation. Political parties, governmental bodies and other 
segments of society must be willing to cooperate and facilitate their work. In order to gain 
trust and have legitimacy for Iraqis, their proper composition, and interaction with 
affected communities needs to be fully ensured.107 In addition, it is argued that they need 
to be focused not only on individual hearings, but also on institutional matters in order to 
call to account those institutions directly or indirectly responsible for the fragility of the 
Iraqi state and for serious HR violations.  
Given the political challenges, high ethno-sectarian divisions, mistrust, the sensitivity of 
the issues, especially any allegations of the involvement of political parties, government 
officials and bodies and pro-government militia, directly or indirectly, in the committing 
of violence in Iraq with impunity, the task of the NRC and any proposed truth commission 
can be expected to face tremendous difficulties. Nevertheless, their task may be helped 
should various ethno-sectarian communities be willing to reconcile the past, to live 
peacefully and resolve differences through dialogue not violence. In addition, it needs to 
be carefully considered whether the offer of limited and conditional amnesty by amending, 
for instance, Amnesty Law, No. 27 of 2016, with the agreement of the affected 
communities, would be in the interest of reconciliation and truth recovery. Their task may, 
also, be to receive the support of protest and civil society movements. It is encouraging 
that one study finds that investment in recent citizen-oriented governance in Iraq, such as 
civil society programmes, has begun to have a positive impact by providing an 
opportunity for civil society to improve governance and advance reconciliation.108 Civil 
society is, in gradually gaining the trust of Iraqis, becoming a growing arena for citizen 
action, and for their voices to be heard.109  Citizens’ anger over poor public service 
delivery, as evidenced in frequent demonstrations since 2015, has channelled peaceful 
pressure through civil society actors towards tackling corruption and government 
abuses.110 These persistent peaceful demonstrations are important in strengthening Prime 
Minister Abadi in the pursuance of his reform agenda and reconciliation. This study 
further recommends that encouraging dialogue between government and citizens will 
improve transparency, accountability and legitimacy, and long-term support for Iraqi civil 
society needs to be given.111 Where the NRC and any proposed truth commission are 
                                                
107 In December 2016, Prime Minister Al-Abadi decreed the establishment of a directorate to address minority issues within the 
National Reconciliation Committee. IILHR et al. (n 67) 34. 
108 For further details, see Proctor and Tesfaye (n 26) 1-7. 
109 Ibid. 
110 Ibid. 19. 




supported by government and all affected communities and civil society, they will be 
useful for addressing past violence and restoring trust and hope in new respectful shared 
norms of reciprocal relationships of accountability. This may be a key to the re-
establishment of stability, security and a peaceful, stable and healthy civil society in Iraq. 
In turn, implementation of the positive obligations discussed in this thesis would be likely 
to become a more realistic prospect in future, a point pursued below. 
6.2.2 Towards Gradual and Future Institutional Reforms 
While the numerous unresolved ills within the state since 2003 require challenging and 
long-term institutional reforms, these are essential for any future successful reconciliation 
and transition. These reforms must ensure that widespread violations of HR, especially 
the right to life, will not be repeated, and that the state and its criminal justice system will 
gradually be able to restore the collective sense of social protection. This can be done by 
fulfilling their positive obligations with due diligence, to meet the legitimate expectations 
of Iraq’s citizens as rights holders, in addition to rebuilding trust between citizens and 
their public institutions. However, as noted, one of the main concerns with the Iraqi 
Constitution of 2005 is that it contains flaws and ethno-sectarian discourse which has 
helped reinforce political strife and differences within Iraqi society,112 and damaged the 
peaceful secular norms which marked the early period of Iraq.113 With recent positive 
developments and reconciliation initiatives, there is an opportunity to provide stability, 
unify the country, and improve legitimacy by strengthening state-society relations, 
                                                
112 The relationship between the scope of Islamic religious provisions and a democratic political system embodying equal individual 
HR and the rule of law is a serious concern; Article 2, Section 1 of the Iraqi Constitution states that ‘Islam is the official religion of 
the State and is a foundation source of legislation’ and that ‘[n]o law may be enacted that contradicts the established provisions of 
Islam’. ‘While Iraq is not unique in its incorporation of some form of Islamic law [a law that is either embodied in or derived from 
Islam’s foundational legal sources] into its legal system, the precise scope and effect of this restriction on legislation in Iraq remains 
[…] unclear’, long after the adoption of the Iraqi Constitution of 2005. Many articles in the Iraqi Constitution, including Article 2, 
Section 2, 14, 41 and 43 recognise the rights of Iraqis, especially minority groups, to freedom of religious belief; their equality ‘before 
the law, without discrimination based on religion’; freedom of their ‘personal status according to their religions, sects, beliefs, or 
choices’ and freedom to practise them. However, the requirement that provisions of Islamic law should be established ‘makes the 
protection of the rights of religious minorities [under these Articles] even more difficult’ to protect. For further details about the 
problematic nature of the principles embodied in the Iraqi Constitution, see David Pimentel and Brian Anderson, ‘Judicial 
Independence in Post Conflict Iraq: Establishing the Rule of Law in an Islamic Constitutional Democracy’ (2013) 46 The George 
Washington International Law Review 29, 34-39; the positive aspects in the Constitution regarding the respect and protection of 
liberties and HR of Iraqi citizens (Articles 14-46) have potentially been rendered meaningless because, in reality, with the domination 
of religious parties, institutions and personalities on the Iraqi scene since 2003, any of these liberties and HR could be undermined if 
religious institutions and figures claim that it contradicts Islamic beliefs. See Jawad (n 27) Ch. 5, 15-16; Al-Bayan Center for Planning 
and Studies (n 43) Ch. 5, 25; because of this domination, there is a seemingly deliberate decision on the part of the Constitution’s 
drafters to keep international legal obligations binding Iraq through conventions or customs to what appears a limited role in domestic 
courts and, thus, the demand to entrust the judiciary with a fair amount of independence and legitimacy and, thereby, to the possibility 
that these international obligations become a part of a domestic judicial process has ended with so unwilling a reaction. See Hamoudi 
(n 472) Ch. 5, 121.   
113 Although Iraq, since its foundation in 1921, has adopted secularist norms, intellectual and political plurality, peaceful co-existence 
of various ethnic groups and religions, it has experienced a striking increase in the role of religion in its politics. See Safwan Al-Amin, 
‘The Future of Secularism in Iraq’ (2016) Atlantic Council <http://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/menasource/the-future-of-
secularism-in-iraq> accessed 17 November 2016; Khaled Sheykholeslami and Asad Khezri, ‘Failuring of Secular Nationalism in Iraq 




motivated by the idea of citizenship rights.114 This can help re-establish clear norms of 
state secularity to rebuild a healthy civil society based solely on citizenship which values, 
respects and reassures all secondary social affiliations. It must also be remembered that 
some recent severe violations, especially against minority communities, are attributed to 
hostility towards their identities and the escalation of political violence, extremism, 
ethno-sectarian tension, and armed conflict. This has led many to flee Iraq, and it is clear 
that these refugees’ major concern is to ensure that these violations are not repeated in 
future. 115  They require immediate protection and long-term legislative guarantees, 
constitutional reforms and policy efforts to reassure them of their valued and equal place 
in Iraq.116 
In this context, Iraq’s flawed social contract in the current Constitution of 2005 needs to 
be reformed by introducing ‘a respected, coherent, and representative document’ to unite 
Iraqis behind their political and legal institutions.117 In this way, it can repair the damage 
to the moral relations and shared norms of living peaceably, and enshrine citizens’ right 
to be free from fear and physical violence by explicitly de-legitimising violent actions. It 
also emphasises that the key rationale for the existence of the state is to provide protection 
and procedural and substantive remedies should it fail in this responsibility. Although the 
fight to gradually reform the constitution unlikely to cure all Iraq’s troubles or be 
straightforward, ‘without it, the state lacks legal foundations and sovereignty, and 
changes to the country’s political structures will be fraught’.118 Therefore, a type of 
legitimacy will be granted to the constitution when its amendment ensures both the 
involvement of all or most sections of Iraqi society and the major political entities’ 
consensus and support. It will also highlight a tangible point of change towards national 
                                                
114 See Bapir (n 54) Ch. 5, 117, 118-124; O’Driscoll and van Zoonen (n 72) 8. 
115 It has been noted that ‘while there is no official data on the numerical size of minority communities that remain in Iraq, early 2017 
figures indicate that 100,000 Yezidis have already left the country, with a further estimated 100-200 people continuing to leave each 
day. Iraq’s Christian community, numbering 1.4 million people in 2003, has declined to no more than 300,000’. See IILHR et al. (n 
67) 26, 32. 
116 Ibid. 33. 
117 Mina Al-Oraibi, A Decade of Flawed Governance: Iraq’s Troubled Constitution Hinders Its Sovereignty, (15 October 2015) Yale 
Journal of International Affairs <http://yalejournal.org/op-ed_post/a-decade-of-flawed-governance-iraqs-troubled-constitution-
hinders-its-sovereignty/> accessed 9 November 2017; to ‘reconcile and satisfy, as much as possible, the divergent aspirations and 
diverse identities of Iraqis’, most, if not all, sections of Iraqi society need to agree a social contract to address the fragility of the state. 
The proposed Iraqi social contract needs to create an environment in which ‘the state’s monopoly on the legitimate use of force 
throughout its territory’ is recognised by all the different sections of Iraqi society and is committed to respect and promote the interests 
of all, especially with regard to security and justice. It should also include: ‘development of the rule of law and parliamentary 
institutions, which guarantee constitutional promises, particularly with respect to the HR provisions contained in the constitution; and 
[also] an appropriate framework for subordinating the military and militias to civilian control and authority and the establishment of 
institutions to entrench accountability’. See Bouillon (n 14) Ch. 1, 290-293. 
118 Al-Oraibi (n 117); the political practice in Iraq over the past years has not been based on any constitutional or legal framework, so 
it has not become an agreed norm. Therefore, the Iraqi political actors, especially in the context of national reconciliation, must find 
a formula for a democratic consensus. See Yahya Al Kubaisi, There is no Alternative for the Real Consensual democracy in Iraq, (20 




unity, consensus, and reconciliation in which the narrow sectarian or party interests of the 
politicians can be set aside.119 In particular, many Iraqi academics and researchers believe 
that a secular constitution will unite sects, ethnic groups and races, if religion is separated 
from the state and the state becomes the sole guarantor of the rights of citizens.120 This 
could provide a solution to outstanding problems, address the needs of a fragmented 
society, and make all citizens equal before the law regardless of their affiliations. It will, 
also, prevent the state abuse of religion for political purposes and resolve sectarian strife 
when its general legislation is independent of all sectarian blocs.121 Although the exact 
meaning of secularism is controversial among thinkers and researchers, its main feature 
is to ensure the separation of religion from politics because it maintains that the state and 
all institutions function better without religious interference.122 This does not mean, as 
some religious leaders claim, that secularism in Iraq is hostile, disrespectful or in denial 
of the role of religion. On the contrary, it respects religion and protects it from being 
exploited for selfish interests.123 Some influential religious clerics have controversially 
declared that secularism is a western philosophy incompatible with the conservative 
principles of the majority of Iraq’s Muslim society124 and, thus, some Iraqis have been 
                                                
119 An example of constitutional negotiation processes is provided by South Africa’s experience. Following the conflict in South 
Africa, the political elite took ten years to negotiate, write, and implement a new constitution. In the light of this, the Iraqi government 
must give all parties adequate time and opportunity to agree the details and avoid the mistakes of the 2005 constitution. Moreover, 
‘grassroots support for national unity and against ethno-sectarian politics [is required] to encourage politicians to keep negotiating and 
avoid brinkmanship’. See Al-Bayan Center for Planning and Studies (n 43) 42-43. However, some clauses of the current constitution 
have been interpreted by the IFSC to promote national unity, prevent the escalation of a new conflict, and curb narrow political 
ambitions. For example, its decision on the 2017 Kurdish independence referendum (based on Articles 1 and 109 of the Iraqi 
Constitution) voided the results. See the Iraqi Federal Supreme Court, Cases Nos 89, 91-93/federal/2017 on 20 Nov 2017 
<https://www.iraqfsc.iq/krarat/1/2017/89_fed_2017.pdf> accessed 2 March 2018; see UN Assistance Mission for Iraq, Statement on 
the Federal Supreme Court Decision concerning Kurdistan Referendum [EN/AR/KU], 21 Nov 2017 
<https://reliefweb.int/report/iraq/statement-federal-supreme-court-decision-concerning-kurdistan-referendum-enarku> accessed 3 
March 2018. 
120 See, for instance, Sana Kazem Kata, ‘The Future of Secularism in Iraq’ (2008) 4 WU Journal of College of Education 241, 243; 
Al-Ali (n 5) Ch. 1, 244-246; Al-Qarawee (n 28) Ch. 5, 1-3; Abdel-Qader Abu Issa, ‘Secularism and the Separation of Religion from 
Politics is an Urgent Need for the Iraqi Society’ (15 June 2015) <https://www.kitabat.com/ar/page/15/06/2015/53288/> accessed 17 
November 2016. In the opinion of an Iraqi judge, one of the worst issues with the constitution is that it has entrenched the rule of 
religion in the administration of the state. Othman Al-Mukhtar, 12 years on the Writing of the Iraqi Constitution: Who Drafted it 
Overturned Against It, 16 October 2017 <https://www.alaraby.co.uk/politics/2017/10/15/12-عاما-على-كتابة-الدستور-العراقي-من-صاغھ-انقلب
 .accessed 6 November 2017 <علیھ
121 Kata (n 120) 244. 
122 Ibid. According to Abdelwahab El-Affendi, ‘secularism recommends itself by claiming to offer something for everyone: freedom 
for religion and freedom from religion. As a doctrine advocating the “containment” of religion outside the realm of public policy, it 
seeks to protect religion from coercive state interference, while preventing the state from enforcing a divisive religious view’. 
Religious sectarian divisions lead to violence and short term gains. Fundamentally, this demonstrates that religion and its leaders are 
in a state of crisis. Secularism also ‘has evolved largely peacefully and by consensus in the United States and many European countries. 
Often this also followed a series of violent conflicts in which the state secured a monopoly of religious authority by suppressing or 
annexing independent religious institutions (as in England)’ Abdelwahab El-Affendi, ‘Beyond Secularism: Sectarian Conflict and the 
Resilience Challenge for the African State’ (2015) Tana High-Level Forum on Security in Africa 1, 7. 
123 In Iraq, the ruling establishment in recent years has cloaked itself in pseudo-Islamic religious principles to give itself a sacred 
character, allowing its policy of threats to be beyond criticism, accountability, and change. Such religious overemphasis has 
strengthened the militant sectarian groups and weakened the legitimate authority of the state, escalated violence, and prevented the 
establishment of independent institutions devoted to the rule of law. If it adopted secular norms, clerical religious authorities would 
not be able to assert themselves as a dominant factor in political affairs and judge the legitimacy or illegitimacy of its political decisions. 
Kata (n 120); if the first task of the constitution in the modern state is to establish the rule of law through the state institutions, the 
Iraqi constitution has neutralised this authority in favour of the ruling Islamic parties. Yahya Al Kubaisi, Towards Building the 
Authority of Al-Faqih, (9 November 2017) <http://www.alquds.co.uk/?p=823190> accessed 10 November 2017.  




hostile to a secular re-building of the state and its political system. Therefore, these 
misconceptions must be addressed to balance the power of religious parties, or religion 
and sectarianism will remain entrenched in traditionally secular state institutions like the 
security forces and the educational system. On this basis, political and societal conflict 
will remain in society on the basis of religious alignment. Indeed, ‘given the urgent need 
for national reconciliation, the establishment of state institutions, and the curbing of terror 
attacks, secular Iraqi politicians should promote and defend secularism more aggressively 
as a potential solution.’125 
Most Iraqi citizens desire a secular form of government rather than the ethno-sectarian 
framework that has existed since 2003, as shown in 2011, when a poll revealed that they 
‘would prefer politics to be separate from religion’.126  The demonstrations made by 
citizens from all social backgrounds that emerged since 2015 could well encourage the 
secular movements in Iraq in their demands for the de-politicisation of Islam and the 
establishment of a truly reformed civil state.127 Since the defeat of ISIS, the improvement 
of the security situation, along with protest movements and the national election due in 
2018, there is an opportunity to reinforce the state by halting the cycle of failure that has 
undermined efforts to assert national cohesion and win citizens’ confidence in 
government institutions since 2003.128  It appears likely that ethno-sectarian political 
leaders are less able to rally or unify their constituents principally on identity politics in 
this round of state reinforcement.129 This cautious optimistic development may stem from 
the tendency for protest movements, which offers a potential new platform to influence 
the formation of a government and, thereby, the process of enhancing the state.130 It 
suggests that ‘many Iraqis are no longer bound by the identity politics that underpinned 
the legitimacy of the post-2003 elite’ and that the demonstrators are ‘now unwilling to 
allow their leaders to hide behind identity politics – or related arguments based on the 
need for security or stability – in order to ensure their own position’.131 Although Iraqis 
are now more willing to support state institutions since the state, under the leadership of 
                                                
125 Ibid. 
126 The majority of citizens also ‘consistently pronounces itself in favour of democracy, equality, the peaceful transfer of power, 
governmental accountability and equity’. Al-Ali (n 5) Ch. 5, 245.   
127 Al-Amin (n 113). 
128 See Mansour (n 267) Ch. 5, 2; a survey conducted across Iraq by the National Democratic Institute (NDI) in 2017 reveals some of 
these positive aspects at some levels, including security, Sunni/Shia relations, Abadi policies and sectarianism. See National 
Democratic Institute, ‘Improved Security Provides Opening for Cooperation in Iraq: March to April 2017 Survey Findings’ (7 June 
2017) <https://www.ndi.org/publications/improved-security-provides-opening-cooperation-iraq-march-april-2017-survey-findings> 
accessed 15 November 2017. 






Abadi, seems to be strengthening these institutions in a positive way, they have also 
expressed their concern that the root causes of the rise of ISIS have not been adequately 
addressed.132 Therefore, they stress the need to defeat and prevent ISIS from returning, 
and counter corruption by proper state-building and improved governance. Security and 
corruption are intertwined and so the leaders of the future must be accountable for 
national security and service provision, in a way which avoids corruption. 133  The 
corruption of government officials, legal authorities and the courts, as noted above, is one 
reason for the impaired establishment of the rule of law, the ineffective fulfilment of HR, 
and the incapability of the ICJS to meet its binding obligations under international law,134 
especially with regard to positive obligations. In addition, considering that grievances 
surrounding corruption and deprivation have been used by various sectarian insurgent and 
terrorist groups, especially ISIS, to gain grassroots support, it is apparent that endemic 
corruption, lack of stable services, and reliable infrastructure can reawaken violence. This 
indicates that ‘preventing corruption, [and] providing development, reconstruction and 
opportunities are not only significant on their own; they are also significant towards a 
sustainable process of reconciliation and stability’.135 Prime Minister Abadi has recently 
vowed to fight corruption and corrupt officials, and called on citizens, especially young 
people and civil society organisations and activists, to cooperate and support the 
government by detecting corruption and providing accurate information about it.136 This 
movement towards long-term stability, unity and the reinforcement of state authority also 
requires dealing with the challenges surrounding Al-Hashd Al Shaabi (PMU),137 perhaps 
                                                
132 Ibid. 14. 
133 Ibid. Corruption was perceived by many Iraqis in a survey by the NDI as a greater driver of the emergence of ISIS than sectarian 
tension. National Democratic Institute (n 128); see also Nussaibah Younis and Sali Mahdy, The Next War in Iraq Needs to be on 
Corruption, (16 December 2016) War on the Rocks <https://warontherocks.com/2016/12/the-next-war-in-iraq-needs-to-be-on-
corruption/> accessed 16 November 2017.    
134 See also Almusawi (n 17) Ch. 5, 276-277. 
135 Al-Bayan Center for Planning and Studies (n 43) Ch. 5, 39-41; see Report of the Task Force on the Future of Iraq Achieving Long-
Term Stability to Ensure the Defeat of ISIS, May 2017, Atlantic Council, 7-13 
<http://www.atlanticcouncil.org/images/publications/Future_of_Iraq_Task_Force_0531_web.pdf>  accessed 6 March 2018. To move 
towards sustainable reconciliation and stability, Iraq also needs to address the impacts of the de-Ba’athication policies which have 
caused continued resentment among much of the Sunni population, and provided the rallying call for a number of insurgent groups. 
‘While the demands of total reversal of de-Ba’athication cannot be realistically fulfilled, it does highlight a need for a new, 
comprehensive policy regarding de-Ba’athication so that this particular chapter of Iraq’s history can be closed’. The South African 
model, in particular the TRC, is recommended for Iraq to comprehensively address de-Ba’athification. Al-Bayan Center for Planning 
and Studies (n 43) Ch. 5, 37-39; it has been suggested further that ‘controversial practice of de-Ba’athification should be reversed and 
de-politicized and left to the judicial authorities’. Also, the current Iraqi laws and regulations regarding the controversial counter-
terrorism need to be ‘eliminated or amended to exclude its future abuse’. See Ali (n 398) Ch. 5.  
136  See Iraqi Dinar, Abadi declares war on the corrupt and threatens them with {surprises}, 22 November 2017, 
<http://iraqidinarchat.net/?p=50881> accessed 23 November 2017; Osama Mahdi, Abadi: We ended a military call and we will 
celebrate the day of his defeat soon, 21 November 2017, <https://search4dinar.wordpress.com/2017/11/21/abadi-we-ended-a-military-
call-and-we-will-celebrate-the-day-of-his-defeat-soon-dr-osama-mahdi/> accessed 23 November 2017.   
137 The PMU is considered one of the divisive issues among Iraqi society. ‘For many Iraqis, particularly Shia Muslims (but other 
groups as well), the PMF is a set of religiously sanctioned paramilitaries –some refer to it as al-Hashd al-muqadis (the Sacred 
Mobilisation Units). As one fighter from the city of Amarah stated, ‘You can criticize any politician or even religious cleric, but you 
cannot speak against the Hashd and its martyrs.’ To many, they have defended their country with their lives. Iraqi society is now full 




by integrating them into the Iraqi Security Forces. Having one army, police force and 
border patrol with a single command structure, beholden to civil oversight, would not 
only be essential to improved security, it would also be ‘an important symbol in aiding 
national reconciliation and promoting cooperation between different communities’.138  
Supporters of this solution would be assured that Sunni and Shia were working within 
one official military body with allegiance only to Iraq, and this would help move away 
from ideas of sectarianism and foreign influence which could later lead to renewed 
conflict.139  Were this solution applicable, it could reassure all society that the main 
government priority is to ensure that the PMU do not threaten state authority, thus 
restoring the legitimate coercive power of the state to prevent and control illegal activities 
and defend state borders by establishing well-functioning and unified security and 
military institutions subject to the rule of law. 
6.3 Summary Remarks 
In recent years, domestic protection of HR, especially the right to life and observance of 
ethical and international HR principles, has been extremely limited for complex reasons. 
This analysis has shown that Iraq has not provided redress to the victims of non-state 
actor violence and that its positive duties under international HR instruments to protect 
its citizens from such violence have not been adequately fulfilled. It has also shown, in 
the context of a very difficult and volatile security situation, that the Iraqi government has 
not fully investigated criminal activity via mechanisms and processes in place to protect 
citizens from non-state actor violence. However, recent positive developments 
concerning the defeat of ISIS and the sound leadership of the current Prime Minister, 
together with some reconciliation and transitional initiatives, have created an 
unprecedented opportunity to address the previous endemic failure and deficiencies of 
                                                
however, the PMF is a group of problematic militias neither accountable to the state nor under the rule of law’. See Renad Mansour 
and Faleh A. Jabar, The Popular Mobilisation Forces and Iraq’s Future, (April 2017) Carnegie Middle East Center, 3-12.  
138 However, it has been said that ‘the current situation on the ground, in terms of security, reconciliation, and political will, precludes 
an aggressive, straight-forward pursuit of this objective. This necessitates an initial phase in which significant progress in these areas 
is made before incorporation of most PMF units can realistically take place’. See O’Driscoll and van Zoonen (n 72) 8, 30.  
139 See NDI, A Fragility Unity: After Military Gains, Iraqis Look to Leaders for a Better Future, Focus Group Findings, (February 
2017) 2; as Iraqi forces edge closer to declaring victory over ISIS, disarming the PMF is seen as the most difficult test for Prime 
Minister Al-Abadi. It is encouraging that one of the most important militias in Iraq indicated recently that ‘it would give any heavy 
weapons it had to the military once Islamic State was defeated’ and that ‘the heavy weapons belong to the Iraqi government, not us. 
We are not rebels or agents of chaos and we do not want to be a state within a state’. It said that ‘The PMF is under the command of 
the Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces [Prime Minister Abadi] and naturally when the war is over and victory is declared, the 
final decision will be his’. See Ahmed Aboulenein, Iraqi Militia Indicates will Hand Heavy Guns to Army after Islamic State Quashed, 
23 November 2017, <http://www.oann.com/iraqi-militia-indicates-will-hand-heavy-guns-to-army-after-islamic-state-quashed/> 






Iraqi authorities to meet the legitimate HR-based expectations of its citizens. If these 
developments combine with the institutional reforms proposed above, with the support of 
all or most sections of Iraqi society, it is argued that real prospects for gradual and 
incremental reforms in Iraq, specifically related to the subject of this thesis, are likely to 
be achievable. This would provide an important opportunity for Iraqis to learn from the 
atrocities of post-2003 and consolidate their state, creating a genuine democratic and 
accountable system of government and functional institutions strictly based on the rule of 
law, capable of tackling any activities of criminal, terrorist and militia groups. It may also 
establish an effective criminal justice system with independent courts, to prevent any 
future attempts to escalate ethno-sectarian divisions and extremism. Such a message may 
reassure all Iraqi citizens of its commitment to adequate legal, judicial, political, 
administrative and cultural means of tackling the roots of violence against their right to 
life from whichever source, and provide justice and adequate reparation should this right 
be violated. In this context, Iraq needs to take concrete steps to gradually bring its legal 
system and practice into closer conformity with HR norms. These norms, as stipulated in 
various jurisdictions of the HRC, ECtHR and IACtHR, prohibit a state from absolving 
itself from complying with them on the grounds of its own particular culture, religion, 
customs or the nature of its political and legal systems and practices.140 Regrettably, 
victims in Iraq still have no effective domestic or international mechanism by which the 
breach of these norms can be heard adequately. Repeated demands have been made by 
the HRC and other HR bodies, to the conventions of which Iraq is a party, such as the 
Committee of Enforced Disappearances, that Iraq submit itself to their jurisdiction. By 
doing so it will give the right to individuals, who allege that their rights of protection, 
justice and reparation have not been adequately addressed by their own domestic judicial 
system, to petition the HRC and other committees of HR should these demands not be 
met. 
Without a remedy for victims at the domestic level for any political and/or judicial reason, 
the need for an international one has proven ‘increasingly significant as the only avenue 
                                                
140 When transitioning from a period of gross and systematic HR violations, in addition to various pressures which will influence 
government policies on how to respond to such violations, legal constraints also exist; that is, states are obliged under international 
HR law to bring perpetrators to justice in a fair trial, provide reparations to victims, and reveal the truth. These obligations have created 
‘a normative framework to guide governmental action, setting out “the right thing to do” in a way that cannot be ignored regardless 
of what a government’s political concerns may demand. They also apply important pressures on governments to ensure that responses 
to atrocity serve two important goals: the restoration of dignity for the victims of HR violations and the non-recurrence of those 
violations’. In this context, ‘a state cannot rely on its inability to prosecute more than a handful of accused individuals as an excuse 




towards a measure of justice and accountability’, in cases of HR violations.141 This does 
not mean, however, as Helen Duffy asserts, that international litigation fails to be a 
‘panacea’ and ‘replacement’ for effective domestic national courts; rather, ‘the objective 
of such litigation is very often, ultimately, to impel the national process’.142 Many positive 
goals can be achieved by following the path of judicial litigation at domestic and 
international levels for the litigants who seek the cessation and prevention of violations 
of their rights and, in addition, redress when such violations occur.143 One positive goal 
is ‘social, legal, political or institutional change’.144 Regarding these, it is necessary for 
victims in Iraq to access litigation before international judicial courts to effect their legal 
rights at the domestic level, because it seems that the reluctance of the state authorities to 
explicitly incorporate their positive obligations into the Iraqi legal system, as repeatedly 
required by HR bodies, and to honour these obligations in their practice, will not be 
overcome soon. This would hopefully compel the domestic courts to ensure these rights, 
establish accountability, and bring the necessary changes in law and practice. Such 
reluctance has also negatively affected the possibility of building a new tradition in which 
the scope and nature of these positive obligations and their effective interpretation and 
enforcement as stipulated in various case law of HR bodies can be considered, to entrench 
them in the Iraqi domestic legal system, both in theory and practice.  
To this end, the benefits of implementing the principles of international HR law for Iraqis 
will be significant. However, to achieve this: (1) judges need to be able to effectively 
interpret rules according to international standards, and must study the international 
jurisprudence case law of the HRC, IACtHR and the ECtHR; and (2) law enforcers need 
basic education on international standards, via the curriculum of educational institutions 
like police colleges.145  
Clearly, changing a culture in which the rights of victims are not recognised in practice 
takes time. Building a new culture of awareness, true norms and values and the adoption 
of obligations to protect citizens’ right to life and uphold the rights of victims should be 
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144 It has been suggested that ‘the practice of human rights litigation [particular in the context of counter-terrorism] has reinforced the 
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the executive when it fails to protect rights, checks the executive action or inaction, and establishes government accountability. Ibid. 
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the prime concern of any future competent Iraqi state, criminal law-makers, academic 
institutions, society, and NGOs, to address the neglected rights of Iraqi citizens 
adequately. In particular, Iraq is at present just emerging from the ISIS-related conflict, 
and, therefore, while it was engaged in that conflict, it was less able to establish sound 
criminal justice policies. As such, it is far from achieving the criminal justice standards 
reflected in many HR treaties and case law. It may well, post-2018, struggle to do so in 
any event, due to all the issues with which it will have to deal in future. Nevertheless, 
some of the positive developments mentioned above reveal small signs that eventually 
the positive obligations regarding victims may be accepted and, thus, Iraq is gradually 
moving in the direction of accepting such standards. To bring Iraq into closer conformity 
with international HR norms and enable the ICJS to meet the rights of victims, some 
tentative suggestions can be made, and among these are: 
• The inability of Iraqi victims to be considered as having equal reciprocal relations 
of accountability must be addressed because the current and previous atrocities 
committed against victims, whether under the former or post-2003 regime, may 
have seriously undermined relations. This requires the creation of a sound rule of 
law in which state authorities are accountable for acts of violence, from whatever 
source, irrespective of who is responsible, if there is evidence that these authorities 
have not taken reasonable measures with due diligence to prevent them or punish 
the perpetrators. This is essential if past atrocities against the citizens are to be 
avoided in future. In other words, citizens’ sense of protection and justice for 
victims cannot be restored unless the moral and legal duties of state are carried 
out in practice. 
• The adoption of comprehensive legal reform. This requires a well-functioning and 
effective criminal justice system based on the rule of law, which must be upgraded 
where necessary, and rigorously applied if it is to comply with the HR norms. 
These norms demand positive obligations of provision of effective protection, 
investigation into deaths and injuries, prosecution and punishment of perpetrators 
and adequate reparations for victims. This study has highlighted the need to 
address multiple institutional and legislative problems so that the criminal justice 
system can adequately respond with due diligence to acts of violence by non-state 
actors, including gender-based violence, enforced disappearance, torture, and 




Terrorism Law of 2005 and the laws and regulations regarding domestic violence, 
including the draft Law of Anti-Domestic Violence, need to be amended to 
comply with HR norms and prevent future abuses. Comprehensive legislative 
measures also need to be established to address enforced disappearance.  
• The strengthening of the rights of Iraqi victims by explicitly embedding the 
relevant principles concerning the positive obligations of the state in its 
constitution and enacting or amending the existing laws, including criminal and 
civil laws, to strictly correspond with these principles. The courts must provide 
assurance that they will honour them in any judgment of complaints by victims 
alleging that their government has failed to observe them. The constitution needs 
to indicate specifically that these principles are part of the domestic legal system 
and may be invoked directly by victims before the domestic courts, in order to 
overcome the reluctance of these courts to apply them. Compelling Iraqi judges 
to take these principles strictly into account may, hopefully, have a genuine 
positive impact on HR protection in practical terms. It would provide victims with 
a mechanism of accountability and encourage them to bring cases before the 
courts against any passive attitude, negligence or unwillingness by the state, and 
on the future development of the Iraqi legal system, in the sense of gradually 
reforming it and bringing it, both in theory and practice, into closer conformity 
with these principles.  
• If there is conflict on how far the above principles are compatible with domestic 
provisions, such as in cases of domestic violence, it is essential for any proposed 
constitutional reform to consider the latter invalid. Iraq could also draw lessons 
from other states, such as South Africa, whose constitution stipulates that ‘every 
court must prefer any reasonable interpretation of the legislation that is consistent 
with international law over any alternative interpretation that is inconsistent with 
international law’.146 Therefore, to build a culture in which the rights of potential 
and actual victims are observed, it is insufficient to incorporate the rights of 
victims and the correlative positive obligations of the state in their constitution; 
the domestic courts, including the Iraqi Federal Supreme Court, should also adopt 
an effective interpretation mechanism according to HR case law, to consider 
                                                





whether reasonable measures with due diligence have been taken by state 
authorities to ensure these rights. 
• The rights of victims, both in theory and practice, must also be acknowledged in 
the ICJS and the next of kin of the deceased must be involved in the criminal 
proceedings and treated with the respect and fairness necessary to safeguard their 
legitimate demands to discover the truth of what happened to their relative(s), and 
to ensure that all relevant procedures have been adequately addressed by the 
police, investigators, public prosecutors and judges.  
• The establishment of a genuinely independent and well-functioning judicial 
system which is capable of ensuring that violations of the right to life of 
individuals are adequately addressed, in the sense that there must be a thorough, 
impartial, forensic investigation into the facts, leading to prosecution and 
punishment of perpetrators or those who contributed to them by negligence, 
unwillingness to take action, or lack of due diligence. This requires addressing 
both the shortcomings of the Criminal Procedures Code and the practice of the 
investigative system, and combatting abuses of HR in criminal procedures and 
corruption. This is essential to prevent perpetrators from going unpunished and 
avoid any impunity by a state official, and to send a stern message to perpetrators, 
state officials and victims that such violations will not be tolerated.  
• The adoption of a comprehensive symbolic, monetary and moral reparations 
programme, as required by HR norms, to deal with the large scale unlawful 
violation of the right to life. In particular, ‘Iraq should carefully reflect on the 
merits and flaws of [its compensation system under Law 20] and use the lessons 
learned in the design of a more comprehensive scheme for victims of the conflict 
with ISIS. Such an undertaking will require significant expansion in the scope of 
the law and a reconsideration of processes in order to effectively reach all victims, 
as well as strong implementing institutions with adequate financial resources’. 
The Iraqi government, specifically, must: 
• Strengthen those institutions in the reparations process, by giving staff 
specialised training on reparations.  
• Recognise violations by all parties in the conflict and provide all eligible victims 
with reparations. 
• Develop the range of harm entitled to reparation to cover mental and sexual 




• Use multiple approaches to reparations, including restitution, rehabilitation, 
satisfaction, and compensation, as well as ensuring non-repetition. 
• Review special measures to address collective harm inflicted on communities, 
especially ethnic and religious minorities. 
• Employ simpler and more flexible evidence requirements for reparations, to 
avoid excess strain on victims. 
• Involve communities in the design and improvement of any reparations 
measures. 
• Review the creation of a single register of victims to facilitate reparations and 
reparations programmes. 
• Base reparations measures within a plan for transitional justice, including aspects 
such as judicial accountability and truth-seeking as well as reparation.147 
 
The promotion of the rights of victims also requires the Iraqi state to improve the 
performance of the HCHR and promote resort to the Iraqi Federal Supreme Court, thereby 
invoking constitutional HR to ensure the protection of certain fundamental HR, such as 
the right to life and physical integrity against any violations, and improving the conduct 
of Iraqi institutions in this regard. In addition, Iraq needs to sign the First Optional 
Protocol of the ICCPR to enable victims to make complaints to the HRC against their 
state, should its legal and judicial systems have failed to adequately address their rights. 
Similarly, Iraq must submit itself to the judgment of other legal bodies, such as the 
Committee of the Enforced Disappearances, should it fail in its positive obligations to 
respect and ensure the rights of victims.  
There is a hope that by gradually considering the above proposals and other reconciliation 
and transitional efforts post-ISIS conflict, Iraqi citizens can create the future they deserve, 
living free from threats to their right to life in a viable and competent state. The first 
priorities of such a state would be the protection of its citizens’ HR, and, should those 
rights be violated, provision of the right to have their case properly investigated, such that 
those accountable for these violations are justly tried and punished in the courts, with 
appropriate reparations.   
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